US Recession? Probably Not Yet

https://www.un.org/en/coronavirus

I tried to find a “mainstream media” article that objectively and insightfully evaluates the state of the US economy as of the end of the second quarter without success. So, I’ll take a shot at it.

First, I want to highlight that “this time, it’s different”. The US and global economies are recovering from a global pandemic situation last seen more than 100 years ago. The global economy is more integrated than ever. Viruses spread faster than ever. Businesses and governments have more information and ability to change quickly than ever before. The economic contraction was sharp, far more severe than the Great Depression or the Great Recession. The health care experts were unable to immediately evaluate the threat or recommend public policies. Nonetheless, “they persisted” and the medical, travel and economic recovery was far quicker than ANYONE expected in March, 2020 or December, 2020 or September, 2021 or January, 2022.

Second, I apologize for the required details involved to evaluate the simple question, “are we in a recession?”. Unfortunately, there is some judgment involved, as we have to evaluate three factors. Is there a clear downturn versus the trend rate? Is the downturn of significant length? Is this a widespread downturn, effecting most sectors of the economy?

Einstein said “be simple, but not too simple”.

https://wiki.c2.com/?EinsteinPrinciple

Sir Walter Scott noted the “tangled web we weave”.

https://nosweatshakespeare.com/quotes/famous/oh-what-a-tangled-web-we-weave/

The Ancient Greeks noted “many a slip twixt cup and lip”.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/There%27s_many_a_slip_%27twixt_the_cup_and_the_lip#:~:text=There%27s%20many%20a%20slip%20%27twixt%20the%20cup%20and%20the%20lips,your%20chickens%20before%20they%20hatch%22.

Cheech and Chong rambled on with ” recession, repression …”

https://www.lyricsfreak.com/c/cheech+chong/santa+clause+and+his+old+lady_20745568.html

Total Economy Level

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPC1

At the aggregate level, we clearly have a peak. Do we have an extended downturn? Not yet, based on the total. The rapid recovery from the second quarter 2020 bottom could not be sustained. A significant slow-down in the growth rate was expected. Typical annual real GDP growth in recent years has been only 2%, so the difference between “extended expansion” and “recession” is thin.

Components

Macroeconomic theory focuses on aggregate demand and aggregate supply. Real, inflation adjusted, gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of the productive output of a nation. The demand side is split into consumption, investment, government and net exports. I’ll go one level deeper, reviewing 9 components of GDP.

The business cycle is influenced by the relative sizes of the components of GDP and their relative variability from quarter to quarter and typical changes as the business cycle moves from expansion to decline to recovery.

From most to least correlated with the business cycle, with their current percentage share of GDP (sums to more than 100 because imports are a negative factor and changes in private investment can be negative), the 9 components are: Change in private inventories (1%), Residential Investment/Housing (5%), Business Investment (14%), Durable Goods Consumption (9%), Imports (16%), Non-durable Goods (food, energy) (15%), Services (45%) !!!!, Exports (8%) and Government (17%).

Overall, I see 4 sectors as “maybe” trending to a recession and 5 sectors currently at “no”. Unfortunately, the two most sensitive, Housing and Business Inventories, are in the “maybe” category, along with non-durable goods consumption and government consumption.

It is critical to look at the longer-term trends and context to evaluate short-term changes. There is significant month-to-month and quarter-to-quarter variability in the final numbers for GDP and especially for the initial estimates, like those we just saw for the second quarter of 2022. Significant revisions are made for 6 months, which is why the NBER committee which officially declares recessions is typically waiting longer to make a final call than everyone desires. Hence, I won’t usually share a long-term graph, a short-term graph, annual percentage changes and quarterly percentage changes annualized for each component. The media tends to focus on the preliminary quarterly percentage change annualized as the “gospel”. This is unwise. Let us begin to review the 9 main components.

Durable Goods (9% of GDP, 4/9 Volatile)

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEDGC96#0

Durable goods demand spiked by an incredible 20-30% during the pandemic, fueled by government transfers and fewer opportunities to consume services. Demand for durable goods has flattened at this 20% higher level, it has not declined. In my view, this sector is not signaling recession.

Non-durable Goods (15%, 6/9 Volatile)

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCENDC96

Non-durable goods consumption jumped by a real 12% during the pandemic and has essentially remained at this elevated level. We have two quarters at slightly lower consumption levels, so I rate this as “maybe” moving to a recession. Focus on the “big picture”. Both durable and non-durable goods consumption increased by historic percentages during the pandemic period and have remained at that elevated level 2 years later. It is not surprising that this demand has flattened or fallen off a bit. The surprising feature is the willingness of the American consumer to voluntarily spend much more money on “things” during the pandemic and maintain that level of spending as service opportunities returned, government transfers ended, and savings were drawn down.

Services (45%, 7/9 Volatile)

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCESC96

The very large (44% of GDP) services sector was slower to recover from the pandemic, but demand for services remains quite strong, even though the percentage growth rate is lower than during the initial recovery period.

Business Investment (14%, 3/9 Volatile)

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PNFIC1

Business investment was above trend in the two years before the pandemic and has resumed its solid level. No recession indicator here.

Housing (5%, 2/9 Volatile)

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PRFIC1

New housing investment grew by 50% between 2012 and 2016 and then remained at that level for the next 4 years before the pandemic. Long-run supply and demand factors indicate a “need” for more housing construction in the US to make up for the “missing” construction from 2008-2016. New housing construction did not decline with the pandemic, it increased by 15% in real terms! As with durable and nondurable goods consumption/production, this would not have been predicted in March, 2020 by anyone. Residential construction has levelled off 15% above 2019, equal to 2007 before the Great Recession. The increased mortgage interest rates indicate that demand will soften and this sector will decline somewhat in the second half of 2022, so this is a “maybe”. The long-term shortage of housing supply provides a floor for this sector.

Business Inventories (1%, 1/9 Volatility)

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CBIC1
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A371RX1Q020SBEA

“Supply chain issues” have restricted the accumulation of business inventories since the pandemic began. The unexpected spike in demand for durable and nondurable goods and residential construction lead to shortages. Worries about supply chain resiliency have led to higher targeted business inventory levels. Retailers have overstocked some product categories as the recovery has slowed and are being forced to discount prices to move these goods. Overall, this is a slight “maybe” recession indicator. I think that businesses would like to have 20% higher inventories overall.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ISRATIO

Exports (12%, 8/9 Volatility)

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EXPGSC1

US exports continue to solidly recover from the pandemic.

Imports (16%, 5/9 Volatile)

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IMPGSC1\

Although imports act as a reduction in the calculation of GDP, they tend to decline when the US economy declines. Import demand remains high, not indicating a recession.

