By 2004, Haidt saw that his preliminary findings applied to national politics in the US. Democrats relied on just one or two of the moral foundations, or even zero, while Republicans appealed to all five in effective ways. He contrasts Bush, Sr and Bush, Jr, neither a naturally gifted politician, with cool and cerebral Dukakis, Gore and Kerry, who they handily defeated. The Bushes appealed to Republicans, independents and Democrats by using a variety of emotional pitches. Separately, Bill Clinton stands out as a naturally gifted politician and manipulator of emotions.
By 2011, Haidt and his associates had developed and perfected a variety of questionnaires and attracted 100,000 on-line respondents to make their results scientifically sound. Liberals greatly valued the Care and Fairness dimensions and disregarded the Loyalty, Authority and Sanctity dimensions. Moderates were like liberals in terms of their rank orderings but had much closer scores on the 5 attributes. Conservatives valued all 5 equally and Very Conservative individuals valued Authority, Sanctity and Loyalty above Care and Fairness.
Colleagues corroborated the findings based on religious sermon content, dog preferences and brainwaves! The author began to write articles for the general public to share his findings. Many of the responses were predictable. Liberals downplayed or rejected the 3 conservative foundations. Conservatives tentatively complimented an academic who “go it”. But many conservatives were as critical as the unhappy liberals. They questioned Haidt’s morals and lack of understanding of the differences between Democrats and Republicans. They emphasized that Democrats really don’t believe in fairness, just equality and rights. The respondents saw fairness as proportionality and earned rewards.
Haidt and his team reconsidered the 5 moral foundations and made two changes. First, they redefined “Fairness” to be based on the idea of proportionality of work/contibution and rewards. Haidt found evolutionary psychology support from Christopher Boehm’s research on humans and primates. While the original “reciprocal altruism” foundation basis does have support in human history, the development of larger communities with shared property 500,000 years ago required the development of people and norms with group concepts and different fairness behaviors. With more powerful tools/weapons and communications, groups were able to limit the direct power of alpha males and use gossip and communications to support a moderate hierarchical structure with a leader or leading group that commanded extra resources, power and respect, but not too much. This “goldilocks” scenario is considered by many anthropologists and evolutionary psychologists to be a key turning point in human history. Proportional fairness is more highly valued by conservatives but moderately valued by liberals.
Second, while considering this same turning point in human development, Haidt decided to add a sixth moral foundation: Liberty/oppression. In larger groups with an “authority” moral foundation required to support the leader, there is a need for a complementary value to oppose excessive use of authority. Individuals accept, follow and respect valid, legitimate authority, but they rebel against being abused. They can embrace hierarchy and disproportionate rewards to a point, but they are able to band together and oppose any abuse of power. Haidt shares anthropological details to make this plausible. This moral foundation is supported by both the left and the right. The left emphasizes relative equality of rewards and generic antiauthoritarianism. The right emphasizes the personal liberty side, “give me liberty or give me death”, “don’t tread on me”, don’t regulate me, don’t restrict my choices, guns, family or religion. A powerful moral foundation indeed.
Haidt returns for a third time to share John Stuart Mill’s vision of a just society. It is based on the enlightenment, individuals, rationality, utility and a theoretical contract between individuals and society. “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others”. This modern, progressive, Western view is based upon Care and Fairness alone.
He then shares sociologist Emile Durkheim’s view of how society works. It is organic, based on community, evolving to meet actual needs, incrementally changing, inherently conserving order and tradition, skeptical of change, based upon existing well-functioning institutions like the family and church. Durkheim argues that man needs to belong to a binding moral system comprised of institutions larger than the individual in order to have a sense of place, stability, order, belonging and meaning. Without this grounding, he is rootless, anxious, experiencing anomie, a lack of grounding. This world view prioritizes self-control over self-expression, duty over rights, and loyalty to one’s groups over concern for out-groups. Historically, Durkheimian societies have predominated. WEIRD societies have been the minority. Haidt encourages the reader to consider both conceptions to have legitimacy. He does not dwell on the possibility of a “both/and” blending of these views or ways to accommodate both at the individual, institution and society level, but consider these possibilities. The individual and the group both matter. Different individuals prioritize individual versus group needs differently and the 6 moral foundations. Given our seemingly intractable differences of opinion, how do we make society function?
Haidt shares more details about conservatives, liberals and libertarians, but the main point is most essential. Different people have different moral worldviews. They are not changing. No one worldview is clearly superior by any broadly accepted ethical standard. We are going to have to “agree to disagree” or as Rodney King said, “Can we all get along?” Can each side understand all six foundations and others who value them differently? Can liberals understand and appreciate Durkheim’s view of a group-based society? Can conservatives appreciate the “individual” and abstract principled, universal, secular insights of liberals, aside from liberty?
Nine: Why Are We So Groupish?
Individuals express both selfish and group-oriented thoughts and behaviors. Everyone knows this. We join and support teams and nations. We donate anonymously. We “do the right thing” when no one is looking at least some of the time (ring of Gyges theory be damned). We embrace religions and consider others. We volunteer. We participate in politics. Not always. Not everyone. But enough to say that this is a feature of humanity, not a bug or a flaw or a mistake. Haidt admits that he has pushed hard on the cynical view of humanity to demonstrate what individuals often do or do “on average”. Nonetheless, group thought, and behavior is part of our human make-up.
Haidt addresses this based on evolution. George Williams in 1955 and Richard Dawkins in 1976 made strong arguments against existing theories of “group selection” in nature and for humans. The differential positive survival of groups based upon group cohesion, solidarity and individual sacrifice is possible in evolutionary theory, but depends upon the group being able to control the individual member’s behavior so that he generally does what the group needs and does not “free ride”, avoiding the personal cost of a behavior that helps the group. Williams and Dawkins debunked many “group selection” examples, demonstrating that they were caused by individual selection or near-kin selection.
Haidt shares Darwin’s view which supports group selection in concept, especially with regard to morality! He provides four rather technical scenarios that support the idea that human group level selection has been a major factor in the development of morality.
The history of biology is that of transitions from one level of competition to a higher level of competition. Bacteria to mitochondria to cells to … animals to societies. 8 transitions in all of recorded time. In each case, the next higher level absorbed the prior lower level, making it secure and dependent upon the higher level, disabling the disruptive competition at the prior level. The development of queen bees and workers in a hive is an example. These more recent changes took place when a persistent, defensible resource was involved (nest and food). They also involved a need to feed infants and the need to defend against other groups of the same species. Human societies fit this model: caves, needy children and aggressive neighbors. Fixed location crops and city-states match this pattern. Group level competition by bands of humans makes sense.
Michael Tomasello argues that “it is inconceivable that you would ever see two chimpanzees carrying a log together”. Humans, on the other hand, have what is described as “shared intentionality”. We have some sense of what another person is seeing, feeling, doing and thinking. We have a mirror image capability. This allowed groups of 2-3 to cooperate and communicate effectively. Even before formal language, humans could use signals, expressions and actions to share ideas and confirm mutual understanding. This is a critical underpinning for moral thought and behavior. It allows groups to share expectations and norms, to consistently provide feedback on acceptable and unacceptable behavior.
Once a group has mutual understanding, empathy and communications it can define a culture and sustain that culture though time. The culture can evolve to further and cumulatively improve group level effectiveness. The culture can take advantage of biological evolution, teamwork, communications and innovations. Biological and cultural evolution can interact. Dairy herds, lactose tolerance, more food, more herds, cheese, more people. Abstract symbols and markings and language evolve. The components or vocabulary become richer and support faster and innovative growth. The sense of groupness increases as the communications skills and feedback loops improve. The group level matters even more. Group innovations such as shame and guilt develop. The authority, sanctity/cleanliness, liberty, fairness and loyalty moral foundations become more effective. Effective societies “self-domesticate”, restraining extreme individualism and promoting cooperation and support of the group.
Biologists argue about the speed of evolution. Haidt shares examples of rapid individual and group evolution in 10-30 generations. He argues that the migration of humans around the globe during a period of warming and cooling provided a challenging environment for humans that could have triggered very rapid evolutionary changes at the biological and cultural levels in the last 50,000 years.
Haidt concludes that we are 90% selfish chimp and 10% cooperative bee. Once again, this is assuming that the evolutionary framework is the “alpha and omega”, without any religious, spiritual or sacred dimension working in the universe.
Ten: The Hive Switch
Haidt asserts that humans have evolved to live at both the individual and group levels. In this chapter he describes this potential in more detail, emphasizing his 90/10 theory that we mostly live in the profane, individual, day to day world, but at times we “switch” to the group, sacred, infinite, eternal, religious level.
His favorite sociologist, Emile Durkheim, describes these two levels and emphasizes, in contrast to the individualist views expressed by other scientists, social scientists and philosophers from 1500-1900, that the social, group or religious level is an essential part of man’s nature. No man does or can live without a “thick” attachment to his culture, neighborhood, community and nation. Durkheim describes the lack of connection as the dreaded “anomie” or emptiness experienced by individuals who leave their community and emphasizes the “collective effervescence”, or energy felt by individuals in group settings.
Haidt opens the chapter describing a simple version of an “altered state of consciousness” created by the muscular bonding of military drills. He connects this with the rhythmic dancing to exhaustion reported in many primitive cultures by anthropologists. The individual is moved from being an individual, conscious agent to being a part of the collective, aligned, bonded, trusting, equal, outwardly focused group. He describes another half dozen ways in which individuals shift from a “me” to a “we” world view, in each case experiencing a different consciousness. Awe of nature, drugs, initiation ceremonies, sporting events, political rallies, religious ceremonies and meditation all produce this change in perspective.
Haidt outlines two biological channels that appear to be involved. The hormone oxytocin is associated with bonding, love and attention. Experimental psychology studies show that it improves feelings towards others in a group, not to broader humanity and that it does not create negative feelings for out-group members. The mirror neuron system allows humans to have the emotion of empathy. Seeing others, especially those we view favorably, perform an action triggers the same brain circuits as when the individual does the same action. Haidt describes this as “parochial altruism” or “parochial love”, the exact range of impact consistent with the development of group level bonding in an evolutionary mechanism.
The author reminds us of his earlier amazement at the scale of organization level cooperation seen in the modern world, especially in large corporations. Without inherent group level bonding and interaction capabilities, this would not be possible. He notes that modern organizations try to use “transformational” rather than merely “transactional” leadership styles to shift team members from a purely economic exchange to more of a partnership or group membership.
Haidt takes a quick tour through political groups which appear everywhere in human history. The nation state shows that group feelings can apply at a large scale. Manipulative leaders such as fascists can misuse groupness. He notes Robert Putnam’s research that shows the many ways in which “social capital” can be built and provide benefits in smaller scale political and social organizations.
Finally, the author relates his belief that human “happiness” does not come from the individual, self and soul alone as promoted by some religions and philosophies. Instead, he proposes that it comes primarily from positive relationships between the individual and others, groups and the sacred realm.
Eleven: Religion is a Team Sport
The chapter opens with a description of University of Virginia football traditions. Symbols, chants, songs, dances, traditions, rites, colors, colleagues, fraternities, sororities, ecstasy, collective effervescence, sanctity, sacred objects and locations. Yes, just like a religion, perhaps a Pentecostal religion! Sporting events and religions are “social facts”. They exist in almost all times and places.
After 9/11, many scientists, philosophers and journalists could no longer withhold their contempt for “organized religion”, especially any version of fundamentalist religion. The “New Atheists” documented why religion is almost all “bad” and an evolutionary mistake that could be overcome if everyone would follow their lead in eliminating it. Their model of human behavior is the familiar Platonic one where belief determines behavior. Haidt offered much evidence to question this simple model earlier in the book. He also presents a model of religious psychology where Beliefs, Actions and Belonging interact as equals.
