The Road to Character – 2015

“This was first conceived as a book about cognition and decision making … it became a book about morality and the inner life”.

0. Introduction: Adam II and the “Eulogy Virtues”

Contrast the Adam I “resume virtues”: job market, external success, career, ambition, building, creating, producing, discovering, status, victory, how things work, venture forth, utilitarian logic and success with the Adam II “eulogy virtues”: kind, brave, honest, faithful, relationships, moral, serene, right and wrong, love, sacrifice, truth, soul, why things exist, return to roots, charity and redemption.

We all live these two selves, but there is an inherent tension between their competing claims.

Adam II logic is inverted: give to receive, surrender to gain, conquer desire to get what you crave, failure leads to the success of humility and learning, forget to fulfill yourself, confront your weaknesses, not just leverage your strengths. [Nietzsche’s “weak religion” claims echo here]

American culture today prioritizes the “resume virtues”. School and career competition. Product marketing. Fast and shallow communications. Self-promotion, elevator speech, LinkedIn. [These are not new criticisms. See Daniel Bell’s 1976 “The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism”.] The emphasis and power of the “transactional” virtues have grown since 1945 or 1976 to make the modern world almost unrecognizable from earlier times.

Brooks describes this imbalance producing merely a “shrewd animal”, capable of playing one game, with a vague anxiety about lack of meaning, boredom, missing love and unattached to any moral purpose making life worthwhile. Inner consistency, confidence and integrity are missing. Without developed morals, the achievements of Adam I are undercut.

Brooks promises to deliver an “older moral ecology” for modern times by sharing biographical essays. This is the “broken timber” tradition, emphasizing human weakness, brokenness, sin, moral drama and development. He admits that no simple outline or list of principles is adequate. Moral development requires an individual journey, experiences, feelings, intuitions, awareness, a community, principles, choices, feedback, small steps and habits. Each person’s journey is different.

Those who are further along on the moral journey have certain characteristics: inner cohesion, calmness, ability to face adversity, persistency, consistency, dependability, reservedness, reticence, humility, kindness, cheerfulness, restraint, respect, temperance, balance, dignity, centeredness, service, comfort, quiet action, receptivity, reflection, support and depth. These are the classical moral virtues. They are less common, but no less important today.

1. The Shift

The central fallacy of Adam I life is that accomplishments and the pursuit of happiness will produce deep satisfaction. The Adam II view is that desires are infinite, fleeting and an inadequate basis for a meaningful life. The ultimate joys are moral joys pursued by living a moral life, in spite of our flawed nature. Brooks argues that our culture since WW II has lost the experience, language, norms and habits to encourage most people to pursue the moral life rather than just the surface-level materialistic life.

V-J Day celebrated the end of the war, the second “war to end all wars”. News coverage highlighted the views of politicians, celebrities and regular people. The tone was one of self-effacement and humility. This is it. What can you say? Thank God it’s over. We won because our men are brave and many other things. I hope we are more grateful than proud. Joy, yes. But solemnity and self-doubt too.

Brooks inserts the disclaimer “in so many ways, life is better now than it was then”. Racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, conformity, limited cultural options, cold culture, hierarchy, rigid parental roles, etc. His vignettes and text highlight the benefits of “the moral journey” without claiming that any formula, church, culture or person were perfect. His deepest point is that humans are flawed (sinful), but in spite of that nature, they can lead a morally worthy journey. He is concerned that today we don’t emphasize this dimension of life, reducing opportunities for individuals and society as a whole.

The “greatest generation” displayed humility. Even most of the celebrities shared these characteristics. Bragging was considered gauche or “out of place” by every class. People were more grounded, skeptical, balanced and aware that everyone has challenges and demons to face. The “hardness” of life in the generation after the “roaring twenties” had impacted habits and culture. Cabinet members served; they didn’t write memoirs.

The “Big Me” view of life, focused on child development started immediately after the war with self-help, get ahead and parenting books all aiming to apply the “humanistic” psychology that contrasted with Freud’s much darker view of humans and humanity. Rock and roll and the “swinging sixties” receive more press, but they were part of an overall change in popular culture rooted in an individual oriented psychology that gave less emphasis to the non-individual dimensions. Human nature did not change. People did not become more evil. But their focus started with the individual and often simply stayed there.

Brooks cites data showing that individuals today consider themselves more important, display more narcissistic traits and pursue fame more often. Popular culture reinforces the parenting and schooling changes. “You are special. Trust yourself. Follow your passion. Don’t accept limits. Chart your own course. You are so great”. Part of this was a reaction to the “conformity” of “mass society” in the 1950’s. But the reaction swung to an extreme rather than finding a new and better balance.

Brooks outlines why the Adam II, eulogy virtues path of a moral journey is “better”. Self-effacing people are aesthetically pleasing. That is, Brooks simply likes this style. Self-promoters are fragile and jarring. Humility is intellectually impressive. It takes great effort, insight and discipline to offset our natural tendency to embrace ignorance. Humility leads to wisdom, not merely knowledge. The path of wide-awake “trial and error” supported by a community develops insights and confidence. Wise people have learned to see things from multiple perspectives and broader perspectives, to know their own limits, to integrate pieces, to reach tentative conclusions, to deal with issues, accepting that others may make better choices in the future. Humility has a direct moral value, avoiding pride and hubris.

Wise, humble, moral individuals approach life as a journey. They start with the same broken human nature and grab-bag of talents and weaknesses. They experience highs and lows. But they learn from the lows as they are open to learning, feedback, looking inside, restarting and taking small steps forward in hope of improving. This self-awareness allows them to not become distraught by their repeated brokenness, but to embrace the human condition, the opportunity for grace, help from others and always another opportunity. This apparently “negative” or “pessimistic” view of life leads to a tempered optimism, a confidence that these small steps are the essence of a good human life and that despite the backsliding, the journey is good. They also accept that the demand for moral perfection remains but cannot be fulfilled. In spite of this, they move ahead graciously and positively.

Brooks emphasizes the complementary side of the semi-sweet, bittersweet, self-disciplined path he has outlined. Austerity and hardship play a role, but love and pleasure are required too. The experience of nature, people, love and art are required to be humble, wise and human. There is a balance again. Devotion to a cause, service and mystical wonder are essential ingredients of the journey. This journey has an “everyman” quality, encouraging individuals of all classes, professions and backgrounds to join in and support each other.

The author reiterates that “human nature” has not changed in the last 3 generations, but our culture has moved to an “individualistic” extreme that encourages parents, children and adults to focus on the “success” dimension of life above the “moral” dimension. We are losing the habits, language, examples, understanding and beliefs needed to maintain the “moral” dimension as an important part of our civilization.

2. The Summoned Self: Frances Perkins

Brooks uses the life of Frances Perkins, FDR’s multiple-term Secretary of Labor, to develop the ideas of a moral journey, a calling or vocation and the tension between different aspects of a person’s self and their environment. In thumbnail terms, Perkins was one of the first liberal, feminist pioneers, advocating for women’s, children’s and worker’s rights. She reflected her stern and religious New England upbringing and the special guidance of Mount Holyoke at the turn of the nineteenth century.

Perkins’ “calling” arrived when she experienced the horrific Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire in 1911, when she was 31. Dozens of eighth through tenth floor workers died from a fire where the exits had been blocked. New York City reacted with mourning, outrage and shame. Working conditions had been highlighted by a strike two years earlier, but management had prevailed, and society had ignored the ladies’ plight. Prior to this time Perkins had worked in her field of social service in a conventional manner, but now knew that she would truly have to devote her life to improving working conditions, even at personal cost to herself in terms of time, methods, dress and relations.

Brooks describes today’s commencement calls to individuals to “follow their passion, to trust their feelings, to reflect and find their purpose in life”. Their best role is to be found by looking inward. It is to be shaped in Adam I terms: what is my purpose? what do I want? What do I value? Inventory my talents. Set some goals and metrics of progress. Map a strategy and go. Apply your self-determination achieve self-fulfillment.

In prior times, highly talented, driven and aware individuals like Perkins approached these questions from the opposite side: what does life want from me? Servants don’t create their lives; they are summoned by life to meet the needs of their time and place.

Brooks highlights Victor Frankl’s 1942 experience in Nazi concentration camps where he was positioned with “no choice”, but was able to identify his one remaining choice, to focus on the gap between stimulus and response, to decide what response could be made in the worst environment. Frankl could choose to not surrender, to focus on the wishes of others, to serve, to educate, to preach, to work out a means of survival. Most people try to avoid suffering. Frankl embraced it and survived. Lived experience and the condition of society can (and should) play a role in determining one’s vocation, not just personal reflections.

The author describes a vocation as a “calling” versus a job or a career. Some are called by God, indignation, nature, literature, or a personal experience. The vocation chooses the individual. A vocation is not chosen on a utilitarian basis to maximize happiness. The person becomes an instrument of the cause, religion, movement, industry, tradition or profession. They are part of something larger than themselves that applies across time. Such a vocation is serious, but not burdensome. The rewards of professionalism, craftsmanship and service are fulfilling even if conventional success is not assured or achieved.

Perkins’ background was nineteenth century New England Yankee. Dead serious, parsimonious, earnest, brutally honest, focused, reticent, self-reliant, egalitarian, and emotionally tough. Yet the social conservatism was combined with communal compassion, local government action and a faith in education. There was a balance, or sorts. Mount Holyoke existed to help teenagers become adults by shaping their moral character, identifying weaknesses, building discipline skills, wrestling with religious obligations, connecting themselves with life, identifying opportunities to serve, tempering idealism, pursuing heroic causes with humble steps. Perkins selected a I Corinthians verse for her class motto: “Therefore my beloved brethren, be ye steadfast, unmovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord”.

Perkins “career” included roles as a teacher, social worker, manager, lobbyist, leader and public policy analyst and influencer. She served in New York State commission roles before becoming Secretary of Labor. Her views were shaped at Hull House in Chicago which directly involved women with the local poor and immigrants, offering a wide variety of services in a cooperative environment. Staff were taught to serve God and the cause rather than individuals, so that they would retain their motivation.

Perkins was effective in promoting her causes, using her knowledge and passion to sway legislators, owners and journalists. She embedded herself into every needed political environment to become influential, going where ladies had not gone before, playing real politics, compromising as required, even dressing to look older and appeal to the “maternal instincts” of her audience. While Perkins’ career looks like a linear success, her personal life was difficult and cold, at best. Her husband and daughter suffered from mental illness. She managed them and kept this separate from her public life. She retired to live in a dorm and teach at Cornell.

Perkins believed in reticence. She kept her private life private. She did not feel a need to use her inner feelings, passions and desires as tools for public policy. They belonged in private. Brooks notes that Perkins had her weaknesses. She was not best at emotions, intimacy, public relations, introspection or softness. As a woman in a man’s world, especially the epitome of labor relations, she was “all business”. On the other hand, Perkins’ “all business” approach was successful and she was humble about her style, pioneering status and results. Anyone else with the same opportunities would have done the same things, she said.

Perkins was an astute observer of people, managing FDR and writing a biography about him. She appreciated FDR’s adopted style of humility and interactions with people. She saw that his incremental, probing, seeking, improvising, balancing decision-making style was successful, even if it was difficult for his colleagues, opponents and the world. She noted that he crafted policy as an instrument of the process, not as an engineer himself.

Brooks summarizes her great political results in defining, supporting and delivering the New Deal. He contrasts her insignificance as a Mount Holyoke student, shaped by a system that chipped away at her weaknesses of laziness and glibness to then pursue idealistic goals as a servant of mankind. She set aside her own image and family to pursue this calling. She met each new challenge and steadfastly pursued objectives. She combined activism with reticent traditionalism, hesitancy and puritanical sensibility. How unlikely a career path. But, not so unlikely as a calling for a young lady enrolled at Mount Holyoke in 1900.

3. Self-Conquest: Dwight Eisenhower

Dwight Eisenhower is another leader of the FDR era, born in 1890 and raised on the frontier prairie around Abilene, KS. Brooks uses Eisenhower’s life to illustrate self-conquest and moderation.

Ike’s father David had limited career success, was quiet, somber, solitary and difficult. He married Ida Stover and raised 5 boys, each remarkably successful. Ida was born in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia in 1862, lost both parents of her large family by age 11, and worked as a cook for a family as a teen. She moved away, finished high school, joined a westbound caravan and settled in Kansas. She studied music in college, married David Eisenhower and joined the River Brethren church, which believed in plain dress, temperance and pacifism (!). While Ida adopted the strict faith of her church, she maintained her warm, joyful, optimistic, vibrant, gregarious personality and belief that each person must make their own faith choices.

The boys were raised in this economically marginal, but psychologically mixed home. No drinking, card playing or dancing. Plenty of Bible study and verses. A focus on thrift, self-discipline, chores, manual labor, temperance, self-restraint, self-wariness and natural risks. The prairie was an unforgiving atmosphere that emphasized prudence, hard work and endurance.

“Sin” remained an important enemy in the Eisenhower home. Ida and Dwight were both schooled in Bible verses and skilled at applying them to real world situations. The need to “conquer sin and your soul” was obvious. Developing character was a central part of life. Brooks shares that we don’t speak of “sin” today, even though human nature has not changed, and we still experience a dual nature of being selfish, deceiving and self-deceived while also showing God’s image and seeking transcendence and virtue. The darkest Puritanical obsession with sin lies in our historical past. The Victorian commingling of “sin” and pleasure is mostly gone. The use of “sin” as a catch-all term to ensure that no one has fun is less common. The use of “sin” as a tool for strict parenting, irrespective of moral development, is also fading away. So, we are left with the downside of human nature, but no vocabulary to describe it.

Brooks argues that the moral concept of sin cannot be ignored because it is so central. Despite the materialistic scribblings of some scientists and philosophers, life cannot be reduced to atoms and forces. People make moral decisions. Bad choices are not simply errors or mistakes. They are choices made within competing moral forces and shortcomings. Sin is a social term. Our decisions impact others. Their expectations impact us. We recognize the universality of sin in our neighbors and seek help and forgiveness. Sin is real. Individuals “know” right from wrong. We still do the wrong thing. We don’t want to be hard-hearted, cruel or ignore situations, but we do. Our talents drive complementary shortcomings from exaggeration or pride. Sin is large and small, mostly small. The habit of avoiding small sins helps to avoid large sins. Small sins lead to large sins. We face moral choices every day. Moral character is built upon the control of our partially sinful nature.

Ida Eisenhower lived a “both/and” life. She was funny and warm-hearted but demanded compliance with her rules. She required work and offered freedom. She demanded that her family cultivate the habit of small, constant self-repression. Etiquette, attending church, deference, respect, plain food, avoiding luxury, keeping the Sabbath. Practice the small outward disciplines to build character. Work hard. She also used love as a character-building tool. Love of children, country, the poor, giving and neighbors. Strict and kind. Disciplined and loving. Sin and forgiveness.

Dwight always had a temper. Ida helped him learn to control it. At West Point he excelled at demerits. Although he mostly controlled his temper, Ike’s colleagues and subordinates learned to read his face, watch his neck arteries bulge, observe his moods, and avoid him on brown suit days. Ike was aware of his challenges. As a staff officer, he adapted to his superior. He focused on the details and processes to produce results. He identified and studied the habits of his most effective colleagues. He guided disagreements and complaints into the trash or his diary. He bought into the military’s hierarchical culture and accepted that his best place was where the military assigned him. Ike was happy to assume a persona as a staff leader, general or president. He used the persona to his advantage.

Ike was slow to fully blossom. He entered full service after WW I, behind thousands with higher ranks and experience. He remained a lieutenant colonel for two decades. His brothers gained early career success. Yet, Eisenhower continued to serve his country and develop his craft, earning honors and attention for the performance of his duties and his school record. He was attached to Generals Connor and MacArthur for a decade, mastering politics, management and leadership. When his time arrived, he delivered. He was able to bridge between competing factions and earn the respect required to make critical decisions and win support. Ike kept the focus on the team, praising victories and embracing defeats closely.

Ike was not a saint, a visionary, a creative thinker, a brilliant strategist, a leader of human rights or a warm human being. He was comfortable with himself. He was comfortable with his second self, the persona required to achieve his objectives. Brooks notes that this inauthenticity is often criticized today. Being true to oneself is seen as a supreme value. Ike put this in perspective.

Brooks praises Ike’s moderation. Once again, we have a flavor of both/and rather than either/or. Moderation is not compromise, average or equanimity. It is the ability to identify conflicting perspectives or dimensions and use the best of them to make practical decisions. Conflict is inevitable. A fully harmonious person does not exist. A single coherent philosophy cannot guide all choices. Various political goals are incompatible. In politics, philosophy and personality things don’t fit together neatly. Passion and self-control. Faith and doubt. Security and risk. License and liberty. Equality and achievement. Order and liberty. Individual and community. The key is to recognize that clean solutions do not always exist. Good solutions require balance, long-term and short-term, practical and ideal considerations, action and calm. Like FDR, Ike saw that incremental decisions may be the best choice.

The “moderate” instinctively considers options, accepts compromises, considers goals and values, incorporates multiple perspectives, separates means from ends. He or she is wary of simple solutions, single truths, zealotry, and unbridled passion.

Brooks does not say this, but this is the historical basis for “conservatism” from Edmund Burke forward. The accumulated wisdom of history, tradition and society is a valuable counterweight to the latest progressive insight, breakthrough or revolution. The conservative is wary of risk, especially the biggest risks. This approach reduces those risks.

4. Struggle: Dorothy Day

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dorothy_Day

Dorothy Day is less well known than the others featured in this book and perhaps the most difficult to summarize, categorize, explain or relate to. Born in 1897, she was a radical Catholic social worker. Her life was shaped by a seeker’s need to know, to connect, to understand, to matter. She delivered results for millions of people and inspired millions more. She challenged orthodoxy and promoted versions of the Catholic faith and social practices. She is a feminist hero. She is recognized as a “servant of God” by the Catholic Church and may become a saint someday. I’m guessing that Brooks included her to provide a left leaning example in his pantheon of heroes, to explore conversion and suffering as virtues.

After a challenging first 30 years of life, Day joined the Catholic Church because she saw the practical and ideal effects it had on poor immigrant workers in the city. She was rebounding from a series of disappointments but had discovered romantic love and experienced childbirth and motherhood. She needed a new and better answer to her striving for truth, beauty, justice and meaning. Initially, she was drawn mostly to the orderliness of the religion, but she saw that its doctrine of radically true equality of individuals could be the basis for real, transformational service.

She built upon her previous radical politics and journalistic experience to found a newspaper advocating for workers. This evolved into a newspaper that served the working people, soup kitchens, food pantries, group housing and political activism. Brooks notes that she wanted to demonstrate the ideal of true human service to others, partly to address human needs, but also to set a radical example to challenge individuals to read and reflect upon the church’s teachings.

Throughout her life, Dorothy Day was a seeker, a feeler, a maximizer, a searcher, a dramatist, unbounded, fearless, driven, experimental, focused and testing. She wanted to know truth, beauty and justice. She burned with a passion for this wisdom. She deeply felt the virtue of unity and the pain of separation. She looked for new perspectives and understood that there are many layers of depth in our journey. She lived day to day, but honored history and eternity. In the end, she knew that she could not fully achieve this kind of mastery or certainty as a human but was grateful for her life and her religious experience.