Government (17%, 9/9 Volatile)

A majority of government spending is accounted for as a simple transfer, not part of the annual production of goods and services.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GCEC1

Government production activity grew quite significantly from 2014 to 2020. It has since declined by less than 1%. I rate this as a “maybe” indicator of recession, even though government activity is typically a countercyclical indicator, rising when recession arrives.

Summary

Services (45%), Business Investment (14%), Exports (12%), Imports (16%) and Durable Goods (9%) are NOT in recession. Housing (5%) and Non-durable Goods (15%) point towards recession, while Government (17%) and Business Inventories (1%) show warning signs. If I were a member of the NBER board, I would not designate a recession in the first half of 2022 as of today.

For the second half of 2022, a recession is possible. The Fed raising interest rates is already affecting the housing industry. But businesses continue to report solid to record profits. The stock market has declined by a bear market 20% but may or may not have found a bottom. The global risks from Russia’s attacks on Ukraine and China’s Covid lockdown strategy remain. Consumer confidence is weak, especially in a partisan world. Business confidence is weaker than in recent months, but most measures remain marginally positive. The labor market is at its strongest position in 50 years, supporting consumer demand. Higher than expected inflation has slowed consumer spending, but not to recession levels. Consumer savings and debt levels remain positive. Business debt levels have increased, but most businesses locked in low debt interest rates during 2020-22.

Why So Positive?

  1. Governments operate with expansionary fiscal policy, ensuring that aggregate demand is adequate. There is a risk of too much stimulus and “modern monetary theory” excesses, but so far this is not a risk in the major economies.
  2. Central banks are more effective. They provide credit in downturns, increase interest rates when required, coordinate with each other and pressure banks to hold adequate capital.
  3. Governments and central banks take proactive steps to avoid currency crises,
  4. After the Great Recession, lending in the US housing market is more reasonable.
  5. Businesses have worked through many challenges in the last 15 years and are well positioned to prosper.
  6. The overall economy is increasingly based on services more than manufacturing, mining and agriculture. The operations leverage of manufacturing facilities is a smaller factor in the world economy.
  7. Labor power is lower. Cooperation with management is stronger.
  8. Demand for labor is high. US has record open jobs and voluntary quits. The effective minimum wage has increased from $8-10 per hour to $12-15 per hour without major business disruptions.
  9. Trade is lightly restricted.
  10. Global economy is multipolar, relying on US, EU, Japan, China, India, Middle East, etc.
  11. Technological progress continues. Better goods and services. Better processes, trade, transportation, markets, communication and insights.

Lake County, Ohio: A Swing County for Presidential Elections (1952-2008)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/My_Little_Town

Historically, Ohio was a critical “swing state” in presidential elections.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_elections_in_Ohio#:~:text=Ohio%20is%20considered%20a%20swing,regular%20swing%20state%20since%201980.

My “little” hometown of Fairport Harbor is part of Lake County, Ohio which once was the most sensitive county to changing presidential voting patterns after 1952. Lake County is a suburban or exurban county in the Greater Cleveland area. The population doubled from 29K to 60K between 1920 and 1944 while it retained a mixture of agricultural and manufacturing employment. The county grew very rapidly on its western side as Cleveland residents moved away from the city, reaching 149K by 1960. Another 50,000 new residents arrived by 1972, pushing the total above 200K. Growth slowed with the decline of the Cleveland metro area, but the population reached 228K by 2000. The population has been relatively fixed for the last 20 years.

https://wikiless.org/wiki/Lake_County,_Ohio?lang=en

From 1952 through 2008, Lake County voted with the national presidential election winner in all but one of the 15 elections. In 1992, Lake County provided George Bush, Sr with 38% of the vote, the same as he won nationally, but only provided Bill Clinton with 36% of the vote, offering a very high 26% of the vote to “protest candidate” Ross Perot, far above his national 19% share.

https://wikiless.org/wiki/Lake_County,_Ohio?lang=en

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_United_States_presidential_election

From 1920 to 1932, Lake County voted 70% Republican, a solid 16% above the national average. Lake County took pride in its role as part of the Connecticut “New Western Reserve” and its road, rail and ship based east to west transportation role at this time. The county was also the proud home of Republican President Garfield.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/james-garfield/

While the country gave FDR 57% of the vote in 1932, Lake County offered just 35%, preferring to re-elect President Hoover.

From 1936 to 1956, the county continued to lean Republican, offering an average of 6% more votes to the Republican head of the ticket than the average state. The county supported FDR in 1936 but opposed him in 1940 and 1944 and opposed Truman in 1948.

The county started its remarkable 14/15 presidential winners string in 1952, supporting Eisenhower by 5 points more than the country at large and repeating this support in 1956.

The county surprisingly supported Kennedy over Nixon 51/49 in 1960, dropping those 5 extra points of Republican support. Kennedy visited the small county during the election. This may have helped shift enough marginal voters.

https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKSEN/0912/JFKSEN-0912-002

This was a time of change, with future 20-year congressman Frank Stanton serving as a county commissioner.

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-apr-13-me-stanton13-story.html

From 1960 to 2004, the county’s Republican vote percentage matched the national average.

Democrats earned a record high 62% vote share for LBJ in 1964, with Goldwater falling to a stunning 38% Republican low. Lake County “faced east”, looking to the New England/New York and Midwest Republicans (Taft) for inspiration. Goldwater’s Texas, Arizona, California “western” message gained little local traction.

The 1968 election was completely different. Nixon edged Humphrey by 0.8%, with Wallace receiving 14%, as he did nationally. I was just 12 years old, but as a newspaper carrier for 3 years, I had read many editorials from the Cleveland Press, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Lake County News-Herald and Painesville Telegraph. The race riots of 1966-67, Vietnam protests and counterculture demonstrations and activities were beyond the lived experience of my neighbors. Nixon and Agnew leveraged a “patriotic” message to win voters in “my little town”. George Wallace earned a remarkable 14% as a modern populist, promising simple solutions to all of the nation’s problems. I don’t believe that Wallace’s “racist” message was a significant part of his appeal in this heartland. He was an early version of the right-side “anti-establishment” candidate.

In 1972, Nixon cruised to victory by 61/38 against a weak McGovern candidacy. Lake County agreed: 59/38. The “Kent State Riots” were part of this vote. Governor Rhodes was very popular in Ohio, winning 3 terms.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Rhodes

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kent_State_shootings

In 1976, Jimmy Carter sold Lake County on a moderate Democratic platform and his promise to “never lie”, winning 51/46, about the same as the national 50/48.

In the same year, the county’s largest employer, Diamond Shamrock, announced that it was permanently closing its chemical plant that had employed as many as 5,000 workers historically.

https://www.rsworld.com/snix66/diamond.html

Reagan solidly won Lake County and the country by 50/41 and 59/41 in 1980 and 1984. His positive, traditional, patriotic, common-sense, reassuring message was well-received in a county and metropolitan region that was very hard hit by the start of a long-term downturn in manufacturing employment and regional population and economic growth.

