Lake County, Ohio: A Swing County for Presidential Elections (1952-2008)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/My_Little_Town

Historically, Ohio was a critical “swing state” in presidential elections.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_elections_in_Ohio#:~:text=Ohio%20is%20considered%20a%20swing,regular%20swing%20state%20since%201980.

My “little” hometown of Fairport Harbor is part of Lake County, Ohio which once was the most sensitive county to changing presidential voting patterns after 1952. Lake County is a suburban or exurban county in the Greater Cleveland area. The population doubled from 29K to 60K between 1920 and 1944 while it retained a mixture of agricultural and manufacturing employment. The county grew very rapidly on its western side as Cleveland residents moved away from the city, reaching 149K by 1960. Another 50,000 new residents arrived by 1972, pushing the total above 200K. Growth slowed with the decline of the Cleveland metro area, but the population reached 228K by 2000. The population has been relatively fixed for the last 20 years.

https://wikiless.org/wiki/Lake_County,_Ohio?lang=en

From 1952 through 2008, Lake County voted with the national presidential election winner in all but one of the 15 elections. In 1992, Lake County provided George Bush, Sr with 38% of the vote, the same as he won nationally, but only provided Bill Clinton with 36% of the vote, offering a very high 26% of the vote to “protest candidate” Ross Perot, far above his national 19% share.

https://wikiless.org/wiki/Lake_County,_Ohio?lang=en

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_United_States_presidential_election

From 1920 to 1932, Lake County voted 70% Republican, a solid 16% above the national average. Lake County took pride in its role as part of the Connecticut “New Western Reserve” and its road, rail and ship based east to west transportation role at this time. The county was also the proud home of Republican President Garfield.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/james-garfield/

While the country gave FDR 57% of the vote in 1932, Lake County offered just 35%, preferring to re-elect President Hoover.

From 1936 to 1956, the county continued to lean Republican, offering an average of 6% more votes to the Republican head of the ticket than the average state. The county supported FDR in 1936 but opposed him in 1940 and 1944 and opposed Truman in 1948.

The county started its remarkable 14/15 presidential winners string in 1952, supporting Eisenhower by 5 points more than the country at large and repeating this support in 1956.

The county surprisingly supported Kennedy over Nixon 51/49 in 1960, dropping those 5 extra points of Republican support. Kennedy visited the small county during the election. This may have helped shift enough marginal voters.

https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKSEN/0912/JFKSEN-0912-002

This was a time of change, with future 20-year congressman Frank Stanton serving as a county commissioner.

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-apr-13-me-stanton13-story.html

From 1960 to 2004, the county’s Republican vote percentage matched the national average.

Democrats earned a record high 62% vote share for LBJ in 1964, with Goldwater falling to a stunning 38% Republican low. Lake County “faced east”, looking to the New England/New York and Midwest Republicans (Taft) for inspiration. Goldwater’s Texas, Arizona, California “western” message gained little local traction.

The 1968 election was completely different. Nixon edged Humphrey by 0.8%, with Wallace receiving 14%, as he did nationally. I was just 12 years old, but as a newspaper carrier for 3 years, I had read many editorials from the Cleveland Press, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Lake County News-Herald and Painesville Telegraph. The race riots of 1966-67, Vietnam protests and counterculture demonstrations and activities were beyond the lived experience of my neighbors. Nixon and Agnew leveraged a “patriotic” message to win voters in “my little town”. George Wallace earned a remarkable 14% as a modern populist, promising simple solutions to all of the nation’s problems. I don’t believe that Wallace’s “racist” message was a significant part of his appeal in this heartland. He was an early version of the right-side “anti-establishment” candidate.

In 1972, Nixon cruised to victory by 61/38 against a weak McGovern candidacy. Lake County agreed: 59/38. The “Kent State Riots” were part of this vote. Governor Rhodes was very popular in Ohio, winning 3 terms.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Rhodes

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kent_State_shootings

In 1976, Jimmy Carter sold Lake County on a moderate Democratic platform and his promise to “never lie”, winning 51/46, about the same as the national 50/48.

In the same year, the county’s largest employer, Diamond Shamrock, announced that it was permanently closing its chemical plant that had employed as many as 5,000 workers historically.

https://www.rsworld.com/snix66/diamond.html

Reagan solidly won Lake County and the country by 50/41 and 59/41 in 1980 and 1984. His positive, traditional, patriotic, common-sense, reassuring message was well-received in a county and metropolitan region that was very hard hit by the start of a long-term downturn in manufacturing employment and regional population and economic growth.

George W. Bush was a little more popular in Lake County than the country as a whole, earning a 57/42 win, better than the national 53/46. Bush, Sr.’s WWII pedigree, executive experience and countenance played well in Lake County.

The 1992 election, pitting Bush, Sr.’s continuity, generation, broken tax promise, moderate social and economic views against Clinton’s contrasting policies was a divisive election, the true beginning of our polarized red versus blue state situation today.

In 1996, Bush’s support dropped from 57% to just 38%, while the national vote fell from 53% to 38%. Bush beat Clinton in Lake County 38% to 36%, the one non-match in the 15 elections.

Lake County was enamored with Ross Perot, offering him 26% of the vote in 1992 versus his 19-point national haul.

I worked for Ross Perot’s EDS in the 1980’s, as a headquarters financial analyst and project manager, producing the kinds of “charts and graphs” he loved to use in debates and press conferences. Ross was the most “what you see is what you get politician” I have ever seen. He believed that there are pragmatic, straightforward answers to any problem, and had lived a life demonstrating that this was true in the IT business, inventing the outsourced IT model and selling it to government agencies and corporations, just as he had sold mainframe computers in record volumes for IBM.

Ross was an anti-politician, a nationalist, a leader, a persuader, a man of integrity, a team player, a Texan, an outsider and very customer focused. Even with his significant campaign flaws, he was able to many attract voters who wanted to vote “none of the above”. I don’t believe his appeal was one of subtle racism, anti-immigration or historical pandering to a simpler, more culturally conservative time. Ross believed in progress, science and business.

Perot attracted 14% of Lake County voters in the next election, almost double the 8% national tally.

Clinton edged Dole 44/42 in Lake County in 1996, significantly behind his 49/41 national victory. In essence, this was a “none of the above” election for many in Lake County.

Lake County was an optimistic, fast-growing growing county for many years, tripling its population from 50,000 in 1940 to 149,000 in 1960 as Cuyahoga County grew, freeways opened, and people moved further from the central city. The county added another 50,000 people by 1972 as regional shopping malls such as the Great Lakes Mall opened by the Youngstown DeBartolo’s provided new attractions at the edge of the metro area. Growth slowed significantly after that, with the county adding just 20,000 people in the next 20 years through 1992 and another 14,000 people in the next 20 years. This change in the local environment from boom town to slow growth aggravated concerns about the country’s direction.

In 2000, George HW Bush, Jr. was able to capitalize on his message of “compassionate conservatism”, winning Lake County by 50/45, better than his narrow 48/49 popular vote loss. Even with the 9/11 patriotism bump, Lake County and the nation only narrowly re-elected Bush, Jr. by 51/48.

