Fukuyama defends “classical liberalism” as a political structure. Not US “liberals” or UK “liberal democrats” or neo-liberals. It was born in the 18th century, child of the enlightenment and religious wars, emphasizing the individual over the group, the equality of individuals, the human species rather than any subset, and practical political structures that provide reasonable results. Individual rights, rationality, human dignity, the rule of law, institutions, compromise and tolerance. Typically connected with objectivity, the scientific method and free trade versions of capitalism. The mixed economic and political systems that he celebrated in 1992 as the “end of history” when fascism and communism were defeated.

“Classical liberalism” is threatened from the right and the left. First, from the right with Reagan/Thatcher neoliberalism which elevates economic property rights as a super-value, undercutting other political and social values. Second, from populist, authoritarian leaders who are actively “illiberal”, campaigning against “free trade”, international bodies, immigration, elites and various “others”, discounting the value of institutions and the “rule of law”. Third, from the left as the progressive, new, radical left has adopted the postmodernist views that elevate “power” as the central political value/insight and claim that powerful elites always control society unless they are opposed by “marginalized” groups to lead a revolution against the dominant groups.

Fukuyama criticizes neoliberalism for being too extreme, opposing the role of government even where it is needed per elite opinion: some regulations, public investments, income redistribution, fiscal and monetary policy, international trade and development, public utilities, environmental externalities, etc. He challenges the notion that property rights are significantly more important than other “rights”. He agrees that the intellectual foundations for “classical liberalism” tend to result in a “thin” basis for morality and community, but argues that neoliberalism makes this even worse, ignoring the moral and community dimensions. He recommends that voters and politicians focus on improving the “quality” of necessary government services.

“Classical liberalism” was developed within a Christian religious and moral worldview, which provided the required moral and community dimension for their 18th century societies. However, Luther’s Protestant Reformation was radically individualistic, downplaying the church as an institution and elevating the individual’s reading of the Bible and personal relationship with God. Philosophers like Rousseau further elevated the role of the individual and criticized the potentially corrosive role of society. Philosophers like Kant developed frameworks that were independent of history and culture, using reason alone to develop morality. Fukuyama notes that a full-fledged individualistic society really grew after WWII, in the shadow of Darwin, Freud and Marx. He notes that John Rawls’ 1971 “Theory of Justice” provides an overly abstract approach to morality and politics, further eliminating the role of “community”. Fukuyama doesn’t have a simple solution to the individualistic imbalance in society.

Fukuyama invests two chapters outlining the development of the post-modernist philosophical and political worldview. 19th century philosophers like Nietzche declared that “God is dead” and that objectivity is dead. They tried to find a “subjective” basis for philosophy, rejecting the core tenants of “classical liberalism” and prior objective, idealistic models. Objectivity, causation and the scientific method were shaky foundations. Dynamic, organic, artistic, natural, revolutionary, evolving worldviews were proposed. After WWII this coalesced into the post-modernist approach. Post-modernism provided a new home for those who supported communism. The elites and power structure oppress the marginalized communities because “they can”. The intellectuals have the role of ensuring that the oppressed understand their abused role and work to overthrow the repressors. The parallel with Marxism is strong. Fukuyama admits that “power” is really important and that powerful people and institutions have used and sometimes abused their power. Yet, he points to the progress of “classical liberal” societies in providing economic success, making life better for poor and minority communities, expanding individual rights, providing a framework for progress, a forum for participation and safeguards against extreme policies or leaders, etc. Philosophically, he cannot support the singular emphasis on power or the subjective worldview. He claims that the “burden of proof” for overthrowing the “classical liberal” model remains on the critics.

Fukuyama leaves us with 10 principles: quality of government, inequality matters, federalism can help, freedom of speech is critical, privacy matters, the scientific method and rational problem-solving work, individual rights have a solid intellectual and historical basis, while group rights do not, the individual and group/morality both matter, civic participation matters and moderation is a virtue.