“To an evolutionist, religious behaviors ‘stand out like peacocks in a sunlit glade'” according to D.C. Dennett. Evolution prunes away wasteful behaviors since they require the use of scarce energy. Yet, religion is everywhere. The New Atheists begin with the “hypersensitive agency detective device” that humans possess. We identify patterns. We assume an agent is behind any behavior, activity, shape, result, situation, effect, outcome, sight, sound, taste, image, memory, belief … Although philosophers argue about the existence of “cause and effect”, regular humans simply know that this is true. We assign causal agents in almost any situation as an instantaneous first hypothesis.
Once humans lived together in larger communities and used language, someone described agency in the form of God or spirits for all kinds of events: weather, wind, animal attacks, good harvests, bad fishing, attacking neighbors, etc. Other translations of human capabilities to serve the “God hypothesis” may have helped. Love of man to love of God. The idea that bodies and minds, souls, and God are different. In this analysis, religion was never a valuable tool at the individual or group level, merely a strange accident.
However, religions that did a better job of convincing people that they were correct, for whatever reason, would have continued through time and survived, attracted new groups while other less believable or effective religions would have passed away. This is a fine point, but a critical one. Selection is based on the ability of religious ideas, stories and leaders to survive and reproduce, irrespective of whether they provided any benefits to groups or individuals. In other words, appearances matter most in evaluating supernatural concepts. Religions are described by the “New Atheists” as viruses or parasites that promote themselves, even at high costs to their hosts.
Some anthropologists and evolutionary psychologists propose a similar evolutionary explanation for religion’s pervasive existence and influence. They argue that religions that made groups more cohesive and cooperative DID provide clear benefits at the group level, and possibly personal benefits too. As groups got bigger and adopted agriculture, making assets and a hierarchical structure more important, the need for cohesion increased and the opportunity for “more effective” concepts of God arose. Gods who can see everything. Gods who hate cheaters and oath breakers. Gods who administer collective punishment. Angry gods.
Haidt shares research on the survival of communes to support the idea that religions can greatly improve group solidarity. Religious communes survive 6 times as often as secular communes. Religious communes that required the most personal sacrifices from members did best. Personal sacrifices did not make a difference for secular communes. Haidt and some researchers argue that the “sacredness” of sacrifices, rituals, laws and practices allows them to become invisible, held at God’s level, unchallengeable and more effective.
Biologist David Sloan Wilson’s book “Darwin’s Cathedral” offers a theoretical framework combining Darwin’s idea of group level evolution to create morality and eliminate the “free rider” problem with Durkheim’s definition of religion as a “unified system of beliefs and practices that unites members into one single moral community”. Religion, as a social institution, arises and then evolves by delivering group level cohesion benefits. He refers to John Calvin’s strict Protestantism, medieval Judaism and Balinese rice farmers solving complex water management challenges as evidence for how this works. Haidt likens God to a maypole that serves the function of giving people a central figure to coordinate their lives as a community.
Robert Putnam and David Campbell in “American Grace” relate that individuals who “practice” a religion are significantly more generous than others, first to members of their religion and second to the larger community.
Haidt describes religions as “moral exoskeletons”. “If you live in a religious community, you are enmeshed in a set of norms, relationships and institutions that work primarily on the elephant to influence your behavior”. If you are not shaped by a religious community then you have to rely upon individual, rational decision-making, allowing the rider to try to guide the elephant, who has nonetheless picked up moral beliefs. Haidt is very skeptical that a society can be effective if it is comprised of individuals trying to “reason” their way through life rather than adopting some “religious” perspective that provides an agreed upon moral framework.
“Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate self-interest and make cooperative societies possible”. This is a functionalist definition describing what morality does, not what it “ought to do”. Haidt suggests that utilitarianism, supplemented by the value of maintaining social order and cohesiveness, is a good philosophy (Ought) for making public policy decisions. Produce the greatest good for the greatest number, subject to the need to preserve the social order.
Twelve: Can’t We All Disagree More Constructively?
American politics has become more polarized in the last 50 years for the familiar reasons: Voting Rights Act of 1964 triggered alignment of conservative = Republican and liberal = Democratic parties. The Reagan Revolution consolidated varied “conservative” groups into one “conservative” umbrella allied in opposition to the “liberals”. The Gingrich Revolution further exaggerated these differences and staked out extreme positions and undercut compromise. These opposing parties have increasingly disregarded formerly shared norms on how “our democracy” works (2011 debt ceiling vote, Supreme Court nominations).
Haidt devoted a whole book to isolating six different dimensions of political, moral and religious beliefs, but returns to the simpler “left versus right” yardstick because it is most researched and provides solid insights. He adds libertarians to liberals and conservatives in some of his analysis. He notes that research shows that individuals pursue their moral/belief/worldview self-interest, not their economic self-interest in politics. Self-interest, but not naked self-interest.
Research documents that there is a genetic basis to political beliefs. Liberals tend to be less reactive to threats and more attracted to change and novelty. Conservatives are more attentive to threats of all kinds and value the familiar. Twins studies show that political views are about one-third predicted by genes, like many other personality traits. As individuals develop into young adults they adapt to their environments, where their initial preferences are reinforced or modified. Eventually they adopt a political/moral matrix world view and buy into a life narrative/story that makes sense for them. These life narratives are filled with moral content.
The grand narrative of liberalism is the heroic liberation narrative. “The arc of justice curves forward”. The world progresses from the darkness of oppression towards increasing fairness and equality. “Modern, liberal, democratic, capitalist (?), welfare societies” prevail. Authority, hierarchy, power and tradition are overcome. The grand narrative of conservatism is the heroic defense of the valued society. Reagan’s speeches illustrate this with a consistent pattern of outlining liberal threats and championing conservative responses to restore the just society. All of the moral foundations are employed. The organic and sacred roles of community, family, neighborhood, church and nation, are highlighted.
Haidt’s research shows that moderates and conservatives can generally imagine and understand, if not “appreciate”, the liberal narrative and priority moral dimensions. However, liberals, especially those who are “very liberal” struggle to even understand how loyalty, authority and sanctity belong in a moral worldview. The extreme rational, individualists struggle to see the community, group or religious dimension of life, morality and politics. “Morality binds and blinds”.
Haidt’s research shows that liberals fail to understand or appreciate the necessary role of “social capital” in building support for society, institutions and politics. He quote’s Putnam’s 1999 “Bowling Alone” which documents the huge decline in social activities in the US since the 1950’s and the impact on trust in others, institutions, politics and society. He does not “blame” liberals directly but points to the individualist bias of the modern world as a driving factor.
Haidt takes yet another pass at making “conservatism” accessible to his liberal colleagues in the academy, noting that much of his research is consistent with modern (1776+) conservative philosophy. Historian Jerry Muller argues that the original modern conservatives, David Hume and Edmund Burke, reason within the Enlightenment framework, attempting to outline political ideas, frameworks, concepts, institutions and structures that improve human happiness. They emphasize history, tradition, caution, moderation, community, institutions, beliefs, real people and skepticism. Muller contrasts this with “orthodoxy” which emphasizes a “transcendent moral order”.
Haidt argues that this worldview supports the value of “social capital” and “moral capital”. As outlined in the last two chapters, humans have the capacity to shift between the profane and sacred dimensions. Religions use this sacred, group, infinite, eternal dimension to bind people together in a solid group. This achievement of a deeply, intuitively shared worldview allows society to function more effectively, reducing the need for external laws and enforcement, building trust which simplifies daily life, reducing transaction costs, and offsetting pure self-interest.
Haidt contrasts the Chinese complementary framework of yin/yang or the pluralist (not relativist) philosophy of Isaiah Berlin with the monist (one) moral frameworks of pure utilitarianism or deontology (pure reason) or the Manichaean religious perspectives (good/evil). He is never so crass as to just say, “both the individual and the group matter”, but I believe that is the essence of his work. The WEIRD, academically liberal descendants of the rational, scientific, individual “enlightenment” believe that some form of fixed, final, perfect, just, fair, ideal philosophy and state is possible and will arrive. Orthodox religious believers and social conservatives idealize the community above the individual and perceive their own version of an ideal, well-run state arriving. The “silent majority” of Americans know that we need both the individual and community perspectives, the profane and the sacred, to have an effective community, nation and world [TK speaking].
Haidt proposes “Durkheimian utilitarianism” as the standard for public policy decisions. Create the most good for all people but preserve the core commitment to our shared community life. Promote the “little platoons” of life. He says that liberals are right to propose government as a necessary regulator and counterweight to the superorganism known as a multinational corporation. He says that libertarians are right to emphasize the benefits of the capitalist market system. He says that conservatives are right to emphasize the importance of preserving social and moral beliefs, laws, policies and institutions. He notes that liberals hate the idea of exclusion, so they prioritize, even sacralize, the defense of individual rights and the importance of shared humanity. This sometimes leads to policies that unintentionally undercut social structures (welfare and out-of-wedlock births).
Haidt does not dwell on solutions. He has a website, http://www.civilpolitics.org, with details. He discounts civility pledges or a miraculous insight that will change minds. He believes we are 90% individualistic chimp and 10% social bee. He believes that we “should” begin with honestly trying to empathize and understand the views of others. From his beliefs, actions, belonging model of religious psychology, he advises taking actions to interact with others.
Conclusion
Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning is second. The elephant leads, the rider acts as a press secretary.
There’s more to morality than harm and fairness. 6 flavors of morality at the cafe.
Morality binds and blinds. We are selfish and we are groupish. 90% chimp and 10% bee.
TK Commentary
We all have political, religious and moral worldviews that seem to be correct and obvious. We struggle to see why others don’t see the world as we do.
Yet, after 50,000 years of progressively more complex societies, politics and economics, we are stuck with each other now more than ever.
I’m not convinced that Haidt has “THE” 6 moral foundations identified and described or “explained” by evolution. But I think that he has clearly outlined our dual individual and group, moral, community, religious, sacred nature. And, it’s a good thing that we are inherently individuals and naturally community members. We live in a world that requires both at every level: family, neighborhood, community, profession, organization, state and world.
The author gently focuses on the excesses of the academic, new, far left without addressing the even more extreme postmodernist flavors common in the academy, media and progressive politics today. This an “orthodoxy” just as close-minded as the fundamentalist religious orthodoxy on the right, IMHO.
I believe that our politics is dominated by the extreme “orthodoxies” of religious fundamentalism, libertarian individualism and grievance/victim populism on the right and postmodernism, secular humanism, and identity grievance/victim populism on the left. Both extremes provide simple solutions to our complex modern challenges while demonizing the opposition to make us feel righteous.
During the challenges of the depression and WWII and in the post-war breather period, Americans largely set aside their political differences to support the nation first in 3 existential struggles (survival, fascism, communism). Racial, cultural and military events in the 1960’s conspired to set the stage for polarization. Some politicians have attempted to appeal to the “better angels of our nature”. Eisenhower and Kennedy, in their own ways. Reagan as an “above politics”, traditional, American, Teflon, city on the hill, idealist and communicator. Carter, Clinton and Obama as centrists. Bush, Sr and Bush, Jr. as less ideological Republicans. The political forces of extremism, simplicity and populism have been winning for 50 years. 😦
I believe that Haidt’s work provides the conceptual basis for some kind of new consensus that accepts that we are “stuck with each other”. The original US constitution took this same negative, but practical, view of reality. The US didn’t experience the religious and political wars as Europe did, so it is not so sensitive to the risk of such wars. We had the “Civil War”, but it has mostly receded from the public imagination as a force for compromise in modern politics. We are seeing the disfunction of solid red states and solid blue states. At some point, I predict that the “elites” in society will reassert control. These divisions are “bad for business”, threatening national security, undermining democracy, risking civil war, dividing neighbors, and damaging children and families.