Obama’s centrist “hope and change” message attracted a few more Lake Countian’s to the Democratic ticket in 2004, earning a narrow 49.5% to 48.6% win, much tighter than the national 53/46 win.

The tables were turned in 2012, with Romney beating Obama by the same 49.5% to 48.6% result, in contrast with Obama’s 51/47-point victory. The 14/15 election match was broken. Lake County’s Republican share was 3 points higher than the nation this year, but its average Republican tilt for the last 16 elections was less than 1%.

Trump’s 2016 nationalist, populist, anti-immigrant, anti-globalization message played well in Lake County. He earned 5 points more than Romney, earning a solid 55/40 win, far ahead of his 46/48-point popular vote loss to Hillary Clinton. As with other blue collar, middle class, rust belt, Midwest states that had historically supported the Democrats, Lake County voted “no”, offering just 40% to Clinton.

2020 was very similar to 2016 in Lake County. Trump beat Biden 56/43 in Lake County, discounting Biden’s small-town Pennsylvania roots claims and centrist messages. Biden increased the Democrats’ national popular vote margin to 51/47.

It’s difficult to reconcile the 20-point swing from LBJ’s 1964 62/38 victory with Trump’s 56/43 advantage in 2020. Goldwater was a weak Republican candidate, promoting a conservative “philosophy” and radical “for the time” policies. Biden is a lifetime Washington politician, subject to obvious criticisms.

From Wallace to Anderson to Perot to Trump, a significant share of independent Lake County voters has been attracted to “outsider” national political candidates. The shared national experience of the Depression and WWII and bipartisan support for national leaders like FDR, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Reagan is nearly gone.

Since Reagan’s 1980 50/41 victory, Lake County has averaged a 51/43 Republican advantage. Based on Trump’s recent higher results (55-56%), Lake County looks to be a solid Red county today, leaving behind it’s Purple history.

Years of Missing Housing

The Housing Market is Tighter than Ever

20% housing price inflation.

Typical house sells in one month.

Listings down by 70%.

https://eyeonhousing.org/2020/01/a-decade-of-home-building-the-long-recovery-of-the-2010s/
https://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/written-materials/2021/09/01/alleviating-supply-constraints-in-the-housing-market/

Existing homes available for sale cut in half, even before the recent decline.

https://www.realtor.com/research/topics/housing-supply/

Even with record prices, new listings lagged during 2020-22.

The supply of new homes available for sale, has remained flat at 300,000 for the last 50 years, while the population has grown by 50%.

The home vacancy rate is at one-half of its historic level.

Housing Units

The ratio of housing units to population in 2021 is 0.38, a little higher than the 0.37 in 2001.

The “American dream” of single family home-ownership remains. Buyers continue to try to recover from the decline from 69% in 2006 to less that 64% in 2015.

The number of owner-occupied (single-family) homes reached a peak of 76 million in 2006 and then flat-lined for eleven (11) years through 2017. An estimated 8 million homes have been added in the last 5 years, about 1.8M per year after zero per year for 11 years.

Supply Has Not Recovered from the Great Recession

https://www.freddiemac.com/research/insight/20181205-major-challenge-to-u.s.-housing-supply

A thorough analysis of supply and demand would include dozens of factors and 100 metro housing markets. However, at the simple trend-based macro level, we see 1.5-1.6 million units per year added from 1960-2010. We see a trough from 2007-2020 with a deficit of more than 5 million missing housing starts.

Even Worse, Starter Homes and Manufactured Housing Have Almost Disappeared, Driving an Affordability “Crisis”.

https://www.freddiemac.com/research/insight/20210507-housing-supply
https://www.freddiemac.com/research/insight/20210507-housing-supply

https://myhome.freddiemac.com/blog/research-and-analysis/20211013-starter-homes

https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/erdmann_-mophousing_was_undersupplied_during_the_great_housing_bubble-_v1.pdf
https://multifamily.fanniemae.com/news-insights/multifamily-market-commentary/manufactured-housing-landscape-2020

Aging of the Housing Stock: The 2010-19 Decade Was a Huge Outlier

https://www.huduser.gov/datasets/ahs/ahs_taskc.pdf

During every decade, except WW II, the US added 10 million+ housing units. They have an expected life of nearly 100 years.

https://eyeonhousing.org/2020/01/a-decade-of-home-building-the-long-recovery-of-the-2010s/
https://eyeonhousing.org/2022/06/the-aging-housing-stock-5/

The US added less than one-half of the usual amount in the teens, driving the median housing stock (owner-occupied) age up from 33 to 39 years. So, it’s even more than the 5 million housing units that weren’t built. The whole stock is older. More units require maintenance. More people are waiting to have the new or “newer” home ownership experience.

Many Ratios Echo the Simple “Missing” Housing Stock Claim

https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/erdmann_-mophousing_was_undersupplied_during_the_great_housing_bubble-_v1.pdf

Housing units per capita has declined. New housing starts have not kept up with population growth.

https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/us-data-housing-starts-can-be-misleading

Compared with the overall size of the market, housing starts have become a smaller and smaller share.

https://www.freddiemac.com/research/forecast/20170726-lean-inventory-of-houses
https://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/written-materials/2021/09/01/alleviating-supply-constraints-in-the-housing-market/

The last graph is most persuasive for me. Housing starts are less than one-half of what they were in the 1970’s. That’s a big drop. It’s possible that consumers have just chosen to consume less housing and more of other goods and services, but that does not appear to be the case.

https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/erdmann_-mophousing_was_undersupplied_during_the_great_housing_bubble-_v1.pdf

Overall, we’re missing 5-8 million units out of 128 million units in a market that is struggling to deliver 1.6 million units to meet the normal demand.

The Freddie Mac experts come up with a smaller number, just 3.8 million.

https://www.freddiemac.com/research/insight/20181205-major-challenge-to-u.s.-housing-supply

https://www.freddiemac.com/research/insight/20210507-housing-supply

Contrary Views: Supply is OK, Too Much Short-term Demand

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4498666-us-housing-is-a-dead-man-walking
https://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2021/02/03/housing-boom-will-end-after-2021/?sh=27038d981e41

As noted earlier, the total housing units per capita ratio is relatively consistent. “Everybody gotta be somewhere”. The total housing units level has grown, with rental units replacing the desired and missing single-family units. The other graphs are comparing two rates of change and concluding that the rates of change are roughly equal, so there cannot be a shortage. I believe that the very deep and historically unprecedented (except for WW II) catastrophic decline in single family home construction from 2006-2020 created a material deficit in the stock of single family homes. The very weak economic recovery after the “Great Recession” held back new household formation and effective demand for new single family homes, so the construction industry did not recover back to its prior level for a full decade or more. The deficit remains.

Summary

One of the most important concepts in Economics 101 is “stocks and flows”. Stocks are a summary quantity at a single point in time, like all of the gallons of water in Lake Erie behind Niagara Falls. Flows are a quantity per unit of time, like the gallons of water flowing over Niagara Falls per minute, hour or day. Our economy contains both “stocks and flows”, especially relevant in the housing market. The flow of new home construction (single family or multi-family) is one of the most volatile components of GDP (flow of $ produced per year).