In her youth and young adulthood, she actively sought but did not find. She began writing at a young age. She was a voracious reader from a young age of philosophers and “deep” novelists. She learned about the conflicts between the spirit and the flesh at a young age and explored this tension into her thirties. She explored alternative lifestyles, living arrangements, work, drinking, drugs and sex. She was attracted to radical politics, especially addressing injustice. Brooks interprets this as her heart was in the right place, but without a proper structure there was no ability to connect with the infinite, the eternal, the transformational until she was a practicing member of the Catholic Church.

Day was “wound so tight” that she never experienced the deep serenity which many other saints have been claimed to find. She pursued service and community and practice, but retained a doubt if she was “good enough”. Was her action pure or prideful? How could one know? She served the community, but did she do enough for her family? She chose to remain celibate after losing her partner and father of her daughter due to irreconcilable religious and political differences. This human longing was never refilled. She innovated, served, lectured, lead others, wrote, lobbied and impacted millions, but was this enough? Was it the best course? She lived in community with the poor and colleagues but still felt alone.

Day embraced suffering. She was hard on herself. She accepted small windows of relief. But she was relentless. What else can I do? Brooks outlines the potential good of this kind of radical suffering. Suffering can help the seeker to find a new dimension, a deeper reality that leads to a better world. Suffering is a natural byproduct of an honest complete search for holiness, divinity and the perfect life. Suffering connects us with others who need help and who share our universal experience. Suffering allows an individual to “hit bottom” as in a “12 step program” and surrender to a higher power. Suffering can help us to empathize with others as they actually live their lives, different from our experience. Suffering jolts us away from our everyday, surface, bourgeoise, Adam I life. Suffering ensures that we understand that we are not in control, we are not self-sufficient. Suffering exposes layers and dimensions that we had tried to hide. Suffering teaches gratitude. We gain perspective on the “highs and lows” of life. Suffering can connect us to history, providence and God. Suffering can lead individuals to their vocation or calling, or at least scare them away from false gods. Individuals can respond to deep suffering with magnanimous responses of community service.

In the end, Day found enough to satisfy her longings. Her experience was “good enough”, adequate, but still not perfect. She continued on her journey, adapting, improving, adjusting and praying. She embraced order, routine, service, communion, motherhood, community, prayer, writing, reading, discipline, practices, and much progress that was made for the poor, the community and the world. She was gracious and thankful for her life’s experiences. That was enough.

5. Self-Mastery: George Marshall

The memory of General George Marshall is fading from public consciousness with time. As an Army general, he led the overhaul of training and prioritization of senior officers to prepare the US military for WW II. He served as Army deputy and chief of staff for FDR, advising the president, managing relations with Congress and the press and preparing for the D-Day invasion. After the war he served as ambassador to China, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and leader of the “Marshall Plan” to rebuild Europe.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_C._Marshall

Other American leaders considered him the very best in a time filled with heroes. Towering intellect, unnatural genius, integrity, selfless devotion to duty, beyond all influences, telling the truth, immensity of integrity, terrific influence and power, no politics involved, trying to win the war the best way.

Marshall was born in 1890 and raised in a small Pennsylvania coal town. His father was a successful small businessman who risked everything on a real estate venture and lost. Marshall experienced childhood poverty in a proud family distantly related to Supreme Court Justice John Marshall. George was an unengaged elementary school student but “buckled down” in high school when he heard his brother say he did not want George to follow him to the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and embarrass the family.

Marshall enrolled at VMI and found the school’s history, tradition and military culture to be a good fit. VMI had produced many Civil War generals and considered itself like West Point despite the Confederacy’s unfortunate outcome. VMI was part of an older military tradition that intended to shape the character of young men bound for future public leadership. It combined ” a chivalric devotion to service and courtesy, a stoic commitment to emotional self-control, and a classic devotion to honor”. It believed that leaders were made, not born. VMI taught reverence for the heroes of the past as a way to define, form and motivate self-discipline and build character. Marshall blossomed at VMI where he “excelled at drilling, neatness, organization, precision, self-control and leadership”. He graduated without a single demerit and was the unquestioned leader of his class.

Brooks emphasizes that this training to be a “great leader” does not fit with today’s “find yourself” and “express yourself” model of personal development. Leaders are public servants. They should strive to be magnanimous, to rise above the passions of mere mortals. Holding power, they will be subject to the risks of abusing that power, exaggerating their own weaknesses and strengths. They will need to rely upon their own good judgment as they are subject to the pressures of politics. Hence, they must develop a core sense of “right and wrong” and habits that allow them to work alone as necessary, seeking advice but not relying upon coalitions. They must develop complete self-control to attract and wield power and influence, for others and upon themselves.

This style highlights the role of institutions, society and traditions versus the individual self. The self is weak and subject to influence and emotions. A stoic self-reliance is needed. This is built from the outside in by practicing self-control in the small things of life; drill, decorum, etiquette, language, erect posture, shiny shoes. By building and applying the habit of self-control to daily routine, the leader is able to apply it in the great decisions, where it really matters.

Like Eisenhower, Marshall was caught in the after WW I period with more experienced officers holding the higher-ranking positions, preventing his promotion for two decades. Marshall did serve in WW I as a logistics officer and caught the attention of General Pershing who moved him to his general staff office. Marshall served mainly as a staff officer, managing things like ordnance, logistics and training. He excelled in these roles but only won his promotion to general at age 58.

Marshall applied and exemplified the military virtues. As an aide to others, he subordinated his views to theirs, applying extra energy to ensure that their wills and orders were delivered. He was loyal to the military as an institution. It came before him and would follow him. He was honored to participate in the institution, gaining from it and contributing a bit. Brooks highlights the role that professions and institutions can have in counterbalancing self-centered individualism. Through participation an individual is shaped and molded to think like the group, to serve, to mirror the culture and ethics of the group. The connection between an individual and the group is more than transactional. It is more like a solemn commitment to support, learn, serve and honor the wisdom of the collective whole and those who had served before. In return, the group connects the individual to a meaningful something that is larger, and which lives on. Some might call this a conservative viewpoint while others would describe it as a balancing force.

Marshall’s picture could appear in the encyclopedia under the entry for soldier or general. He looked and acted the part. Stoic, reliable, dead serious, private, attentive to details, focused on victory, impatient with politics or frivolity. He was a reserved person with few close friends. Personable but not garrulous. Devoted to duty and his two wives, but not interested in “club life”, he filled key roles because of his talents, trustworthiness and history of delivering results. He was a natural leader, a revered leader, but not an inspirational leader in today’s terms of public speaking, charisma and emotional impact.

Despite his slow academic start, Marshall learned to apply himself academically. He developed an outstanding memory for details. He learned to connect mission, vision and values with strategy, tactics and logistical details in the most complex situations. He was an innovator, willing to overhaul procedures to make them more effective. He was willing to set aside emotions and potential consequences and “speak truth to power” as required. He refused to ask FDR for the D-Day leadership role because he honored the president’s role in making such a decision based upon all factors, including personal and political ones.

Marshall was not perfect. He could be cold, rigid and aloof. His distaste for the frivolous part of politics and journalists sometimes leaked through. He didn’t have a large group of friends or allies. In the end, he was a “magnanimous” leader as VMI sought to create. He pursued a leadership role in a public institution where it was best for him to be “above the fray”. Society needed someone to lead, advise and deliver reliably, without second guessing their motives. Society needed some individuals to look and act like “heroes”, hiding the doubts and shortcomings of the leader and society. This leader was made of marble, qualitatively different from others but committed to his nation. This leader earned great honors because he was worthy of them based on achievement and character. In the post-sixties, post-Watergate, post-Clinton era we struggle to truly “look up” to any leaders. We prefer irreverence.

Marshall died just shy of his 80th birthday. He ensured that there was no big ceremony, no grand eulogies, just a soldier’s honorable burial.

6. Dignity: A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A._Philip_Randolph

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayard_Rustin

Brooks next chooses two civil rights leaders who are not as well-known as Martin Luther King, Jr., but who had the same level of impact on the African American community and the US between 1940 and 1970. “Dignity” is an ironic title for this chapter. There is clearly great dignity in the cause of civil rights, the dignity displayed by these two leaders and the dignity mastered by civil rights action participants. I am a man. We are men. We belong. We are morally strong. We have God and history supporting us. However, Brooks’ main message, in my reading, is not about simple human dignity. Rather, it is that the greatest achievement of the post-war, modern “liberal”, secular, individual rights world view, real civil rights, was achieved by self-doubting radical conservatives.

Randolph was born in 1899 in Jacksonville and moved to New York City in 1912 after completing high school. Rustin was born in 1912, raised and educated in Ohio and Pennsylvania before moving to New York City in 1937. Both were deeply influenced by the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) church and the norms of the emerging Black middle class. Both were good students with strong interests in the humanities. Both mastered the precise speaking skills and manners required for Blacks to hope to advance in a still racist world.

Randolph pursued “dignity” as a goal. He was taught that he could and should “transcend” his social environment. Son of a minister, he was a student of the Bible and familiar with the roles of ancient and modern heroes. He adopted a formal, polite, dignified approach to life, emphasizing self-control, self-mastery, renunciation and self-discipline. He accepted being poor and considered luxury as a temptation or even a moral failing. He understood that he would need to be a moral leader in all of his work, eliminating any signs of corruption or self-dealing in order to attract followers and participants in his political, union and civil rights efforts.

Like Marshall, he looked at the big picture and saw a need for public leaders who would be “different” from regular people, held to a higher standard, relied upon as solid and ethical, aware of their own potential faults but self-aware and self-correcting. He would need to be “public-spirited”, working to identify a common core of beliefs, policies and actions that met the public’s needs and were effective, even if they weren’t his own exact beliefs.

Randolph started as a radical leftist, promoting Marx and the Russian Revolution. He became more pragmatic in his work and as a married man and Harlem socialite. He worked as a union organizer, earning some victories. He worked with the Pullman Car porters for a dozen years, attracting union members and union recognition, followed by a breakthrough contract in 1935, giving him a high national profile.

With the build-up to WW II, the country needed more war production but failed to employ the Black workforce in large numbers. Randolph was able to persuade FDR to issue an executive order prohibiting discrimination in war factory production. Randolph used the threat of a “march on Washington” to achieve this goal. FDR blinked, perhaps reconsidering his statement that “You can’t bring a hundred thousand negroes to Washington, somebody might get killed”. Other civil rights leaders urged Randolph to use the threat of a march to push for greater victories, but he chose to not push any harder at that time. Randolph used his public standing, charisma and moral integrity to promote civil rights in the 1940’s.

Randolph adopted Gandhi’s nonviolent resistance model in the late 1940’s, opposed by many other civil rights leaders who subscribed to the “arc of justice” view that education, prosperity, communication and modernity would slowly persuade Americans to drop their prejudices and advantages and offer equal opportunities and equal rights to all. Brooks emphasizes the “ironic” nature of nonviolent resistance. It is designed to use weakness to build leverage against the powerful oppressor by forcing him to act and expose his worst side and thin excuses. It requires extreme self-discipline to embrace the suffering required for effectiveness. It is rooted in the biblical prophecy tradition, calling upon higher principles, demanding justice, forcing confrontation rather than simply hoping for good-will and time to prevail. It embraces a religious view of broken man, requiring strong forces to move him out of his sinful thoughts and habits.

Rustin was shaped by the AME church and the Quakers. A scholar, poet, speaker and athlete, Rustin had many talents and many interests. He began as an organizer in a Christian pacifist organization. Linking religion and politics, Rustin tried to combine a path to inner virtue with a strategy for social change. Rustin became a speaker and organizer for the civil rights movement, risking his life in various civil disobedience acts. He chose to go to jail for his pacifist beliefs rather than do service as a conscientious objector during the war. Even within prison he promoted desegregation. Following his 3-year prison term, Rustin resumed his civil rights activism.

Rustin accepted his gay self during college and found some support from his tolerant family and a Harlem subculture, but America at that time did not tolerate this personal option. Despite Rustin’s attempt to fill the role of a morally solid, dignified, respected leader, he was tempted by promiscuity. This caused him and his organizations problems leading him to back out of any public leadership role in 1953. He remained engaged as a civil rights leader, training, organizing and promoting activities, events and other leaders.

In 1962 Randolph and Rustin revived the idea of a massive “march on Washington” as a way to pressure president Kennedy to act rather than just study or discuss civil rights legislation. The more progressive and traditional civil rights leaders initially opposed this escalation, concerned about the risks and the potential reduction of their political influence. The Birmingham marches and police responses raised the temperature and convinced most to support the “march on Washington”. Randolph and Rustin organized and led the march. King served as the headliner. It attracted attention and served as a “tipping point” for civil rights.

Brooks emphasizes the active nature of the civil rights movement based upon a “crooked timber” view of man. This was not a more radical “Black Panthers” approach, but it was radical nonetheless. The participants were willing to invest their lives into a cause, an institution, greater than themselves, on behalf of their ancestors and descendants. The leaders understood that extreme action was required. They understood that their own actions were subject to the same human weaknesses. Action required leadership. Leaders quarreled and indulged their own weaknesses. Yet, these leaders prevailed.

7. Love: George Eliot/Mary Anne Evans

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Eliot

Mary Anne Evans was born in a small central England community in 1819, as the Victorian age was digesting “cracks in the faith”. Her father was a carpenter and middle-class land agent/manager. Her mother struggled with severe medical challenges and died when Mary Anne was 16. Mary Anne and her siblings attended boarding schools. She received a superior education for a young woman of her time but was required to return home and become the female head of household when her mother died. Biographers contrast this extremely intelligent and well-educated young woman with an emotionally deprived young woman.

Evans began her fiction writing career at age 37 and was soon world famous. She adopted the pen name George Eliot to shield her personal life from public attention and to ensure that she would not be pigeonholed as merely a woman writer. Silas Marner, Adam Bede, Middlemarch and her other works are considered classics of Victorian, British, Western and World literature.

She is considered one of the first to truly describe the inner self. (Freud’s influential writing began a quarter century later in 1890). D. H. Lawrence wrote “It was really George Eliot who started it all. It was she who started putting the real action inside”. She is considered a master of “realism”, describing local worlds, characters and times as they fully exist. Her work is prior to “depth psychology” or purposely making characters represent or illustrate abstract philosophical, psychological, scientific, artistic or political viewpoints. She introduces women as deeply real characters, on par with men, emphasizing their real-world interactions, not just romantic fantasies. Her novels are written bottom-up, inside-out, organically or holistically, connecting the pieces as in real life, allowing readers to see multiple levels and perspectives. She is considered a perceptive and empathetic author, highlighting the real character development of ordinary people. Her work is noted for its excellent plots, descriptions, dialogue and character development, especially moral development.

In 1840, when Evans came of age, the Enlightenment, Protestant Reformation, Counterreformation, Scientific Revolution, Colonialism and Deism were old news. The Industrial Revolution and rapid urbanization were causing problems in Europe and the United States. The philosophy of Locke, Hobbes, Voltaire, Hume, Diderot and Kant was widely understood by intellectuals. Hegel was seen as a leading new voice. John Stuart Mill was consolidating the Utilitarian perspective. Fichte, Schiller, Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, Emerson, James and Spencer were attracting attention. While the Victorian Age was socially conservative, this was a pivotal period in intellectual history with increasing challenges to the “received Christian tradition”.

As an intellectually precocious youth and young adult, Mary Anne digested the newer views in the context of her “lived experience”. At 21, she encountered Charles Hennell’s early “historical Jesus” work and agreed that there was little evidence to support the claimed miracles. She befriended Charles Bray who proposed a combination of a watchmaker God/Deism and Social Gospel activism based on deeply understanding the rules God provided. She translated Feuerbach’s “The Essence of Christianity” from German. Feuerbach proposed that the essence of Christian morality could be preserved through love. Love was the highest power and truth, capable of triggering transcendence. Her husband, George Lewes, was freethinking and romantic. He was knowledgeable about French and German life and writers. He was witty and effervescent in a British society that valued dour self-importance.

Brooks outlines Eliot’s journey of character development. She began as a very needy individual, intellectually advanced but emotionally handicapped. She sought love, acceptance and affirmation, but did not find them. She smothered her brother, father and a series of men, but failed to win their affection. Biographers say that her neediness and plain appearance were equally damaging in not reaching her goals. At age 23, she informed her father that she could no longer practice a religion which she did not believe in. This led to a dramatic separation and reconciliation. Evans began to learn that intellectual principles must be applied, weighed, compared and balanced with other human, familial and social considerations. Brooks notes that her intellectually driven need to pursue “the truth” helped her to apply the same principles to herself, seeing that she was selfish and narcissistic.

Mary Anne applied her intellectual talents as a writer and editor with some success. She pursued men and failed to win them. She developed intellectually and emotionally through her twenties. She was romantically attracted to the young philosopher Herbert Spencer, but this did not work out. Evans was disappointed at age 32, but was incrementally developing her worldview, self-confidence, dignity and agency.

Mary Anne met George Lewes in 1851 at age 32, and they agreed to “marry” in 1854. Lewes brought much baggage. He had been married to a woman for 11 years who had a long running affair with another man and children. Lewes adopted the children and never divorced his wife. Mary Anne and Lewes moved to the Netherlands, Germany and other continental countries to escape the inevitable rejection from British Victorian society.

Brooks describes Evans’ relationship with Lewes as based upon “intellectual love”. Evans continued to seek someone who would affirm, support, accept, embrace, value, engage, understand, and love her. Brooks asserts that she found this. They shared a world of ideas, the pursuit of moral and intellectual truth, common acquaintances, intellectual experiences and a vocation.

Brooks views “love”, however derived, as an even larger force than mere agency and sees it applied in Evans’ life with Lewes and her remarkable literary career. Love is described as reorienting the soul, losing control, falling, irrational, surrendering, vulnerable, naked, weak, broken, fused, affirmed, growing, giving, receiving, poetic, losing mind, magical, submissive, embracing, local, specific, narrowing, transcendent, awakening, enlarging, energetic, softening, serving, amazing and caring. Whew! He claims that Evans and Lewes were transformed and ennobled by their mutual claims and commitments to each other. Evans viewed marriage as a spiritual rather than a legal connection and observed the conventional dimensions of married life with her new husband.

Evans and Lewes continued to learn on their European journeys. She started writing fiction at age 37. Her works were quickly well received. She had leveraged her inherent talents of observation and empathy with her position as a “marginal” person in society, carefully watching her interactions with others skeptical of her status as a member of society. Eliot never achieved a self-confident state. She wrestled with anxiety and depression. Writing was a struggle. She had to feel the experience of her characters in order to translate them into words.

In the end, Eliot was a radical, innovative, breakthrough author much at home with the intellectual developments of her time. Yet she was a traditionalist honoring the ways and values of her time and her father. She was a realist about life, most famous for describing the reasons for unsuccessful marriages. In her writing and her philosophy, she adopted no grand schemes. Her successful characters worked within their own limits, trades and neighborhoods. They lived incremental, practical, cautious lives, reflecting who they were. They were humble, tolerant, sympathetic and decent. They grew practically and morally by making small decisions. They were honest men and women pursuing their lives within a social fabric.

Like many coming 19th century philosophers and novelists, Eliot points to day-to-day life as the answer or meaning of life in a disenchanted world. Local experience. Practical institutions like marriage. Small decisions of self-control, duty, sacrifice and service. Daily work in a vocation. Tolerance and acceptance of neighbors. Embracing the ugly, stupid and inconsistent people in life as they are. Cherishing all possible hopes.