Evolutionary psychologist Jonathan Haidt wants the general reader to understand how man’s evolution has shaped his psychology, especially as it applies to “politics and religion”. He and his colleagues have considered a wide variety of theories from evolutionary psychology. He has concluded that real world men and women first have intuitive views of politics and use their “rational” skills to justify their views and avoid changing. Second, he identifies a half dozen evolutionary behaviors and thought patterns that underly most political beliefs. Third, he shares research that shows that liberals generally only emphasize 2-3 of these viewpoints while conservatives apply all 6. Fourth, he argues that humans are 90% solitary individuals and 10% collective or community animals who naturally live at both the profane and sacred levels. Fifth, he argues that religious belief has co-evolved in the last 10,000 years with the domestication of animals, increased value of assets and development of larger groups in civilization who threatened each other.
Many religious people struggle to even consider a book that uses “evolution” to outline politics and religion. Haidt does not take a determinist approach, nor does he disregard a sacred basis for religion. Many progressives, especially those who believe that only fairness and equality are proper bases for political views and who discount religion, also struggle with this book which provides a “broader” picture. I encourage readers to set aside their political views, even though Haidt shares many studies that say we are very poor at doing so, because I think that his insights into people using intuition and rationalizing, overall, are objectively true. I also think that understanding the 6 underlying thought patterns supporting our deeply held political beliefs can help to reduce our polarization and make us more accepting of the beliefs of other people [Are those who think differently from me really EVIL?].
Finally, I think that his analysis of the individual and community and the role of religious belief is applicable today as we struggle to accommodate a variety of political and religious views. I think that it is possible that we could get a consensus among 80% of Americans that we “need” some degree of community to balance a purely individualistic perspective and that religious belief is a valid worldview that is not going to disappear in the next century, so we ought to recognize, at a public policy level, that religious belief and organizations have played and can play a very constructive role in American life, with the encouragement from all, even as we preserve the “separation of church and state”, freedom of belief and a commitment to the ideals of America’s founders regarding individual rights and equality. The genius of the American political system, in my view, is that it allows us to define pragmatically effective institutions and norms, while allowing individuals to hold diametrically opposed views about politics, religion and philosophy. We can “agree to disagree” about many things while working together to make a great life for ourselves and our descendants.
Introduction: The Wisdom of Rodney King (1992)
Rodney King was nearly beaten to death by 4 LA police officers. Despite a videotape of the attack, the officers were not convicted of a crime. LA erupted in riots. King then said “please, we can get along here. We can all get along. I mean, we’re all stuck here for a while. Let’s try to work it out.” We all hold “righteous” beliefs about right and wrong, politics and religion. We’re right and the other guy is wrong.
One: Where Does Morality Come From?
Haidt provides the reader with a quick history of how psychology has treated morality as a “special way of thinking”. In the “nature versus nurture” debate, psychologists generally chose nurture. From Rousseau through Piaget, Kohlberg and Turiel, psychologists found that a “stages of growth” model effectively described the progress of moral thinking in children. The detailed research focused on perceptions of harm and fairness. The research confirmed that children universally progressed through stages of understanding leading to an “adult” level view of harm, fairness, justice and moral behavior. As Rousseau described the world in 1750, humans are born with a “blank slate” mind and easily develop language, thought and morality. In this view, society and its institutions, including parents, teachers and religion, mostly interfere with the “natural” development of children. The “conventional wisdom” through 1990 supported this worldview. Haidt deems this a “rationalist” worldview because in it all children can develop moral views rationally, through their basic interactions with the world, without need for cultural education or innate capabilities beyond general reasoning.
Haidt studied philosophy, politics, anthropology and psychology before starting to work on his doctoral thesis. Like many students in the seventies, eighties and nineties, he found the mainly behaviorist psychology of the time to simply be too “neat and tidy”, objective, simplistic, static, deterministic, dry, rational, logical, machine-like, inhuman. Input-processing-output. Homo economicus. Stimulus-response. No gap, no consideration. No social context. No biological or evolutionary basis. Certainly no religion.
Richard Shweder challenged the consensus view of how people conceive of morality in 1987. He started from an anthropological perspective. Successful cultures all find a way to balance the needs of the individual and the community. Most choose to emphasize the needs of the community. Only a few, mainly modern Western ones, strongly prioritize the needs of the individual. The modern West had doubled down on the individualistic view in the 18th and 19th centuries with the growth of Protestant religious sects, science, capitalism and new individual based political systems. In the 20th century, the extreme “social” views of fascism and communism were rejected, reinforcing the individualist perspective. Shweder saw that the progress of modern psychology was based solely on the individualistic perspective. His research showed that moral views differed by culture and that both harm/fairness and social conventions matter.
Haidt’s dissertation research pushed this a little further along. He emphasized moral stories that could trigger reactions of disgust or disrespect. He found that the US and Brazil, urban and rural, upper- and lower-class people had quite different moral views. There was no single moral conclusion.
Haidt also found that individuals were strongly predisposed to justify their moral views, no matter how normal or unusual they appeared to the interviewer. We all need to believe and feel that our moral views are “righteous”, no matter where they came from. He quotes David Hume (Rousseau’s contemporary) that “reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them”.
Morality includes factors from both individual and social community perspectives. Individualistic and abstract fairness, harm and justice are not enough. Social taboos, food prohibitions, sexual taboos, hierarchy, loyalty and family ties also matter.
Moral views in traditional, social based communities are generally quite similar. They are very different from individualistic societies.
Haidt is working hard to be an objective scientist, describing how moral views exist, not how they “ought to be”. Social centered communities have quite different views. These “traditional” views continue to be held by some, even in modern, individualistic societies.
Haidt rejects the psychological mainstream view. Individuals do not simply “figure it out” rationally. They are shaped by logic/reason, social influences and innate thought patterns.
Two: The Intuitive Dog and Its Rational Tail (Tale)
How do people really address moral decisions? Philosophers tend to emphasize individual rationalism, even though Plato’s discussion, Q&A, social model was the beginning of modern philosophy. They emphasize reasoning (the head) and mostly or totally ignore emotion (the heart). While philosophers were aware of Hume’s view of reason as a slave to the passions, they ignored this possibility. As noted in chapter one, psychologists followed the “rationalists” until 1990, when some challenges arose.
Frans de Waal documented that chimpanzees possessed most of the building blocks human use to build communities and moral systems: feelings of sympathy, fear, anger and affection. Feelings might matter more.
Antonio Damasio documented a type of brain damage in humans that reduced their emotional skills to near zero. This caused them to lose their ability to make rational decisions about daily choices. Without a gut level, intuitive sense, they were overwhelmed by the complexity of making common daily rational decisions. Emotions are part of decision making.
Edward O. Wilson proposed in his 1975 book Sociobiology that natural selection influenced human behavior. He argued that there is in some sense a human nature that rationality and social pressures cannot simply ignore. The response from the “rational” psychology community and many others holding Rousseau’s “blank slate” view of the mind as a necessary underpinning for their political views was extremely negative, making the idea “untouchable” for more than a decade. A number of researchers quietly picked up Wilson’s approach and renamed it evolutionary psychology. New research defined hypotheses that could be scientifically tested.
In 1987 Howard Margolis, a public policy professor published Patterns, Thinking and Cognition. He demonstrated that there is a clear difference between the quick, intuitive cognition of pattern matching (seeing-that) and the slower, conscious, more complex and formally rational logic used to reason or justify (reasoning-why). Both are forms of cognition, but they use different parts of the brain.
Haidt developed experiments to help distinguish between the roles of the head and the heart, reason and emotions. He first found that individuals can make moral decisions just as well when being stressed by other demands on their thinking (a heavy load). Moral judgements seemed to match Margolis’ intuitive, pattern matching, quick, subconscious form of cognition. He next found that in a wide variety of cases, initial moral judgments could not be changed even with the strongest forms of logic, evidence and persuasion. Participants stuck with their initial choices. They defended themselves with good and bad reasons. When their bad logic was challenged, they doubled down with new reasons or just claimed that they didn’t need to justify their choices.
In his 2006 book The Happiness Hypothesis, Haidt consolidated this thinking into the analogy of an elephant (automatic processes, including emotion, intuition, and all forms of “seeing-that” and a rider of the elephant (controlled processes, including reasoning-why). In behavioral economist Daniel Kahneman’s 2011 work Thinking, Fast and Slow, he calls them simply system 1 and system 2. The rider can see into the future, learn new skills, master new technologies, consider complex situations and justify or rationalize choices. For most moral decisions, individuals react intuitively and rationalize their gut feelings. Hence, a simple model has the individual interacting with the environment, the elephant/heart/emotions/intuition making moral judgements and the rider justifying the choices.
Haidt argues that few moral decisions involve rational choices, and few decisions are revised by individual reconsideration. On the other hand, he notes that man is a social animal who wants to be held in high esteem by his peers and looks to them for feedback on a variety of topics including moral decisions. Hence, Haidt’s model of moral decision making adds a feedback loop from society to the individual. This is about social pressure that can persuade an individual to reconsider the basis for a moral decision and potentially provide a different intuition that replaces the old one.
On the one hand, individuals make subconscious, intuitive moral decisions rapidly without the benefit of “logical” thought and tend to “stick to their guns”. On the other hand, individuals are capable of logical introspection and they can be influenced by others and they can consider new or competing models, insights, perspectives, paradigms, etc. Individuals tend to have “their minds made up” on moral issues (politics and religion), but there is some ability to consider the views of others and to reconsider moral insights.
Three: Elephants Rule
Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second. The social intuitionist model is summarized in just 6 words.
Hypnotized subjects instructed to feel a flash of disgust by a word evaluated stories containing the word more negatively. Even a story with no moral violation triggered such a response in 30% of subjects and they tried to rationalize their initially stated feelings.
Brains evaluate instantly and constantly. The founder of experimental psychology, Wilhelm Wundt, in 1890 described affective primacy. Individuals feel small positive or negative flashes of emotion with most perceptions and impressions. Feelings are associated with perception. Although the feelings may be weak and fleeting, they are triggered hundreds or thousands of times a day. In 1980, Robert Zajonc demonstrated that we attach mini feelings even to neutral objects like made-up words, Japanese characters and shapes. We are built to respond emotionally to the world.
Social and political judgements are particularly intuitive. Research shows that the positive or negative connotations of words effect our ability to interpret the positive or negative nature of a second, following word. The pair “love-cancer” requires extra mental energy and time to evaluate the emotional nature of “cancer”. Negative prejudices have also been shown to impact our reactions to succeeding pictures, stories or events. Liberal and conservative biases have been demonstrated using these techniques. Other research shows that research participants make several intuitive judgements of photos in a very short period of time. Subjects’ evaluations of “competence” allowed them to predict 2/3rds of political elections.
Our bodies guide our judgments. We use “affect as information”. Positive or negative feelings generated by smells or objects change perceptions. Subjects who wash their hands evaluate stories with higher moral intensity. Immorality makes people feel dirty. The link between the body and morality flows in both directions.
Psychopaths reason but don’t feel. Their lack of social feeling leaves them without a moral compass. Their “logical” brain merely pursues self-interest, treating others as objects. Feelings matter for moral judgments.
Babies feel but don’t reason. Six-month-old infants have innate understanding of basic physical movements and will respond to anomalies by staring longer. In a similar fashion, such infants understand “niceness” and respond differently to nice and “not nice” puppets. Even before they have reasoning abilities, babies have some ability to reason morally.
Affective reactions are in the right place at the right time in the brain. Damasio’s studies of brain damaged patients without emotions have been followed by related studies on “normal” individuals. Stories that involved direct personal harm triggered negative reactions, while those with only impersonal conflict situations triggered much less of a response. Other games, experiences and situations have been presented and subjects’ brains measured. Emotional areas are triggered by such personally impactful experiences leading to greater degrees of moral evaluations as predicted.
Elephants are sometimes open to reason. The intuition does not always “win”. The rational mind is always tempted to defend the intuitive response. If given time to consider, it is more likely to look at a variety of factors and may become more independent of the elephant’s initial reaction. The “rider” is also attentive to social pressures, reactions, influences and arguments and will consider the thoughts, stories and reasons of others that it considers socially influential.