Historically, major changes in home construction have driven a majority of all business cycle declines. Bank runs and changes in interest rates account for another one-third. Supply shocks and international trade/currency changes account for the remainder.

Most markets “clear” in a relatively short time period and we collectively quickly benefit from the increases in prices that attract producers and drive consumers to find “next best” options and from the decreases in prices that force producers to leave an industry and reallocate capital elsewhere and the relative increase in consumer demand that limits price declines.

Unfortunately, the real estate industry works across much longer time frames. Consumers “want” to own single-family homes, but they can rent or live with relatives for many years. Construction firms are unable to quickly increase their supply capacity when demand increases. This is an industry where “learning by doing” remains a core factor.

The construction industry was truly “decimated” in 2006-7-8. One-half, two-thirds, three-fourths or four-fifths of all firms in any local market (general contractors and suppliers) were bankrupted. It has been slow to recover as banks were “burned” by construction loans and slow to extend credit to anyone.

The remaining construction firms reached new “critical mass” by 2017 and have been expanding rapidly, subject to zoning, land acquisition, labor and materials constraints.

Nonetheless, the cumulative supply deficit is quite large and will drive housing price increases for many years, perhaps another decade!

Indy Metro Housing Market: Not the Hottest!

All of the national indicators point to an overheated housing market.

Houses are selling in 30 days, 60% faster than their usual 75 days on the market.

The median home sold for $320,000 throughout 2017-18-19-20. Homes now sell for $100,000 more at $420,000. That’s a 30% increase. We’ve had 10% inflation during this time, so that’s still 20% extra.

Builders have joined the party, showing the same pattern.

https://www.corelogic.com/intelligence/april-jump-in-us-rent-price-growth-puts-pressure-on-inflation-corelogic-reports/

Single family rental prices have also followed suit.

Real, inflation-adjusted, home prices are at an all-time high, equal to those just before the bubble popped starting the “Great Recession”.

Are current house prices sustainable? I think so. Will they continue to increase by 15% per year? No. Prices will level off based on the slow-down of the overall economy, lower consumer confidence, higher mortage rates, etc. Prices are sustainable due to supply and demand. Population growth in the US has continued, especially those aged 25-34 who form the age range where ownership increases.

https://www.freddiemac.com/fmac-resources/research/pdf/202105-Note-Housing_Supply-08.pdf

The supply of new housing has lagged greatly since the Great Recession, compared with history and population. The supply of “starter homes” has been especially low.

The US population has not quite doubled since 1960, but we’re getting close.

Let’s use 1.5 million housing starts as the typical level for 1960-1970. The comparable level today would be at least 2.25 million, even accounting for the “catch-up” in the 1950’s and 1960’s to make up for the housing shortfall in the 1930’s and 1940’s. The 1970’s and 1980’s were very weak decades due to international competition, energy crises, crazy high mortgage rates, recessions, stagflation, etc. The Clinton economic recovery in the 1990’s was strong for employment, low inflation, lower mortgage rates and zero federal budget deficits, but the economic gains were not disproportionately invested in the housing market. The population had increased from 180 to 280 million (55%), but housing starts were essentially “flat”.

The turn of the millennium saw a 25% increase in housing starts, from 1.6 to 2.0 million per year. This level was artificially supported by low interest rates and unsustainable mortgage lending practices. Based on the population, 2 million new homes built per year was sustainable in theory, but not in practice. The construction market dropped to near-zero. (0.5 million starts/year). It reached the 1959 (think about this) level of 1.6 million starts again only in 2020.

Let’s estimate the “lost” construction units of this 16-year period. Assume 1.6 million units per year is the long-term requirement. 2.9 million units were lost during 2007-10. Another 5.3 million units were lost from 2011-20. That’s a total of 8.2 million units, or about 4-5 years’ worth of construction. We can throw out the first period and assume this was offsetting unreasonable demand and supply before the Great Recession. But that still leaves 5.3 million missing units, 3 years worth of current construction. If we assume that 1.8 million units per year is the real long-term requirement, then the 2011-21 period was short another 2.2 million units, for a total of 7.5 million units, or nearly 5 years worth of current construction. At a national level, we still have a severe housing deficit.

https://www.freddiemac.com/research/insight/20210507-housing-supply

The decreased building of “starter homes” aggravates the situation. Home builders try to optimize the profit on their investment in land, within zoning rules, so they disproportionately build larger single-family homes.

The Freddie Mac folks estimate a 4 million home deficit, about one-half of my “back of the envelope” estimate. Even at that level, we have a 2.5-year shortfall. This shortfall will work to increase home prices at a rate above inflation for at least the next 5 years.

Indy metro population has grown at about the same rate as the nation in recent decades, so it is not surprising that it’s housing starts pattern is quite similar. Perhaps 1,200 permits per month, or 14,000 per year at the peak. Dropping by 75%, eliminating most of the local builders by 2008. The “recovery” has been even slower, reaching 800 permits per month only in late 2020 (2/3rds of the base). Doing the same kind of “rough” math, Indy has a minimum 400 permits per month deficit for 15 years, or 72,000 missing units. At 6,000 units per month, we have a 7-8 year shortfall!!! (flyover country) Assuming that metro Indy continues to be relatively attractive as a destination for college graduates and movers, existing housing prices should increase by more than inflation for the next decade, even though Indy is “cursed” by being a relatively small city with many freeways and housing development options in all directions (tongue placed firmly in cheek)

https://www.storagecafe.com/blog/despite-rising-home-prices-indiana-and-mid-atlantic-states-step-up-with-starter-homes/

Although Indy residents complain about recent increases in housing prices, even the higher end suburbs of Fishers and Carmel show up in an “affordable” housing article.

Metro Indy house prices increased by 40% from 1995-2005, but then flat-lined for the next decade, showing just a 40% increase over 20 years or less than 2% growth per year, slower than inflation. They grew by another 40% from 2015-20 in 6 years, 3 times faster than the previous 20 years. They grew much faster in the last year!

The 2%ish price increase rate bumped up to 5% from 2015-2020, before spiking to 20%.

https://www.realtor.com/research/topics/housing-supply/

Realtor.com says Indy has a $320K median list price, up 16% for the year, with 30 days listing to accepted offer.

FHA reports 15% price increases in Indy home sales. Indy ranks 63/100 metro areas, slightly below the average 17% rate, and well below the 30% price increases in southwest Florida.

https://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Tools/Pages/FHFA-HPI-Top-100-Metro-Area-Rankings.aspx?

https://www.redfin.com/news/redfin-rental-report-may-2022/

US rents are up by 25% in the last year and a half. Places like Cincinnati and Nashville are seeing 30% asking rent increases. Redfin reports 20% increases in Indy asking prices, but the $1,471 monthly rent remains in the bottom 20%.

Realtor.com reports a less “frothy” Indy rental market with 11% actual increases and a $1,275 per month rate.