Brooks summarizes Eliot as a “both/and” inspiration. “Tolerant and accepting, but also rigorous, earnest, and demanding. She loved but she also judged”. I think Brooks chose to highlight Evans/Eliot because she considered the intellectual forces rejecting Christianity, agreed with the detailed criticisms, but remained focused on the need for a society based upon broken human nature and practical possibilities within a set of familiar local experiences and institutions.

8. Ordered Love: St. Augustine of Hippo

Brooks attempts to condense Augustine’s life, journey, conversion, theology and impact into 16 short pages! He focuses on the contrast between an upwardly mobile rationalist and skilled rhetorician and the passionate tugs of his own heart and his mother.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augustine_of_Hippo

Brooks highlights irony, contrast, tensions, complements, duality, evolution and journeys throughout this book as he seeks to illustrate, teach, inculcate and build character. Augustine’s conversion story is familiar to many who have read it in church, Western Civilization, political theory, theology or psychology classes. He was one of the first authors in the western tradition to look deeply inward. He was already knowledgeable about several religions and highly skilled as a teacher of rhetoric before his conversion to Christianity. He was a seeker, a searcher, ambitious, advancing, proving, learning, and enjoying. He was successful, but he felt a void, a gap, something missing.

Looking inward, he found brokenness, crooked timber, original sin, a self which was unmanageable and inconsistent. He knew what was right, but he did otherwise. Repeatedly, passionately, with self-awareness. His self-awareness and emotional depth made this contradiction a big problem. He tried to ignore it, but once he was aware of this gap it continued to grow. He tried to delay confronting it, but as a “seeker of truth”, he had to consider its meaning.

He also found that the void in his core pointed towards the infinite, the eternal, to God. He was unable to find the “answers” in himself, in his daily activities and success, even in his seeking. The base of life had to be in God, not in his self.

Augustine contrasted the shortcomings of the dualistic, good and evil, Manicheans with the Christians who also had idealistic principles, but who focused more on the individual person or soul, who worshipped this “son of man” and “son of God”. The Christian faith both pointed towards the awesome God and to the individual man, made in the image of God. As part of the Judeo-Christian tradition, this religion emphasized personal responsibility and wrestled with man on earth and man in spirit. It provided a richer tapestry for faith.

Augustine focused on the concept of Grace, the forgiveness of sins and embrace of man by God solely due to God’s choice, not earned by man. This would later play a key role in Luther’s thinking. For Augustine it provided a way to undercut the deeply felt desire of a seeker of wisdom, truth, control and pleasure to manage his own life. The individual by himself was unable to make true progress in life. Without a framework, order, principle, crutch, lever or basis, he was condemned to flail, to dig his hole deeper with every action. With this intuitively felt God, expressed in the historical story of Jesus on earth, an individual could start with a reliable context of meaning and spirit. Most importantly, it meant giving up control of the journey, method, way or approach.

The individual needed to surrender to the graciously given Love of God, the embrace of God, the acceptance from God in order to turn away from selfishness. The goals, passions, methods, and failures of the self could be replaced by a simpler way. The failures of achievement could be replaced with responsive service. The individual was not then made perfect, but the gnawing disappointment and anxiety of striving could be calmed. The balance between the ineffective self and the most effective God could slowly but consistently improve.

Some of this path is closely tied to Augustinian Christianity. Brooks argues that the broader journey and components are more universally applicable. Connecting with a philosophy or community that is broader than yourself. Managing selfishness. Wrestling with pride. Honestly observing human behavior. Honestly looking at your own psychology, habits, tensions, motivations and shortcomings. Considering the full effects of your behavior, habits, goals, passions, and priorities. There are no “easy” solutions. The journey remains a journey with suffering, hope, happiness and thanksgiving.

Brooks emphasizes the paradoxical nature of Augustine’s journey. Seeking builds skills, talents, knowledge, experience and desires. Roadblocks inevitably fill the path. Progress is made in some places but not in others. The pain of unfulfilled progress drives courageous self-assessment. Augustine uses his best skills to find a “compromise” solution. “Make me chaste, but not yet”. Like Rene Descartes, Augustine searches for what he “cannot doubt”. He identifies his own imperfection and the mysterious call of God. He wrestles with these maxims and everything else he “knows”. He seeks help. His friend, God or the spirit point him to a Bible passage. This verse helps Augustine to more clearly see the human predicament. His personal striving is inadequate, no matter how hard he tries to find an answer. The solution is to “let go and let God”, to accept grace, to listen, and to hush. This diminishing of the human mind allows the self to be connected with God and then confidently embrace a path chosen by God. This path does not lead to earthly achievement but does provide a way for life today and for eternity.

The meek shall inherit the earth. Paradox is an appropriate response to man’s condition.

9. Self-Examination: Samuel Johnson

Samuel Johnson was born in 1709 in a small England town to undistinguished parents. At age 37 he contracted to write an English dictionary, which he completed in 8 years, defining 42,000 words and documenting 116,000 appropriate quotations. He wrote scientific and legal texts for others. He wrote a book of 52 biographies. He created the purported words of speakers in parliament for two years based upon an informer’s summary. He wrote thousands of essays on diverse subjects. He was a leading figure in British letters, a noted conversationalist and friend to dozens in all classes.

Johnson suffered from early medical issues that made him partially blind, deaf and lame. From an early age he recognized that his handicaps constrained him and made others interact with him in various ways. He chose to actively engage in the battle to live his life. Johnson had diverse interests and a short attention span. He learned from his solid primary and secondary classical educations. He took advantage of his father’s books and read widely. He was basically self-taught. He attended Oxford for one year without learning much due to his attitude and the more conventional approach to learning which it required. He did show glimpses of outstanding work and learned that he could function at the highest level.

Johnson left the university after one year. He tried teaching but failed. He continued to learn on his own. He married a woman 20 years his senior. He started a school which failed. His health deteriorated further, developing behavioral tics and fighting depression. He continued to engage with life and people and devour his food and live “hand to mouth”. At 28 he departed for London and supported himself as a freelance writer on the edge of poverty.

His career and life began to blossom when he started crafting his imagined versions of parliamentary speeches at age 29. Johnson built upon his talents. He leaned into his problems and “managed” his suffering. He interacted and engaged broadly even though others mostly rejected him. He developed his craft of reading, discussing, observing and writing. He remained a generalist at a time when specialists were starting to prevail. He was pragmatic, skeptical and determined. He was a social person despite his rejection by most. He decided to be proud and to leverage his pride as a way to combat his feelings of envy. He had an outstanding memory for details and an ability to link memories to context. He was comfortable with details and particulars, aware of general theories but more comfortable drawing smaller lessons. He chose to see the world as a moral place and was motivated to engage and make the world better. He saw the world as it was and was intellectually honest about himself, his acquaintances and men in general.

Johnson had great gifts and major handicaps. He was motivated to engage and improve despite the many headwinds he faced in his first 30 years of life. He was temperamentally a fighter. He was persistent and displayed grit or what the Finns call sisu. He had the ability to digest mountains of material, observe people and synthesize any situation into a summary that included the essence of the situation and some broader implications, including moral implications. He could clearly express his thoughts, integrating his broad learning into his expression. He benefitted from his interactions with people of all walks of life and some of the greatest thinkers of his time.

In addition to suffering, pride and envy, he emphasized charity and mercy in his writings. He disdained pity for handicapped individuals and sufferers, but he empathized with the human condition and believed that individuals were worthy of care and support. As an essayist, he addressed “despair, pride, hunger for novelty, boredom, gluttony, guilt and vanity”. In his breadth of important topics addressed, he compares with Shakespeare.

Brooks argues that Johnson was able to assemble a consistent view of man and morality even though he naturally remained interested in so many different topics and was skeptical of general theories and philosophies. He was a keen observer of himself and others. He was self-critical. He created and tested his ideas about life and morality. He became fearless in addressing difficult situations. He knew his own experience interacting with a difficult world and many different people. He was able to combine this breadth and depth into a practical set of mini generalizations. He was noted for his many insightful maxims about human behavior. Based on his struggles he gradually grew more confident in his ability to manage any situation.

Once again, Brooks encourages the reader to walk away impressed by the subject’s conflicting (dual) attributes. Johnson’s insights were driven by his suffering and his capacity for sympathy. He could see deeply, and he could express what he saw. He combined thinking and feeling. He moved between details and generalizations. He quotes a biographer saying that Johnson was “a mass of contradictions: lazy and energetic, aggressive and tender, melancholic and humorous, commonsensical and irrational, comforted yet tormented by religion”.

10. The Big Me

Brooks contrasts quarterbacks Johnny Unitas and Broadway Joe Namath in 1969 to illustrate the commonly held view that “the revolution” in American culture took place after the “swinging sixties” replaced the self-effacing Greatest Generation with the narcissistic Baby Boomers. Brooks argues that the loss of “moral realism” as the predominant worldview began after WW II when society simply couldn’t handle a future of “dead serious” compliance with strict rules of behavior after 16 years of economic and existential challenges.

Brooks defines “moral realism” as emphasizing “how little we can know, how hard it is to know ourselves, and how hard we have to work on the long road to virtue” … “limited view of our individual powers of reason … suspicious of abstract thinking and pride … limitations in our individual natures”.

He considers romanticism to be the main alternative. Romantics trust the self and distrust the conventions of the world rather than vice versa. Man is inherently good, distorted by social pressures. The individual needs to find himself and develop that self. Nature, the individual, sincerity and identity matter most.

A flurry of positive thinking, self-help, parenting and positive psychology works were embraced after WW II. Be positive, nice, kind, especially to yourself. Break free from the constraints. Carl Rogers urged people to be “positive, forward moving, constructive, realistic and trustworthy”. Pursue self-actualization. “Self-love, self-praise, and self-acceptance are the paths to happiness”. This singularly positive, idealistic and individualistic perspective has shaped schools, curriculums and human resources training. Brooks accepts that this countercultural movement helped to unlock large groups of constrained people (women, minorities, the poor) from socially imposed limitations on life, morality, career and vocation..

Brooks argues that these changes have gone too far. A simplistic romanticism has been turbocharged by faster and more frequent communications, options to personalize each individual’s media consumption and a social media environment that promotes “brand me”. An increasingly meritocratic work world has also pushed individuals to devote more time, talent and effort into competition for apparently limited rewards of money, power, goods and status. Work success has replaced vocation, profession or craft. Work has pushed aside the competing eulogy virtues of Adam II. A tendency to frame all decisions in utilitarian, cost-benefit frameworks has devalued the whole idea of character, sin, ethics, virtues, vices, love, poetry, God, idealism, grace, wisdom and a moral journey. Busyness, status based social invitations and social media status fill the remaining time as a pseudo road to character.

As in his earlier “Bobos in Paradise”, Brooks levies his sharpest criticism upon the upper middle class professional parents who “ought to know better”. Their children are more materialistic. They have unreasonable expectations. Their time is carefully organized by helicopter parents to deliver additional success status to the parents, undercutting the true unconditional love of good parents. Surveys show that we have fewer friends and less intimacy, that we show less empathy. The frequency of use of character terms has declined drastically. Individuals rarely frame decisions in moral terms. Since they rely upon their inner feelings rather than some received or constructed moral framework, they are moral relativists and choose to not judge the character or character journeys of others. A downward spiral continues.

Brooks asks those who believe in moral realism and the overreach of simplistic romanticism to push back. He is not perfectly clear in this final chapter, but the rest of the book emphasizes the notion of pairs of values held in tension. A moral world view is not just positive and idealistic or negative and skeptical. It is a method to consider these conflicting perspectives. We have lost the skills, experience, language and frameworks to consider moral choices and to purposely develop character as a meaningful way of life.

Brooks offers 15 solutions. Live for holiness. Fight selfishness. Use your heroic capacity to struggle against external and internal challenges. Humility is the first virtue. Pride is the central vice. Struggle against sin and for virtue. Purposely build character skills, habits, experiences and preferences. Focus on the long-term, permanent attributes of life. Seek help in building character. Recognize the U-shaped pattern of falling, evaluating, feeling and accepting grace and recovering. Quiet the self enough to listen and defeat weaknesses and temptations. Aim for a practical wisdom built upon experience and history rather than a perfect ideology, theology or philosophy. Organize work around a “vocation” and do your best. Define leadership as finding “a just balance between competing values and competing goals”. Embrace the path of becoming better in your vocation and better as a person. That is the opportunity we are given.

American Presidents – 36 Great Biographies

https://www.laphamsquarterly.org/contributors/roosevelt

45 presidents. 36 great biographies. Just 20 presidents qualify. 9 presidents hog 24 of the 36 places with multiple entries. Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, Roosevelt, FDR, LBJ, Nixon, Reagan and Clinton won multiple spots in my ranking. Grant, Adams, JQA, Jackson, Wilson, Hoover, Kennedy, Ike, Truman, Bush, Bush and Carter claimed a single entry each.

As Americans, we demand and deserve the very best. We must demand this level of greatness now and in the future. We have 330 million fellow citizens. The “1%” is 3.3 million residents! So may qualified and experienced people. The Fortune 500 has 500 CEOs, 500 presidents, 500 CFO’s, 500 CIO’s, 500 CMO’s. 50 governors. 3,000 university presidents. 500 hospital system presidents. 100 national law firm managing partners. 50 national CPA managing partners. 100 large national NFP presidents. 1,000 large privately held firms. 100 big city mayors. 500 medium sized city mayors. 50 religious organization leaders. 100 media firm leaders. 100 generals. 1,000 college and pro head coaches. 100 major think tank leaders. 100 investment bankers. 100 venture capitalists. 100 community organizers. 100 ambassadors. 500 Nobel prize winners. 100 senators and 365 congress persons. 500 large school superintendents. 1,000 award winning performing artists. 500 elite athletes.

We live in a meritocratic society. There are 10 to 100,000 people clearly qualified to be the American president. We should never, ever settle for anything less.

We Need a More Legitimate US Senate

https://kids.britannica.com/students/article/13-colonies/338325

The alliance of 13 independent states to become the United States of America enshrined the notion of “minority representation” in the US constitution. North versus South. Different religious majorities. Rural versus urban. Domestic versus international leaning. Free versus Slave.

We should embrace that principle but fine-tune the mechanism. Two senators per state when the population was just 3 million was a practical compromise. The US population reached 300 million in 2006; 100 times larger. The numerical and proportional differences today are simply too large to ignore. Louisiana and Kentucky at 4.6 million people are the median states. The average state population is 6.6 million today. 5 states, SD, ND, AL, VT and WY have less than 1 million citizens. They get 5 to 7 times more representation than the “typical” state. I recommend that we accept this difference as a way to preserve “minority representation” and the legitimacy of our democratic system.

On the top side, four states stand out. California (39M), Texas (30M), Florida (22M) and New York (20M) have populations 5-8 times the median and 3-6 times the average population. [For perspective, note that California’s population today is 13 times as large as the whole country in 1780.] I recommend that these four states be given 2 extra Senators since they have more than 4 times the median state population. Seven states have populations more than twice as large as the median 9M: PA, IL, OH, GA, NC, MI and NJ. I recommend they each get an additional Senator. [California (19x), Texas (15x), Florida (11x) and New York (10x) after these changes are still less represented than the dozen states with populations of just one million, rounded; just not so disproportionately.]

This change would add 15 Senators. It would dilute the “minority representation” of the other 39 states by 15%.

Fortunately, the political impact of this change would be modest, so both parties can support this improvement in political legitimacy. CA and NY are Democratic locks, while Texas and Florida are Republican locks. Illinois and New Jersey are Democratic locks, while Ohio is a Republican lock. Pennsylvania and Michigan lean left, while Georgia and North Carolina lean right. Net, net this change adds one Democratic Senator out of the new 115 seats, an immaterial number.

The Senate is a very important part of our government. It acts as a check on the more representative and responsive House. It approves treaties, constitutional amendments, judges and presidential appointments. The number of Senators drives the size of the electoral college. Changes should not be made without due consideration.

My Republican colleagues might reject this “out of hand” because it costs them a Senate seat today and it reduces the future leverage of less populated states. I think that the legitimacy of our government, to prevent populist winners and civil war is reason enough to “fine tune” our system. Republican oriented Texas and Florida are growing faster than California and New York, so their citizens are the most “disenfranchised” by the current system in the future. A revision might block the pressure to admit DC and PR as states. Four of the five next least populous states are likely Democratic states in the future: DE, RI, ME, NH versus MT, which has some Democratic voting potential. The next, Hawaii, is a Democratic lock. In the next five, KS, NE and WV are safe Republican seats, but Idaho and New Mexico could follow Colorado and Nevada into the other party’s column.

It’s time for all Americans to step out of their partisan comfort zones and think about what is best for the country in the long-term. This is a reasonable change that everyone should support.

https://www.statsamerica.org/sip/rank_list.aspx?rank_label=pop1

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/01/heres-how-fix-senate/579172/

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/11/28/by-2040-two-thirds-of-americans-will-be-represented-by-30-percent-of-the-senate/

https://www.vox.com/2020/11/6/21550979/senate-malapportionment-20-million-democrats-republicans-supreme-court

https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/10/politics/small-states-supreme-court/index.html

https://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2019/4/9/18300749/senate-problem-electoral-college

Why We’re Polarized 2020

0. What Didn’t Happen

Was Trump’s 2016 victory extraordinary? Hillary Clinton, Democrats, never-Trumpers and most journalists and analysts said “of course”. Many competing explanations were offered. Political data analyst Larry Bartels disagrees. Comparing the results of the 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016 campaigns, Trump’s percentage vote results are normal for a Republican presidential candidate when disaggregated by gender, race, religion, popular vote and historical Republican voter percentage support. Even though 61% of exit poll respondents said Trump was unqualified to be president and “principled” conservatives and his primary opponents painted him in the most unfavorable light initially, Trump was able to attract the normal Republican share of voters, mostly from the usual demographic groups.

Non college graduate white voters moved to Trump in significant numbers in 2016, especially in swing states, delivering his narrow electoral college win but other voter slices remained “normal”. Given Trump’s many headwinds, the more important question is “how was he even competitive”? Klein’s answer is that American politics, especially at the national level, is highly polarized based upon a binary split of political identities. Voters on both sides voted for their traditional “home team”, their political party, in spite of the wrinkles provided by Trump’s extraordinary campaign, voting against “the other guy” even more than “for” their heroes.

Klein claims that our political system, not the individual participants, no matter how interesting to follow, has evolved to become a self-reinforcing system that builds ever more polarization. He notes that most political issues have been studied by well-meaning academics, advocates and politicians resulting in compromise proposals that could address the basic challenge while meeting some of the desires of the political parties and not triggering rejection from the majority of either party. But when such proposals are made from either team or from blue ribbon panels, the political logic then focuses on the differences and makes real-world political adoption impossible. When “push comes to shove”, politicians decide that they are personally better positioned to fight “the other guys” than to be part of a compromise solution, aka a “defeat”.

The term “identity politics” has been used by Republicans to criticize and undermine parts of the Democratic coalition: blacks, Hispanics, Asians, women, LGBTQ, etc. However, the term is essential because almost all politics is “identity politics”. Individuals support parties, proposals and candidates that match one of their various identities, whether demographic, geographic or based on values. Politics is about defining brands that can be assembled in a coalition to drive political wins by parties, candidates and interest groups. Everyone has personal and political identities and winning political actors cater to them. Klein asserts that today we are more focused on political identities than on specific policies or issues. Further, he notes that our many identities increasingly overlap with the political identity of Red versus Blue, right versus left, conservative versus liberal, Republican versus Democrat. Partisan identities have merged with racial, religious, geographic, ideological and cultural identities. This simplification and streamlining have led political actors to be laser focused on this single dimension helping to further grow its dominant “share of mind”.