Four: Vote for Me (Here’s Why)
Haidt begins the chapter with another trip to philosopher land. He presents Plato’s story about Glaucon who claims that people are virtuous only because they fear the consequences of being caught. The legal/criminal consequences; but especially the social consequences that will interfere with their social standing and ability to work within the community as a trusted member. Glaucon describes the mythical gold ring of Gyges, which allows an individual to be invisible at will. He claims that anyone possessing such a ring would do as he pleases, without regard to any notion of morality. Haidt believes that Glaucon is right, and that Plato and subsequent philosophers have been caught up in a delusion that rational thinking is and can be the basis for outstanding morality.
Haidt says that humans are the world champion of cooperation beyond kinship. We work effectively in formal and informal systems of accountability, defined as the “explicit expectation that one will be called upon to justify one’s beliefs, feelings or actions to others”. In later chapters Haidt digs into the evolutionary basis for this remarkable social ability, supported by natural capabilities. Haidt cites researcher Phil Tetlock who sees the world as Haidt does, describing how we act like intuitive politicians striving to maintain appealing moral identities. In simplest terms, we could not work in large, non-kinship based, organizations without having the common ability to interact on a basis of trust, including feedback loops that build such skills and reinforce the incentive to build trust. Tetlock’s research shows that when experimental subjects know that they will have to explain their decisions, they think more systematically and self-critically, avoiding the many “sloppy thinking” errors typically found in experimental psychology settings. When socially required, humans can focus, self-evaluate and justify adequately their reasoning. He argues that conscious reasoning is carried out largely for the purpose of persuasion, not finding truth.
Researcher Mark Leary developed experiments that demonstrated that all individuals, even those who claim that they ignore the opinions of others, see and respond to negative feedback from others, even anonymous others. Leary says that at a nonconscious and pre-attentive level we continuously scan the social environment for any negative feedback.
Haidt uses the presidential press secretary to illustrate our tendency and ability to justify any previously expressed conclusion. Research in 1960 by Peter Wason defined the idea of “confirmation bias”. When asked to brainstorm or defend a position we can easily generate many new related ideas. We prefer to generate confirming ideas and evidence while neglecting contrary evidence. Researcher David Perkins demonstrated that higher IQ individuals generated more arguments to support their views, but not more contrary hypotheses or evidence.
Haidt summarizes the United Kingdom’s Parliament scandal of 2009, when it was revealed that nearly all members, given an opportunity to be reimbursed for nearly any expense, made claims at this scale for years and were surprised by the public’s very negative response to their egregious behavior. Humans can easily rationalize their opinions and behavior, even convincing themselves of its righteousness. Psychologists have emphasized the role of “plausible deniability” in shaping immoral or borderline immoral decisions and actions. Dan Ariely’s more recent experiments show that nearly all people with secrecy and plausible deniability will cheat, not greatly, but somewhat. Ouch.
Social psychologist Tom Gilovich studies the cognitive mechanisms of “strange beliefs”. He finds that such individuals employ a double standard. When an individual wants to believe something, a small amount of roughly plausible evidence will suffice. When opposing evidence is presented, any possible reason to discount the evidence is considered conclusive. Psychologists have deep evidence of our ability and propensity to pursue “motivate reasoning”. People can see what they want to see, given just a little ambiguity. Hence, they can discount scientific studies and mainstream media and political opponents.
Political scientists, following economists, once believed that people voted, volunteered and donated out of individual self-interest. Most political scientists today would at least say that people are also motivated by their groups’ best interests. People belong to various groups with various degrees of attachment. They participate for both their own self-interest and their groups’ interest. Haidt claims that the group dimension is very dominant.
Haidt directly attacks the “rationalist delusion” that the ability to reason well about ethical issues causes good behavior. No surprise, he has research studies that demonstrate that elite moral philosophers behave no differently from other people. He also cites Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber who summarized the research on motivated reasoning and reasoning biases/errors stating, “skilled arguments … are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views”. Haidt claims that no teaching method has been developed to overcome the confirmation bias since it is so strong. [TK doubts this based on personal experience]
The author then reclaims his scientific authority and allegiance to reason. “We must be wary of any individual’s ability to reason”. Most individual people, 80%, 90%, 95% or more remain trapped, most of the time, in non-self-aware decision making about moral situations. However, social processes (science, structured decision making, projects, political systems?) can be structured to overcome the individual biases. This requires a structure, individual buy-in, communications, techniques, trust, leadership, participation, etc. Most individuals, even highly educated, intelligent, experienced ones tend to make moral, religious and political decisions without challenging their intuitions. Yet, individuals can be self-reflective and social systems can improve outcomes.
Five: Beyond WEIRD Morality
Most psychology research is based on individuals who are Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic (WEIRD). How could it possibly represent universal, scientific truths?
Worldviews matter. Moral worldviews matter. Richard Shweder’s 1991 publication spanned anthropology and psychology, termed cultural psychology. He and his colleagues said that the two fields are intertwined. You can’t study mind alone, because it is situated within a culture. You can’t study culture alone, because many of its views, myths and beliefs are generated from the common views of minds.
Shweder described 3 different varieties of fully functioning moral worldviews: the ethics of autonomy (individual), community and divinity (infinite, beyond). All of anthropology supports the view that different moral worldviews exist. Haidt asks that we defer discussions of which are “best” or “right” until later after we have learned about them, appreciated them and learned about methods to not simply defend our worldview and criticize all others.
[Yes, Haidt is an unusual academic. He shares his own liberal leaning political views. In the end, he believes that learning and cooperation can help us all to get along. But he relies on scientific evidence from anthropology, biology, psychology, political science, behavioral economics, philosophy, social psychology and sociology, even when it does not support his political leanings or academic theories. Hence, he is criticized both as a “closet conservative” and as a “secular utopian”]
The ethic of autonomy is our world, especially the upper middle class professional world epitomized in Haidt’s U Penn Ivy League students. They strongly believe in the classic liberal worldview expressed by John Stuart Mill in 1859: “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others”. This is the modern mainstream Western, English and American worldview. The world is comprised of individuals first and foremost. Individuals have inalienable rights. Political and moral systems must protect these rights. Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. First, do no harm. Contract theory of politics. Individual rights. Human rights. Freedom and liberty. Libertarianism. Utilitarianism focused on the best summarized results treating each individual as equally valuable.
The ethic of community begins with the community, relationships, structures, institutions and roles first. The whole is greater than the sum of the individuals and distinctively different. Haidt points to Asia for examples. He could have pointed to pre-Enlightenment, pre-Reformation, pre-Renaissance Europe. In this world, people are first and foremost members of larger entities such as families, teams, armies, companies, tribes and nations. People have an obligation to the groups. Moral concepts of duty, hierarchy, respect, reputation and patriotism matter greatly.
The ethic of divinity envisions people as temporary, immaterial components of a comprehensive divine whole. The whole world is infused with the divine spirit. Individuals are also divine objects with a divine purpose. There is a hierarchy of most divine and least divine or degraded things. Disgust at despicable, dirty things is natural. The body is a temple when alive and even after death. Moral concepts of sanctity and sin, purity and pollution, elevation and degradation are employed. Again, Europe before 1500 qualifies as following this ethic. See Charles Taylor’s 2018 A Secular Age. My grandmother from rural Hungary, near Ukraine, brought this worldview with her to America in 1903 and still followed it when she died in a small Ohio village in 1966.
Haidt relates his personal story. A New York Jew, descendant of Russian grandparents, garment industry workers, Haidt inhaled the liberal air, FDR’s semi-divine status and the undergraduate Yale University atmosphere. Stops at the Universities of Pennsylvania and Chicago reinforced the “conventional political consensus”. Democrats were right/correct. Republicans were wrong/right/evil/fooled/deluded/impaired. Haidt was attracted to philosophy, psychology, biology, anthropology, etc. He was a free thinker. Good academic, trying to find a multidisciplinary perspective that would provide new, better scientific insights.
Shweder’s work was a breakthrough for Haidt, psychology, cultural psychology and evolutionary psychology. His work provided a paradigm shift, first described by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962. Science moves forward incrementally and smoothly until … it doesn’t. For Haidt, mid-way through writing his dissertation after finishing his field research, it provided a framework for his provocative moral stories that were viewed so differently by different nations, classes and regions. His “best” stories were either those of disrespect that violated the ethics of community or those of disgust or carnality which violated the ethics of divinity.
Even is a modern WEIRD society, some individuals did not conform to the prevailing individualistic/autonomous norms. They were greatly offended by violations of community and divinity-based norms and taboos. Cultures and individuals have multiple moral worldviews innately!!!!
Haidt provides more details about his 1993 research in India, where the ethics of community and divinity prevail. He was able to appreciate how these systems create an internally consistent society that meets most social needs. He sees how these ethics do not mesh well with the ethic of autonomy, but learns to see the value, beauty, worth, history, results, flexibility, hope, ideals and reality of India at that time. He returns to the US and can appreciate the views of social conservatives. He is released from partisan anger.
Six: Taste Buds of the Righteous Mind
Haidt provides an analogy between taste buds for enjoying food and evolutionarily derived “moral modules” that are used to construct real world moral cultures, beliefs, intuitions, responses and language. He returns to the history of philosophy through modern rationalist psychology once again. He notes that rationalist philosophers since the “Englightenment” have sought to derive a moral philosophy that can be reduced to a single principle, model or framework. He notes that Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant were great systematizers and poor empathizers, which allowed them to propose these kinds of systems and attract followers.
He recalled that the Enlightenment has been characterized as a war between Reason and ignorant Religion, with Reason winning. He returned to David Hume’s philosophy which rejected a reductionist approach and embraced a pluralist approach, even quoting the same analogy between taste and moral philosophy. He describes utilitarianism as the “arithmetic” of pain and pleasure and Kant’s version of the Golden Rule as the “logic” of noncontradiction. He rejects both as too simple to scientifically describe how real-world moral thinking takes place.
Haidt seeks to develop a Moral Foundations Theory comprised of “moral modules” that are consistent with the main findings of evolutionary psychology and the variety of moral cultures and thinking described by anthropologists. He warns the reader 3 times that it is very easy to find a plausible evolutionary basis for nearly any observed behavior but believes that he and his partner Craig Joseph were able to identify robust rationales for 5 clusters of morality.
His model starts with the original adaptive challenge and triggers, notes current triggers of intuitive, emotional reactions, notes the primary linked emotion and the relevant virtues for 5 flavors of morality.
The first flavor is care/harm focused on the care and protection of children. A child’s suffering triggers a compassionate response which we call caring or kindness. Today baby seals or cartoon pictures might trigger the same response!
Sensitivity to fairness/cheating derives from the need to develop two person partnerships. (Anger, gratitude, guilt)
Sensitivity to loyalty/betrayal is needed for the formation of larger social groups. (group pride, rage at traitors)
Sensitivity to authority/subversion is needed to manage hierarchical relationships without constant battling. (Respect, fear)
Sensitivity to sanctity/degradation is required to avoid contaminants. (Disgust)
Haidt ends the chapter saying that “theories are cheap”.
Seven: The Moral Foundations of Politics
In this chapter, Haidt digs deeper into the proposed 5 moral foundations of politics. He wants us to agree that these “modules” drive many currently important political/moral beliefs and that they make sense in terms of key evolution developments for humans. He is also working hard to help his tribe, the liberals, truly appreciate that these are ALL legitimate moral principles held by billions around the world and how the mainstream Western liberal emphasis on just the individual and rationality, summarized in John Stuart Mill’s 1859 maxim about very limited rightful political restraints on individuals, is an outlier historically and cross-culturally. [He’s still dodging the question of whether this path of philosophy is in some sense right or better than the others].