As housing prices have spiked, analysts have attempted to identify the bubble areas. Indy is in the below average risk catgeory.

https://www.corelogic.com/intelligence/potential-risks-of-price-declines-in-the-real-estate-market/
https://fortune.com/2022/05/31/is-housing-market-bubble-which-markets-overvalued-home-prices/

Summary

The US housing industry is not like a typical consumer product or services market where the forces of supply and demand determine a market price and the equilibrium quantity of housing is delivered instantaneously. Households adapt, calculate, defer, overextend their housing demand based on many factors. Given the four-fold difference between peak and bottom supply, the construction industry is inherently unstable. Zoning rules and approvals change. Mortgage interest rates change. The economy moves through business cycles. Houses are built with 40-60-80 year expected lives, but consumed one year at a time.

The US economy has underinvested in housing for 15 years. The population has grown and median household incomes have grown. Households have aged and decided they prefer single family houses. There is a 3-5-7 year deficit of new housing. Housing prices will increase faster than inflation for the next decade. Indianapolis may see housing prices rise even faster than the national average since it has built relatively fewer new homes.

Good News: SCARY INFLATION Has NOT Returned!

I was a wide-eyed young adult when the US last experienced 12% and 15% inflation rates. Our current situation is very different from that sad time 50 years ago. Fiscal policy was much looser, with LBJ pursuing a both “guns and butter” policy and Nixon following along. Monetary policy was slightly accommodating in the 70’s, comparable to today. The “supply shock” in the 70’s was much larger. The US was then much more dependent on foreign oil imports. Today the US is roughly “energy independent”, so subject to global price changes only. In the 1970’s, labor unions had some degree of power against the largest manufacturing concerns and used that power to attempt to maintain workers’ wages. There is no similar labor power today.

Average Inflation is at a Recent High of 8%

Core Inflation, Excluding Food and Energy is Growing at 6%

The inflection point is March, 2021. 2-3% inflation before then. 6% inflation in the last year. 6% is much higher than the 2% trend of the last 2-3 decades, but not a harbinger of spiraling inflation or wage-price spirals or cost-push inflation.

Inflation is Driven by Historically Highly Variable 1) Energy, 2) Commodities and 3) Food Prices.

The doubling of global energy prices since the end of 2020 is apparent. This was driven by the unexpectedly rapid global recovery from the pandemic (good news, overall) and the supply crimp from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Energy is a 7% weight in consumer prices, so a doubling has a tremendous effect.

US demand for durable goods spiked by 50% within the pandemic, as in-person services were unavailable. This completely unexpected increase in demand for final goods drove a completely unexpected demand for commodity inputs, resulting in much higher prices that continue through today.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIFABSL

Food price increases also spiked. The pandemic interrupted direct agriculture and food processing labor inputs. Raw food inflation reached 16%, while “away from home” food prices grew by just 7%.

Lodging and Vehicle Prices Spiked Due to the Stop/Start Nature of the Pandemic Economy.

Lodging and used car inflation exceeded 20% but is now slowing. New car prices increased by 12%, but this price increase is back down to a 7% annual rate.

But, All Other Sectors Have Experienced “Normal” – Non-accelerating 6% or Lower Price Increases.

6%.

3-4%.

3-5%.

4-5%.

Drugs 2%. Medical Services 6%.

Communication and IT continue their price decreases after a small increase.

1-2% annual inflation.

Household furnishings, up 9% like other consumer durables.

Food away from home, up 6-7%, despite the incredible disruptions in the last 2-3 years.

Summary

Energy, food and commodities prices have increased sharply in the last year. The other dozen price indices have increased by 5-6-7% and then flattened off. Loose fiscal and monetary policy, combined with commodities price spikes have driven quite high consumer price inflation for the last 6-9 months. Inflation will drop from 8% to 6% in the 3rd quarter and then to 4% in the 4th quarter and then lower into 2023.

There is no indication of rapidly increasing prices or a wage-price spiral. US labor unions don’t have the power to respond to the recent unexpected increase in consumer prices with a demand for equal or higher wage increases. Wages have increased by 5% in the last 2 years as inflation has spiked to 8%.

Good News: Black Labor Force Participation Exceeds National Average, First Time in 50 Years

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-03/black-americans-lead-recovery-in-may-labor-force-participation#xj4y7vzkg
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2022/06/17/three-questions-for-the-labor-markets-near-future/

African-American men and women have increased participation rates quickly since the depths of the pandemic.

https://www.epi.org/indicators/unemployment/
https://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab2.htm

The African-American employment to population ratio has been increasing through time, closing a 5 point gap to just 2 points before the pandemic, and squeezing it to less than 1 point most recently.

Context Since March, 1990 Peak Overall Rate

4 point decline before the pandemic. 1.5% pandemic hit. Almost 50% recovery.

3 point decline for prime age workforce, but 2 point improvement at the end of the prior economic recovery period. 2 point pandemic hit. More than 3/4ths recovered.

6 point slide before pandemic. 1.5 point pandemic hit. Perhaps 1/3rd recovered.

Up 3 points. Down 3 points. Up 3 points. Down 2 points. 80% recovered.

Context: History and Trends Through 2015+ Were Negative or Unclear for African-American LFP

https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/assets/economy/articles/economic-insights/2017/q4/eiq417.pdf
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2018/blacks-in-the-labor-force/pdf/blacks-in-the-labor-force.pdf
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2020/african-american-history-month/pdf/african-american-history-month.pdf

Challenges Make Black LFP Rate Improvement Even Better News

https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/2021-economic-commentaries/ec-202123-whats-holding-back-employment-in-the-recovery-from-the-covid19-pandemic.aspx
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2020/african-american-history-month/pdf/african-american-history-month.pdf
https://www.epi.org/indicators/unemployment/

Historically high concentrations of Black workers were hard hit by the pandemic.

https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2020/african-american-history-month/pdf/african-american-history-month.pdf
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2020/african-american-history-month/pdf/african-american-history-month.pdf
https://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0255_poverty_by_race

Positive Factors Supporting the Increase

https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2018/blacks-in-the-labor-force/pdf/blacks-in-the-labor-force.pdf

Size, growth and share all matter. Black workers may have quietly reached a “critical mass” where they face less obstacles and benefit from more positive network effects.

https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2018/blacks-in-the-labor-force/pdf/blacks-in-the-labor-force.pdf
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2018/blacks-in-the-labor-force/pdf/blacks-in-the-labor-force.pdf
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2020/african-american-history-month/pdf/african-american-history-month.pdf

A history of higher than average labor force participation by those with some college education and a growing share of people in that category.

https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2020/african-american-history-month/pdf/african-american-history-month.pdf

Black men have worked full-time schedules about the same as all men, while Black women have worked full-time more often than other women.

Context: The Labor Market

Real wages are up for African-Americans.