1. How Democrats Became Liberals and Republicans Became Conservatives

In 1950 a committee of the American Political Science Association concluded that the two parties were too similar and were doing voters a disservice by not providing them with clearly different choices. Political parties exist in representative democracies to give voters shortcuts. Voters can’t or don’t wish to become familiar with hundreds of policy choices, so they delegate this mission to representatives and political parties. Voters choose to support parties and candidates that roughly align with their values and preferences, especially on the few largest issues or general positions. The problem in 1950 was that the Democratic Party combined moderate to liberal to populist northerners with southerners of various views united by the preservation of their state racial policies. This was a “marriage of convenience” that provided the Democrats with national power and southern Democrats with state control at home. The liberal versus conservative scale had great overlaps in the two parties with many liberal Republicans far to the left of conservative Democrats. Many practicing politicians saw no problem with this system, noting that it helped to unify the country.

In 1959 a Republican Party committee decided that building its platform based mainly on ideological values was unwise. Barry Goldwater’s promise to offer “a choice, not an echo” in 1964 was diametrically opposed to this viewpoint. Goldwater and the Republican Party across the country lost badly in 1964 trying out this new approach. Most politicians doubled down on “moderation” after this result which was later reinforced by George McGovern’s similar loss in 1972. In the 1976 election 30% of Americans saw “no” ideological difference between the parties and only 54% agreed that the Republican Party was more conservative.

Ticket splitting between state and presidential candidates was commonplace into the 1970’s but had nearly disappeared by 2018. Using a “feeling thermometer” with a 1-100 degree scale, voters’ views of their own party cooled between 1980 and 2016 from 72 to 65 degrees, in line with more negative polling results about all kinds of institutions. Yet feelings for the “other” party plummeted from 45 degrees to a very chilly 29 degrees. Negative partisanship changed dramatically during this period. Other research showed that independents in 2000-4 were more consistent in supporting their favored party than were “strong partisans” in 1972-76. Self-described “independents” had grown from 20% to 37% of the electorate, but they were more politically consistent than self-proclaimed party stalwarts of the earlier era. Researchers say that independents vote against one of the parties consistently even though they do not align with the other party. We like “our” party less, but we dislike the “other” party much more.

The US has a long history of claiming that we prefer moderates, centrists and independents, going all the way back to George Washington. We dislike parties, factions and partisans because they highlight “conflict”. Historically, we prefer to be seen as “independent”, individualistic, thoughtful, reasoned, flexible, etc. We don’t want to be seen as inflexible or extremist, unwilling to compromise. But as the parties have become more clearly and reliably conservative versus liberal, they have crafted their messages and attracted candidates to match and we, the citizens, have moved along becoming more partisan and less apologetic about it. Survey questions on race, immigration, poverty programs and other issues show growing gaps between the opinions of Republicans and Democrats with the average gap growing from 15 points in 1994 (Clinton era) to 36 points recently. Voters better align with party positions today. Positions between the two parties are further apart. Party supporters increasingly see the “other” party as not just disagreeing, but disagreeable, a growing threat to many policies and values the hold dearly.

Klein provides examples on taxes, international trade, health care and abortion to show that presidents and parties in the 1970’s to 1990’s were still able to embrace compromise solutions on high visibility issues. We all know that has been impossible for the last 25 years. The parties have clarified and aligned their positions on a left to right scale and moved further apart. In this simpler world, voters find it easier to match their views with one party. As voters focus on this single, clear identity and reinforce it for years they find it nearly impossible to break with their self-identity and vote for the “other” party. In 2016, 45% of Republicans and 41% of Democrats saw their opponents as “a threat to the nation’s well-being”.

Challenge: Klein’s overall framework and evidence are compelling for me. However, in many places he seems to overstate his case. This makes the prospects of reform or change difficult to even imagine. In this case, keep in mind that the country is roughly split into thirds between the red, blue and purple. 45% of one-third is 15%. 41% of one-third is 13%. In the hotly contested 2016 election 28% of the population was really concerned about the “other side”. That is a big number, a true weakness in our democracy, but it is a minority position. These positions may be weakly held and subject to “cooling off” with different candidates, issues and party platforms in the future.

2. The Dixiecrat Dilemma

Southern Democrats were termed Dixiecrats in the post WW II era. The 11 states of the Confederacy had founded stable one-party authoritarian states in the 1890’s and maintained them for the next 70 years in alliance with the national Democratic party. Robert Mickey is quoted as saying “these rulers curtailed electorates, harassed and repressed opposition parties, and created and regulated racially separate – and significantly unfree – civic spheres. State-sponsored violence enforced these elements in a system that ensured cheap agricultural labor and white supremacy”. As with other one-party authoritarian regimes, staying in power was always the primary objective. Democrats held 90% of elected offices and less than 10% of Blacks were registered to vote.

The Dixiecrats’ regional domination translated into national power within the Democratic party. In the first third of the twentieth century, they comprised two-thirds of the house caucus. They maintained at least 40% of the caucus seats for the next two decades. Based on the seniority system and lack of candidate turnover, southern Democrats ran almost all committees of congress, holding veto power over all legislation at both the committee and party levels. Modern readers are often surprised to see the anti-civil rights positions, or lack of action taken by FDR, Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy, but practical politics played a critical role at that time.

The 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed with the support of 80% of House Republicans and 60% of House Democrats. President Johnson led the arm-twisting, breaking the Dixiecrat-Democrat link forever. Republican presidential nominee Goldwater voted against the bill. Suddenly the Republican party’s small government and state’s rights position became more appealing to southern politicians that were in no hurry to overhaul their local societies.

A little detour. Polarization is not extremism, but it is sorting. Polarization occurs when almost everyone choses one of two options with nearly no one left undecided or in the middle. 50/0/50 for example. 45/10/45 for example. Many political scientists would say 40/20/40 isn’t polarized, just sorted. Klein views “extremism” as how far towards the extreme end of the political spectrum a party’s choice is on an issue. The two parties can completely disagree, but one or both can hold relatively moderate positions when gauged against history or experience in other nations. He also criticizes the idea of a “moderate majority” because most individuals with “moderate” politics scores actually have a combination of left and right views on particular issues, with some being very extreme. He calls this group of people “internally unsorted”. The author is trying to distinguish between polarization and extremism. We clearly have polarization today: less ideological overlap, fewer people in the middle and more tension at the poles. Party positions are not automatically more “extreme” than they were historically.

Challenge: It appears that Republicans after Newt Gingrich have chosen to take extreme, yes/no positions on taxes, budgets, fiscal policy, guns, education, abortion, etc. in order to align voters with the “conservative” axis, to change the terms of debate with Democrats and to improve the effectiveness of their messaging. This appears to have been a very successful strategy.

Between 1955 and 2015, the Republican Party increased its share of non-White voters from 2% to 10%. The Democrats increased their share from 6% to 43%. The electorate became more racially diverse overall, with Democrats capturing nearly all of the change.

In 2014 evangelical Protestants were the largest religious group in the Republican Party while “nones” were the largest in the Democratic Party.

Geographical patterns are becoming more fixed and divided by party. County level results between McGovern in 1972 and Carter in 1976 were largely uncorrelated. Landslide counties with 60% or higher presidential support increased from 39% in 1992 to 61% in 2016. The urban/rural divide is greater and more consistent today. Bill Clinton carried 1,500 of 3,100 US counties in 1992, Al Gore won 700 in 2000 and Hillary Clinton won fewer than 500 counties in 2016, nearly all urban.

A 2017 poll revealed that 65% of Republicans prefer to live in large homes, farther apart, away from schools and shopping versus 61% of Democrats who prefer the complement of smaller houses within walking distance of schools and shopping.

Each of these changes means that political identities are becoming more important as they overlap with other identities and reinforce the political identities. Living with more people with a shared political identity does the same thing.

Klein proposes that a single personality trait sometimes underlies the main differences between liberals and conservatives. One scholar focuses on “openness – a general dimension of personality tapping tolerance for threat and uncertainty in one’s environment”. Another pair say to focus on “your perception of how dangerous the world is. Fear is perhaps our most primal instinct”. A third pair highlight “fluid” versus “fixed” approaches to managing threats and dangers. Liberals hold a basic optimism because they are open to experience while conservatives are closed to such risks, favoring conscientiousness, order and tradition that buffer change. People high in “openness” experiment with food, travel, options and politics. More “conscientious” people are more organized, faithful and loyal. Hence corporate store planners drop Whole Foods stores into Democratic locations and Cracker Barrels into Republican locations.

Challenge: the “entrepreneurial” wing of the Republican Party might disagree. A single conservative versus liberal axis combines a variety of views on economics, religion, race, class, opportunity, justice, fairness, immigration, freedom, international politics and economics which may not be perfectly compatible.

The author is not saying that personality strictly determines political views, but that this general difference in world views is correlated with political positions, so it is likely that personality drives politics at least as much as rational arguments. Liberal political views supporting changes, difference and diversity “fit” with a predisposition to “openness”. Political conservatives naturally overlap with preferences for predictable life in a smaller town, near family, based in faith, frequenting familiar stores.

Other research shows that the alignment between these measures of “openness” and “fluidity” are effective predictors of political views of those who are highly engaged in politics. Individuals work hard to achieve internal consistency. They manage their self-identity. Less politically engaged individuals don’t feel the need to align their votes with themselves. They tend to vote on a more transactional basis, looking for policies that might deliver personal benefits. “When we participate in politics to solve a problem, we’re participating transactionally. But when we participate in politics to express who we are, that’s a signal that politics has become an identity. And that’s when our relationship to politics, and to each other, changes”.

3. Your Brain on Groups

Research demonstrates that “discrimination” is a universal phenomenon. The targets and intensity vary by time and culture. The mental steps and rationalizations are the same everywhere. We have a deep mental capability to classify groups as “we” and “they”. We discriminate against “the other” even if there is no real basis or advantage. This conflicts with the “rational” view that posits that we perceive slights or threats from others and therefore work against them. Experiments showed that it took almost no time or effort to get individuals to adopt a group identity and then to discriminate between their group and another group even when there was no advantage to the home group or even if there were opportunities to increase the total take from the experiment by making more equal choices. Winning, rather than maximizing income, seemed to be the biggest driver of group behavior.

Sports team exemplify this kind of irrational attachment. Sports riots are common in North America, Europe and around the world. “Groupness” appears to be an evolutionary advantage. To be part of a group and make it win increased the odds of survival. To be exiled or see your group beaten by rivals could mean death. Some research links these real experiences of loss to psychological conditions such as social isolation. Some authors note that we have evolved to excel in small scale groups but have also managed to adapt these skills to succeed in much larger social environments. These large-scale associations; nations, religions, corporations, military divisions, universities, research parks, co-operatives, political parties, etc. can deliver positive results OR hatred and violence.

A 2015 paper reports “The behavior of partisans resembles that of sports team members acting to preserve the status of their teams rather than thoughtful citizens participating in the political process for the common good”. Research showed that policy ideas and ideology have moderate effects on feelings, and the strength of partisan identity was a much stronger motivator. “Us versus them” comparisons focused attention on potential “losses”, driving rivalry and anger. Partisan identity was also the strongest factor predicting actual voting. The foot soldiers in political campaigns are driven more by identity and group rivalry than by policy and ideology. Winning becomes the “only thing”. The same results occurred for making donations, but here negative feelings toward the opposition were much stronger than positive feelings toward the home party in driving donations. The most engaged people in politics are strongly driven by their political group identity. Politicians need resources from the most engaged, so they highlight group identity and rivalry rather than issues, ideologies or solutions.

Klein tells the story of Beto O’Rourke nearly defeating Ted Cruz with massive support only to be a mere footnote in the presidential primary when he could not capitalize on negative partisanship. Inspiration remains a tool in politics, but it is increasingly bypassed to promote fear of the “other guys”.

The Obama story. Polarization is something that is done to voters and candidates by political hacks, consultants and donors. It is possible to not be divided. Red and Blue states have much in common. Red and Blue voters overlap in every state. Obama doubted polarization and saw his experience as a counterexample. Obama sought to lead, educate, posture and negotiate to engage different groups and perspectives. He was unable to do so. Political identities are not our only or primary identities. We can certainly connect in other ways. Some identities have more influence on our thoughts, feelings and actions. Different experiences trigger different reactions. Individuals can choose to work around the usual flow of messages and message channels to not be polarized. Klein decides Obama was simply too optimistic.

Lilliana Mason argues that our partisan identity has become our mega-identity, subsuming all other identities. Religion, race, class, geography and culture are aligning with politics. When these identities are combined, individuals become even more sensitive to any threats to their mega-identity. We now have feedback loops “all the way down”. Political actors take advantage of these combined identities to trigger positive and negative partisan responses using the most sensitive dimensions of the mega-identity. Repeated experience of this messaging further reinforces the strength of the inter-identity associations.

Challenge: The data does show that the overlaps on various dimensions with political views are more common than before. But this shows that on a population basis there is overlap, not that the mental individual identities are truly fused. Marketers do use tricks to influence people, but their tricks are only grossly effective. The claims of Vance Packard and the Hidden Persuaders from the 1960’s have been repeated ever since, but not shown to be nearly as powerful on society, groups or individuals as claimed. They are effective, or advertisers would stop spending money, but they are not omnipotent.

Klein shares the story of Colin Kaepernick’s protests, the NFL’s responses and Nike’s response to highlight the linking of politics to other identities. He says that politics as the mega-identity is encompassing all others, depriving them of their independence.

Klein highlights the surprising claim that having many strong identities can lead to more cooperative politics as individuals can find some strong links to political actors. Yet if only “Red versus Blue” matters and other identities are submerged, we run the risk of true “winner take all” politics. It becomes “dead serious”. Cross-country research shows that civil wars are LESS likely when nations have multiple significant dimensions of differences. Detailed analysis of voters’ policy views showed that individuals with policy preferences that matched the other party still rated their party much higher. The correlation between policy preferences and identity are weak. Most individuals don’t have detailed policy preferences, but they do know that their identity is the “right one”. So … “The crisis emerges when partisan identities fall into alignment with other social identities, stoking our intolerance of each other to levels that are unsupported by our degrees of political disagreement”.

In 1960 5 percent or fewer Democrats or Republicans reported they would be upset if their children entered into a cross-party marriage. Race and religion mattered much more at the time. In 2010, 49% of Republicans and 33% of Democrats expressed concern. A resume evaluation experiment showed that political affiliation was a greater source of bias than race in recommending candidates for a scholarship. Researchers noted that political identity is fair game for discrimination or even hatred, while race is not. Cable TV news and opinion options confirm this view.

This research suggests that party politics has taken on a life of its own. It can trump objective facts, science and reason. Policy differences and identity conflict can become self-reinforcing; yet another feedback loop. When my team has more immigrants, we’ll adapt policies to be more immigrant friendly, attracting more immigrants and demonizing those who do not support our members and our policies. “Identity doesn’t just shape how we treat each other. It shapes how we understand the world”.

Challenge: Merging all identities and political dimensions into a single scale or two buckets of red versus blue is not as easy or permanent as described. Most democracies have 4-12 parties in order to accommodate these differences. Our two-party system encourages but does not require this consolidation. Third party candidates have not won, but they have influenced American politics. In a two-party system, parties try to align/merge interest groups and prioritize issues that benefit the party. Possible political dimensions are numerous: region, prosperity, urban/rural, industry, domestic/international, race, ethnicity, religion, ideology, class, profession, social policies, economic policies, immigration, international trade, defense, international relations, history, tradition, character, nature, global issues, generations, safety, crime, opportunity, fairness, justice, the list has no end.

President Reagan was a “once in a century” political talent who was able to consolidate various strands into a simple conservative versus liberal/socialist/radical framework. Big business, main street, libertarian, fundamentalist, neoconservative hawks, traditionalists, patriots, ideological conservatives and others were consolidated in opposition to the perceived radical/anarchist/revolutionary/socialist threat of the countercultural and antiwar 1960’s attached to McGovern’s 1972 campaign and the breakdown and ineffectiveness of professional elites in war and economics reflected in Carter’s 1976 presidency. Americans were motivated to vote against what they perceived as both prongs of the Democratic Party. Reagan cleverly linked this to an “American city on the hill”, tradition and a time without political conflict.

Newt Gingrich was not satisfied with presidential power alone and together with groups like the “Club for Growth” encouraged Republican candidates to take “extreme” positions on social issues in order to win congress. No taxes. Taxation is theft. Government is bad. Abortion is murder. No regulations. Minimum criminal sentences. No active fiscal or monetary policy. Drill, baby drill. Bomb, baby, bomb. Terrorism is an existential threat. Oppose everything from Obama. Welfare queens. Willie Horton. Tear down that wall. Greed is good. Free market. This helped to clearly define the Republican Party in opposition to the Democratic Party.

This extreme positioning helped the Republican Party to attract and retain those who agreed with the various “conservative” positions. It also helped the party to paint the opposition party as being clearly against each home position. But it does not reconcile the inherent differences between the different wings of the party. Libertarians and fundamentalist Christians. Big business and populist workers. Dynamic entrepreneurs and Main Street traditionalists. Globalist elites and corporations versus protectionists. Business support for immigration versus worker opposition. Social security and Medicare entitlements versus lower taxes. America first versus economic growth. Truck drivers versus investment bankers. Unconstrained capitalism versus “traditional values”. Free market versus unsustainable health care costs. Democrats face similar challenges in aligning policies with varied group interests. As Klein notes, Blacks, Asians and Hispanics are not inherently or universally liberal; socially, economically or internationally. It may be that the two parties are living in a “one time” period where a single dimension aligns most voters.

4. The Press Secretary in Your Mind

Mr. Klein begins the chapter by sharing a detailed history of the origins of Obamacare based on “individual provision” as a conservative, Republican solution to America’s health care system challenges, including initial Republican support and Romney’s use of the model in Massachusetts. However, by December 2009 every Senate Republican, including those who had sponsored a similar bill in 2007, now rejected it wholesale. When it was time to vote, all Republicans opposed Obamacare and the “individual mandate” component. “Cap and trade” was proposed by some Republicans in 2007 as a carbon emissions solution but then rejected wholesale as support for Climate Change beliefs. Klein rejects simple charges of hypocrisy and lying to explain these, and other changes of opinion made by political leaders.

He proposes a much larger explanation summarized by philosopher Joseph Heath, “The central flaw in the concept of reason that animated the eighteenth-century Enlightenment is that it is entirely ‘individualistic. … reason is both decentralized and dispersed across multiple individuals. It is not possible to be rational all by yourself; rationality is inherently a collective project”. Klein argues that group reasoning is also an evolutionary adaption that is more effective than individual reasoning. Hence, even informed individuals change their “minds” to adapt to the group’s decisions.

Various psychology experiments have shown that many individuals will report different conclusions to mildly ambiguous problems based upon peer pressure. They will comply with other individuals or the group as a whole even if they personally believe in a different solution. Experiments about political policy choices by political partisans reported that party policies quite easily overcame other evidence in selecting preferred policy choices. Reference group information overrode that of policy content. Political parties are a rational response to making many choices. We rationally outsource the detailed research and choice. But parties are not scientists or philosophers searching for truth, they are organizations with their own goals, associated with multiple ideologies and personal and group histories and goals.