George W. Bush was a little more popular in Lake County than the country as a whole, earning a 57/42 win, better than the national 53/46. Bush, Sr.’s WWII pedigree, executive experience and countenance played well in Lake County.

The 1992 election, pitting Bush, Sr.’s continuity, generation, broken tax promise, moderate social and economic views against Clinton’s contrasting policies was a divisive election, the true beginning of our polarized red versus blue state situation today.

In 1996, Bush’s support dropped from 57% to just 38%, while the national vote fell from 53% to 38%. Bush beat Clinton in Lake County 38% to 36%, the one non-match in the 15 elections.

Lake County was enamored with Ross Perot, offering him 26% of the vote in 1992 versus his 19-point national haul.

I worked for Ross Perot’s EDS in the 1980’s, as a headquarters financial analyst and project manager, producing the kinds of “charts and graphs” he loved to use in debates and press conferences. Ross was the most “what you see is what you get politician” I have ever seen. He believed that there are pragmatic, straightforward answers to any problem, and had lived a life demonstrating that this was true in the IT business, inventing the outsourced IT model and selling it to government agencies and corporations, just as he had sold mainframe computers in record volumes for IBM.

Ross was an anti-politician, a nationalist, a leader, a persuader, a man of integrity, a team player, a Texan, an outsider and very customer focused. Even with his significant campaign flaws, he was able to many attract voters who wanted to vote “none of the above”. I don’t believe his appeal was one of subtle racism, anti-immigration or historical pandering to a simpler, more culturally conservative time. Ross believed in progress, science and business.

Perot attracted 14% of Lake County voters in the next election, almost double the 8% national tally.

Clinton edged Dole 44/42 in Lake County in 1996, significantly behind his 49/41 national victory. In essence, this was a “none of the above” election for many in Lake County.

Lake County was an optimistic, fast-growing growing county for many years, tripling its population from 50,000 in 1940 to 149,000 in 1960 as Cuyahoga County grew, freeways opened, and people moved further from the central city. The county added another 50,000 people by 1972 as regional shopping malls such as the Great Lakes Mall opened by the Youngstown DeBartolo’s provided new attractions at the edge of the metro area. Growth slowed significantly after that, with the county adding just 20,000 people in the next 20 years through 1992 and another 14,000 people in the next 20 years. This change in the local environment from boom town to slow growth aggravated concerns about the country’s direction.

In 2000, George HW Bush, Jr. was able to capitalize on his message of “compassionate conservatism”, winning Lake County by 50/45, better than his narrow 48/49 popular vote loss. Even with the 9/11 patriotism bump, Lake County and the nation only narrowly re-elected Bush, Jr. by 51/48.

Obama’s centrist “hope and change” message attracted a few more Lake Countian’s to the Democratic ticket in 2004, earning a narrow 49.5% to 48.6% win, much tighter than the national 53/46 win.

The tables were turned in 2012, with Romney beating Obama by the same 49.5% to 48.6% result, in contrast with Obama’s 51/47-point victory. The 14/15 election match was broken. Lake County’s Republican share was 3 points higher than the nation this year, but its average Republican tilt for the last 16 elections was less than 1%.

Trump’s 2016 nationalist, populist, anti-immigrant, anti-globalization message played well in Lake County. He earned 5 points more than Romney, earning a solid 55/40 win, far ahead of his 46/48-point popular vote loss to Hillary Clinton. As with other blue collar, middle class, rust belt, Midwest states that had historically supported the Democrats, Lake County voted “no”, offering just 40% to Clinton.

2020 was very similar to 2016 in Lake County. Trump beat Biden 56/43 in Lake County, discounting Biden’s small-town Pennsylvania roots claims and centrist messages. Biden increased the Democrats’ national popular vote margin to 51/47.

It’s difficult to reconcile the 20-point swing from LBJ’s 1964 62/38 victory with Trump’s 56/43 advantage in 2020. Goldwater was a weak Republican candidate, promoting a conservative “philosophy” and radical “for the time” policies. Biden is a lifetime Washington politician, subject to obvious criticisms.

From Wallace to Anderson to Perot to Trump, a significant share of independent Lake County voters has been attracted to “outsider” national political candidates. The shared national experience of the Depression and WWII and bipartisan support for national leaders like FDR, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Reagan is nearly gone.

Since Reagan’s 1980 50/41 victory, Lake County has averaged a 51/43 Republican advantage. Based on Trump’s recent higher results (55-56%), Lake County looks to be a solid Red county today, leaving behind it’s Purple history.

Good News: SCARY INFLATION Has NOT Returned!

I was a wide-eyed young adult when the US last experienced 12% and 15% inflation rates. Our current situation is very different from that sad time 50 years ago. Fiscal policy was much looser, with LBJ pursuing a both “guns and butter” policy and Nixon following along. Monetary policy was slightly accommodating in the 70’s, comparable to today. The “supply shock” in the 70’s was much larger. The US was then much more dependent on foreign oil imports. Today the US is roughly “energy independent”, so subject to global price changes only. In the 1970’s, labor unions had some degree of power against the largest manufacturing concerns and used that power to attempt to maintain workers’ wages. There is no similar labor power today.

Average Inflation is at a Recent High of 8%

Core Inflation, Excluding Food and Energy is Growing at 6%

The inflection point is March, 2021. 2-3% inflation before then. 6% inflation in the last year. 6% is much higher than the 2% trend of the last 2-3 decades, but not a harbinger of spiraling inflation or wage-price spirals or cost-push inflation.

Inflation is Driven by Historically Highly Variable 1) Energy, 2) Commodities and 3) Food Prices.

The doubling of global energy prices since the end of 2020 is apparent. This was driven by the unexpectedly rapid global recovery from the pandemic (good news, overall) and the supply crimp from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Energy is a 7% weight in consumer prices, so a doubling has a tremendous effect.

US demand for durable goods spiked by 50% within the pandemic, as in-person services were unavailable. This completely unexpected increase in demand for final goods drove a completely unexpected demand for commodity inputs, resulting in much higher prices that continue through today.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIFABSL

Food price increases also spiked. The pandemic interrupted direct agriculture and food processing labor inputs. Raw food inflation reached 16%, while “away from home” food prices grew by just 7%.

Lodging and Vehicle Prices Spiked Due to the Stop/Start Nature of the Pandemic Economy.

Lodging and used car inflation exceeded 20% but is now slowing. New car prices increased by 12%, but this price increase is back down to a 7% annual rate.

But, All Other Sectors Have Experienced “Normal” – Non-accelerating 6% or Lower Price Increases.