From 1975-97, African-American unemployment rates were 10% or higher. They briefly found the 7-8% level at the end of the Clinton presidency/expansion. They popped back up to 10% and recovered to about 8% before the “Great Recession”. They jumped up to 17% and then slowly declined to 10% by 2015. The extended recovery brought them down below 7% in 2018 and to a record low of less than 6%, briefly during 2018-19. The pandemic flirted with 17% rates once again. Instead of taking a decade to recover, unemployment rates have recovered in 2 years.

https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2020/african-american-history-month/pdf/african-american-history-month.pdf
https://www.epi.org/indicators/unemployment/

Black unemployment continues to be higher than other groups, but the gap is smaller than it once was.

References: Many Challenges Remain for African-Americans in the US Labor Market.

https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/2021-economic-commentaries/ec-202123-whats-holding-back-employment-in-the-recovery-from-the-covid19-pandemic.aspx

https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/diversity-and-inclusion/race-in-the-workplace-the-black-experience-in-the-us-private-sector

Good News: Increased Labor Force Participation

For each comparison, I’ll focus on the pre-pandemic Feb, 2020 numbers, the effective bottom rate in Jun/Jul, 2020 and today’s rate at May, 2022, about 2 years later.

The overall labor force participation rate dropped by 2 points from 63.4% to 61.4% and has recovered about half-way to 62.3%.

While many hope for a faster recovery, this 1% increase in 2 years is faster than from prior recessions. It is also taking place in the context of a long-term decline from 2000 to 2015, followed by a plateau and a bit of an increase in 2019 as the recovery from the “Great Recession” moved into a record length with record low unemployment.

The Hispanic rate generally followed the overall rate since 2000. However, the rate increased by a full 2 points in 2019. Hispanic labor force participation encountered a larger drop of almost 3 points, but has recovered one-half of the decline.

The Asian LFP rate follows the same general decline and flattening, with a somewhat higher rate in 2018-19 than the minimums from 2014-16. It dropped a little less than the overall average during the pandemic, by 1.7% and has fully recovered to the pre-pandemic level!

Black Americans showed the same general decline after 2000 to a minimum of 63% in 2015, with a significant and maintained increase to 64% in 2016 and a further 1% increase in 2019. Black labor force participation fell by a little more than 3 points to just 60%. It quickly added 1 point and in the last 6 months has added 2 more points, returning to its pre-pandemic 11 year high!

The White rate followed the overall pattern, but remained at the 63% plateau through the middle of 2019 before inching up by one-half percent. The participation rate was 1.8% lower in Jun/Jul, 2020. It did not change materially through the 3rd quarter of 2021, and has since added 0.4%. The White rate has recovered only 30% of the lost participation rate.

Women had added about one point of participation between 2016 and the beginning of 2020. Their participation declined a little less than men, at 1.8%. Women were slow to return to the work force during 2021, but have now closed one-half of the gap.

The Male participation rate remained flat from 2014 through the end of 2019. Note that male participation has been declining for 70 years. 2.1% of men left the labor force by Jun/Jul, 2020. The return during 2020-2021 was slow. The more recent increase has 40% of the absent men returned to the workforce.

Black men did not see a major participation rate increase in 2019. They experienced a 2.6% decline from the pandemic, followed by a 1% increase in the next year and a dramatic improvement in 2022 to a participation rate above the pre-pandemic level.

About 1.5% of Black Women were attracted into the labor force in 2019. Their pandemic decline was a very high 3.9%. They have added 2.7% of participation, so are about 3/4ths recovered.

Hispanic men did not show a clear participation increase in 2019. Their rate fell by a large 2.8% in the pandemic. It has rebounded by 2%, so is about 2/3rds recovered.

An additional 3% of Hispanic women entered the labor force during 2018-19. Their participation rate fell by 3.3% and remained low through the third quarter of 2021. It has grown by less than 1%, leaving it at a one-fourth recovery level.

White men did not increase their engagement during 2019 and recorded a 1.8% participation decline. There has been no significant recovery at this date.

Looking at the long-term trend, it may be that the 2015-19 rates were just a “pause” in the long-term decline. This topic warrants a separate article.

A smaller percentage of White women were drawn into the labor force during 2019, less than 1%. Their participation rate declined by 1.4% by Jun/Jul, 2020 and by 2% total in mid-2021 before beginning to recover. They have recovered by one-fourth to one-third of their decline.

Teenagers were least impacted by the pandemic, returning to prior work levels in less than a year.

College age young adults added almost 2 points of participation during 2018-19. They dropped a stunning 5.3% during the pandemic. They have recovered a solid 2.8%, so are a little more than 50% back.

The 55 and older group didn’t add many workers in 2019. Their participation declined by 1.1% and then by 1.7% total during 2021. They have recovered about one-third of the maximum decline.

The prime age (25-54) work force participation rate dropped 3 points, from 84% to 81%, between 2000 and 2015 in periods often decried as “jobless recoveries”. This group added 2 points of participation during 2016-19 as the recovery was extended, jobs added and unemployment reduced to record lows. Participation dropped by 2.1% in the pandemic. It has recovered 1.5%, so it is about three-fourths back to the elevated pre-pandemic level. The monthly increase rate looks very solid.

Prime age men added almost 1% of participation from 2016-2019 before losing 1.5% in the pandemic. They have added 1 point of participation, so are two-thirds recovered.

Prime age women added almost 3 points of participation from 2016-19, but experienced a 1.7% reduction during the pandemic. They have added 1.4% to their participation rate, reaching 80% of total recovery to the high pre-pandemic level.

https://www.epi.org/indicators/unemployment/

The even simpler ratio of employment to population shows a near total recovery in the prime age population. The steepness of the curve indicates that this will continue, at least in the short-run, even though the peak ratio was only 80.2%, 80.2% and 80.5% in 3 prior economic expansions. In 1999, the recent record was 81.9%.

Summary

From 2000 to 2015, the overall, male and white-male labor force participation rates declined by 4%, 5.5% and 5%. These rates bottomed out from 2016-18, with small increases in 2019. The recovery from the pandemic is fighting long-term trends that result in lower labor force participation (lower and later marriages, declining/flat pay for lower-skilled workers, increased disability claims, increased criminal, drug and alcohol records, social acceptance of not working, electronic entertainment options, etc.). Minority groups saw stronger 1-2% participation rate increases in the last years before the pandemic.

Hispanics, Blacks, teens and college students experienced pandemic dropout rates much higher than the 2% average from Feb, 2020 to Jun/Jul, 2020.

Overall, one-half of the decline has been recovered, but there are significant differences among the groups. Adults 55+ have remained close to their reduced rates. White men (a big share of the labor force) have made little progress returning to the labor force. Less than one-fourth of Hispanic women have returned. Two-thirds of the Hispanic male decline has been recovered. Three-fourths of the Black female gap has been closed. Teen participation has recovered (90%). Asian participation has fully recovered. Black male participation is above the pre-pandemic level.

The prime age group (25-54) has regained 1.5% of its 2.1% decline and the recovery trend looks solid in spite of the slower recovery groups.

Labor force participation has not increased quickly in prior periods. Based on the significant increases in the last 6-months, a continued increase in the participation rate through the end of the year is likely. I estimate that the pre-pandemic participation rate of 63.4% will be reached in the 1st quarter of 2023.