Klein rejects the theory that “smart” or “knowledgeable” people are different. More information, better decision-making, awareness of context, etc. are all rejected as relatively minor players in explaining why individuals conform to group norms, especially political positions taken by a party that are “obviously” or “objectively” illogical. One study concluded that individuals are motivated more by improving their group standing by embracing group norms than by “pursuing the truth”. This experiment showed that better math/science skills were helpful in applying data that supported a preconceived position but worse in applying facts that opposed their preferences. Better math skills reduced the ability to solve a problem when it conflicted with previously held policy choices. Partisans exhibited this “blind spot”, while those with mild political views showed smaller self-deceit.

“True believers” on both sides are very adept at constructing such frameworks of logic, data, argument and counterargument to support their policy choices. These arguments are quite unconvincing to scientists or “neutral” parties, but persuasive to political supporters. Even the definition of “expert” is subject to political bias for partisans. Experiments also show that individuals who are most “politically informed” are most subject to such biases. Tests of “historical facts” showed that Democrats would deny positive results to Republican presidents and vice versa, even if they were supposedly “well informed”. So … the logic flows from party and group loyalties to political preferences, judgments and actions. Parties shape beliefs of members. Even these researchers say that for many decisions people are convinced by evidence, but individuals are willing to “rationalize” or “choose” to match the group’s views when a contrary view would threaten the group or our standing in the group. “Groupness” is the trump card, especially for individuals with strong attachment to the group.

Proponents of this view, including Dan Kahan, term this “identity-protective cognition”. Mildly guiding and shaping our views to align with a preferred group is more rational than relentlessly “seeking the truth”. Everyone lives in a social world and values their social standing. That value can outweigh “truth” in many situations. Klein says that this is especially true in the politically charged and socially driven climate of Washington, DC. This drive for belonging can blind the “rational mind” from fighting with the preferred logic.

Klein provides the Supreme Court testimony against the constitutionality of the “individual mandate” as evidence of how motivated partisans are able to create “evidence” to support any pre-existing conclusion, even if the bulk of scientific, professional, mainstream opinion has contrasting evidence and rejects the new claims. This counterevidence appears to have little impact on “true believers”. Klein refers to Johnathan Haidt’s conclusion in “The Righteous Mind” that the “press secretary” is required to defend any policy, history or situation and will do so. Such “motivated reasoning” is common and often pragmatically effective.

Historically, Americans have believed that the Supreme Court, in some sense, was an objective body, subject to political influence, but nonetheless capable of largely finding the “truth” with respect to the “constitutionality” of executive, legislative or judicial decisions. The increased politicization of the Court is leading many to doubt this fundamental pillar of the American political system or to consider changes in its structure to “shore up” this component.

5. Demographic Threat

Change and threats motivate political feelings and actions. In 2013, the majority of US newborns were nonwhite. By 2045, non-Hispanic whites will no longer be an absolute, 51% majority. Hispanic and Asian populations are forecast to double and mixed-race populations to triple by 2060, while the non-Hispanic white population falls from 200 to 180 million. The foreign-born population is expected to increase from 14% to 17% of the nation, a record high, triple the 1970 level of 5%. Women hold more power in society based on their greater educational results. Traditional religious belief and activity are falling. The dominant culture, white and Christian, is losing power. 70% of seniors are white Christians, but only 30% of young adults are white Christians. “Intersectionality” applies to the former majority just as it applies to minorities of minorities.

Data matters, but perceptions are most important. Race is a social construct and whiteness may someday include Hispanics, Asians or mixed-race individuals. Americans tend to overestimate the nonwhite share of the population. Political and media activity matter. It is the “feeling” or “perception” that a political group or identity is threatened which counts.

Research studies show that awareness of such change makes individuals more “conservative” when making political choices. They are primed or triggered to be more aware of potential threats and to respond to the threats. Given the demographic and policy choices of American Republicans and Democrats, this demographic change pushes more Americans to sympathetically consider the “whiter” party.

Klein highlights the “post-racial myth”. Race was a lesser political factor in the 2000’s prior to Obama’s winning candidacy. But this high visibility event resulted in greater sorting of political views by race, despite Obama’s relatively quiet advocacy for specific positions advocated by the Black Caucus. American media provided significantly more minority characters, ads and shows in the 2000’s. Strong minority support was essential for any national Democratic presidential candidate in the twenty-first century. Professors like Amy Chua noted that a very dominant racial/religious group (WASP) could “afford” to be enlightened or “liberal” and provide increased opportunity to minority groups in the 1960’s and 1970’s when their power was assured, but that it was not so easy more recently. While political power lags demography due to voting participation rates, cultural power “leads” because advertisers rationally attempt to develop brand allegiance in unsettled young adults, highlighting the demographic and cultural milieu in which they live. Hence, multicultural news, advertising, music, entertainment and university views get disproportionate attention.

“The left feels a cultural and demographic power that it can only occasionally translate into political power, and the Right wields political power but feels increasingly dismissed and offended culturally”.

Trump was the one Republican who rejected the national party’s 2012 presidential loss post-mortem advice to be “more inclusive” because of the inevitable impact of demographic trends. Trump clearly differentiated himself from the other candidates, doubling down on the majority’s historical cultural, political and demographic identity. Right-wing talk shows in the 21st century routinely adopted “extremist” cultural views that demonized the opponents. And these opponents were linked by political, racial, national, immigrant, gender, cultural, consumption, regional, educational, professional and other identities into a bipolar, Manichean “us versus them” world. These extremist voices were often dismissed by the mainstream media, academicians, scholars, analysts, critics and many “moderate”, “Main Street”, “corporate” or “establishment” Republican leaders. However, they highlighted the increased role that cultural views would have above economic, ideological or international political views in shaping parties and elections.

A 2016 poll reported that 57% of whites thought that discrimination against whites was as big a problem as discrimination against minorities. 48% of millennials agreed, showing that this was not just a Boomer issue. Klein agrees with Seth Trende in validating Trump’s 2016 strategy to focus on motivating the base of 7 million missing white voters in 2012 rather than catering to the vanishing “swing voter” or undecided voter. “White Identity Politics”, once unspeakable, became a clear part of Trump’s winning message and strategy. “Jardina repeatedly finds that much of the strengthening of white political identity is a defense of white political privilege without an attendant rise in racist attitudes”. One-third of the white population feels a sense of racial solidarity. Most of this subset does so without an increase in racial hostility. Hence, a wise marketer like Trump is careful to appeal to both groups of potential supporters.

“The simplest way to activate someone’s identity is to threaten it, to tell them that they don’t deserve what they have, to make them consider that it might be taken away. The experience of losing status – and being told that your loss of status is part of society’s march to justice – is itself radicalizing.

Klein does not go here, but I think some of the tremendous emotional and political reaction to Obama’s 2012 claim that “you didn’t build that” is related to this construct of human perception and thought.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/You_didn%27t_build_that

Klein argues that the post-2016 analysis of Trump’s victory shows that racial resentment activated economic anxiety.

Before Obama racial perceptions were uncorrelated with perceptions of the economy. After Obama, racial resentment was a strong predictor of views on the economy. Trump’s election led to an 80% jump in Republicans confidence about the economy and a 37% fall among Democrats. Klein cites the centrality of anti-immigrant positions in all “far-right” parties around the world as further evidence for the primacy of racial/ethnic views above economic views. He also notes that only right-wing populist parties have grown in recent years following the economic challenges of the Great Recession and the pandemic, not left-wing populist parties who might be expected to capitalize on economic anxiety.

Challenge: This is not very convincing to me. Working- and middle-class whites with economic anxiety have been moving from the union supporting Democrats to the union opposing Republicans since the times of George Wallace in 1968. This accelerated with the Great Recession 40 years later. The coincidence with demographic changes and Trump’s choice to highlight conservative social values above traditional mainstream corporate economic Republican economic choices on trade, immigration and social security do not “prove” that race is the dominant factor. Nativist populist parties have always used social issues: race, ethnicity, religion and nation to drive participation and emotion.

Detour regarding “political correctness” by Klein. The emphasis on the demon “political correctness” by Fox and Republicans is a long-standing political strategy to undercut the opposition, but its increasing use and greater emotional impact is new. This is a “culture war” about what is and who defines “acceptable discourse”.

Demographic change impacts political party positions. Democrats in 1992 presented “balanced” immigration platforms. In 2016 they were decidedly pro-immigrant groups. Klein quotes Michael Tesler, “In the post-civil rights era, Democrats needed to maintain their nonwhite base without alienating white voters. Republicans needed to win over white voters without appearing racist. So their incentive was to speak about race in code. The shifts have made it so Democrats’ incentive is to make explicitly pro-racial equality appeals and Republicans now have an incentive to make more explicit anti-minority appeals”. Democrats and Republicans have increasingly different views on the role of discrimination in explaining why “black people can’t get ahead”. In 1994, a few more Democrats agreed, 39% versus 26%. In 2017, a chasm of 64% versus 14% divided the parties. Klein argues that the merging of racial identity with party identity will continue to drive party choices in the future. As political demography changes, so do political identities.

Klein argues that the loss of white Christian primacy in politics has led to the emphasis on “identity politics” as the Democratic Party has increasingly embraced the preferences of racial and ethnic minorities. He warns that this inevitably leads into greater conflict between the parties. He notes that some talented politicians focus on actions rather than rhetoric to advance their policies to undercut this situation. He also notes that it would be wiser for Democratic politicians to downplay demographic changes by highlighting different terms, definitions and that many states and communities have become demographically diverse successfully. He notes that strong politicians like Obama can combine diverse groups using inspirational speech to bridge demographic gaps, but the demographic changes also call for populists and demagogues to take advantage of the inherent tensions.

6. The Media Divide beyond Left-Right

The political media is biased toward … loud, outrageous, colorful, inspirational and confrontational.

Klein considers other political journalists and media as collaborators fighting to build political attention of people who can choose to pay attention to anything else. No one must follow politics. Most consider it a hobby. Competition for political media attention is greater today because the political and non-political options have exploded. As much political news and commentary is available as anyone could hope for. Access to history is also ubiquitous, while in the past it mostly disappeared within a week.

Many political science models focused on access to information as a key constraint limiting effective democracies. The modern information age has eliminated this constraint, but democracies did not flourish. Political scientists have moved on to make interest in political information the new limit to effectiveness. Prior to the cable and internet revolutions, 3 TV networks and a handful of local and national newspapers served up political news as part of the general news. Some skipped the headlines and opinion pages, but many consumed at least some political news each day. Today, those less interested in politics consume less and those more interested consume more.

Political media is for the politically invested. Producers of political media have adapted to the new consumers. They provide more content. They include opinions. They select news of interest to politicos. They emphasize political identity, conflict and celebrity. Yet another feedback loop. This deepens political identity, hardens polarization and increases the political stakes.

Despite the large overlaps of demography and miscellaneous identities between the red and the blue, modern media has not helped partisans to understand the identity of members of the opposing party. Partisans tend to overexaggerate the distinctive demographics, characteristics and views of the opposition. The media emphasizes party differences – and colorful and opinionated newsmakers. Consumers normalize this input and exaggerate actual differences.

The new political media knows its audience, demographics, preferences, identities, hot buttons, etc. It has real-time feedback on audience followers, clicks and forwards. Klein recounts that Buzzfeed first defined, measured and used the power of identity to build followers, clicks and shares. This source demonstrated that interests could be translated into communities and identities that were powerful in building and deepening audiences. The media did not have to take communities and demographics “as is” but could construct and grow identity-based communities. This didn’t require outstanding insight or journalistic skill, just the willingness to define and feed a group that worked and abandon groups that failed to work. Other social media platforms have followed using the same techniques. Of course, focusing on enemies is a shortcut that is used here. As identities have been defined and fed compatible information, they are stronger today, less able to be changed.

Klein destroys another historical wish. If individuals only read the opposition they would better understand, tone down their rhetoric and views and seek compromise. Research provides no evidence for this view. If anything, individuals required to consume opposing views become more certain about their pre-existing positions. Some political media is designed to persuade and can have some effectiveness in gaining attention or moderating views, but few political media outlets invest in this.

Journalists who perform in a polarized political and media arena produce more polarizing output and become more polarized themselves, by and large.

Historically, the mainstream media promoted objectivity and balance, claiming that it was “above the fray”. With limited competition the main outlets all trended towards the middle and reinforced this informal norm. Today we have returned to the pre-mass media era when most media outlets adopted a political view and made no apologies. Some remain in the middle today, but the growth has been on the polarized ends. Trump capitalized on this world attracting one-half to three-quarters of news coverage during the 2016 campaign. News outlets are free to determine what is “newsworthy” and Trump understood that new, outrageous, conflict-oriented, secret, interesting, shocking, offensive, threatening and celebrity were far stronger than relevant, important, supported, normal, wise, presidential, balanced, consistent, inspirational and objective. In a competitive business, the “race to the bottom” was quick and largely universal.

Challenge: the main-stream media has revised its coverage to reduce the share of “sensational” coverage. It has improved its ability to call out extreme claims and not rely on formulaic “balanced” coverage. Some organizations continue to provide “neutral” news coverage and separate this from their commentary. Individuals who wish to follow this more traditional approach can find it.

7. Post-Persuasion Elections

The rising share of self-defined “independents” among American voters obscures the fact that “true independents”, those without a tendency to consistently support one party or the other had fallen from 22% to just 7% of the electorate by 2000. Bush and Gore ran against each other as “Tweedledum and Tweedle-dee”, a fiscally conservative New Democrat versus a “compassionate conservative”, both competing for the persuadable swing voter. By 2004, politicos had digested the loss of the “middle” voter, the suburban soccer mom, and re-engineered their campaigns to register, message, and energize their base to vote. Messages were sharpened to differentiate between the two parties and to demonize the opposition. Republicans won in 2004 and both parties adopted this strategy going forward. With the parties adopting polarizing strategies, voters learned to pick one or the other and the share of persuadable voters declined even further. The contrasts between Bush, Sr and Bush, Jr or Bill and Hillary Clinton tell the story. Compromise is out. One side is right and the other is wrong.

Political parties expected to benefit from this polarization but have become weaker. They are placeholding labels, fundraisers, messaging coordinators, sources of analysts and advisors but they are not as politically powerful. They don’t choose candidates, define and enforce platforms or influence behavior of elected officials as they once did when they had real power.

Trump conducted a hostile takeover of the Republican Party. He had limited history with the party and had transactionally invested in candidates from both parties. His ideology was undefined, he waffled on many issues, so did not match the views of any existing Republican group. He adopted a mishmash of policies, casually discarding core Republican policies on economics, trade and international relations. He ignored the eleventh commandment to not speak ill of a fellow Republican. He criticized everyone: candidates, war heroes, Senators, military leaders, business leaders and political leaders in terms that were simply “off limits” historically. His character and religious past made no friends. Yet, when he won the primary, almost everyone except for a relatively small group of “never Trumpers” lined up to support his campaign and his actions from 2016 until today. None of this could have occurred when political parties were effective forces.

Republicans who opposed Trump in the primaries in apocalyptical terms decided that a choice between Trump and Hillary or Bernie or Elizabeth Warren or mayor Pete or AOC or even “sleepy” Joe Biden was very easy to make. The Democrats opposed every “core” Republican belief. Trump would deliver on taxes, regulations and judges. He would not allow any Democratic initiatives. Bill Clinton had removed “character” as a requirement for holding higher office. There was no political downside to supporting Trump. The “Republicans in Name Only” (RINOs) were not going to run opposing primary candidates. In the post-Reagan/Thatcher era, politicians were expected to look out for their personal interests, not those of their communities, states, party or nation and they delivered on that promise.

Political parties lost power beginning with the move to direct election political primaries and caucuses in the 1970’s. Insiders – governors, long-term Senators, fundraisers, mayors, political bosses, large state delegate leaders, favorite sons, Wall Street and Silicon Valley community leaders, lobbyist and law firms, the largest corporations, major unions – lost power to whoever could win the most votes. Democrats held on to a small share of “superdelegates” but dropped even this after Bernie’s supporters objected. The McCain-Feingold Act restricted pure party fundraising. The transaction costs of campaigns dropped, allowing individual candidates to compete with their own staff and on-line fundraising from small donors. Parties still play an important role, but they are unable to shape primary and general election campaigns to match the interests of the party, per se.

This matters, because “the party”, the small group of individuals who are able to wield power on behalf of the party (or themselves), has different objectives than the candidates or the party’s voters, donors, volunteers or partisans. Political scientists argue that parties want to maximize their own power. They want to manage the other actors as required in order to use the party’s power. They want to get candidates elected. They want to define deliverable platforms. They want to deliver on the platform promises. They want to raise even more money for the party. They want to constrain the actions of “rogue” congressmen and women. They want activities to fit within the brand and messaging strategies of the party. They want to allocate funds and resources to the races with the best chance of winning for the party. They are OK with “horse-trading” and earmarks and “log rolling” as required to achieve political goals, even at the expense of ideological impurity. The party caucuses in the House and Senate have retained much of this central power, but the “national” parties have not.

This matters because political parties can act as a moderating agent. They identify, select and promote moderate candidates with the highest chance of winning in the general elections. They act as a governor on the pure ideologues, the motivated volunteers and activists and the most extreme candidates. Their downfall has contributed to the polarization of political races. Political scientists observe these forces at the national and state levels. Klein does not cover this topic, but it appears that the ability of more states to earn a trifecta of house, senate and governor rule (and judicial appointments) has radicalized this historical approach, with gerrymandered districts ensuring 60% safe, 10% competitive and 30% safe opponent districts which reduces the need/incentive to select moderate/electable candidates.

The reduction in the role of state and national parties in funding local candidate has changed the priorities for congressional candidates. In order to raise their own money, they need to gather attention from small donors, big donors and the party. To do so, they need to manage public attention by standing out. This encourages more extreme positions, messaging, allies and campaigns. Loud, extreme, controversial. Negative campaigning is up. Attention grabbing events are up. Purist ideological positions and platforms are up. Time devoted to fundraising is up. Winning the primary is most important since most districts are already “safe seats” and most primary opponents’ supporters will “fall in line”.

Klein contrasts large and small donors as pragmatists and purists, corrupt and polarized, details and big issues. Both are required, but wise candidates focus public messaging to attract and serve the small donors while taking time to work with large donors to understand and quietly deliver on their transactional needs. At the presidential level, small dollar contributors increased TEN-fold from 55,000 in 2000 to 566,000 in 2016. The “special interest” groups demonstrated that this could be done, and the political consultants and modern technology have made this a reality.

Politics is increasingly about “national” positions and issues. Donations to state and local candidates have fallen from two-thirds to one-third of the total between 1990 and 2012. With identity more important, individuals invest in those who reflect their party identity, not individual candidates, policies or character. Even at the state and local level, candidates “free ride” on national party identity politics to raise funds and attract voters, rather than invest in differentiating themselves based on local issues or personal attributes like competence or character.

Klein worries that the current environment opens the door for demagogues, populists, showmen and talented extremists and communicators to be nominated and secure power, risking democracy to authoritarians who could become dictators.

8. When Bipartisanship Becomes Irrational

Or, the system is simply broken.