6%.

3-4%.

3-5%.

4-5%.

Drugs 2%. Medical Services 6%.

Communication and IT continue their price decreases after a small increase.

1-2% annual inflation.

Household furnishings, up 9% like other consumer durables.

Food away from home, up 6-7%, despite the incredible disruptions in the last 2-3 years.

Summary

Energy, food and commodities prices have increased sharply in the last year. The other dozen price indices have increased by 5-6-7% and then flattened off. Loose fiscal and monetary policy, combined with commodities price spikes have driven quite high consumer price inflation for the last 6-9 months. Inflation will drop from 8% to 6% in the 3rd quarter and then to 4% in the 4th quarter and then lower into 2023.

There is no indication of rapidly increasing prices or a wage-price spiral. US labor unions don’t have the power to respond to the recent unexpected increase in consumer prices with a demand for equal or higher wage increases. Wages have increased by 5% in the last 2 years as inflation has spiked to 8%.

Good News: Black Labor Force Participation Exceeds National Average, First Time in 50 Years

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-03/black-americans-lead-recovery-in-may-labor-force-participation#xj4y7vzkg
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2022/06/17/three-questions-for-the-labor-markets-near-future/

African-American men and women have increased participation rates quickly since the depths of the pandemic.

https://www.epi.org/indicators/unemployment/
https://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab2.htm

The African-American employment to population ratio has been increasing through time, closing a 5 point gap to just 2 points before the pandemic, and squeezing it to less than 1 point most recently.

Context Since March, 1990 Peak Overall Rate

4 point decline before the pandemic. 1.5% pandemic hit. Almost 50% recovery.

3 point decline for prime age workforce, but 2 point improvement at the end of the prior economic recovery period. 2 point pandemic hit. More than 3/4ths recovered.

6 point slide before pandemic. 1.5 point pandemic hit. Perhaps 1/3rd recovered.

Up 3 points. Down 3 points. Up 3 points. Down 2 points. 80% recovered.

Context: History and Trends Through 2015+ Were Negative or Unclear for African-American LFP

https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/assets/economy/articles/economic-insights/2017/q4/eiq417.pdf
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2018/blacks-in-the-labor-force/pdf/blacks-in-the-labor-force.pdf
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2020/african-american-history-month/pdf/african-american-history-month.pdf

Challenges Make Black LFP Rate Improvement Even Better News

https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/2021-economic-commentaries/ec-202123-whats-holding-back-employment-in-the-recovery-from-the-covid19-pandemic.aspx
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2020/african-american-history-month/pdf/african-american-history-month.pdf
https://www.epi.org/indicators/unemployment/

Historically high concentrations of Black workers were hard hit by the pandemic.

https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2020/african-american-history-month/pdf/african-american-history-month.pdf
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2020/african-american-history-month/pdf/african-american-history-month.pdf
https://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0255_poverty_by_race

Positive Factors Supporting the Increase

https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2018/blacks-in-the-labor-force/pdf/blacks-in-the-labor-force.pdf

Size, growth and share all matter. Black workers may have quietly reached a “critical mass” where they face less obstacles and benefit from more positive network effects.

https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2018/blacks-in-the-labor-force/pdf/blacks-in-the-labor-force.pdf
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2018/blacks-in-the-labor-force/pdf/blacks-in-the-labor-force.pdf
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2020/african-american-history-month/pdf/african-american-history-month.pdf

A history of higher than average labor force participation by those with some college education and a growing share of people in that category.

https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2020/african-american-history-month/pdf/african-american-history-month.pdf

Black men have worked full-time schedules about the same as all men, while Black women have worked full-time more often than other women.

Context: The Labor Market

Real wages are up for African-Americans.

From 1975-97, African-American unemployment rates were 10% or higher. They briefly found the 7-8% level at the end of the Clinton presidency/expansion. They popped back up to 10% and recovered to about 8% before the “Great Recession”. They jumped up to 17% and then slowly declined to 10% by 2015. The extended recovery brought them down below 7% in 2018 and to a record low of less than 6%, briefly during 2018-19. The pandemic flirted with 17% rates once again. Instead of taking a decade to recover, unemployment rates have recovered in 2 years.

https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2020/african-american-history-month/pdf/african-american-history-month.pdf
https://www.epi.org/indicators/unemployment/

Black unemployment continues to be higher than other groups, but the gap is smaller than it once was.

References: Many Challenges Remain for African-Americans in the US Labor Market.

https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/2021-economic-commentaries/ec-202123-whats-holding-back-employment-in-the-recovery-from-the-covid19-pandemic.aspx

https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/diversity-and-inclusion/race-in-the-workplace-the-black-experience-in-the-us-private-sector

Good News: Increased Labor Force Participation

For each comparison, I’ll focus on the pre-pandemic Feb, 2020 numbers, the effective bottom rate in Jun/Jul, 2020 and today’s rate at May, 2022, about 2 years later.

The overall labor force participation rate dropped by 2 points from 63.4% to 61.4% and has recovered about half-way to 62.3%.

While many hope for a faster recovery, this 1% increase in 2 years is faster than from prior recessions. It is also taking place in the context of a long-term decline from 2000 to 2015, followed by a plateau and a bit of an increase in 2019 as the recovery from the “Great Recession” moved into a record length with record low unemployment.

The Hispanic rate generally followed the overall rate since 2000. However, the rate increased by a full 2 points in 2019. Hispanic labor force participation encountered a larger drop of almost 3 points, but has recovered one-half of the decline.

The Asian LFP rate follows the same general decline and flattening, with a somewhat higher rate in 2018-19 than the minimums from 2014-16. It dropped a little less than the overall average during the pandemic, by 1.7% and has fully recovered to the pre-pandemic level!

Black Americans showed the same general decline after 2000 to a minimum of 63% in 2015, with a significant and maintained increase to 64% in 2016 and a further 1% increase in 2019. Black labor force participation fell by a little more than 3 points to just 60%. It quickly added 1 point and in the last 6 months has added 2 more points, returning to its pre-pandemic 11 year high!

The White rate followed the overall pattern, but remained at the 63% plateau through the middle of 2019 before inching up by one-half percent. The participation rate was 1.8% lower in Jun/Jul, 2020. It did not change materially through the 3rd quarter of 2021, and has since added 0.4%. The White rate has recovered only 30% of the lost participation rate.

Women had added about one point of participation between 2016 and the beginning of 2020. Their participation declined a little less than men, at 1.8%. Women were slow to return to the work force during 2021, but have now closed one-half of the gap.

The Male participation rate remained flat from 2014 through the end of 2019. Note that male participation has been declining for 70 years. 2.1% of men left the labor force by Jun/Jul, 2020. The return during 2020-2021 was slow. The more recent increase has 40% of the absent men returned to the workforce.