Good News: The Increase of Producer Price Inflation Has Peaked

https://4kwallpapers.com/nature/jasper-national-park-alberta-canada-winter-glacier-4561.html
Measure2.5 YearsRecent 1 YrTrend
PPI Minus food, energy, trade11%7%Peaked
Total Final Demand16%11%Peaked
All Commodities37% !!20% !Flat
Energy56% !!!45% !!Flat
Foods23% !13%Down
Other Goods14%8%Peaked
Other Services6%3%Down
Transport and WH24% !20% !Peak?
Whlse and Retail Trade22% !14%Down

For each measure of produce prices, I’ve provided a 5- or 10-year framework of annual inflation AND a 5 year view of prices indexed to Jan, 2020 before the pandemic began. We did have 2% inflation before the pandemic.

This traditional measure of ongoing inflation pressures peaked at 7% annual rate in 4Q, 2021. In total, just 12% in 2+ years.

Grand total PPI reached 10% annual inflation by the end of 2021 and has remained at that level. This provides pressure for CPI to be higher than 7% for a few more months.

Commodities pressure has been strong only recently, so the total PPI is just 3% higher than the measure excluding the volatile components.

Annual commodity inflation rocketed from 0% in Dec, 2021 to 20% by Jun, 2022 as the global economy was recovering from the pandemic and the extraordinary increase in durable goods demand was registered in supply chain purchasing decisions. Commodities are historically most volatile, but this increase in demand and prices was historic. Note this is way before the Ukraine invasion.

Energy prices were below the pre-pandemic level as late as Jan, 2021 (-3%). They increased exponentially to 50% higher by Apr, 2021. Energy prices have continued to increase at 35-40% annual rates as increased demand, mothballed assets and the Ukraine invasion effects combined to change the global markets. This is one measure where continued very high inflation is possible.

Food prices were a little slower to accelerate. Zero increase at Dec, 2020. 4% annual inflation at May, 2021. 13% inflation at Aug, 2021. Again, this is pre-Ukraine. The 13% ish inflation rate has continued, supported by Ukraine issues. Historically, food prices do not remain elevated for long periods.

Another subtotal, excluding 2 more volatile sectors shows 8-9% inflation peaking.

Business services inflation has remained tame, supporting the notion that cost-push inflation due to wage increases is not yet a major threat.

Transport and warehouse prices were also slow to “take off”, remaining below pre-pandemic level through Feb, 2021. Energy prices drive the transportation sector, so these prices also increased. The 20% annual increase seems to have peaked.

Wholesale and retail trade also lagged a bit, still at the historical average 2.5% inflation rate as of Mar, 2021. But, inflation grew to 10% by Aug, 2021 and a peak of 18% in Mar, 2022. The annual rate of inflation has receded to 15%, but that still offers some risks to the CPI for the next 6 months.

https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ppi.nr0.htm

https://www.bls.gov/ppi/

Summary

Six of the nine measures have peaked or are declining. The other three remain at worrying levels without clear signs of retreat. The “core” PPI inflation measure at 7% is not accelerating, so CPI should be able to decline in the second half of 2022. On the other hand, commodities inflation, mostly driven by energy inflation, remains very high without evidence of a meaningful decline in the near-term. Historically, energy and commodity prices fall back after a sharp increase. The general weakening in the global economy also points to a somewhat softer market for energy and commodities.

There is no evidence yet of labor-based cost-push inflation or accelerating/spiraling/self-reinforcing inflation.

“Price gauging” claims are always in the eye of the beholder/customer/politician. When I see relatively low historical price increases, followed by sharp increases, I imagine that business leaders are taking advantage of the situation to drive price increases that were impossible to propose and make stick during the less dynamic past. These can be spotlighted during a period of high inflation, but appear to be more reasonable across the whole business cycle. The food and energy price changes look similar to historical levels of volatility so are less easily questioned.

Big picture, IMHO, this looks like a global commodities “squeeze” due to the faster than expected recovery from the pandemic, especially the 50% growth in demand for durable goods as in-person services were less attractive and available. Loose fiscal and monetary policy in the US and other nations may have been a significant driver of the faster than expected global recovery, but this does not look like a classic case of excessive fiscal and monetary stimulus.

In hindsight, the slow response of the US Federal Reserve Board to the very rapid change in price levels from Jan, 2021 to Jun, 2021 looks like malpractice. Market prices quickly adapted to the current and expected disconnect between supply and demand.

Producer and consumer price increases are likely to remain in the 7-8% range during the 3rd quarter of 2022, but should begin to drift back to the 5-6% range in the 4th quarter of 2022, and still lower in 2023, especially if the Fed increases interest rates by the expected 3-3.5% and businesses slow their inventory, hiring, project and capital spending decisions accordingly.

Good News: 2022 Federal Budget Deficit is Way Down

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYFSGDA188S and forecasts described below

Good News: Early Forecasts: 2022 Deficit Cut in Half

https://www.crfb.org/blogs/no-president-biden-has-not-implemented-historic-deficit-reduction
https://datalab.usaspending.gov/americas-finance-guide/deficit/trends/

Better News: In May, CBO Forecasts Closer to $1Trillion, About the Same as 2019

https://www.crfb.org/papers/analysis-cbos-may-2022-budget-and-economic-outlook

Best News: May Data Indicates a Decline to 2017’s $0.7 Trillion Level (3/4ths Reduction)

https://www.pgpf.org/the-current-federal-budget-deficit
https://www.pgpf.org/the-current-federal-budget-deficit/budget-deficit-september-2019
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/deficit-tracker/

The May YTD deficit for fiscal year ending in September, 2022 was $426B, down 79.4% from the $2,064B level of FY 2021. The total FY 2021 deficit was $2,772B, so the same percentage reduction for the whole year estimates a $572B deficit for FY 2022. Visually, the year-to-date pattern most closely matches 2017 which ended with a $666B deficit. In fiscal years 2018 and 2019, the additional deficit for the last 4 months of the year was $245B and $247B, respectively. That gives us a forecast of $672B for FY 2022. DC insider, Wrightson ICAP, recently forecast a deficit of $600-700B.

https://rollcall.com/2022/05/09/tax-revenue-boom-fuels-steep-budget-deficit-decline/

Good News: CBO Forecasts FY 2023 and FY 2024 Deficits at Same Levels as FY 2022

https://www.crfb.org/papers/analysis-cbos-may-2022-budget-and-economic-outlook
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57950#section0

Good News: Public Debt as % of GDP is Forecast to Be Down for 2022-27

https://www.crfb.org/papers/analysis-cbos-may-2022-budget-and-economic-outlook

Good News: FY 2022 Government Deficit % of GDP is Best Since FY 2015

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYFSGDA188S

The conservative forecast of $700B deficit for FY 2022 is 2.8% of the CBO estimate of FY 2022 GDP at $24,694B. The CBO forecast Deficit/GDP ratios of 3.8% and 3.9% for the next 2 years, roughly the same as the pre-pandemic 2018 rate.