The Supreme Court traditionally acted as a conservative break on the “progress” of the nation based on politics. Justices were nominated by politicians but made decisions based upon their own views. Like the divide between the president and the legislature, or between the House and the Senate, the judiciary provided one last place to buffer rapid changes in a representative democracy. The Warren Court made decisions more liberal than the American public, a historical outlier. The Burger Cort also provided relatively liberal results. Conservatives worked hard to ensure that Republican appointees would no longer “vote their conscience” or their profession but be reliably conservative. Justices like Antonio Scalia developed an “originalist” view which opposed the expansionist view of the Warren Court in defining “rights”.

In 2014 Obama nominated moderate Merrick Garland to succeed Scalia. Senate leader Mitch McConnell refused to consider the nomination, despite 103 comparable cases, because he could. With Trump’s 2016 victory a Republican nominee was appointed to the court. Democrats howled, but Republicans simply disregarded the informal norms. This could undermine the independent, non-political role of the judiciary, but this potential consequence was disregarded.

Klein turns to Juan Linz’s 1990 critique of the American political system. The multiply divided system is designed to prevent hasty progress, yet it has endured for two centuries. No other country has adopted this system. The US did not recommend it to Germany or Japan after WW II. Most democracies have a parliamentary system where the winning party or coalition has the combined legislative and executive power to get things done. The electorate will then judge the results.

Klein raises the big issue of political legitimacy. He accepts that McConnell’s tactics were legitimate and expects that future Senates may oppose all nominees of the other party, because they can. He then points to a world in which the Democrats routinely win the popular vote but lose the presidency due to the electoral college. Or that Democrats win 60% of the popular vote, but less than 50% of the Senate seats. Or that Democrats win 55% of the popular vote, but less than 50% of the House seats. Or that Democrats win 70% of GDP, but less than 50% of the House seats. In a polarized world with geographical advantages favoring one party, what happens in the long run?

Historically, national politics was both national and local. Senators and congressman took care of their constituents in a transactional manner, winning special rules for local interests, military bases and highway projects. Earmarks were used to deliver goods to local representatives who could set aside their political preferences. Voters have increasingly chosen to focus on national issues. Local representatives have increasingly chosen to oppose national policies even if they benefit local constituents.

Klein notes that 2-party politics are quite different when one party is dominant, as was the case from 1865-1965. In this situation, the minority party strives to have some influence. Demonizing the opposition is illogical. Working with the dominant party to limit the impact of its policies is rational. Cooperating makes sense. Once the two parties are relatively competitive, the rules are quite different. Winning is everything. Obstruct when in opposition. Cooperation is for losers. This was the Newt Gingrich moment for the newly competitive Republican Party.

Klein recalls the history of the Senate filibuster. It was accidentally created and mostly used by Southern Democrats to protect their modern version of the “peculiar institution” of racial domination. In recent years Republicans have used the required 60 vote majority as an effective weapon. In similar fashion, Republicans have used the approval of an increase in the “debt ceiling” to fund previously approved spending as another negotiating tool, despite the potential consequences.

“The problem is that we have a political system where the rules create irresolvable conflict, gridlock, and even global financial crises”.

9. The Difference between Democrats and Republicans

The author begins this chapter quoting Thomas Mann and Norm Ornstein in their 2012 book “It’s Even Worse Than It Looks”. These respected authors from opposing think tanks had worked together for many years and established a reputation for objectivity and nonpartisanship. By 2012 they concluded that the Republican Party had become ideologically extreme, contemptuous of traditional policy platforms, scornful of compromise, immune to facts and science, dismissive of the opposition’s legitimacy and opposed to the government which they sought to lead. They weren’t saying the Democrats were saints, but Democrats did largely play by the historical rules of politics, were more centrist ideologically, endorsed core government roles, were open to incremental policy changes and bargaining and less eager to pursue large win/lose situations. Their view was welcomed by Democrats, but controversial amongst independents, journalists and analysts. Trump unapologetically moved the party even further towards the edges, confirming their views.

Mann and Ornstein saw Trump as a logical next step for a party that had taken more extreme and emotional positions and relied upon angry social conservatives and tea partiers who felt that the opposition, the elites and the system conspired to prevent them from living as they wished. As the Republican congress was pushed to adopt more extreme positions and support more extreme politicians, the rest of the political actors at the national, state and local levels adjusted. The establishment, business, suburban, RINO, New England wing of the party lost its remaining power and influence. The conservative media welcomed this alignment of the party and politicians with their own message of rage, confrontation, disruption and revolution.

Klein notes that congressional Republicans have moved further right than Democrats have moved to the left. He also points to the fights between the “true believers” and House speakers John Boehner and Paul Ryan where no position or positioning was radical enough. He believes that Republican willingness to risk financial catastrophe with debt ceiling votes reflects this extreme mindset.

Klein says that the Democrats have not responded to the same polarizing pressures in the same way because the diversity of their coalition prevents it. Party activists have called for stronger measures, but the political leaders have mostly chosen to “waffle” and present policies and actions that appeal to both the progressive-left and the center-left wings of the party. Democrats rely on a coalition of liberal whites, African Americans, Hispanics and Asians. The three minority groups contain conservatives, moderates and liberals. Democrats span many religions and beliefs. Primary election winners must appeal to many groups. In the general election, Democrats face an audience that is quite individualistic, socially conservative and economically conservative compared with European nations. The American political system and the clustering of Democrats in urban areas provide Republicans with a 3-5% built-in advantage in many races. Hence, Democratic political winners must present policies that appeal to both the center and the left in most districts and states.

In 2019 35% of Americans identified as conservatives while only 26% identified as liberals. Liberals cannot support a winning party by themselves. Since only 30% of Americans vote in primary elections and the most partisan people are likeliest to vote, extreme candidates can be elected in Democratic as well as Republican primaries but face a stiffer challenge in the general elections. Three-quarters of Republicans identify as conservative while only half of Democrats identify as liberals. A recent survey reported that 57% of Republicans want their party to become more conservative while 54% of Democrats prefer their party to become more moderate. Democratic activists, partisans and candidates might wish to adopt “Bernie Sanders” positions, but the Democratic winners appeal to moderates as well.

Political scientists describe the Democrats as a coalition of interest groups and the Republicans as a collection of similar ideologies, connected by freedom, liberty and individual rights. Democrats rely upon policies and transactional politics more than Republicans. Klein promotes his view that the Republican party is held together more by identity than by any one purely consistent ideology. One research project was able to demonstrate that Trump’s position (sometimes left or right) was more influential than a voter’s self-expressed ideology in making political choices.

Partisan Democrats also consume a diverse media diet of mainstream media, left-leaning sources and select center-right options. Partisan Republicans consume right-leaning sources alone. This difference also supports Democrats defining and promoting more moderate political positions. Klein notes that the Republican Party has actively opposed the mainstream media and universities for decades, narrowing its news sources, while the Democrats continue to consume from these sources. He argues that conservatives did not create a parallel “neutral” and “objective” media because the existing mainstream media already filled the role well enough.

Klein ends this chapter by focusing on the depth of feeling held by many Republican voters. They see an urgency in winning, in defeating the enemy. They fear that these are the last elections in which their view can be supported in a democracy. He quotes former Bush, Sr and Trump Attorney General William Barr extensively. Barr sees a cosmic competition between secularists and religious people. He believes that the “secularists” will use any means to reach their goal of achieving a secular society where religion is outlawed. He sees religion as “under attack” and society threatened by the “moral relativism” of the secular world view. He points to the combined power of the media, popular culture, entertainment industry and universities to outlaw religious views, sidestepping the political processes and allowing a small unelected minority to impose their view. Many social conservatives share this apocalyptic view and are highly motivated to win this ultimate war.

10. Managing Polarization – and Ourselves

Klein reiterates that polarization, per se, is not a problem. Polarization causes issues to be raised and addressed even if they are not resolved. The absence of polarization can be suppression when real political issues are hidden or ignored. Unfortunately, our current polarization does not lead to problems being resolved but to greater political theatrics and a threat to democracy. The underlying factors described in the book don’t seem to be changing, so structural changes are needed to avoid the disaster scenarios.

Klein reiterates his support for the “rough and tumble” of the legislative process and the validity of representatives wrestling to a conclusion. But he argues that some decisions and situations are so essential that the full political arsenal should be stored in the armory. The debt ceiling threats should be eliminated by including debt authorization with the budget. The budget process itself should be revised to make longer term commitments to programs. Automatic stabilizers should be defined to ensure that counter cyclical economic support is available in recessions and not subject to blackmail from the minority party.

The legitimacy of our democracy must be increased. The electoral college cannot be easily changed but the National Interstate Popular Vote Compact could be used to increase the influence of the popular vote and reduce the disproportionate influence of rural, low population states. Independent commissions or other changes could reduce gerrymandering. Innovations like multiple member districts and ranked choice voting could help voters to see that their vote matters. The filibuster should be eliminated. Washington, DC and Puerto Rico should have congressional representation. Klein believes that improved voter representation would force the Republican party to serve/rebuild its moderate wing and define positions that would appeal to 60% of Americans rather than 40%.

His third principle is “balancing”. The American political system aimed to balance between the competing forces of democratic and elite rule, large and small states, federal and state power, etc. Today we compete between red and blue, liberal and conservative identities. The system does not address this dimension. Perhaps a multiparty system would be better. Perhaps a 15-person Supreme Court with 5 nominees from each party and the last 5 decided by the 10 justices. Consider reform of congressional rules that give the speaker absolute power to determine what bills are considered.

Klein urges us to become more aware or mindful of the role of identities, especially the mega-identity of politics. We have multiple identities and they all matter. We can choose to not immediately react to stimuli that touch our political identity. Practice maintaining the gap between stimulus and response. Be aware that political actors and advertisers and bloggers do want to use identity to influence and persuade us. Proactively define our information sources. Diversify them. Evaluate their bias and quality. Fight against the nationalization of views. Invest time in state and local politics where the issues are more concrete, the players are closer, and the impact is greater.

11. Afterword

The January 6 insurrection and the support for Trump’s claims of electoral theft should not surprise anyone who accepts the identity model of politics. Once an identify is chosen and closely held, almost nothing can pry it away. The Democrats chose Joe Biden and adopted relatively moderate policies in order to win. The Republican geographical advantage was clear again, with a 7 million vote margin barely winning the electoral college. The legitimacy of the president, senators and the Supreme Court is challenged by both parties. The overlap of race and politics lessened a bit with Trump winning 8% more Hispanics and Biden winning 7% more college educated whites. Klein doubles down on his challenge to the Republican Party to throw away its narrowly targeted white, religious, rural, extreme approach and redefine the party to appeal to a broader set of Americans. He argues that the Democrats’ voting reforms bill, HR1, could start the nation towards rebuilding its democratic foundation.

Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis (2015)

Author Robert Putnam also wrote the award-winning Bowling Alone (1999) and The Upswing (2022) summarizing the mountains of social science research on American Community and related topics. The first book documented the large, steady and widespread decline in community participation in the second half of the 20th century. The second book extended the timeframe back to the 1850’s to document that community participation was very low in the post-Civil War era, but that institutional innovations plus social, economic and political changes aligned to promote greater community participation throughout the next 75 years, before declines began in the post-WW II era.

This book is also data-intensive and primarily focused on the role of “community” in driving divergent opportunities for lower socioeconomic status (SES) versus higher SES children. Five chapters focus on the American Dream, Families, Parenting, Schooling and Community before a final chapter on why we should care and what we might do. The author provides paired case studies of higher (top 1/3rd) and lower (bottom 1/3rd) SES families in his hometown of Port Clinton, Ohio (near Toledo), Bend, OR, Atlanta, Orange County, CA and Philadelphia to illustrate how the various factors interact and apply.

The author chooses to frame his story under the heading of upward mobility or equal opportunity because this is a very widely held American value with supporters in both political parties. His liberal/Democratic party bias shows in various places, but his mastery of the data, case studies and sequencing make this a powerful book describing how American communities, families, kids and neighborhoods were actually functioning in 2015 contrasted with those in 1955-75.

In summary, the reduction in community activities documented in Bowling Alone is mostly felt by the bottom half of the SES groups. Poor/poverty class, working class and middle-class families have been very negatively impacted by both lower absolute and relative economic opportunity and weaker community support, while professional, upper middle and wealthy class families have maintained economic and community resources to guide their children to positive outcomes. Upward mobility in the US has fallen as income and wealth inequality have increased, leading to greater divisions in society, lower trust, weaker institutions and polarized politics.

Putnam tries not to shout, but the clear implication is that American civilization, per se, is at risk! If one-third or one-half or two-thirds of Americans do not benefit widely from social institutions, choose to not participate in them, lose trust in their neighbors, fail to raise their children and turn to populist political candidates for solutions, The American Dream is at risk. The author does quietly note that the measurements of intergenerational mobility lag by 20 years, so what we are seeing today is somewhat based upon the social, economic, political and economic conditions of the late 1990s. The next two decades of community, institution and parent formation have already taken place and shaped childhood development.

“Sociologists”, like Dr Putnam, are often commingled with “socialists” and other leftwing political groups in the public mind; and the profession is clearly leftward leaning in universities today. However, the discipline also has an inherent rightwing slant. Sociologists devote their time to analyzing the roles of community, family, kin, religion, neighborhood, voluntary groups, institutions, unions, employers, political parties and other groups on human behavior. The focus is on the group as a counterweight to the purely individualist, commercial, scientific, rational, transactional, computing, materialist conceptions of human beings. Classical conservatives have often tried to “conserve” the delivered group history, traditions, culture, value, art and institutions (civilization) of the past against the various progressive, experimental, enlightened proposals of liberals. A successful civilization must have successful groups and institutions.

As my 1972 high school general business teacher, Mr. Dunlap, often said, “we have much, much to do today”.

The American Dream

The 1950’s can be improperly idealized, but the contrast between 1950’s and 2010 Port Clinton, Ohio shows massive changes in economic opportunities and living conditions between the “haves” and the “have nots”. The author compares the top and bottom one-third of society using case studies and data. For data slices, he typically uses educational achievement, comparing high school graduates or less education groups with college degree achieved groups. His home village of 7,000 is between Toledo and Cleveland on the shores of Lake Erie, not far from the site of fictional Winesburg, Ohio. The small town thrived with manufacturing, fishing, farming, mining and government sites in the post-WW II era, but declined quickly after the 1970’s except for the addition of a string of lakeside second homes. Relatively small income and status differences, school and activity mingling between classes and widespread economic and educational advances characterized the 1950s. By the 2010’s, the poor had become poorer and the wealthy were of a different economic stratum, with less formal institutional support, class intermixing or intermarriage, informal mentoring or upward mobility.

Don 1959 – working class upbringing, dad worked 2 jobs, mom a homemaker, neither parent HS grad, top 1/4th academically, sports star, local minister guided him to liberal arts college, became a minister, married a high school teacher and his daughter became a librarian. Emphasis on economic and social stability of home life, assistance of community in upward mobility.

Frank 1959 – son of local business owner (fishing) and college educated mom from Chicago, lived 4 blocks from Don, modest school results, worked summers in family restaurant, not considered socially different even though dad was commodore at yacht club and mom “did charity work”, attended Ohio liberal arts college, played sports, worked as a journalist in Columbus for 25 years. Comparable results to Don.

1959 class – “we were poor, but we didn’t know it”. Of the parents, 5% held college degrees and one-third had not completed high school. Three-quarters of the high school graduates obtained more education than their parents. Half of the children of high school dropouts went to college. Absolute and relative upward mobility was high. On average, the children of the class of 1959 (1980s HS grads) equaled their parents in educational attainment but did not exceed them.

Libby 1959 – one of 10 children born to farmer/craftsman and homemaker without HS degrees. Parents actively involved at school. English teacher helped Libby attend U Toledo, but she dropped out of freshman year to marry hometown boy and become a homemaker. Divorced 20 years later, Libby worked as a clerk, writer and manager before winning a countywide political seat which she held for 30 years. Male and female opportunities and participation were quite similar for this cohort through joining college, but only 22% of women completed degrees versus 88% of men.

Jesse and Cheryl 1959 – only two black graduates out of 150. Families had moved from the South, dads worked in manufacturing and mining, moms worked as maids. Jesse excelled in sports, served as student council president, attended college on a sports scholarship, earned master’s degree in education and served as a high school teacher. Cheryl was hardworking, academic achiever and class officer. She also earned a master’s degree and taught high school. Both families lived in the poorest parts of town. The students interacted with their classmates, but knew that there were limits for dating, travel and recreational activities. The students were guided/assisted by local adults to attend college. While race and gender restrictions have fallen since 1959 in the US, class-based differences in opportunity have increased.

1950’s and 1960’s forward to 2010- one-half of high school grads to college and one-half to work. 1,000 employee factory trimmed jobs, then closed in 1993. Army base and gypsum mines closed. Manufacturing fell from 55% to 25% of jobs. Real wage in 2012 was 16% below that of 1970. Population had grown by 50% from 1940-70, flattened through 1990, then dropped by 17% by 2010. 2010 juvenile delinquency rates 3 times national average, up from just average in 1980’s. Net departures of 30-39 year olds doubled from 13% in 1970’s to 27% in 2000’s. Single parent households doubled, divorce rate up 5X, unwed births doubled, child poverty up 4X. At the same time, second homes now covered 20 miles of the lake shore. Small town “rust belt” story has same social impact as large city “rust belt” stories.

Chelsea 2014 – lives on the lake, dad is a national sales manager, mom has graduate degree and does part-time special education work. They own a second home. Mom is very active in shaping kids’ school life, intervening, investing and coaching. Chelsea is “most active person” at school, leading many extracurricular activities. She attends a big 10 university and plans to become a lawyer.

David 2014 – dad a HS drop out, worked periodically in odd jobs, imprisoned, angry, many women, drugs, moved from place to place. Mom moved out when David was preschooler. David has 9 step siblings. Finished HS through career classes. Juvenile detention record begins with age 13 store break-ins and continues for drug and alcohol violations. Lived with dad and grandparents at different times. Passed each grade, but never engaged in school. Worked in retail, factory and landscaping. Became a father at 18, did not marry, shares custody of child. Invests time helping his stepsiblings. Wants further education but has no plans. Bitter that community did not help him through his childhood when it was clear that his imprisoned dad and absent mom were incapable of raising him.

Equality of income and wealth is different from equality of opportunity and social mobility. The first is widely discussed in the media and rising inequality bemoaned by many. However, proposed government initiatives to address it, especially income or wealth transfers, are hotly debated by the two main political parties. While this form of inequality and changes in it clearly impacts equality of opportunity, the author focuses on the second measure.

“Do youth coming from different social and economic backgrounds in fact have roughly equal life chances, and has that changed in recent decades?” “A bedrock American principle is the idea that all individuals should have the opportunity to succeed on the basis of their own effort, skill and ingenuity” according to Fed chair Ben Bernanke. Faith in equal rights is embedded in the American founding documents and stories, American history, especially due to the growing economy of the US across more than two centuries. The Horatio Alger story of “rags to riches” has been told since formal public education began in the US in the 1840’s. Public opinion surveys from the 1940s through the 1980’s recorded an American public that believed that they and their children could pursue The American Dream with confidence.

95% of Americans repeatedly endorse equality of opportunity – “everyone in America should have an equal opportunity to get ahead”.