Black men did not see a major participation rate increase in 2019. They experienced a 2.6% decline from the pandemic, followed by a 1% increase in the next year and a dramatic improvement in 2022 to a participation rate above the pre-pandemic level.

About 1.5% of Black Women were attracted into the labor force in 2019. Their pandemic decline was a very high 3.9%. They have added 2.7% of participation, so are about 3/4ths recovered.

Hispanic men did not show a clear participation increase in 2019. Their rate fell by a large 2.8% in the pandemic. It has rebounded by 2%, so is about 2/3rds recovered.

An additional 3% of Hispanic women entered the labor force during 2018-19. Their participation rate fell by 3.3% and remained low through the third quarter of 2021. It has grown by less than 1%, leaving it at a one-fourth recovery level.

White men did not increase their engagement during 2019 and recorded a 1.8% participation decline. There has been no significant recovery at this date.

Looking at the long-term trend, it may be that the 2015-19 rates were just a “pause” in the long-term decline. This topic warrants a separate article.

A smaller percentage of White women were drawn into the labor force during 2019, less than 1%. Their participation rate declined by 1.4% by Jun/Jul, 2020 and by 2% total in mid-2021 before beginning to recover. They have recovered by one-fourth to one-third of their decline.

Teenagers were least impacted by the pandemic, returning to prior work levels in less than a year.

College age young adults added almost 2 points of participation during 2018-19. They dropped a stunning 5.3% during the pandemic. They have recovered a solid 2.8%, so are a little more than 50% back.

The 55 and older group didn’t add many workers in 2019. Their participation declined by 1.1% and then by 1.7% total during 2021. They have recovered about one-third of the maximum decline.

The prime age (25-54) work force participation rate dropped 3 points, from 84% to 81%, between 2000 and 2015 in periods often decried as “jobless recoveries”. This group added 2 points of participation during 2016-19 as the recovery was extended, jobs added and unemployment reduced to record lows. Participation dropped by 2.1% in the pandemic. It has recovered 1.5%, so it is about three-fourths back to the elevated pre-pandemic level. The monthly increase rate looks very solid.

Prime age men added almost 1% of participation from 2016-2019 before losing 1.5% in the pandemic. They have added 1 point of participation, so are two-thirds recovered.

Prime age women added almost 3 points of participation from 2016-19, but experienced a 1.7% reduction during the pandemic. They have added 1.4% to their participation rate, reaching 80% of total recovery to the high pre-pandemic level.

https://www.epi.org/indicators/unemployment/

The even simpler ratio of employment to population shows a near total recovery in the prime age population. The steepness of the curve indicates that this will continue, at least in the short-run, even though the peak ratio was only 80.2%, 80.2% and 80.5% in 3 prior economic expansions. In 1999, the recent record was 81.9%.

Summary

From 2000 to 2015, the overall, male and white-male labor force participation rates declined by 4%, 5.5% and 5%. These rates bottomed out from 2016-18, with small increases in 2019. The recovery from the pandemic is fighting long-term trends that result in lower labor force participation (lower and later marriages, declining/flat pay for lower-skilled workers, increased disability claims, increased criminal, drug and alcohol records, social acceptance of not working, electronic entertainment options, etc.). Minority groups saw stronger 1-2% participation rate increases in the last years before the pandemic.

Hispanics, Blacks, teens and college students experienced pandemic dropout rates much higher than the 2% average from Feb, 2020 to Jun/Jul, 2020.

Overall, one-half of the decline has been recovered, but there are significant differences among the groups. Adults 55+ have remained close to their reduced rates. White men (a big share of the labor force) have made little progress returning to the labor force. Less than one-fourth of Hispanic women have returned. Two-thirds of the Hispanic male decline has been recovered. Three-fourths of the Black female gap has been closed. Teen participation has recovered (90%). Asian participation has fully recovered. Black male participation is above the pre-pandemic level.

The prime age group (25-54) has regained 1.5% of its 2.1% decline and the recovery trend looks solid in spite of the slower recovery groups.

Labor force participation has not increased quickly in prior periods. Based on the significant increases in the last 6-months, a continued increase in the participation rate through the end of the year is likely. I estimate that the pre-pandemic participation rate of 63.4% will be reached in the 1st quarter of 2023.

Good News: The Increase of Producer Price Inflation Has Peaked

https://4kwallpapers.com/nature/jasper-national-park-alberta-canada-winter-glacier-4561.html
Measure2.5 YearsRecent 1 YrTrend
PPI Minus food, energy, trade11%7%Peaked
Total Final Demand16%11%Peaked
All Commodities37% !!20% !Flat
Energy56% !!!45% !!Flat
Foods23% !13%Down
Other Goods14%8%Peaked
Other Services6%3%Down
Transport and WH24% !20% !Peak?
Whlse and Retail Trade22% !14%Down

For each measure of produce prices, I’ve provided a 5- or 10-year framework of annual inflation AND a 5 year view of prices indexed to Jan, 2020 before the pandemic began. We did have 2% inflation before the pandemic.

This traditional measure of ongoing inflation pressures peaked at 7% annual rate in 4Q, 2021. In total, just 12% in 2+ years.

Grand total PPI reached 10% annual inflation by the end of 2021 and has remained at that level. This provides pressure for CPI to be higher than 7% for a few more months.

Commodities pressure has been strong only recently, so the total PPI is just 3% higher than the measure excluding the volatile components.

Annual commodity inflation rocketed from 0% in Dec, 2021 to 20% by Jun, 2022 as the global economy was recovering from the pandemic and the extraordinary increase in durable goods demand was registered in supply chain purchasing decisions. Commodities are historically most volatile, but this increase in demand and prices was historic. Note this is way before the Ukraine invasion.

Energy prices were below the pre-pandemic level as late as Jan, 2021 (-3%). They increased exponentially to 50% higher by Apr, 2021. Energy prices have continued to increase at 35-40% annual rates as increased demand, mothballed assets and the Ukraine invasion effects combined to change the global markets. This is one measure where continued very high inflation is possible.

Food prices were a little slower to accelerate. Zero increase at Dec, 2020. 4% annual inflation at May, 2021. 13% inflation at Aug, 2021. Again, this is pre-Ukraine. The 13% ish inflation rate has continued, supported by Ukraine issues. Historically, food prices do not remain elevated for long periods.

Another subtotal, excluding 2 more volatile sectors shows 8-9% inflation peaking.

Business services inflation has remained tame, supporting the notion that cost-push inflation due to wage increases is not yet a major threat.

Transport and warehouse prices were also slow to “take off”, remaining below pre-pandemic level through Feb, 2021. Energy prices drive the transportation sector, so these prices also increased. The 20% annual increase seems to have peaked.