He begins with another stab at homo economicus, the utilitarian version of man who simply maximizes personal pleasures versus pains. [We could have long discussions about the details, power and uses of the philosophy at the individual and community levels, but for now his focus is on real moral behavior and his point well taken, IMHO]. Haidt shares five paired research questions that demonstrate our inherent, innate, intuitive, subconscious, primal, unlearned, universal, easily triggered reaction to violations of moral rules or taboos on the 5 posited moral dimensions. Stick a needle into a child’s arm. Receive a stolen TV. Criticize the US on Al-Jazeera. Slap dad in the face. Attend a play of naked, grunting actors. Most of us react negatively to the stories even if intellectually we see “no real harm”.
Haidt circles back to the definition of “innateness”, emphasizing that a pre-1970 strict definition of “exactly so in every culture” is not supported by scientists today. Instead, they describe humans as 50/50 “nature versus nurture”, prewired and flexible versus hardwired, starting with some abilities but adding to them and refining them through experience. For example, we are prewired to quickly react with “fight or flight” when seeing a snake, but some people have much stronger reactions than others and this response can also be triggered by a “squiggly line”. This is critical because he is arguing that the “moral modules” are each innate, ready to be used and fine-tuned by all humans.
Humans give birth to children who require 3-5-7 years of care to be able to survive. Woman and men who innately were predisposed to respond to infant signals of need were best positioned to shepherd these needy animals into early childhood survival. Psychology’s “attachment theory” says that the “serve and return” interaction of moms and children is required for development. Cute kids, dolls, cartoons and stuffed animals all trigger the loving, protective response. Liberals emphasize the “caring” dimension, applying it to disenfranchised groups of all kinds. Conservatives “care” for more closely related sets of kin, neighbors, co-religionists, racial and ethnic allies, fellow patriots, etc.
Humans evolved to function in hunter-gatherer societies and then in fixed agricultural societies. This required an ability to judge the real cooperation of others. Robert Trivers’ 1971 theory of “reciprocal altruism” agrees with much game theory research that shows that a “tit for tat” strategy of interacting with others is optimal. Individuals who took a step away from simple self-interest were able to cooperate effectively without being “suckered” by others. A genetically common group with this insight could radically outperform its strictly individualist peers. They felt “pleasure, liking and friendship when people show signs they can reciprocate … [and] .. anger, contempt and even disgust when people try to cheat us or take advantage of us.” Liberals emphasize ideal, abstract “fairness” while conservatives emphasize proportional “fairness”. Equal results versus equal opportunity and proportionate rewards for performance.
As groups further increased in size, humans required additional signals to evaluate who was “pulling their fair share” versus being a “free rider”. Individuals that actively bought into a group identity and willingly displayed this commitment were able to form larger, more tightly knit communities. On an evolution basis, they would have succeeded far more often than the pure individualists or groups with just better “one on one” bonds. Haidt points to Muzarif Herif’s 1954 research that documented the “tribal” nature of 12-year-old boys, as we still see in scout packs today. Boys want to be part of a team, to be leaders, to compete, to stake out territory, to adopt names, flags, songs and secrets. Just like irrational sports team allegiances. In a world of tribal warfare, groups that bonded together would have survived better. Identifying (loving) teammates and (hating) traitors was essential. Conservatives naturally employ this dimension. Liberals apply it to more universal groups: humanity, union brothers, seekers, the enlightened, academics, the disenfranchised, the working class.
As groups increased in size even further and necessarily became more hierarchical, individuals who could effectively navigate the two-way required dominance/submission relations became more valuable. Respecting “legitimate” authority and willingly delivering signs of respect, dominance and submission became highly valuable at the community level. We’re moving from bands of 10-20-50 to groups of 50-100-150 to communities of 250-1,000-10,000. Adam Smith outlined the advantages of specialization in larger societies in 1776, but they also applied 10-20-50-100,000 years ago. Haidt notes that “pecking order” signs are common in nature. He also emphasizes that agreement on roles reduces constant fighting between individuals and that high-ranking individuals typically take on the role of maintaining order and justice for the community. Haidt notes that this power can be abused, but it is not inherently abusive. Conservatives love this one. “Anything that is construed as an act of obedience, disobedience, respect, disrespect, submission, or rebellion, with regard to authorities perceived to be legitimate” triggers a response. Today, anything that subverts traditions, institutions or values is suspect from the right. Liberals generally struggle with the importance of this dimension.
The fifth proposed basis of morality is more fundamental. Humans are omnivores. We migrate. We eat new foods. We interact with new people. We need to know what is safe or not. The negative reactions to filth, excrement, disease, sores, pus, smells, blood, mixtures, darkness, caves, the unknown, the other, is probably one of the oldest moral foundations. It is found in most cultures and religions. “Cleanliness is next to godliness”. Dietary restrictions. God is high and the devil is low. God’s temple. Human body as a temple. Chastity. Not polluted. Unclean. Sacred and profane. Body and soul. Haidt summarizes this as the sanctity/degradation foundation. The human body/soul is more than a piece of meat. Sexual intercourse is more than animal husbandry. Sex with a relative is repulsive. Some individuals are “untouchable”. Sacred places, objects, saints, symbols, words, books, images, limits, smells, roles, and relics are … sacred. Blasphemy is “beyond the pale”, unimaginable, dead serious, unforgiveable, ruthless, diabolical. This is not just a Manichaean dualist “good versus evil” abstraction. It becomes a definition of the eternal, the infinite, the all-powerful, the best, moral excellence against its evil opposite.
Humans have intuitions about moral issues that were developed to make an increasingly complex society succeed. They are about the individual and the group, the individual and death from disease, and God. These accessible “moral modules” can be applied to current events. Wise politicians understand the strength of these modules and seek to use them to attract political support.
After 1500, Western civilization experienced the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Reformation, the Industrial Revolution, colonialism, the new world, the counter-reformation, Islam, religious wars, world wars, the scientific revolution, Marxism, socialism, utopianism, nuclear threats, the cold war, imperialism, alliances, nationalism, regional governments, global organizations, multinational corporations, global trade, the scientific revolution, urbanization, motorized transportation, electricity, radio, telephony, motion pictures, computers, Darwin, the agricultural revolution, and the internet.
In this unique period of tremendous change what is truly “conservative”? With this much change, conservativism might best be described as a philosophy that preserves the incremental progress of society!
DeSantis wins on 2 points as being more “conservative”, preserving the institutions, practices and values of our society. He is in favor of the traditional “nuclear family” as a preferred social model. New College is clearly more LGBTQ oriented. He favors the powerful against the common man. His acolytes have decided that they can govern New College in their way “because they can”. His budding presidential campaign is focused solely on his side, and he claims that he will destroy the opposition if given the power of the presidency which he “best understands”.
DeSantis claims to represent “traditional values” and organized religion. In reality, he represents only fundamentalist Christians. He is a reactionary. Not mainline Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Unitarians, Deists, Hindus, Muslims, Confucians, or agnostics. New College has a long tradition of students exploring and practicing various religious and spiritual traditions.
DeSantis claims that he is fighting against “wokeness”, a situation where the prevailing social, cultural and political views prevents other views from being expressed. New College is NOT the home of wokeness. Students value radical individualism. Each semester they have to convince a faculty member that their “program of study” will lead to graduation with a recognized major. Students generally “lean left” but seek to discover new worlds. Socially, there certainly are pressures to adopt the prevailing political views, but the radical individual ethos of New College has always protected students from domination by any group.
Viewing New College as a “child” of the last 500 years, it is dedicated to conserving the modern world of progress!
DeSantis proposes a radical reformation of the curriculum. New College seeks to preserve its model.
DeSantis proposes to introduce sports and Greek organizations. New College advocates for the preservation of its individual choice-based situation.
DeSantis proposes enrollment growth at any cost, simply for growth’s sake. New College has a more conservative view, restricting admission only to those who would benefit from its unique offerings.
DeSantis wants to transform NC into the “Hillsdale of the South”. New College wishes to remain true to its founding principles.
DeSantis is very concerned about “unusual” students. New College is inherently dedicated to individual rights.
DeSantis envisions a utopian “Hillsdale of the South”. That matches his religious beliefs but not those of Florida and USA students. New College has a long history of realistically surviving as a small, countercultural institution committed to its mission, vision and values. New College was founded on an idealistic basis but has accepted the constraints of reality.
DeSantis proposes a traditional standard curriculum for all students to ensure that they are acquainted/indoctrinated with western civilization. New College students have thrived for 50 years without these artificial restrictions.
DeSantis proposes a more standardized curriculum. New College has promoted extensive “independent study” to ensure that every student has a broad perspective that allows him or her, conservatively, to make proper judgements.
Finally, New College is firmly based upon individual responsibility. “In the final analysis, each student is responsible for the quality of their own education”. Ironically, this is the most extreme “conservative” principle. The individual is responsible. Not the university or faculty. Not the state. Not the parents. Not social classes. Not parents. Not expectations. Not history. Not random chance. Not race, gender or nationality. Not peer pressure.
In the “final analysis”, DeSantis is no conservative. He is a reactionary willing to do whatever it takes to claim a social conservative position to the right of Trump. New College is merely a pawn in his Quixotic quest.
The alliance of 13 independent states to become the United States of America enshrined the notion of “minority representation” in the US constitution. North versus South. Different religious majorities. Rural versus urban. Domestic versus international leaning. Free versus Slave.
We should embrace that principle but fine-tune the mechanism. Two senators per state when the population was just 3 million was a practical compromise. The US population reached 300 million in 2006; 100 times larger. The numerical and proportional differences today are simply too large to ignore. Louisiana and Kentucky at 4.6 million people are the median states. The average state population is 6.6 million today. 5 states, SD, ND, AL, VT and WY have less than 1 million citizens. They get 5 to 7 times more representation than the “typical” state. I recommend that we accept this difference as a way to preserve “minority representation” and the legitimacy of our democratic system.
On the top side, four states stand out. California (39M), Texas (30M), Florida (22M) and New York (20M) have populations 5-8 times the median and 3-6 times the average population. [For perspective, note that California’s population today is 13 times as large as the whole country in 1780.]I recommend that these four states be given 2 extra Senators since they have more than 4 times the median state population. Seven states have populations more than twice as large as the median 9M: PA, IL, OH, GA, NC, MI and NJ. I recommend they each get an additional Senator.[California (19x), Texas (15x), Florida (11x) and New York (10x) after these changes are still less represented than the dozen states with populations of just one million, rounded; just not so disproportionately.]
This change would add 15 Senators. It would dilute the “minority representation” of the other 39 states by 15%.
Fortunately, the political impact of this change would be modest, so both parties can support this improvement in political legitimacy. CA and NY are Democratic locks, while Texas and Florida are Republican locks. Illinois and New Jersey are Democratic locks, while Ohio is a Republican lock. Pennsylvania and Michigan lean left, while Georgia and North Carolina lean right. Net, net this change adds one Democratic Senator out of the new 115 seats, an immaterial number.
The Senate is a very important part of our government. It acts as a check on the more representative and responsive House. It approves treaties, constitutional amendments, judges and presidential appointments. The number of Senators drives the size of the electoral college. Changes should not be made without due consideration.
My Republican colleagues might reject this “out of hand” because it costs them a Senate seat today and it reduces the future leverage of less populated states. I think that the legitimacy of our government, to prevent populist winners and civil war is reason enough to “fine tune” our system. Republican oriented Texas and Florida are growing faster than California and New York, so their citizens are the most “disenfranchised” by the current system in the future. A revision might block the pressure to admit DC and PR as states. Four of the five next least populous states are likely Democratic states in the future: DE, RI, ME, NH versus MT, which has some Democratic voting potential. The next, Hawaii, is a Democratic lock. In the next five, KS, NE and WV are safe Republican seats, but Idaho and New Mexico could follow Colorado and Nevada into the other party’s column.
It’s time for all Americans to step out of their partisan comfort zones and think about what is best for the country in the long-term. This is a reasonable change that everyone should support.