3 stages. 1875-1945, less inequality of wealth and income, growth of wealth and income, modest equality of opportunity for non-minority men. 1945-75, much less inequality of wealth and income, rapid economic growth, strong absolute growth of opportunities for all and very open opportunities for economic growth and social mobility. 1975-2015, intermittent periods of economic growth, increased inequality of wealth and income, limited absolute economic opportunity and sharply reduced relative economic opportunity and social mobility. The contrast between 1959 and the post-Great Recession 2010 highlights the very different economic and social environments.

Income inequality within each racial/ethnic group increased from 1967-2011.

From 1979-2005, real after-tax income for bottom 1/5th up $1,000; for middle 1/5th up $9,000; for top 1% up $750,000.

From 1980-2012, real earnings of college educated males rose 35%, while high school graduates lost 11% and high school dropouts fell 22%.

From 1992-2013, real wealth of high school graduates or less education remained in $150-175,000 range while wealth of college graduates increased from $600-700,000 range to $1.1 million range. A 3.5 to 1 ratio increased to 6 to 1 in 20 years.

Neighborhoods are more clearly sorted into high, middle and low income. Between 1970 and 2009, high-income neighborhoods doubled from 15% to 30% of the total while low-income neighborhoods increased by one-half, from 20% to 30% of the total, leaving middle-income neighborhoods to shrink from 65% to 40%.

Neighborhood segregation drives educational segregation. In large cities, “neighborhood schools” policies ensure that lower and higher income groups mix less. Within schools, top third SES students disproportionately enroll in advanced tracks and complete AP courses. These differences have even greater disproportionate effects on college attendance, college graduations and especially selective college admissions.

Clustering in neighborhoods, schools and colleges leads to “assortive mating”, with higher SES students marrying each other much more often than in the post WW II era when interactions between the classes were more common. Combining all of these factors leads to extended families and kinship networks that are largely or solely comprised of similar SES people, further reducing the interaction of Americans from different walks of life.

Putnam notes that absolute mobility, completing more education, earning more and holding higher level positions than your parents, is the primary component of “upward mobility” in history. The growth of economies, movement to new locations, development of new industries, technologies and professions does tend to benefit many across society. Relative upward mobility, with the lower classes moving ahead (education, income, jobs) faster than the upper classes, is not as a big a driver because it is less common in history, and even when it occurs it does not mean than bus drivers and surgeons change places, only that bus drivers’ daughters become transportation analysts while surgeons’ daughters become pharmacists.

The social scientist standard measure of mobility compares the income or education of a 30-40 year old with their parents at 30-40 years old, assuming that lifetime career success is largely settled at this age. Putnam asks the reader to not wait for the high school graduates of 2005 to be measured in 2020 but instead to look at their situations in 2005 and project the results, adding urgency to the time period in which absolute and relative mobility have been so much below that experienced after WW II.

2. Families

Putnam next focuses on the rapidly growing mid-sized town of Bend, Oregon, a largely white representative of prosperous western towns driven by their outdoors assets. The logging industry has been replaced by tourism, retirees and second homes. Area population is up from 30,000 to 165,000 between 1970 and 2013. Per capita income is up 50% in one decade. Usual side effects of rapid growth are seen. Wealth is made in real estate and construction. But, even in this growing environment, income inequality has widened by 75%. Poor neighborhoods are clustered on the east side of town.

Andrew – 2015. Parents from modest middle-class backgrounds near Bend. Dad Earl a fair student, graduated from state college. Married classmate Patty, who left college. Earl worked as a stockbroker, Patty as a florist’s assistant. Earl moved into construction and built a solid business worth millions. Patty left work, had 2 kids and thrived as a homemaker. Children attended a new HS with 15% drop-out rate, contrasted with east-side HS with 50% drop-out rate. Parents focused on kids, school, building their marriage. Andrew lacked for little. Parents involved in school, activities and career steps. Andrew a modest student and not driven like dad, working towards a firefighting career. Feels secure in pursuing his future.

Kayla – 2015. Parents Darleen and Joe have both lead troubled lives. Darleen raised on a small ranch a few hours from Bend. Finished HS with modest record, worked in fast food and at a fuel station. Married by 20 with 2 kids to abusive man but left him. Met Joe in new job at Pizza Hut where he was the manager. Soon pregnant with Kayla. Joe’s father was mostly in prison while growing up, mom was an alcoholic who Joe helped from an early age. Experienced some structure and care in 6 years in a foster home. Dropped out of eighth grade. Cared for mom. Married at 18, 2 kids with drug abuser. Left woman, kept kids, moved back in with his mom and mom’s latest boyfriend. Met Darleen in Bend at Pizza Hut. Joe moved from job to job, unskilled, low wage. Kayla grew up with the 4 step-siblings. Always poor, little parental support for school or extras. Mom Darleen left with a new boyfriend when Kayla was 7, living across the west and becoming homeless. Kayla mostly lived with Joe but some of the time traveled with Darleen and her friend. Kayla has essentially lived “alone” due to limited prospects and parenting skills of Darleen and Joe. Kayla drifted in school, found some support in troubled youth and job corps programs and legally finished HS. Some school administrators helped Kayla with medical, counseling and educational support. She has taken some community college classes, has a new boyfriend who lives with her at Joe’s. Kayla is depressed and worried about her future but doesn’t know what to do.

The post WW II norm was a breadwinner dad and a homemaker mom. Relative stability. Modest income or extras, but owned home and settled in a neighborhood. Working- and middle-class wages were adequate to support this model. Only 4% of births were outside of marriage due to social norms and pressured marriages of new parents to be.

Family structure changed during the 1970’s. More divorce, more women working for pay, greater cohabitation, more unwed births resulting in more kids in single parent homes. These changes accelerated for decades. Birth control, feminist views, female job opportunities, working class male job insecurity and individualist, self-fulfillment norms all contributed to these major changes in expectations and actual family structures.

In time, the bottom half of the social classes continued to shun the traditional model, but the top half maintained a high rate of marriage, modest rate of divorce, delayed first births and raised kids in stable two-parent households. These women increased their college attendance rates and worked in higher skilled jobs before and after their children’s pre-school years.

Lower educated moms’ first birth age was relatively stable at 19-20 years from 1960-2010, but higher educated moms delayed child responsibilities from age 24 to age 30, providing time for dating, prospecting and cohabitating before marriage and maturing socially, completing education and career milestones before the responsibilities of motherhood.

Births to unmarried women with college degree completion status doubled from 5% to 10% between 1977 and 2007, making it still a relatively infrequent occurrence (1 in 10). For young mothers with high school credentials or less, the 1970’s rate was already much higher at 20% (1 in 5), but has grown consistently since then to more than 60% (approaching 2 in 3). This is a revolutionary change within the high school grad population — and between them and the college educated group.

By 2010, the high school graduates’ divorced percentage reached 28% versus 14% for the college graduates. Among the one-third of high school graduates who were married when their kids were born, 28% of the families experienced divorce.

Fathers with HS credentials are four times as likely to have children that do not live with them as fathers with college degrees.

The percentage of college educated families with children under age 7 lead by a single parent doubled from 5% to 10% between the 1950’s to 1970’s period and the 1990’s to 2010’s. It was a slightly higher 12% in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. The high school graduate lead families started at 20% in the early decades and has grown to more than 60%, the same pattern as births to unmarried women.

Lower education moms’ employment percentage grew from 18% to 32% between 1960 and 2010, a 70% increase. Higher education moms started at 20% in 1960 and rocketed up to almost 70% in the 1990’s — another gigantic change within this group and between the groups. In 1960, one in five moms worked throughout the classes. More lower education moms joined the paid work force, but more than two-thirds did not work in the 2010’s. More than two-thirds of college educated mothers rejoined the labor force, making that the usual situation for their peer group. On average, high paid college educated families have one and two-thirds earners while lower paid high school grad families have one and one-third earners, a further income difference of 20%, on average. Working moms today spend as much time with their kids as “stay at home” moms did in the 1970’s by cutting out other competing uses of time. Black Americans show this same split towards two-earner married couples at the top and single moms at the bottom. Recent immigrants and Hispanic families look more like the traditional model.

The two-tier model is driven by culture and economics. It is socially possible to have children without being, getting or remaining married. The social prohibitions against birth control, premarital relations, cohabitation and childbirth outside of marriage fell quickly and have little impact for most American today. Motherhood is open to young women irrespective of their economic, educational or social status and is considered a “good”. Young women can choose motherhood and romance over marriage and do so frequently in the lower half of society. Poor and working-class men today have relatively lower wealth, earnings, stability and prospects than their post WW II peers. Young women have greater economic resources and generally believe that marriage requires a solid economic foundation, so often choose to not make that commitment. For less well-off partners economic instability and risks prevent and threaten family stability. For fortunate partners their economic security reinforces family stability despite life’s challenges. This is an essential take-away. Economic differences are translated into social factors which magnify the different opportunities and security experienced by higher and lower income, wealth and education families.

Putnam does not believe that overly attractive welfare benefits play a major role in preventing or disrupting family formation. Technical studies show small effects. The overall change in structure is orders of magnitude larger than those effected by benefits. Welfare benefit policy changes do not correlate with the changes in family formation. Benefits do matter economically and have an impact, but this is not a primary driver of changes in family structure.

The social changes of the 1960’s and 1970’s and the overall trend towards a more secular public society and norms is correlated with the breakdown in family structure overall and for the lower SES groups. Putnam argues that correlation is not causation. The massive split between the top and bottom halves argues against this simple explanation. State and county level correlations indicate an opposite effect, with more rural and religious areas having even greater rates of family decay.

Policy choices in the 1980’s to criminalize drug infractions, increase sentences, reduce sentencing options and increase enforcement led to a five-fold incarceration rate increase between 1970 and 2000. Since young men account for 90% of offenses, this has directly removed many men from actual or prospective marriage. This is not the main driver of fragile families, but an aggravating factor.

The two-tier system has improved outcomes for the top half or two-thirds of society, with married two-income families devoting more time and money to a smaller number of children. The bottom one-quarter or one-third is increasingly comprised of single mother families with part-time, family or government support during the crucial preschool years followed by lower earnings thereafter, so their children receive less financial and social support throughout childhood and lower lifetime opportunities.

From a sociologist’s point of view, these are qualitative differences or “order of magnitude differences” not merely the “differences of degree” experienced in the post WW II period.

3. Parenting

Putnam uses metro Atlanta as the backdrop for this chapter. Fast growing, deep poverty, variety of suburbs, racially segregated, racially mixed in some suburbs, second largest number of African Americans in the US, second weakest upward mobility scores, northern transplants, income inequality within Black community, Black political power, highly educated Black population. But income/class differences have a large impact, perhaps more than race.

Simone, Carl and Desmond – 2015 – Mom Simone from New York City, upwardly mobile family, father a Merrill Lynch manager, mother a medical secretary, married 50 years, moved to New Jersey suburb. Simone earned BA industrial psychology at CUNY. Dad Carl born in Suriname to black and Dutch parents, moved to New York as a child. Dad worked for Alcoa, mom at UN. Dad built a warehousing business. Parents married 33 years. Close family, dinner table discussions, religion important, friends welcome. Simone and Carl met at CUNY, married, waited 5 years to start family per religious counselor’s advice. Simone worked as receptionist and paralegal before becoming at home mom. Carl is an IT manager, brings kids to work, shows role models, he advises them to be productive. Education a priority, in school, out of school, reading, flashcards, outings, activities, sports, music, diet choices. Parents shopped for schools, moved further out in NJ, then to Atlanta, chose HS first, then home. Chose diverse school district to prepare Desmond for world. Mom deeply involved in school activities. Sensitive and firm parenting style; claims never punished son. Dad emphasized autonomy. Religious faith, activities, interactions shaped Desmond’s friendships, activities and thinking. Family adapted to diabetes challenge. Racism acknowledged, but you “have to work a little bit harder”. Simone reflects that “you never stop parenting”. Desmond was top ranked HS student, in college, interning at CDC, moving forward on professional career path.

Stephanie, Lauren and Michelle – 2015 – Mom Stephanie a hardworking office manager in the hospitality industry, grew up in Detroit. Her alcoholic mom left her alcoholic father in Georgia, worked as an RN, lived with an alcoholic Chrysler factory worker. Stephanie grew up in middle class Detroit neighborhood but mixed with project kids, joined a gang, fought, went to juvenile detention center, suspended from school, barely completed grades, stole. Her mom died when Stephanie was 15, she moved in with an aunt who offered more structure and gained Stephanie’s respect. Left aunt and dropped out of 12th grade, moved to Atlanta, earned GED, got pregnant and married. Shared 4 children with her first husband. Caring for first child changed perspective to being responsible for her kids. Worked at fast food, supermarket, discount department store, earned promotions and living salary. Husband left, Stephanie married a forklift driver and has a good marriage with him but they keep financial responsibility for his kids and her 4 kids separate.

Stephanie has been a customer service manager for 15 years where she excels due to her social interaction skills and hard work. Her 4 kids were financially provided for. Mom tried to keep kids safe and used tough love parenting approach. You have to be hard, parents are in charge, not my children’s friend, kids need to be tough and know the world is tough, few conversations and hugs. Family moved twice to better neighborhoods to get further away from trouble. Some education support for kids in elementary and high school, financial support for community college. Eldest son is succeeding, challenging youngest son works at recycling center with his dad. Lauren is completing associates degree in counseling. Michelle dropped out of community college, had struggled with speech and reading in high school. Hopes to attend trade school and be a day care teacher. Currently at a pause in life, hanging out with HS drop out boyfriend. Stephanie claims that racism has never been an issue in her family’s life. Is proud that her kids are “respectable”.

Elijah -2015 – born in Germany to Army parents, mom left family when Elijah was 3, moved in with his grandparents in New Orleans projects. Saw and experienced violence frequently including shootings and murders. Taught by close cousin James how to be a burglar at age 7. James taught him to fight, be a thug and a bully. First re-encountered his dad at age 10, who had been in prison and fathering more children. Moved to Charleston, SC at age 10 to live with mom, then back to New Orleans for 2 years, then back to his mom, new boyfriend and year-old twins in Atlanta at 13. Elijah arrested for arson at age 14, beaten by his dad (moved to Atlanta) after he was bailed out. His father had become a “preacher” and tried to influence Elijah positively, but mom remained verbally abusive throughout his childhood. Elijah tried to reset his life several times after age 14, with limited success. He finished HS with much effort at age 19. He has lived with mom, dad or friends since high school. Worked. Stayed high. Focused on music. Stayed clean. Dreams of being a preacher or hip-hop hero. Influenced by religious teachings but still attracted to violence. Bagging groceries at Kroger, saving money for an apartment and school. Elijah is a survivor against the odds, just barely.

Child development. Experience + environment => neurological development.

Prenatal through early childhood environment => brain circuitry and capacity for empathy.

Contingent reciprocity = “serve and return” experiences matter most. Consistent and caring adult interaction. Development is a social experience.

Much early learning is preverbal but it drives later verbal and math skills.

Early learning also drives “executive functions”: concentration, impulse control, mental flexibility and working memory.

Intellectual and socioemotional development are intertwined. Soft skills may be as important as academic skills: grit, social sensitivity, optimism, self-control, conscientiousness and emotional stability.

Unstable or inconsistently responsive parenting, physical or emotional abuse, substance abuse and lack of affection produce negative neurological changes.

Individuals differ on their inherent resilience, but negative factors have negative effects on children.

Early childhood care drives cognitive and soft skills which drive school performance.

Parental income, education and class are closely correlated with healthy brain development. Differences emerge at very early ages and remain stable through life (on average), operating most strongly in the preschool years.

Dr. Spock’s “permissive parenting” has been replaced by “intensive parenting” in response to this new understanding, especially by higher income, education and social class parents. Concerted cultivation of children’s skills by both parents is the new norm replacing an earlier theory that natural growth by a child would be good enough.

High school graduates prioritize obedience above self-reliance in their children by 55% to 35%, while college graduates seek self-reliance above obedience by 55% to 25%. Upper class parents have adopted the new parenting approach faster than lower class parents.

Working class parents provide their children with a 3/2 ratio of encouragement to discouragement, while professional class parents offer 6/1 positive to negative feedback, consistent with the goal of creating autonomous young adults accustomed to making good decisions and choices. Putnam notes that these differences reflect historical parental experience and the need to help students in threatening environments survive.

Trends in the percentage of parents who say their family usually eats together also shows that college graduate parents are retaining their interactive style better than high school graduate parents, with the first group declining from 80% to 75% since the 1980’s while the second dropped from 77% to 65%. Both groups saw a decline in a busier time, but college educated parents preserved this family time better.

Personal spending on children for educational activities reflects this split as well. Families in the bottom one-third of incomes invested about $1,000 of real dollars per child annually in the 1970s through 2010. The eight decile (higher) income families increased their investment from $1,700 to $2,600 while the top decile families more than doubled their investments from $3,000 to $6,500.

High school graduate parents increased their time in developmental childcare from 35 minutes to 75 minutes per day between 1990 and 2010 while college graduate parents surged from 50 minutes to 130 minutes per day. In rough terms, both groups doubled their investment, but the lower educated parents went from a half-hour to an hour while the greater educated parents moved from an hour to two hours, further increasing the care giving gap.

For their 4-6 year old children, college educated moms chose professional day care 70% of the time versus high school educated moms who “chose” it 40% of the time. Similar differences exist for younger children and for the availability of formal pre-K education.

Parenting differs significantly between American social classes and these differences drive large differences in child development, educational results and preparation for careers and life.

4. Schooling

Putnam next focuses on Orange County, CA, once the epicenter of suburban (and Republican) America. The county kept growing from its early 1960’s rise to prominence reaching 3 million people as the sixth most populous county in the nation. Its demographics have changed. 46% speak a language other than English at home. Latino immigrants account for almost one-half of K-12 students. Within the county, incomes and demographics vary widely. The author contrasts Santa Ana at $17,000 per capita income (95% Latino) with Fullerton at $100,000 per capita income (25% Latino). He compares the school districts and shows that school resources (inputs) are similar but outputs diverge. 65% vs 20% take the SAT test and score 1917 versus 1285. Top 10% versus bottom 20% on California standardized tests. 2% versus 33% truancy rate.

Clara, Ricardo and Isabella – 2015 – mom Clara and dad Ricardo grew up in an LA ghetto in the 1970’s. Both managed to attend college and then graduate, Clara advancing through a social work and counseling career and Ricardo succeeding as an architect and project manager. Clara’s first marriage failed and she managed as a single mom of one son in her late twenties. She married Ricardo before turning 30. Clara’s Mexican parents moved to LA during WWII and settled their family in Watts. Clara and her brother recall racial strains, good family and school support. Their family moved away from the poorer parts of town twice. Clara noted “We’re pretty Mexican at home, but at work we’re totally Americanized”.

When Isabella reached school age, her family also moved further from the poor neighborhoods and cities to Fullerton, noted for its university and high school excellence. Clara researched schools in depth before their move and continued as a highly involved parent, ensuring that her daughter was always engaged in learning. Troy HS in Fullerton is a public magnet school and ranked among the 100 “best” in the US. The environment is “pressure cooker”, but the kids complement their long hours of homework with extracurricular activities. Both parents helped with homework reviews. SAT prep classes are common. Parents easily raise money to support activities. School counselors and parents guided the college application and choice process. Isabella chose to attend a California university to “save money”, while her brother attended an Ivy League school.