Wholesale and retail trade also lagged a bit, still at the historical average 2.5% inflation rate as of Mar, 2021. But, inflation grew to 10% by Aug, 2021 and a peak of 18% in Mar, 2022. The annual rate of inflation has receded to 15%, but that still offers some risks to the CPI for the next 6 months.

https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ppi.nr0.htm

https://www.bls.gov/ppi/

Summary

Six of the nine measures have peaked or are declining. The other three remain at worrying levels without clear signs of retreat. The “core” PPI inflation measure at 7% is not accelerating, so CPI should be able to decline in the second half of 2022. On the other hand, commodities inflation, mostly driven by energy inflation, remains very high without evidence of a meaningful decline in the near-term. Historically, energy and commodity prices fall back after a sharp increase. The general weakening in the global economy also points to a somewhat softer market for energy and commodities.

There is no evidence yet of labor-based cost-push inflation or accelerating/spiraling/self-reinforcing inflation.

“Price gauging” claims are always in the eye of the beholder/customer/politician. When I see relatively low historical price increases, followed by sharp increases, I imagine that business leaders are taking advantage of the situation to drive price increases that were impossible to propose and make stick during the less dynamic past. These can be spotlighted during a period of high inflation, but appear to be more reasonable across the whole business cycle. The food and energy price changes look similar to historical levels of volatility so are less easily questioned.

Big picture, IMHO, this looks like a global commodities “squeeze” due to the faster than expected recovery from the pandemic, especially the 50% growth in demand for durable goods as in-person services were less attractive and available. Loose fiscal and monetary policy in the US and other nations may have been a significant driver of the faster than expected global recovery, but this does not look like a classic case of excessive fiscal and monetary stimulus.

In hindsight, the slow response of the US Federal Reserve Board to the very rapid change in price levels from Jan, 2021 to Jun, 2021 looks like malpractice. Market prices quickly adapted to the current and expected disconnect between supply and demand.

Producer and consumer price increases are likely to remain in the 7-8% range during the 3rd quarter of 2022, but should begin to drift back to the 5-6% range in the 4th quarter of 2022, and still lower in 2023, especially if the Fed increases interest rates by the expected 3-3.5% and businesses slow their inventory, hiring, project and capital spending decisions accordingly.

Good News: 2022 Federal Budget Deficit is Way Down

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYFSGDA188S and forecasts described below

Good News: Early Forecasts: 2022 Deficit Cut in Half

https://www.crfb.org/blogs/no-president-biden-has-not-implemented-historic-deficit-reduction
https://datalab.usaspending.gov/americas-finance-guide/deficit/trends/

Better News: In May, CBO Forecasts Closer to $1Trillion, About the Same as 2019

https://www.crfb.org/papers/analysis-cbos-may-2022-budget-and-economic-outlook

Best News: May Data Indicates a Decline to 2017’s $0.7 Trillion Level (3/4ths Reduction)

https://www.pgpf.org/the-current-federal-budget-deficit
https://www.pgpf.org/the-current-federal-budget-deficit/budget-deficit-september-2019
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/deficit-tracker/

The May YTD deficit for fiscal year ending in September, 2022 was $426B, down 79.4% from the $2,064B level of FY 2021. The total FY 2021 deficit was $2,772B, so the same percentage reduction for the whole year estimates a $572B deficit for FY 2022. Visually, the year-to-date pattern most closely matches 2017 which ended with a $666B deficit. In fiscal years 2018 and 2019, the additional deficit for the last 4 months of the year was $245B and $247B, respectively. That gives us a forecast of $672B for FY 2022. DC insider, Wrightson ICAP, recently forecast a deficit of $600-700B.

https://rollcall.com/2022/05/09/tax-revenue-boom-fuels-steep-budget-deficit-decline/

Good News: CBO Forecasts FY 2023 and FY 2024 Deficits at Same Levels as FY 2022

https://www.crfb.org/papers/analysis-cbos-may-2022-budget-and-economic-outlook
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57950#section0

Good News: Public Debt as % of GDP is Forecast to Be Down for 2022-27

https://www.crfb.org/papers/analysis-cbos-may-2022-budget-and-economic-outlook

Good News: FY 2022 Government Deficit % of GDP is Best Since FY 2015

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYFSGDA188S

The conservative forecast of $700B deficit for FY 2022 is 2.8% of the CBO estimate of FY 2022 GDP at $24,694B. The CBO forecast Deficit/GDP ratios of 3.8% and 3.9% for the next 2 years, roughly the same as the pre-pandemic 2018 rate.

Good News: Government Fiscal Stimulus is a 3.5% Annual Drag on the Economy

https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/hutchins-center-fiscal-impact-measure/

The reduced federal deficit and state/local deficits compared with history provided a very large drag on first quarter GDP, but the economy recovered in the second quarter and is forecast by the CBO to deliver 3% overall real GDP in FY2023 after a very strong 4.4% in FY2022.

https://www.cbo.gov/data/budget-economic-data#4

Context

https://www.pgpf.org/the-current-federal-budget-deficit

Spending reductions are sustainable.

https://www.pgpf.org/the-current-federal-budget-deficit

Revenue increases are not sustainable, coming in as much as 2% of GDP higher than trend or expectations. The 2021 economy was very healthy, resulting in spillover tax receipts in 2022 that will not continue.

https://www.crfb.org/papers/analysis-cbos-may-2022-budget-and-economic-outlook

Spending at 22-24% of GDP cannot be funded by revenues of 18% in the long-run.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYFSGDA188S

Our economy has operated effectively for the last 4 decades with a federal budget deficit averaging 2.5% across the business cycle. Starting with 2.8% in 2022 is an unexpectedly good place. Congress and the president will struggle to maintain this level without significant spending or revenue changes in the next budgets.

https://www.crfb.org/press-releases/cbo-reports-63-billion-deficit-may

https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/25/u-s-deficit-congressional-budget-office-00035052

https://rollcall.com/2022/05/09/tax-revenue-boom-fuels-steep-budget-deficit-decline/

Good News: Widespread 2% Unemployment Rates

14 States Are Currently Below 3%

North Dakota, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Kansas, South Dakota, Minnesota and Nebraska form a low unemployment core in the Great Plains area. Utah, Idaho and Montana represent the Rocky Mountains. Vermont and New Hampshire lead in New England. Alabama leads the South, while Indiana leads the Midwest.

https://www.bls.gov/news.release/laus.nr0.htm

22 Metro Areas with 1M+ Population (of 51) Enjoy Unemployment Rates Under 3%

https://www.bls.gov/web/metro/laulrgma.htm

Large and Small Metro Areas Have Many Low Unemployment Areas

https://www.bls.gov/web/metro/laummtrk.htm

Low Unemployment Rates in US History

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE

May, 1953: 2.5%

Feb, 1968 – Dec, 1969: 3.5-3.8%

Oct, 2000: 3.9%

Dec, 2006: 4.4%

Jan, 2016: 4.8% through Feb, 2020: 3.5%. 4 years “below full employment”.