Was Trump’s 2016 victory extraordinary? Hillary Clinton, Democrats, never-Trumpers and most journalists and analysts said “of course”. Many competing explanations were offered. Political data analyst Larry Bartels disagrees. Comparing the results of the 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016 campaigns, Trump’s percentage vote results are normal for a Republican presidential candidate when disaggregated by gender, race, religion, popular vote and historical Republican voter percentage support. Even though 61% of exit poll respondents said Trump was unqualified to be president and “principled” conservatives and his primary opponents painted him in the most unfavorable light initially, Trump was able to attract the normal Republican share of voters, mostly from the usual demographic groups.
Non college graduate white voters moved to Trump in significant numbers in 2016, especially in swing states, delivering his narrow electoral college win but other voter slices remained “normal”. Given Trump’s many headwinds, the more important question is “how was he even competitive”? Klein’s answer is that American politics, especially at the national level, is highly polarized based upon a binary split of political identities. Voters on both sides voted for their traditional “home team”, their political party, in spite of the wrinkles provided by Trump’s extraordinary campaign, voting against “the other guy” even more than “for” their heroes.
Klein claims that our political system, not the individual participants, no matter how interesting to follow, has evolved to become a self-reinforcing system that builds ever more polarization. He notes that most political issues have been studied by well-meaning academics, advocates and politicians resulting in compromise proposals that could address the basic challenge while meeting some of the desires of the political parties and not triggering rejection from the majority of either party. But when such proposals are made from either team or from blue ribbon panels, the political logic then focuses on the differences and makes real-world political adoption impossible. When “push comes to shove”, politicians decide that they are personally better positioned to fight “the other guys” than to be part of a compromise solution, aka a “defeat”.
The term “identity politics” has been used by Republicans to criticize and undermine parts of the Democratic coalition: blacks, Hispanics, Asians, women, LGBTQ, etc. However, the term is essential because almost all politics is “identity politics”. Individuals support parties, proposals and candidates that match one of their various identities, whether demographic, geographic or based on values. Politics is about defining brands that can be assembled in a coalition to drive political wins by parties, candidates and interest groups. Everyone has personal and political identities and winning political actors cater to them. Klein asserts that today we are more focused on political identities than on specific policies or issues. Further, he notes that our many identities increasingly overlap with the political identity of Red versus Blue, right versus left, conservative versus liberal, Republican versus Democrat. Partisan identities have merged with racial, religious, geographic, ideological and cultural identities. This simplification and streamlining have led political actors to be laser focused on this single dimension helping to further grow its dominant “share of mind”.
1. How Democrats Became Liberals and Republicans Became Conservatives
In 1950 a committee of the American Political Science Association concluded that the two parties were too similar and were doing voters a disservice by not providing them with clearly different choices. Political parties exist in representative democracies to give voters shortcuts. Voters can’t or don’t wish to become familiar with hundreds of policy choices, so they delegate this mission to representatives and political parties. Voters choose to support parties and candidates that roughly align with their values and preferences, especially on the few largest issues or general positions. The problem in 1950 was that the Democratic Party combined moderate to liberal to populist northerners with southerners of various views united by the preservation of their state racial policies. This was a “marriage of convenience” that provided the Democrats with national power and southern Democrats with state control at home. The liberal versus conservative scale had great overlaps in the two parties with many liberal Republicans far to the left of conservative Democrats. Many practicing politicians saw no problem with this system, noting that it helped to unify the country.
In 1959 a Republican Party committee decided that building its platform based mainly on ideological values was unwise. Barry Goldwater’s promise to offer “a choice, not an echo” in 1964 was diametrically opposed to this viewpoint. Goldwater and the Republican Party across the country lost badly in 1964 trying out this new approach. Most politicians doubled down on “moderation” after this result which was later reinforced by George McGovern’s similar loss in 1972. In the 1976 election 30% of Americans saw “no” ideological difference between the parties and only 54% agreed that the Republican Party was more conservative.
Ticket splitting between state and presidential candidates was commonplace into the 1970’s but had nearly disappeared by 2018. Using a “feeling thermometer” with a 1-100 degree scale, voters’ views of their own party cooled between 1980 and 2016 from 72 to 65 degrees, in line with more negative polling results about all kinds of institutions. Yet feelings for the “other” party plummeted from 45 degrees to a very chilly 29 degrees. Negative partisanship changed dramatically during this period. Other research showed that independents in 2000-4 were more consistent in supporting their favored party than were “strong partisans” in 1972-76. Self-described “independents” had grown from 20% to 37% of the electorate, but they were more politically consistent than self-proclaimed party stalwarts of the earlier era. Researchers say that independents vote against one of the parties consistently even though they do not align with the other party. We like “our” party less, but we dislike the “other” party much more.
The US has a long history of claiming that we prefer moderates, centrists and independents, going all the way back to George Washington. We dislike parties, factions and partisans because they highlight “conflict”. Historically, we prefer to be seen as “independent”, individualistic, thoughtful, reasoned, flexible, etc. We don’t want to be seen as inflexible or extremist, unwilling to compromise. But as the parties have become more clearly and reliably conservative versus liberal, they have crafted their messages and attracted candidates to match and we, the citizens, have moved along becoming more partisan and less apologetic about it. Survey questions on race, immigration, poverty programs and other issues show growing gaps between the opinions of Republicans and Democrats with the average gap growing from 15 points in 1994 (Clinton era) to 36 points recently. Voters better align with party positions today. Positions between the two parties are further apart. Party supporters increasingly see the “other” party as not just disagreeing, but disagreeable, a growing threat to many policies and values the hold dearly.
Klein provides examples on taxes, international trade, health care and abortion to show that presidents and parties in the 1970’s to 1990’s were still able to embrace compromise solutions on high visibility issues. We all know that has been impossible for the last 25 years. The parties have clarified and aligned their positions on a left to right scale and moved further apart. In this simpler world, voters find it easier to match their views with one party. As voters focus on this single, clear identity and reinforce it for years they find it nearly impossible to break with their self-identity and vote for the “other” party. In 2016, 45% of Republicans and 41% of Democrats saw their opponents as “a threat to the nation’s well-being”.
Challenge: Klein’s overall framework and evidence are compelling for me. However, in many places he seems to overstate his case. This makes the prospects of reform or change difficult to even imagine. In this case, keep in mind that the country is roughly split into thirds between the red, blue and purple. 45% of one-third is 15%. 41% of one-third is 13%. In the hotly contested 2016 election 28% of the population was really concerned about the “other side”. That is a big number, a true weakness in our democracy, but it is a minority position. These positions may be weakly held and subject to “cooling off” with different candidates, issues and party platforms in the future.
2. The Dixiecrat Dilemma
Southern Democrats were termed Dixiecrats in the post WW II era. The 11 states of the Confederacy had founded stable one-party authoritarian states in the 1890’s and maintained them for the next 70 years in alliance with the national Democratic party. Robert Mickey is quoted as saying “these rulers curtailed electorates, harassed and repressed opposition parties, and created and regulated racially separate – and significantly unfree – civic spheres. State-sponsored violence enforced these elements in a system that ensured cheap agricultural labor and white supremacy”. As with other one-party authoritarian regimes, staying in power was always the primary objective. Democrats held 90% of elected offices and less than 10% of Blacks were registered to vote.
The Dixiecrats’ regional domination translated into national power within the Democratic party. In the first third of the twentieth century, they comprised two-thirds of the house caucus. They maintained at least 40% of the caucus seats for the next two decades. Based on the seniority system and lack of candidate turnover, southern Democrats ran almost all committees of congress, holding veto power over all legislation at both the committee and party levels. Modern readers are often surprised to see the anti-civil rights positions, or lack of action taken by FDR, Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy, but practical politics played a critical role at that time.
The 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed with the support of 80% of House Republicans and 60% of House Democrats. President Johnson led the arm-twisting, breaking the Dixiecrat-Democrat link forever. Republican presidential nominee Goldwater voted against the bill. Suddenly the Republican party’s small government and state’s rights position became more appealing to southern politicians that were in no hurry to overhaul their local societies.
A little detour. Polarization is not extremism, but it is sorting. Polarization occurs when almost everyone choses one of two options with nearly no one left undecided or in the middle. 50/0/50 for example. 45/10/45 for example. Many political scientists would say 40/20/40 isn’t polarized, just sorted. Klein views “extremism” as how far towards the extreme end of the political spectrum a party’s choice is on an issue. The two parties can completely disagree, but one or both can hold relatively moderate positions when gauged against history or experience in other nations. He also criticizes the idea of a “moderate majority” because most individuals with “moderate” politics scores actually have a combination of left and right views on particular issues, with some being very extreme. He calls this group of people “internally unsorted”. The author is trying to distinguish between polarization and extremism. We clearly have polarization today: less ideological overlap, fewer people in the middle and more tension at the poles. Party positions are not automatically more “extreme” than they were historically.
Challenge: It appears that Republicans after Newt Gingrich have chosen to take extreme, yes/no positions on taxes, budgets, fiscal policy, guns, education, abortion, etc. in order to align voters with the “conservative” axis, to change the terms of debate with Democrats and to improve the effectiveness of their messaging. This appears to have been a very successful strategy.
Between 1955 and 2015, the Republican Party increased its share of non-White voters from 2% to 10%. The Democrats increased their share from 6% to 43%. The electorate became more racially diverse overall, with Democrats capturing nearly all of the change.
In 2014 evangelical Protestants were the largest religious group in the Republican Party while “nones” were the largest in the Democratic Party.
Geographical patterns are becoming more fixed and divided by party. County level results between McGovern in 1972 and Carter in 1976 were largely uncorrelated. Landslide counties with 60% or higher presidential support increased from 39% in 1992 to 61% in 2016. The urban/rural divide is greater and more consistent today. Bill Clinton carried 1,500 of 3,100 US counties in 1992, Al Gore won 700 in 2000 and Hillary Clinton won fewer than 500 counties in 2016, nearly all urban.
A 2017 poll revealed that 65% of Republicans prefer to live in large homes, farther apart, away from schools and shopping versus 61% of Democrats who prefer the complement of smaller houses within walking distance of schools and shopping.
Each of these changes means that political identities are becoming more important as they overlap with other identities and reinforce the political identities. Living with more people with a shared political identity does the same thing.
Klein proposes that a single personality trait sometimes underlies the main differences between liberals and conservatives. One scholar focuses on “openness – a general dimension of personality tapping tolerance for threat and uncertainty in one’s environment”. Another pair say to focus on “your perception of how dangerous the world is. Fear is perhaps our most primal instinct”. A third pair highlight “fluid” versus “fixed” approaches to managing threats and dangers. Liberals hold a basic optimism because they are open to experience while conservatives are closed to such risks, favoring conscientiousness, order and tradition that buffer change. People high in “openness” experiment with food, travel, options and politics. More “conscientious” people are more organized, faithful and loyal. Hence corporate store planners drop Whole Foods stores into Democratic locations and Cracker Barrels into Republican locations.
Challenge: the “entrepreneurial” wing of the Republican Party might disagree. A single conservative versus liberal axis combines a variety of views on economics, religion, race, class, opportunity, justice, fairness, immigration, freedom, international politics and economics which may not be perfectly compatible.
The author is not saying that personality strictly determines political views, but that this general difference in world views is correlated with political positions, so it is likely that personality drives politics at least as much as rational arguments. Liberal political views supporting changes, difference and diversity “fit” with a predisposition to “openness”. Political conservatives naturally overlap with preferences for predictable life in a smaller town, near family, based in faith, frequenting familiar stores.
Other research shows that the alignment between these measures of “openness” and “fluidity” are effective predictors of political views of those who are highly engaged in politics. Individuals work hard to achieve internal consistency. They manage their self-identity. Less politically engaged individuals don’t feel the need to align their votes with themselves. They tend to vote on a more transactional basis, looking for policies that might deliver personal benefits. “When we participate in politics to solve a problem, we’re participating transactionally. But when we participate in politics to express who we are, that’s a signal that politics has become an identity. And that’s when our relationship to politics, and to each other, changes”.