Lola and Sofia – 2015 – The young ladies’ birth mom was drug addicted, a gang member and prisoner, dying when they were 10 and 2 years old. Their different fathers were also drug addicts and gang members. One disappeared altogether and one lives in Orange County but played no role in their lives. They were raised by their grandmother (mom’s mom) and step-grandfather in a solid working-class neighborhood in Santa Ana. The girls claim “we had the normal suburban life”. Grandma died when they were 14 and 6. Step-grandad continued to live with them until they were 19 and 11 before moving out, but allowed them to stay in the house and supported them financially. Lola became the “mom” for her sister before starting high school. She dropped out as a junior and eventually completed her GED. She works as a clerk in a discount clothing store.

Both girls had positive stories about elementary school but horror stories about high school. Gangs, disengaged teachers, no academics, no extracurricular options except for a few “honors” students, fights and shootings. Lola persevered and moved Sofia into a remedial “continuation school” for her last two years and she flourished in this “guided” independent study program mostly done at home. Sofia passed the California graduation test and attends the local community college in a teacher-training program, but many obstacles remain to obtaining a professional position.

Putnam uses his statistical approach to answer interrelated questions about public schools. He concludes that different schools provide very different environments and results, but that the different resources, teachers and academic programs have less impact on results than the differing financial and class backgrounds of the students who attend and the support of their parents. He believes that some school changes could improve results to help less advantaged students to compete and thrive.

The achievement gap between low- and high-income students is one-third wider in 2000 than it was in 1975. This is equal to several years of extra schooling. The class gap has been growing within racial groups while it has been narrowing between racial groups. Putnam takes great steps throughout the text explaining how measuring results within racial groups to support his claims that “class” is very important in no way should be seen as saying that differences across race are unimportant or that racism does not play a role in equal opportunity or social mobility. Research finds that gaps in school achievement at age 6 are essentially the same as at age 18 when compared by the mother’s level of educational achievement. Schools don’t seem to narrow or expand these differences. Again, Dr. Putnam walks a fine line. As much as he might like to criticize lower SES schools for their “less” effective programs and results, he must recognize that schools start with students of a given level of preparation, support, habits and expectations and might not be expected to deliver greater results for lower SES kids than for their higher SES counterparts. On the other hand, given their lower academic skills at the start of any school year, it ought to be possible to help some students to learn more than the usual “one year” of progress.

Residential sorting accounts for the differential results by school. Higher and lower SES pupils increasingly live in different neighborhoods and attend different school districts and schools. Higher SES parents have the information and resources to move into the more highly rated school zones, leaving lower SES parents and their children behind. Dr. Putnam acknowledges that “school choice” can have a positive impact for lower SES students who attend higher SES schools, but notes that the evidence is weak and that lower SES parents are not as skilled at identifying the best choices. Putnam cites research that shows that poor kids achieve significantly more in high-income schools, supporting his argument that class is at least as important as income or race in determining student results.

School funding per pupil is equal or subsidizes poorer districts in most states today. Student-teacher ratios and salaries are similar. Putnam suggests that a form of “teacher sorting” explains some of the different program quality across schools and school districts, citing higher turnover rates in lower rated districts as a result of more motivated teachers leaving them and moving to higher rated districts. He recommends investing more money in better teachers to improve results in lower SES programs.

However, the main takeaway is that what students bring to school with them matters most: skills, habits, expectations, curriculum demands, English language skills, medical diagnosis and care, parenting structures, encouragement, drugs, stress, disorder, parents, support, involvement, volunteers, fundraising, networks, etc. “Whom you go to school with matters a lot”. Peer pressure from students and parents complement the efforts of teachers. The “distractions”, discipline and make-up work required in low SES schools reduces the hours teachers invest in teaching.

Assignment of students to main/advanced academic tracks is less common today. Historically, it provided some advantages to higher SES kids who disproportionately qualified for the highest track. Most remaining schools with tracks do identify “higher potential” students from lower SES backgrounds. Schools with and without tracking show insignificant differences in social mobility.

Private school attendance has declined from 10% to 8% of students in the last two generations. The gap in private school attendance between college educated (10%) and high school educated (5%) families has remained the same. Private schools disproportionately benefit higher SES children, but no more today than earlier.

Differences in extracurricular activities offered, participation and leadership roles stand out when lower- and higher-SES schools and students are compared. Research links this participation to the development of soft-skills, education and career success. Five-sixths (86%) of top-quartile SES students participate in activities while only two-thirds (66%) of lowest-quartile students do so, down from a 77% participation rate in the 1970’s and 1980’s. High-poverty schools offer half as many team sports as low-poverty schools. Average and low-income school districts increasingly require “pay to play” funding for more expensive programs while higher income districts pay the fees or convince booster clubs to raise the money for all students.

American high school graduation rates rose throughout the twentieth century from 6% to 80% in 1970. Graduation rates in 1930 and 1950 favored the financially well-to-do, but closed through time to near 100% graduation rates at the top and 75% graduation rates for the poorest quartile by the year 2000. Solid progress. However, GED’s make-up one out of eight (12%) high school credentials and are clearly not the equivalent of a traditional high school diploma. Students with GED’s have some career doors opened, but GED holders have lower career results. Some of the progress in HS completion is real while some is unclear.

Economic, education and career standards have advanced in the last century. A high school diploma is not what it once was. The college degree wage bonus was 50% in 1980, but nearly 100% in 2008.

Rates of high school completion, college application and enrollment have converged in the last half century, with 45% of lower-SES students enrolling in college versus 90% of higher-SES students. Lower-SES students disproportionately enroll in community colleges and “for-profit” schools which have very low completion rates. Lower-SES students have lower graduation rates within 4-year colleges. Their low acceptance into selective colleges is even more disproportionate.

In 2012, 45% of the lower-SES students enrolled in college but only 12% completed degrees, while 90% of higher-SES students enrolled and 58% finished. Twice as many higher-SES students started degree programs, but more than four times as many finished. About one-third of higher SES students had not yet completed degrees within 8 years, while almost three-fourths of lower SES students had not reached their goal.

The gaps in college degree completion by family income have widened throughout the period. Lower-SES students increased from a 5% to a 10% graduation rate. Lower-middle SES students increased from 10% to 16%. The above-middle group improved from 16% to 33%. Higher SES students doubled their completion rate like the others, from 40% to 80%. In ratio terms, things are the same! But 80% versus 10% is clearly a wider gap than 40% versus 5%.

A final comparison shows that test scores play a role in achievement, but less of a role than family income. For the lower-SES quartile, degree completion improves from 3% to 8% to 29% for low, middle and high-test score students. For top-SES quartile students the comparable figures are 30%, 51% and 74%. A middle test score student of low means has an 8% chance of earning a degree (1/12) while a comparable student of high financial means has 50% odds (1/2). A high-test score student of the lowest financial quartile has essentially the same odds of college graduation as a low-test score student from an advantaged family (29-30%).

5. Community

The author turns to Philadelphia, a large and historically important city for America’s upper and working classes. He selects a pair of single moms with two daughters each for his biographical sketches. Like Port Clinton, Philadelphia had a long history of stable manufacturing jobs and mixed class white neighborhoods in the post WWII era, providing opportunities for upward mobility to children in all classes. The loss of manufacturing jobs and aging of housing, infrastructure and institutions lead to a break down of the formerly stable culture after the 1970’s.

Marnie, Eleanor and Madeline – 2015 – mom Marnie was raised in Beverly Hills and lived in suburban Philadephia for most of her adult life, daughter of an alcoholic film producer and wife who divorced and remarried three times. Marnie was academically gifted and despite her home turmoil earned an economics degree and MBA from Ivy League schools. The girls’ father earned similar professional credentials, succeeded as an entrepreneur, but when his business failed a dozen years later, he became depressed, was divorced by Marnie and moved “out West” when the daughters were in middle school.

Marnie worked for a consulting firm after graduate school. She struck out as an independent consultant, after her husband melted down, in order to maintain the lifestyle to which she and her daughters had become accustomed. She succeeded financially and despite a demanding work and travel schedule was able to raise her girls with the help of several caretakers. The daughters were distraught by the divorce and loss of their dad and absence of their mom. Private schools, boarding school, tutors and counselors were used to supplement mom and the caretakers. The daughters had challenges with drugs, sex, motivation and status but were supported by mom and her network of adult friends. Eleanor is majoring in business at a Midwest university while Madeline is pursuing French and International Development concentrations at a Canadian university.

Molly, Lisa and Amy – 2015 – mom Molly has lived in the inner-city Kensington neighborhood her whole life following earlier generations of her family. After her father’s death when she was young, the nine children in her family were placed in foster homes. She was placed in an orphanage for six years. She returned to her mother’s home as a teen but basically raised herself. She became pregnant in twelfth grade and dropped out of high school. Molly married and had a second child, Lisa, but her marriage ended in a few years as dad was an alcoholic and drug addict. Molly supported her family as a waitress and a construction worker for a decade. She had Amy and another child with a man who worked as a roofer, but he too became hooked on drugs and left to become a homeless neighbor.

Molly suffered additional injuries: multiple sclerosis and a stroke, restricting her to a wheelchair. Her youngest son was autistic and required extensive medical help. She did her best to use public welfare programs to get by but suffered from depression. A local church helped her with counseling, housing and programs.

Lisa was damaged by her poverty and parents’ woes. She struggled in school and to make and keep friends. She skipped school often, drank and used drugs. She became pregnant in twelfth grade with a local drug dealer but refused to marry him. She married another boy (John) from her church and lived with his alcoholic family. The church helped John find a job and the couple find an apartment. John finished high school but dropped out of community college. Lisa did graduate from high school and attended a for profit school to earn a pharmacy technician degree but has never worked in this field despite incurring $50,000 of debt.

Amy showed early promise in music and made some solid steps forward during middle and high school. She too fell for alcohol, drugs and boys. Due to cheating and truancy, she was expelled, was home schooled and then returned to public school. She became pregnant in tenth grade. She moved to a “pregnant moms” high school and excelled academically with the extra support provided to her. She has not married. She plans to attend a college with special programs for young moms.

Both families faced challenges. Marnie had enough personal, financial and community assets to guide her daughters to success. Amy lacked these support systems but was able to leverage public school, agency and church resources to help her daughters barely survive their difficult circumstances.

“Social capital” is used to refer to an asset in parallel with financial and human capital assets. It is the social connectedness held by an individual – who they know and what help they can be as mentors, advisors, guarantors, examples, insurers, job leads, system navigators, friends, trusted people, offering a sense of belonging and community, etc. Social capital provides economic and personal benefits. Research ties it to health, happiness, educational and career success, public safety and child welfare. Sociologists have made it a primary focus of their studies for more than a century documenting how migration, urbanization, globalization, family structures, work environments, neighborhoods, social institutions, social norms, religious practices, diversity and homogeneity effect people. In general, sociologists bemoan the loss of small-scale cohesion that existed in an earlier time replaced by large scale cities, secular ethics and a materialist, transactional culture. As noted above, sociologists tend to lean leftward politically, but much of the content of their work focuses on the human dimension that many political conservatives try to preserve or revive.

More educated individuals have more close friends and more contacts. Their friends and contact networks cover a wider range of classes, industries, professions and institutions. More educated individuals are able to leverage these networks as needed and provide reciprocal help to others when approached. The advantage in close friends is only 15-20%, but the informal network advantage ranges from 25-100%. The smaller and weaker networks of less educated parents, even when there is a married couple, provide less support to children in the key high school years when they are making the transition to career training and education. The children have met fewer people, in fewer places, mostly of lower professional levels. Their parents know fewer people and their teachers and counselors are less likely to plug the gap. Formal mentoring programs can help, but their availability and duration make them partial replacements even for the students with such support. Informal mentors and contacts can also help to guide students regarding social choices – drugs, alcohol, sex, church and activities. “It takes a village to raise a child”. Higher SES kids have 50% more mentoring contacts, including almost twice as many teachers, friends of family, religious leaders and coaches.

Neighborhoods are increasingly segregated by class and the character of the neighborhood shapes daily life. Crime, poverty, health, safety, institutions, schools, norms, civic engagement, disorder, decay, trust, responsibility, collective ownership and care vary by neighborhood and shape perceptions, habits, norms and opportunities. Neighborhood differences harm lower class kids at all ages and accumulate with years in a more challenging setting. These effects can accumulate across generations. Some of the effects come from the skills, beliefs, habits, behavior and attitudes of individuals while others are transmitted through the quality of local institutions like schools, programs, libraries, parks, childcare and churches.

60% of affluent citizens say that they trust their neighbors. Only 25% of poor citizens agree. Strong social trust has fallen for top-third educated parents from 37% to 25%, a one-third decline from 1970 to 2010. It fell more sharply, from 30% to 17%, for the bottom-third educated group. Hopefulness versus hopelessness varies by class.

Church attendance and participation has been shown to have strong benefits to the participants, their neighbors and their community. Church attendance has been falling for all social classes but has dropped faster for lower education families. Top-third educated families have reduced church attendance by one-seventh (14%) between 1975 and 2010 from an average of 35 weeks per year to 30. Bottom-third educated families started at 30 weeks per year but dropped by 30% to 21 weeks per year. Given the trend to economic self-sufficiency where higher income families can support themselves (partially) while lower income families struggle, this disengagement from religious organizations is a significant loss for those with the greatest needs.

6. What is to be Done?

Growing income and wealth inequality is a problem. It is a root cause, but the book sidesteps this broad topic. Related to this issue, but slightly different, is the growth in scale and international competitiveness of the US economy that makes the gap between various economic roles much greater. Leaders, VP’s, directors and managers lead much larger firms. The complexity of modern production and commerce requires advanced STEM and other professional roles. Supervisors and technicians increasingly fill the middle jobs. Service and remaining clerical, distribution and manufacturing jobs fill the bottom. The complexity, required education, skills and experience required for higher jobs has increased much faster than that required in the lower half. Hence, the gap in “value added” between different levels is much higher. Upward economic and social mobility requires an even greater “leap forward” than it did in 1959.

The other drivers of lesser “equal opportunity” are the huge differences in family structures, parenting, schools and community support across American social classes.

As Americans, we hesitate to even use the term or concept “social class”, because our country was founded in opposition to the “social classes” of Europe and has embraced the heroic individualism of Jefferson, Jackson, Horatio Alger and the Republican Party for almost 150 years. We don’t have a king or a landed aristocracy. The typical American of either party and any income level is happy to take “pot shots” at the Rockefellers, robber barons, bankers and the corporate elite. Even with the rise of entrepreneurship, “rock star” CEO’s, and “the lifestyles of the rich and famous”, few Americans see a permanent upper class. Sociologists inevitably create social classes as tools for their work: sometimes 3 or 5 or 7, based on income, wealth, education, property, advantages, power, social standing and influence. Putnam’s statistics usually slice the country into 3 or 4 categories. As he noted at the beginning, education serves as a good proxy for class. Today we have 3 roughly equal size classes, defined by high school graduates or less (lower), college grads or more (higher) and the middle.

Putnam’s main conclusion is that social institutions and policies in the post WWII era promoted social mobility and economic opportunity by investing in the lower and middle classes, but that today we don’t make that investment. Our growing economic disparities are further leveraged into weak equality of opportunity and social mobility by our changed norms, institutions and public investments.

He notes that these differences have been felt sooner in marginal communities, especially nonwhite communities. As his Port Clinton chapter documents, I believe that they have also been seen earlier and deeper in small town America as well.

Putnam asserts that there are no “upper-class villains”. Social critics, leftists and populists might “beg to differ”. The increase in income inequality and the disproportionate value of public institutions for the “upper middle class” or the “professional class” or “suburban America” or “the boomers” makes this an increasingly controversial issue.

Putnam says we should address this challenge because of its impact on economic growth, democracy and morality. Failing to invest in lower- and middle-class students and institutions results in less development of their economic potential, lower productivity, lower output, lower earnings, lower growth and greater social costs (crime, welfare, police). Lower education and income citizens are much less engaged in the democratic processes. They have less buy-in to the system. They tend to not participate and undercut the legitimacy of government institutions and become more attracted to populist, authoritarian figures. Most religions and the US founding documents emphasize the inherent equality of individuals as human beings and the need for societies to invest in all citizens. There is an American consensus that “equal opportunity” is essential. This book documents that we clearly do not have “equal opportunity”.

The collapse of the working-class family is the central contributor to the growing opportunity gap. This should be in “ALL CAPS“. “Bowling Alone” documented the decline in community across many measures of participation in America between 1950 and 2000. “Our Kids” refines this analysis to show that the “upper middle class” is quite doing fine, thank you, on most measures of community engagement, participation and support, but that the working class has lost its historical moorings in the neighborhood, parish, ethnic group, union hall, union steward, precinct captain, extended family, social norms, religious enforcement, cooperatives, schools, social hall, VFW, township trustee, political boss, fraternal organization, social and athletic allegiances. The author accepts that these historical sources of working-class cohesion and support are mostly leaving the modern world but “hopes” that new social replacements will be found.

Putnam eliminates policy responses in several areas because they have not worked. Marriage enticements, abstinence, contraception, delayed childbirth, etc, seem to be beyond state influence. Policies that provide more cash to poor families are preferred: cash transfers, earned income tax credits, child tax credits and dollars for existing programs are suggested. Reducing incarceration could help dads to be better providers.

Putnam advocates for public support for children in the critical first 6 years of life. First year parental leave. Childcare subsidies for ages 2-4. Public funded and provided pre-K education. Parenting skills training and promotion.

Class based residential segregation drives different school results. Mixed income residential development policies could help. Invest in more guidance counselors and better teachers in low-income schools. Extend school hours and invest in extracurricular programs in poorer schools. Encourage neighborhood-based charter schools. Encourage Catholic schools to remain and grow in poor areas where they have historically been very successful. Invest in vocational education and locally controlled community colleges with vocational focuses. Eliminate “pay to play” from sports and activities. Invest in mentoring programs.

Postscript

In the last 40 years we were distracted by surface level debates about left versus right, liberal versus conservative. Republicans have clearly won the “framing” battle, contrasting the “free market” with “socialism”, “communism”, “bureaucrats”, “government”, “intellectuals”, “elites”, “planned economy”, “theft” and “taxation”. Schumpeter, Hayek, Rand and Friedman have eclipsed Keynes, Samuelson and Galbraith. The virtues of “capitalist creative destruction”, avoiding “the road to serfdom”, elevating economic results and values above all others and eliminating any national economic policy choices have captured the public imagination. The technocratic details of minimizing business cycles, managing a “mixed economy”, counterbalancing economic powers, balancing inflation and employment, managing the banking system, optimizing international trade and making real economic choices have become political “losers”.

Yet, the nation surely knows that “free market” economics is not the only solution. Real people are affected by our economic and social systems. We have a political system that is intended to manage these competing claims on society’s resources. Putnam describes this as the fundamental contrast between individual and group/community claims. American society has leaned to the individualist side historically but has often considered the community perspective as well. In the last 50 years it has leaned hard towards the individualist perspective alone.

This book shows what has happened. In 1964 with per capita GDP at $20,000, as a nation, we were able to invest in local, state and national institutions that ensured that all individuals in the bottom two-thirds could pursue upward mobility. Today at $60,000 real per capita income, we don’t have effective institutions or programs that support “our kids”. This is an economic, democratic and moral tragedy. I don’t think that politicians or citizens intended this result. I think that this is an unintended byproduct of the pendulum swing towards individual values alone.