Estimates of Natural (Non-accelerating Inflation) Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) Have Been Biased Upwards and Influenced by One Period of High Inflation and Supply Chain Disruptions

https://www.chmura.com/blog/2019/july/19/how-low-can-the-unemployment-rate-goauthormikechmura

In retrospect, the period before 1976 (oil, trade, inflation shocks) should have used a 4.5% NAIRU for policy decisions. The jump to 6% in the late 70’s and early 80’s is supported by history. The NAIRU was deemed to be 5% or higher as late as 2010, but could have been pegged lower. Based on the lack of inflation during the teens, the rate probably should have been set at 4% or lower.

Macroeconomic Theory

Classical economics asserted that labor markets will naturally find equilibrium wages and quantities of labor employed at the individual labor market (micro) and total economy level. The Keynesian view, embraced by 90% of professional economists, is that there are market imperfections at both the individual market level and total economy level. Most importantly, wages are “sticky downwards”. Currently employed workers resist “losing” wages by accepting pay cuts when demand is lower. Aggregate supply (production) does not automatically create an equal amount of aggregate demand in the short-run, as businesses, individuals, banks and governments often choose to save more during economic downturns or periods of greater risk. Hence, a downturn in the economy caused by any source may result in a prolonged negative spiral, rather than automatically delivering lower prices in product, money and labor markets, which could help to recover these markets.

https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/09/22/how-low-can-unemployment-go

https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/09/22/how-low-can-unemployment-go

Microeconomic Theory: Why is There Any Unemployment?

Economists point to frictional and structural factors. Frictional unemployment occurs because labor market information and decisions are not perfect and instantaneous. As with other markets: housing, commercial real estate, offices, bank loans, farm fields, airport gates, container ships, utilities, R&D, IPO’s, private equity, M&A, retail inventories, etc, labor markets are imperfect. It takes time for equilibrium to be found. Given the increased concentration of labor in major metropolitan markets and internet-based recruiting systems, frictional unemployment has decreased in the last 20-30 years.

Structural unemployment occurs because of mismatches between the current skills possessed and skills demanded in a given place or due to legal or regulatory limitations. Binding minimum wages have been a smaller factor in the last 40 years but may have greater impact in the future. Regulatory requirements for professional licensing have increased significantly in the last 50 years (with some “liberalization” seen in recent years), slowing the ability for individuals to move between professions.

The overall labor force participation rate increased for many years as women entered the workforce, but has declined significantly in the last 20 years for men and for women. I’ll provide a detailed analysis of these factors next week. For our purposes, focusing on short-term changes, recent history shows that the labor force participation rate can be 1-2% higher overall. Some workers have not returned from the pandemic challenges. Some early retirees may return to the labor force. Teens and college students may join the labor force at recent wage rates. Marginal groups (elderly, long-term unemployed, handicapped, drug/alcohol recovery, crime history, minorities, limited language skills, inexperienced) may be considered for more positions.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LNU01300060

The media tends to emphasize the increased specialization and technical content required for modern jobs. This has resulted in greater structural unemployment, especially among lower-skilled individuals who held and lost manufacturing jobs between 1970-2000. It has also reduced movement between industries which require a core base of knowledge to be effective, with health care being a prime example.

On the other hand, modern corporations that worked through a dozen post-WW II business cycles eventually adapting to the “business cycle”. First, based on Japanese manufacturing, TQM or lean six sigma manufacturing principles, they reduced their operating leverage. Companies devised factories, offices, distribution centers, product lines and national businesses that could be equally profitable from 70-95% of capacity, rather than 85-95% of capacity. Second, they reduced their unavoidable “fixed costs” by importing goods, outsourcing business functions (manufacturing, IT, accounting, legal, marketing, distribution, sales, R&D) and employing temporary labor. Third, businesses systematized their processes so that core production processes could be operated by individuals with limited specialized or tribal knowledge, including managers and support staff. Fourth, businesses increasingly used matrix and project structures to effectively redeploy staff to any areas of need. So, while variable production staff is a smaller share of employment, the remaining “fixed cost” support staff can be more flexibly deployed. Fifth, after 40 years of process re-engineering, data warehouses, activity based costing and balanced scorecard reporting, companies deeply understand variable costs and incremental benefits driven by sales, production, product lines, facilities, territories and projects. “Knee-jerk” reactions to business cycle downturns are less common as firms better understand short-term incremental profits and medium-term costs of hiring and training. Sixth, firms have improved their ability to define “critical success factors” for every position. This has eliminated many irrelevant experience, degree, culture, personality and other factors from hiring screens. Seventh, firms have increasingly rotated staff through line and staff roles, allowing talented individuals to move between these roles and function effectively. Eighth, firms are more strategically oriented, growing profitable product lines and territories and dropping or “selling off” marginal channels. This means that the incremental positive value of most positions persists, even in an economic downturn.

Overall, firms have learned their “applied intermediate microeconomics” and clearly defined the marginal benefits and costs of every position. They understand exactly what incremental profit can be delivered from each position. Hence, the demand for labor services is significantly greater than it was historically, including through the downside of the business cycle. That means that the natural unemployment level is lower than in the past. Firms can profitably put more people to work than ever before.

Economists, Forecasters and Pundits are Reluctant to Predict Unemployment Below 3% Because it Was Rare Historically.

https://www.reuters.com/business/feds-bullard-says-unemployment-rate-can-go-below-3-this-year-2022-02-01/

https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/09/22/how-low-can-unemployment-go

https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/15/economy/unemployment-rate-goldman-sachs/index.html

https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/economy_14424.htm

https://theweek.com/articles/696915/how-low-unemployment

Lobbyists, Journalists, Politicians and Analysts Highlight the Downsides to “Very Low” Unemployment

From a firm’s perspective, a low unemployment labor market causes increased recruiting, hiring and training costs. It results in less well-matched staff to job roles resulting in lower initial productivity. Companies might even, aghast, inadvertently hire some staff with marginally negative profit results. Hence, very low unemployment rates will increase labor costs, reduce profits, reduce demand for labor and possibly bankrupt previously functional firms.

https://www.investopedia.com/insights/downside-low-unemployment/

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/32-unemployment.htm

https://www.uschamber.com/economy/the-divide-between-job-openings-and-willing-workers-widens

https://www.umassglobal.edu/news-and-events/blog/low-unemployment-rates

Trade-off Between Unemployment and Inflation: The Phillips Curve

In the 1970’s fight between Keynesians and Monetarists/Classical Economists/Rational Expectations teams, the Keynesians emphasized the historical existence of a short-term trade-off between unemployment and inflation, especially when unemployment was very low due to a high level of aggregate demand. The conservative side noted that the historical data was inconsistent. The “rational expectations” camp emphasized that unexpected increases in inflation would lead to increased wage demands by labor. In the long-run, there is no such thing as a “free lunch”, so effective real wages would return to the level determined by the “marginal productivity of labor”. Based on recent data (pre-pandemic), it appears that the US economy can run at 3.5-4.0% unemployment without triggering significant upward wage pressures. In the post-pandemic world, the “natural” unemployment rate (NAIRU) is unclear. The labor supply has basically recovered to the pre-pandemic level. Wages are up 5% in nominal terms but are down 2% in real terms (see below).