3. Your Brain on Groups
Research demonstrates that “discrimination” is a universal phenomenon. The targets and intensity vary by time and culture. The mental steps and rationalizations are the same everywhere. We have a deep mental capability to classify groups as “we” and “they”. We discriminate against “the other” even if there is no real basis or advantage. This conflicts with the “rational” view that posits that we perceive slights or threats from others and therefore work against them. Experiments showed that it took almost no time or effort to get individuals to adopt a group identity and then to discriminate between their group and another group even when there was no advantage to the home group or even if there were opportunities to increase the total take from the experiment by making more equal choices. Winning, rather than maximizing income, seemed to be the biggest driver of group behavior.
Sports team exemplify this kind of irrational attachment. Sports riots are common in North America, Europe and around the world. “Groupness” appears to be an evolutionary advantage. To be part of a group and make it win increased the odds of survival. To be exiled or see your group beaten by rivals could mean death. Some research links these real experiences of loss to psychological conditions such as social isolation. Some authors note that we have evolved to excel in small scale groups but have also managed to adapt these skills to succeed in much larger social environments. These large-scale associations; nations, religions, corporations, military divisions, universities, research parks, co-operatives, political parties, etc. can deliver positive results OR hatred and violence.
A 2015 paper reports “The behavior of partisans resembles that of sports team members acting to preserve the status of their teams rather than thoughtful citizens participating in the political process for the common good”. Research showed that policy ideas and ideology have moderate effects on feelings, and the strength of partisan identity was a much stronger motivator. “Us versus them” comparisons focused attention on potential “losses”, driving rivalry and anger. Partisan identity was also the strongest factor predicting actual voting. The foot soldiers in political campaigns are driven more by identity and group rivalry than by policy and ideology. Winning becomes the “only thing”. The same results occurred for making donations, but here negative feelings toward the opposition were much stronger than positive feelings toward the home party in driving donations. The most engaged people in politics are strongly driven by their political group identity. Politicians need resources from the most engaged, so they highlight group identity and rivalry rather than issues, ideologies or solutions.
Klein tells the story of Beto O’Rourke nearly defeating Ted Cruz with massive support only to be a mere footnote in the presidential primary when he could not capitalize on negative partisanship. Inspiration remains a tool in politics, but it is increasingly bypassed to promote fear of the “other guys”.
The Obama story. Polarization is something that is done to voters and candidates by political hacks, consultants and donors. It is possible to not be divided. Red and Blue states have much in common. Red and Blue voters overlap in every state. Obama doubted polarization and saw his experience as a counterexample. Obama sought to lead, educate, posture and negotiate to engage different groups and perspectives. He was unable to do so. Political identities are not our only or primary identities. We can certainly connect in other ways. Some identities have more influence on our thoughts, feelings and actions. Different experiences trigger different reactions. Individuals can choose to work around the usual flow of messages and message channels to not be polarized. Klein decides Obama was simply too optimistic.
Lilliana Mason argues that our partisan identity has become our mega-identity, subsuming all other identities. Religion, race, class, geography and culture are aligning with politics. When these identities are combined, individuals become even more sensitive to any threats to their mega-identity. We now have feedback loops “all the way down”. Political actors take advantage of these combined identities to trigger positive and negative partisan responses using the most sensitive dimensions of the mega-identity. Repeated experience of this messaging further reinforces the strength of the inter-identity associations.
Challenge: The data does show that the overlaps on various dimensions with political views are more common than before. But this shows that on a population basis there is overlap, not that the mental individual identities are truly fused. Marketers do use tricks to influence people, but their tricks are only grossly effective. The claims of Vance Packard and the Hidden Persuaders from the 1960’s have been repeated ever since, but not shown to be nearly as powerful on society, groups or individuals as claimed. They are effective, or advertisers would stop spending money, but they are not omnipotent.
Klein shares the story of Colin Kaepernick’s protests, the NFL’s responses and Nike’s response to highlight the linking of politics to other identities. He says that politics as the mega-identity is encompassing all others, depriving them of their independence.
Klein highlights the surprising claim that having many strong identities can lead to more cooperative politics as individuals can find some strong links to political actors. Yet if only “Red versus Blue” matters and other identities are submerged, we run the risk of true “winner take all” politics. It becomes “dead serious”. Cross-country research shows that civil wars are LESS likely when nations have multiple significant dimensions of differences. Detailed analysis of voters’ policy views showed that individuals with policy preferences that matched the other party still rated their party much higher. The correlation between policy preferences and identity are weak. Most individuals don’t have detailed policy preferences, but they do know that their identity is the “right one”. So … “The crisis emerges when partisan identities fall into alignment with other social identities, stoking our intolerance of each other to levels that are unsupported by our degrees of political disagreement”.
In 1960 5 percent or fewer Democrats or Republicans reported they would be upset if their children entered into a cross-party marriage. Race and religion mattered much more at the time. In 2010, 49% of Republicans and 33% of Democrats expressed concern. A resume evaluation experiment showed that political affiliation was a greater source of bias than race in recommending candidates for a scholarship. Researchers noted that political identity is fair game for discrimination or even hatred, while race is not. Cable TV news and opinion options confirm this view.
This research suggests that party politics has taken on a life of its own. It can trump objective facts, science and reason. Policy differences and identity conflict can become self-reinforcing; yet another feedback loop. When my team has more immigrants, we’ll adapt policies to be more immigrant friendly, attracting more immigrants and demonizing those who do not support our members and our policies. “Identity doesn’t just shape how we treat each other. It shapes how we understand the world”.
Challenge: Merging all identities and political dimensions into a single scale or two buckets of red versus blue is not as easy or permanent as described. Most democracies have 4-12 parties in order to accommodate these differences. Our two-party system encourages but does not require this consolidation. Third party candidates have not won, but they have influenced American politics. In a two-party system, parties try to align/merge interest groups and prioritize issues that benefit the party. Possible political dimensions are numerous: region, prosperity, urban/rural, industry, domestic/international, race, ethnicity, religion, ideology, class, profession, social policies, economic policies, immigration, international trade, defense, international relations, history, tradition, character, nature, global issues, generations, safety, crime, opportunity, fairness, justice, the list has no end.
President Reagan was a “once in a century” political talent who was able to consolidate various strands into a simple conservative versus liberal/socialist/radical framework. Big business, main street, libertarian, fundamentalist, neoconservative hawks, traditionalists, patriots, ideological conservatives and others were consolidated in opposition to the perceived radical/anarchist/revolutionary/socialist threat of the countercultural and antiwar 1960’s attached to McGovern’s 1972 campaign and the breakdown and ineffectiveness of professional elites in war and economics reflected in Carter’s 1976 presidency. Americans were motivated to vote against what they perceived as both prongs of the Democratic Party. Reagan cleverly linked this to an “American city on the hill”, tradition and a time without political conflict.
Newt Gingrich was not satisfied with presidential power alone and together with groups like the “Club for Growth” encouraged Republican candidates to take “extreme” positions on social issues in order to win congress. No taxes. Taxation is theft. Government is bad. Abortion is murder. No regulations. Minimum criminal sentences. No active fiscal or monetary policy. Drill, baby drill. Bomb, baby, bomb. Terrorism is an existential threat. Oppose everything from Obama. Welfare queens. Willie Horton. Tear down that wall. Greed is good. Free market. This helped to clearly define the Republican Party in opposition to the Democratic Party.
This extreme positioning helped the Republican Party to attract and retain those who agreed with the various “conservative” positions. It also helped the party to paint the opposition party as being clearly against each home position. But it does not reconcile the inherent differences between the different wings of the party. Libertarians and fundamentalist Christians. Big business and populist workers. Dynamic entrepreneurs and Main Street traditionalists. Globalist elites and corporations versus protectionists. Business support for immigration versus worker opposition. Social security and Medicare entitlements versus lower taxes. America first versus economic growth. Truck drivers versus investment bankers. Unconstrained capitalism versus “traditional values”. Free market versus unsustainable health care costs. Democrats face similar challenges in aligning policies with varied group interests. As Klein notes, Blacks, Asians and Hispanics are not inherently or universally liberal; socially, economically or internationally. It may be that the two parties are living in a “one time” period where a single dimension aligns most voters.
4. The Press Secretary in Your Mind
Mr. Klein begins the chapter by sharing a detailed history of the origins of Obamacare based on “individual provision” as a conservative, Republican solution to America’s health care system challenges, including initial Republican support and Romney’s use of the model in Massachusetts. However, by December 2009 every Senate Republican, including those who had sponsored a similar bill in 2007, now rejected it wholesale. When it was time to vote, all Republicans opposed Obamacare and the “individual mandate” component. “Cap and trade” was proposed by some Republicans in 2007 as a carbon emissions solution but then rejected wholesale as support for Climate Change beliefs. Klein rejects simple charges of hypocrisy and lying to explain these, and other changes of opinion made by political leaders.
He proposes a much larger explanation summarized by philosopher Joseph Heath, “The central flaw in the concept of reason that animated the eighteenth-century Enlightenment is that it is entirely ‘individualistic. … reason is both decentralized and dispersed across multiple individuals. It is not possible to be rational all by yourself; rationality is inherently a collective project”. Klein argues that group reasoning is also an evolutionary adaption that is more effective than individual reasoning. Hence, even informed individuals change their “minds” to adapt to the group’s decisions.
Various psychology experiments have shown that many individuals will report different conclusions to mildly ambiguous problems based upon peer pressure. They will comply with other individuals or the group as a whole even if they personally believe in a different solution. Experiments about political policy choices by political partisans reported that party policies quite easily overcame other evidence in selecting preferred policy choices. Reference group information overrode that of policy content. Political parties are a rational response to making many choices. We rationally outsource the detailed research and choice. But parties are not scientists or philosophers searching for truth, they are organizations with their own goals, associated with multiple ideologies and personal and group histories and goals.
Klein rejects the theory that “smart” or “knowledgeable” people are different. More information, better decision-making, awareness of context, etc. are all rejected as relatively minor players in explaining why individuals conform to group norms, especially political positions taken by a party that are “obviously” or “objectively” illogical. One study concluded that individuals are motivated more by improving their group standing by embracing group norms than by “pursuing the truth”. This experiment showed that better math/science skills were helpful in applying data that supported a preconceived position but worse in applying facts that opposed their preferences. Better math skills reduced the ability to solve a problem when it conflicted with previously held policy choices. Partisans exhibited this “blind spot”, while those with mild political views showed smaller self-deceit.
“True believers” on both sides are very adept at constructing such frameworks of logic, data, argument and counterargument to support their policy choices. These arguments are quite unconvincing to scientists or “neutral” parties, but persuasive to political supporters. Even the definition of “expert” is subject to political bias for partisans. Experiments also show that individuals who are most “politically informed” are most subject to such biases. Tests of “historical facts” showed that Democrats would deny positive results to Republican presidents and vice versa, even if they were supposedly “well informed”. So … the logic flows from party and group loyalties to political preferences, judgments and actions. Parties shape beliefs of members. Even these researchers say that for many decisions people are convinced by evidence, but individuals are willing to “rationalize” or “choose” to match the group’s views when a contrary view would threaten the group or our standing in the group. “Groupness” is the trump card, especially for individuals with strong attachment to the group.
Proponents of this view, including Dan Kahan, term this “identity-protective cognition”. Mildly guiding and shaping our views to align with a preferred group is more rational than relentlessly “seeking the truth”. Everyone lives in a social world and values their social standing. That value can outweigh “truth” in many situations. Klein says that this is especially true in the politically charged and socially driven climate of Washington, DC. This drive for belonging can blind the “rational mind” from fighting with the preferred logic.