Good News: Government Fiscal Stimulus is a 3.5% Annual Drag on the Economy

https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/hutchins-center-fiscal-impact-measure/

The reduced federal deficit and state/local deficits compared with history provided a very large drag on first quarter GDP, but the economy recovered in the second quarter and is forecast by the CBO to deliver 3% overall real GDP in FY2023 after a very strong 4.4% in FY2022.

https://www.cbo.gov/data/budget-economic-data#4

Context

https://www.pgpf.org/the-current-federal-budget-deficit

Spending reductions are sustainable.

https://www.pgpf.org/the-current-federal-budget-deficit

Revenue increases are not sustainable, coming in as much as 2% of GDP higher than trend or expectations. The 2021 economy was very healthy, resulting in spillover tax receipts in 2022 that will not continue.

https://www.crfb.org/papers/analysis-cbos-may-2022-budget-and-economic-outlook

Spending at 22-24% of GDP cannot be funded by revenues of 18% in the long-run.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYFSGDA188S

Our economy has operated effectively for the last 4 decades with a federal budget deficit averaging 2.5% across the business cycle. Starting with 2.8% in 2022 is an unexpectedly good place. Congress and the president will struggle to maintain this level without significant spending or revenue changes in the next budgets.

https://www.crfb.org/press-releases/cbo-reports-63-billion-deficit-may

https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/25/u-s-deficit-congressional-budget-office-00035052

https://rollcall.com/2022/05/09/tax-revenue-boom-fuels-steep-budget-deficit-decline/

Good News: Widespread 2% Unemployment Rates

14 States Are Currently Below 3%

North Dakota, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Kansas, South Dakota, Minnesota and Nebraska form a low unemployment core in the Great Plains area. Utah, Idaho and Montana represent the Rocky Mountains. Vermont and New Hampshire lead in New England. Alabama leads the South, while Indiana leads the Midwest.

https://www.bls.gov/news.release/laus.nr0.htm

22 Metro Areas with 1M+ Population (of 51) Enjoy Unemployment Rates Under 3%

https://www.bls.gov/web/metro/laulrgma.htm

Large and Small Metro Areas Have Many Low Unemployment Areas

https://www.bls.gov/web/metro/laummtrk.htm

Low Unemployment Rates in US History

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE

May, 1953: 2.5%

Feb, 1968 – Dec, 1969: 3.5-3.8%

Oct, 2000: 3.9%

Dec, 2006: 4.4%

Jan, 2016: 4.8% through Feb, 2020: 3.5%. 4 years “below full employment”.

Estimates of Natural (Non-accelerating Inflation) Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) Have Been Biased Upwards and Influenced by One Period of High Inflation and Supply Chain Disruptions

https://www.chmura.com/blog/2019/july/19/how-low-can-the-unemployment-rate-goauthormikechmura

In retrospect, the period before 1976 (oil, trade, inflation shocks) should have used a 4.5% NAIRU for policy decisions. The jump to 6% in the late 70’s and early 80’s is supported by history. The NAIRU was deemed to be 5% or higher as late as 2010, but could have been pegged lower. Based on the lack of inflation during the teens, the rate probably should have been set at 4% or lower.

Macroeconomic Theory

Classical economics asserted that labor markets will naturally find equilibrium wages and quantities of labor employed at the individual labor market (micro) and total economy level. The Keynesian view, embraced by 90% of professional economists, is that there are market imperfections at both the individual market level and total economy level. Most importantly, wages are “sticky downwards”. Currently employed workers resist “losing” wages by accepting pay cuts when demand is lower. Aggregate supply (production) does not automatically create an equal amount of aggregate demand in the short-run, as businesses, individuals, banks and governments often choose to save more during economic downturns or periods of greater risk. Hence, a downturn in the economy caused by any source may result in a prolonged negative spiral, rather than automatically delivering lower prices in product, money and labor markets, which could help to recover these markets.

https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/09/22/how-low-can-unemployment-go

https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/09/22/how-low-can-unemployment-go

Microeconomic Theory: Why is There Any Unemployment?

Economists point to frictional and structural factors. Frictional unemployment occurs because labor market information and decisions are not perfect and instantaneous. As with other markets: housing, commercial real estate, offices, bank loans, farm fields, airport gates, container ships, utilities, R&D, IPO’s, private equity, M&A, retail inventories, etc, labor markets are imperfect. It takes time for equilibrium to be found. Given the increased concentration of labor in major metropolitan markets and internet-based recruiting systems, frictional unemployment has decreased in the last 20-30 years.

Structural unemployment occurs because of mismatches between the current skills possessed and skills demanded in a given place or due to legal or regulatory limitations. Binding minimum wages have been a smaller factor in the last 40 years but may have greater impact in the future. Regulatory requirements for professional licensing have increased significantly in the last 50 years (with some “liberalization” seen in recent years), slowing the ability for individuals to move between professions.

The overall labor force participation rate increased for many years as women entered the workforce, but has declined significantly in the last 20 years for men and for women. I’ll provide a detailed analysis of these factors next week. For our purposes, focusing on short-term changes, recent history shows that the labor force participation rate can be 1-2% higher overall. Some workers have not returned from the pandemic challenges. Some early retirees may return to the labor force. Teens and college students may join the labor force at recent wage rates. Marginal groups (elderly, long-term unemployed, handicapped, drug/alcohol recovery, crime history, minorities, limited language skills, inexperienced) may be considered for more positions.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LNU01300060

The media tends to emphasize the increased specialization and technical content required for modern jobs. This has resulted in greater structural unemployment, especially among lower-skilled individuals who held and lost manufacturing jobs between 1970-2000. It has also reduced movement between industries which require a core base of knowledge to be effective, with health care being a prime example.

On the other hand, modern corporations that worked through a dozen post-WW II business cycles eventually adapting to the “business cycle”. First, based on Japanese manufacturing, TQM or lean six sigma manufacturing principles, they reduced their operating leverage. Companies devised factories, offices, distribution centers, product lines and national businesses that could be equally profitable from 70-95% of capacity, rather than 85-95% of capacity. Second, they reduced their unavoidable “fixed costs” by importing goods, outsourcing business functions (manufacturing, IT, accounting, legal, marketing, distribution, sales, R&D) and employing temporary labor. Third, businesses systematized their processes so that core production processes could be operated by individuals with limited specialized or tribal knowledge, including managers and support staff. Fourth, businesses increasingly used matrix and project structures to effectively redeploy staff to any areas of need. So, while variable production staff is a smaller share of employment, the remaining “fixed cost” support staff can be more flexibly deployed. Fifth, after 40 years of process re-engineering, data warehouses, activity based costing and balanced scorecard reporting, companies deeply understand variable costs and incremental benefits driven by sales, production, product lines, facilities, territories and projects. “Knee-jerk” reactions to business cycle downturns are less common as firms better understand short-term incremental profits and medium-term costs of hiring and training. Sixth, firms have improved their ability to define “critical success factors” for every position. This has eliminated many irrelevant experience, degree, culture, personality and other factors from hiring screens. Seventh, firms have increasingly rotated staff through line and staff roles, allowing talented individuals to move between these roles and function effectively. Eighth, firms are more strategically oriented, growing profitable product lines and territories and dropping or “selling off” marginal channels. This means that the incremental positive value of most positions persists, even in an economic downturn.