There are Many Unemployment Measures. They Move Together.

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/02/18/what-does-the-unemployment-rate-measure/
https://www.richmondfed.org/research/national_economy/non_employment_index

Labor Market Slack

In a period of healthy economic growth, the economy is constrained by the limited availability of labor as an input to drive the economic engine.

https://www.richmondfed.org/research/national_economy/non_employment_index

Underemployed individuals provide the logical next best full-time employees. The current slack measure is 3.5%, (7.1% – 3.6%) on the low side, but not so low that conversions from this underemployed group to full-time employment cannot be expected.

Real Wage Rates in a Growing Economy

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CES0500000003
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL

Jun, 2020 – Jun 2022. Nominal wages up 4.7%/year. CPI up 6.1%. 1.4% real wage decrease.

Dec, 2020 – Dec, 2021. Nominal wages up 4.9%. CPI up 7.3%. 2.4% real wage decrease.

May, 2021 – May, 2022. Nominal wages up 5.2%. CPI up 7.9%. 2.7% real wage decrease.

Nominal wage rates have increased by 5% annually in a period of 7% inflation. Employers have been able to economically justify these increases while adding 7 million people to the labor force.

Beveridge Curve: Job Openings Versus Unemployment Rate.

https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2014/ted_20140513.htm

https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_brief/2021/eb_21-36

Historically, there was a well-defined relationship between the national level of job openings as a percent of the labor force and the unemployment rate. Job openings were a low 2-2.5% of the labor force at the beginning of the business cycle, accompanied by higher (6-10%) unemployment, but improved to 4% openings and 4% unemployment. The current labor market has far more job openings, up to 11 million, almost twice as many job openings as unemployed workers, but the unemployment rate has only fallen to 3.6% so far. This is uncharted territory. There are more voluntary quits, so employees are switching jobs at a faster rate. The labor force participation rate has increased with these jobs and higher wages offered. But firms have not found enough acceptable hiring matches to significantly reduce the open positions level. Through time, they are likely to achieve their hiring goals, driving the unemployment rate down below 3%.

https://numbernomics.com/unemployment-vs-job-openings-2/

Summary

  1. The demand for labor already exists. 11 million open positions is 7% of the labor force. We have enough active demand for ZERO % unemployment.
  2. The supply of labor increased by 7 million people since the depths of the pandemic. The rate of monthly additions has slowed from 500-600,000 to 300,000, but that is still 3.6 million jobs added on an annual basis. We only have 6 million total people unemployed!

3. The labor force participation rate is only 62.5%. There is room for millions to return to the labor market. Before the “Great Recession” in 2008 it was at 67%. Many metro areas, large and small, enjoy labor force participation rates above 65%.

4. The underemployed population can provide up to 3% of the total labor market’s full-time jobs.

5. Frictional unemployment is minimal in the internet age. Structural unemployment may be lower than described in the media, as firms have been adapting to the “information age”, high technology and the service economy for 40-50 years.

Finally, many states and metro areas currently have unemployment rates in the “twos”. Nebraska and Utah stand at 1.9%. Minneapolis (1.5%), Birmingham (1.9%) and Indianapolis (2.0%) demonstrate that otherwise unremarkable (!!!) metro areas can function with very low unemployment rates.

Good News: US Foreign Aid

US Spends 1% of Federal Budget on Aid, Not 25%

Aid is 1% of Budget, Down from 1.6% in 1980

Aid is 1% of Budget, Down from 1.4% in 2006

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40213

Real $ Spending Increase Driven by Terrorism Threats with Bipartisan Support

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40213

US Leads in Dollar Spending, Trails in $/Person

US Accounts for 23% of Global Aid

US 0.2% of GDP is Very Low for Developed Nation

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40213

Where Does the Money Go?

41% to economic development and commercial interests

35% to military aid and national security

20% for humanitarian purposes

The congressional report splits up the $48B as

Peace/security 16B

Health, Ed $9B

Humanitarian $9B

Economic Growth $4B

Governance $3B

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40213

Where Does the Money Go?

Africa 25%. Middle East 25%. Afghanistan $5B, Israel $3B, Jordan $2B, Egypt, Iraq, Ethiopia, Yemen, Colombia, Nigeria, Lebanon $1B each. Top 10 $16B, one-third of total.

Criticisms of Foreign Aid

Limited evidence that specific country investments provide political returns

Limited evidence of anti-terrorism campaign effectiveness (counterexamples)

Weak administrative structure and oversight at all levels

Direct evidence of individual country economic growth due to aid is limited

Some autocratic governments have benefitted from aid

Some aid is diverted to corrupt governments and individuals

Specific high priority countries have provided weak returns (Egypt, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq)

Higher returns could be gained from investing in Western Hemisphere, Eastern Europe.

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-spend-its-foreign-aid

https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/09/18/649155725/why-the-u-s-ranks-at-the-bottom-in-a-foreign-aid-index

Benefits

Health measures, disease rates, lifespans. Global health. Economic development results globally and in individual countries. US trade benefits from developing trade lanes. Global education. Increased number of democracies, commitment to mixed capitalist economies. Lower cost of defense. Terrorism activities thwarted. Improved strength of US alliances. Improved flow through NGOs, multilateral organizations improves effectiveness. Dollar allocation provides US policy leverage.

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-spend-its-foreign-aid

https://www.concernusa.org/story/foreign-aid-myths-facts/

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/column-addressing-myths-surrounding-u-s-foreign-aid

Good News: US Researchers Earn Half of All Nobel Prizes

https://iir.gmu.edu/publications/nobelprize/previous-years

https://d101vc9winf8ln.cloudfront.net/documents/41281/original/Nobel_Prize_Summary_2021.pdf?1634227855

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/10/ex-pats-immigrants-nobel-prizes-laureates-science-chemistry-economics-physics-medicine

https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/05/10/the-hierarchy-of-countries-winning-nobels-in-the-sciences-is-shifting