Overall, firms have learned their “applied intermediate microeconomics” and clearly defined the marginal benefits and costs of every position. They understand exactly what incremental profit can be delivered from each position. Hence, the demand for labor services is significantly greater than it was historically, including through the downside of the business cycle. That means that the natural unemployment level is lower than in the past. Firms can profitably put more people to work than ever before.

Economists, Forecasters and Pundits are Reluctant to Predict Unemployment Below 3% Because it Was Rare Historically.

https://www.reuters.com/business/feds-bullard-says-unemployment-rate-can-go-below-3-this-year-2022-02-01/

https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/09/22/how-low-can-unemployment-go

https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/15/economy/unemployment-rate-goldman-sachs/index.html

https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/economy_14424.htm

https://theweek.com/articles/696915/how-low-unemployment

Lobbyists, Journalists, Politicians and Analysts Highlight the Downsides to “Very Low” Unemployment

From a firm’s perspective, a low unemployment labor market causes increased recruiting, hiring and training costs. It results in less well-matched staff to job roles resulting in lower initial productivity. Companies might even, aghast, inadvertently hire some staff with marginally negative profit results. Hence, very low unemployment rates will increase labor costs, reduce profits, reduce demand for labor and possibly bankrupt previously functional firms.

https://www.investopedia.com/insights/downside-low-unemployment/

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/32-unemployment.htm

https://www.uschamber.com/economy/the-divide-between-job-openings-and-willing-workers-widens

https://www.umassglobal.edu/news-and-events/blog/low-unemployment-rates

Trade-off Between Unemployment and Inflation: The Phillips Curve

In the 1970’s fight between Keynesians and Monetarists/Classical Economists/Rational Expectations teams, the Keynesians emphasized the historical existence of a short-term trade-off between unemployment and inflation, especially when unemployment was very low due to a high level of aggregate demand. The conservative side noted that the historical data was inconsistent. The “rational expectations” camp emphasized that unexpected increases in inflation would lead to increased wage demands by labor. In the long-run, there is no such thing as a “free lunch”, so effective real wages would return to the level determined by the “marginal productivity of labor”. Based on recent data (pre-pandemic), it appears that the US economy can run at 3.5-4.0% unemployment without triggering significant upward wage pressures. In the post-pandemic world, the “natural” unemployment rate (NAIRU) is unclear. The labor supply has basically recovered to the pre-pandemic level. Wages are up 5% in nominal terms but are down 2% in real terms (see below).

There are Many Unemployment Measures. They Move Together.

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/02/18/what-does-the-unemployment-rate-measure/
https://www.richmondfed.org/research/national_economy/non_employment_index

Labor Market Slack

In a period of healthy economic growth, the economy is constrained by the limited availability of labor as an input to drive the economic engine.

https://www.richmondfed.org/research/national_economy/non_employment_index

Underemployed individuals provide the logical next best full-time employees. The current slack measure is 3.5%, (7.1% – 3.6%) on the low side, but not so low that conversions from this underemployed group to full-time employment cannot be expected.

Real Wage Rates in a Growing Economy

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CES0500000003
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL

Jun, 2020 – Jun 2022. Nominal wages up 4.7%/year. CPI up 6.1%. 1.4% real wage decrease.

Dec, 2020 – Dec, 2021. Nominal wages up 4.9%. CPI up 7.3%. 2.4% real wage decrease.

May, 2021 – May, 2022. Nominal wages up 5.2%. CPI up 7.9%. 2.7% real wage decrease.

Nominal wage rates have increased by 5% annually in a period of 7% inflation. Employers have been able to economically justify these increases while adding 7 million people to the labor force.

Beveridge Curve: Job Openings Versus Unemployment Rate.

https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2014/ted_20140513.htm

https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_brief/2021/eb_21-36

Historically, there was a well-defined relationship between the national level of job openings as a percent of the labor force and the unemployment rate. Job openings were a low 2-2.5% of the labor force at the beginning of the business cycle, accompanied by higher (6-10%) unemployment, but improved to 4% openings and 4% unemployment. The current labor market has far more job openings, up to 11 million, almost twice as many job openings as unemployed workers, but the unemployment rate has only fallen to 3.6% so far. This is uncharted territory. There are more voluntary quits, so employees are switching jobs at a faster rate. The labor force participation rate has increased with these jobs and higher wages offered. But firms have not found enough acceptable hiring matches to significantly reduce the open positions level. Through time, they are likely to achieve their hiring goals, driving the unemployment rate down below 3%.

https://numbernomics.com/unemployment-vs-job-openings-2/

Summary

  1. The demand for labor already exists. 11 million open positions is 7% of the labor force. We have enough active demand for ZERO % unemployment.
  2. The supply of labor increased by 7 million people since the depths of the pandemic. The rate of monthly additions has slowed from 500-600,000 to 300,000, but that is still 3.6 million jobs added on an annual basis. We only have 6 million total people unemployed!

3. The labor force participation rate is only 62.5%. There is room for millions to return to the labor market. Before the “Great Recession” in 2008 it was at 67%. Many metro areas, large and small, enjoy labor force participation rates above 65%.

4. The underemployed population can provide up to 3% of the total labor market’s full-time jobs.

5. Frictional unemployment is minimal in the internet age. Structural unemployment may be lower than described in the media, as firms have been adapting to the “information age”, high technology and the service economy for 40-50 years.

Finally, many states and metro areas currently have unemployment rates in the “twos”. Nebraska and Utah stand at 1.9%. Minneapolis (1.5%), Birmingham (1.9%) and Indianapolis (2.0%) demonstrate that otherwise unremarkable (!!!) metro areas can function with very low unemployment rates.

Good News: US Taxes Remain Low

https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/revenue-statistics-united-states.pdf

US taxes as a share of GDP have declined by 3% of GDP since 2000 and are about one-fourth lower than the average of other developed countries.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=ffB4

Government taxes (excluding social security) have declined by 1-2% of GDP since 1950’s.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYFRGDA188S

Federal taxes as a percent of GDP have remained flat since the 1950’s.

https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2021/04/six-charts-that-show-how-low-corporate-tax-revenues-are-in-the-united-states-right-now

Effective corporate tax rates in the US are very low.

https://taxfoundation.org/short-history-government-taxing-and-spending-united-states/

Federal government tax receipts have been essentially flat as a share of GDP for more than 70 years.

https://www.usgovernmentrevenue.com/revenue_history

A source with more details shows that any growth since the 1950’s has largely taken place at the state level.

https://www.visualcapitalist.com/comparing-tax-systems-around-the-world/
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-do-us-taxes-compare-internationally

US total taxes as a percent of GDP are exceptionally low among developed countries.

https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/revenue-statistics-united-states.pdf

US income and property taxes are relatively higher than other developed countries, but corporate taxes are half as high, and the US does not use value added taxes (VAT) to quietly collect revenues.