Klein provides the Supreme Court testimony against the constitutionality of the “individual mandate” as evidence of how motivated partisans are able to create “evidence” to support any pre-existing conclusion, even if the bulk of scientific, professional, mainstream opinion has contrasting evidence and rejects the new claims. This counterevidence appears to have little impact on “true believers”. Klein refers to Johnathan Haidt’s conclusion in “The Righteous Mind” that the “press secretary” is required to defend any policy, history or situation and will do so. Such “motivated reasoning” is common and often pragmatically effective.
Historically, Americans have believed that the Supreme Court, in some sense, was an objective body, subject to political influence, but nonetheless capable of largely finding the “truth” with respect to the “constitutionality” of executive, legislative or judicial decisions. The increased politicization of the Court is leading many to doubt this fundamental pillar of the American political system or to consider changes in its structure to “shore up” this component.
5. Demographic Threat
Change and threats motivate political feelings and actions. In 2013, the majority of US newborns were nonwhite. By 2045, non-Hispanic whites will no longer be an absolute, 51% majority. Hispanic and Asian populations are forecast to double and mixed-race populations to triple by 2060, while the non-Hispanic white population falls from 200 to 180 million. The foreign-born population is expected to increase from 14% to 17% of the nation, a record high, triple the 1970 level of 5%. Women hold more power in society based on their greater educational results. Traditional religious belief and activity are falling. The dominant culture, white and Christian, is losing power. 70% of seniors are white Christians, but only 30% of young adults are white Christians. “Intersectionality” applies to the former majority just as it applies to minorities of minorities.
Data matters, but perceptions are most important. Race is a social construct and whiteness may someday include Hispanics, Asians or mixed-race individuals. Americans tend to overestimate the nonwhite share of the population. Political and media activity matter. It is the “feeling” or “perception” that a political group or identity is threatened which counts.
Research studies show that awareness of such change makes individuals more “conservative” when making political choices. They are primed or triggered to be more aware of potential threats and to respond to the threats. Given the demographic and policy choices of American Republicans and Democrats, this demographic change pushes more Americans to sympathetically consider the “whiter” party.
Klein highlights the “post-racial myth”. Race was a lesser political factor in the 2000’s prior to Obama’s winning candidacy. But this high visibility event resulted in greater sorting of political views by race, despite Obama’s relatively quiet advocacy for specific positions advocated by the Black Caucus. American media provided significantly more minority characters, ads and shows in the 2000’s. Strong minority support was essential for any national Democratic presidential candidate in the twenty-first century. Professors like Amy Chua noted that a very dominant racial/religious group (WASP) could “afford” to be enlightened or “liberal” and provide increased opportunity to minority groups in the 1960’s and 1970’s when their power was assured, but that it was not so easy more recently. While political power lags demography due to voting participation rates, cultural power “leads” because advertisers rationally attempt to develop brand allegiance in unsettled young adults, highlighting the demographic and cultural milieu in which they live. Hence, multicultural news, advertising, music, entertainment and university views get disproportionate attention.
“The left feels a cultural and demographic power that it can only occasionally translate into political power, and the Right wields political power but feels increasingly dismissed and offended culturally”.
Trump was the one Republican who rejected the national party’s 2012 presidential loss post-mortem advice to be “more inclusive” because of the inevitable impact of demographic trends. Trump clearly differentiated himself from the other candidates, doubling down on the majority’s historical cultural, political and demographic identity. Right-wing talk shows in the 21st century routinely adopted “extremist” cultural views that demonized the opponents. And these opponents were linked by political, racial, national, immigrant, gender, cultural, consumption, regional, educational, professional and other identities into a bipolar, Manichean “us versus them” world. These extremist voices were often dismissed by the mainstream media, academicians, scholars, analysts, critics and many “moderate”, “Main Street”, “corporate” or “establishment” Republican leaders. However, they highlighted the increased role that cultural views would have above economic, ideological or international political views in shaping parties and elections.
A 2016 poll reported that 57% of whites thought that discrimination against whites was as big a problem as discrimination against minorities. 48% of millennials agreed, showing that this was not just a Boomer issue. Klein agrees with Seth Trende in validating Trump’s 2016 strategy to focus on motivating the base of 7 million missing white voters in 2012 rather than catering to the vanishing “swing voter” or undecided voter. “White Identity Politics”, once unspeakable, became a clear part of Trump’s winning message and strategy. “Jardina repeatedly finds that much of the strengthening of white political identity is a defense of white political privilege without an attendant rise in racist attitudes”. One-third of the white population feels a sense of racial solidarity. Most of this subset does so without an increase in racial hostility. Hence, a wise marketer like Trump is careful to appeal to both groups of potential supporters.
“The simplest way to activate someone’s identity is to threaten it, to tell them that they don’t deserve what they have, to make them consider that it might be taken away. The experience of losing status – and being told that your loss of status is part of society’s march to justice – is itself radicalizing.
Klein does not go here, but I think some of the tremendous emotional and political reaction to Obama’s 2012 claim that “you didn’t build that” is related to this construct of human perception and thought.
Klein argues that the post-2016 analysis of Trump’s victory shows that racial resentment activated economic anxiety.
Before Obama racial perceptions were uncorrelated with perceptions of the economy. After Obama, racial resentment was a strong predictor of views on the economy. Trump’s election led to an 80% jump in Republicans confidence about the economy and a 37% fall among Democrats. Klein cites the centrality of anti-immigrant positions in all “far-right” parties around the world as further evidence for the primacy of racial/ethnic views above economic views. He also notes that only right-wing populist parties have grown in recent years following the economic challenges of the Great Recession and the pandemic, not left-wing populist parties who might be expected to capitalize on economic anxiety.
Challenge: This is not very convincing to me. Working- and middle-class whites with economic anxiety have been moving from the union supporting Democrats to the union opposing Republicans since the times of George Wallace in 1968. This accelerated with the Great Recession 40 years later. The coincidence with demographic changes and Trump’s choice to highlight conservative social values above traditional mainstream corporate economic Republican economic choices on trade, immigration and social security do not “prove” that race is the dominant factor. Nativist populist parties have always used social issues: race, ethnicity, religion and nation to drive participation and emotion.
Detour regarding “political correctness” by Klein. The emphasis on the demon “political correctness” by Fox and Republicans is a long-standing political strategy to undercut the opposition, but its increasing use and greater emotional impact is new. This is a “culture war” about what is and who defines “acceptable discourse”.
Demographic change impacts political party positions. Democrats in 1992 presented “balanced” immigration platforms. In 2016 they were decidedly pro-immigrant groups. Klein quotes Michael Tesler, “In the post-civil rights era, Democrats needed to maintain their nonwhite base without alienating white voters. Republicans needed to win over white voters without appearing racist. So their incentive was to speak about race in code. The shifts have made it so Democrats’ incentive is to make explicitly pro-racial equality appeals and Republicans now have an incentive to make more explicit anti-minority appeals”. Democrats and Republicans have increasingly different views on the role of discrimination in explaining why “black people can’t get ahead”. In 1994, a few more Democrats agreed, 39% versus 26%. In 2017, a chasm of 64% versus 14% divided the parties. Klein argues that the merging of racial identity with party identity will continue to drive party choices in the future. As political demography changes, so do political identities.
Klein argues that the loss of white Christian primacy in politics has led to the emphasis on “identity politics” as the Democratic Party has increasingly embraced the preferences of racial and ethnic minorities. He warns that this inevitably leads into greater conflict between the parties. He notes that some talented politicians focus on actions rather than rhetoric to advance their policies to undercut this situation. He also notes that it would be wiser for Democratic politicians to downplay demographic changes by highlighting different terms, definitions and that many states and communities have become demographically diverse successfully. He notes that strong politicians like Obama can combine diverse groups using inspirational speech to bridge demographic gaps, but the demographic changes also call for populists and demagogues to take advantage of the inherent tensions.
6. The Media Divide beyond Left-Right
The political media is biased toward … loud, outrageous, colorful, inspirational and confrontational.
Klein considers other political journalists and media as collaborators fighting to build political attention of people who can choose to pay attention to anything else. No one must follow politics. Most consider it a hobby. Competition for political media attention is greater today because the political and non-political options have exploded. As much political news and commentary is available as anyone could hope for. Access to history is also ubiquitous, while in the past it mostly disappeared within a week.
Many political science models focused on access to information as a key constraint limiting effective democracies. The modern information age has eliminated this constraint, but democracies did not flourish. Political scientists have moved on to make interest in political information the new limit to effectiveness. Prior to the cable and internet revolutions, 3 TV networks and a handful of local and national newspapers served up political news as part of the general news. Some skipped the headlines and opinion pages, but many consumed at least some political news each day. Today, those less interested in politics consume less and those more interested consume more.
Political media is for the politically invested. Producers of political media have adapted to the new consumers. They provide more content. They include opinions. They select news of interest to politicos. They emphasize political identity, conflict and celebrity. Yet another feedback loop. This deepens political identity, hardens polarization and increases the political stakes.
Despite the large overlaps of demography and miscellaneous identities between the red and the blue, modern media has not helped partisans to understand the identity of members of the opposing party. Partisans tend to overexaggerate the distinctive demographics, characteristics and views of the opposition. The media emphasizes party differences – and colorful and opinionated newsmakers. Consumers normalize this input and exaggerate actual differences.
The new political media knows its audience, demographics, preferences, identities, hot buttons, etc. It has real-time feedback on audience followers, clicks and forwards. Klein recounts that Buzzfeed first defined, measured and used the power of identity to build followers, clicks and shares. This source demonstrated that interests could be translated into communities and identities that were powerful in building and deepening audiences. The media did not have to take communities and demographics “as is” but could construct and grow identity-based communities. This didn’t require outstanding insight or journalistic skill, just the willingness to define and feed a group that worked and abandon groups that failed to work. Other social media platforms have followed using the same techniques. Of course, focusing on enemies is a shortcut that is used here. As identities have been defined and fed compatible information, they are stronger today, less able to be changed.
Klein destroys another historical wish. If individuals only read the opposition they would better understand, tone down their rhetoric and views and seek compromise. Research provides no evidence for this view. If anything, individuals required to consume opposing views become more certain about their pre-existing positions. Some political media is designed to persuade and can have some effectiveness in gaining attention or moderating views, but few political media outlets invest in this.
Journalists who perform in a polarized political and media arena produce more polarizing output and become more polarized themselves, by and large.
Historically, the mainstream media promoted objectivity and balance, claiming that it was “above the fray”. With limited competition the main outlets all trended towards the middle and reinforced this informal norm. Today we have returned to the pre-mass media era when most media outlets adopted a political view and made no apologies. Some remain in the middle today, but the growth has been on the polarized ends. Trump capitalized on this world attracting one-half to three-quarters of news coverage during the 2016 campaign. News outlets are free to determine what is “newsworthy” and Trump understood that new, outrageous, conflict-oriented, secret, interesting, shocking, offensive, threatening and celebrity were far stronger than relevant, important, supported, normal, wise, presidential, balanced, consistent, inspirational and objective. In a competitive business, the “race to the bottom” was quick and largely universal.
Challenge: the main-stream media has revised its coverage to reduce the share of “sensational” coverage. It has improved its ability to call out extreme claims and not rely on formulaic “balanced” coverage. Some organizations continue to provide “neutral” news coverage and separate this from their commentary. Individuals who wish to follow this more traditional approach can find it.
The rising share of self-defined “independents” among American voters obscures the fact that “true independents”, those without a tendency to consistently support one party or the other had fallen from 22% to just 7% of the electorate by 2000. Bush and Gore ran against each other as “Tweedledum and Tweedle-dee”, a fiscally conservative New Democrat versus a “compassionate conservative”, both competing for the persuadable swing voter. By 2004, politicos had digested the loss of the “middle” voter, the suburban soccer mom, and re-engineered their campaigns to register, message, and energize their base to vote. Messages were sharpened to differentiate between the two parties and to demonize the opposition. Republicans won in 2004 and both parties adopted this strategy going forward. With the parties adopting polarizing strategies, voters learned to pick one or the other and the share of persuadable voters declined even further. The contrasts between Bush, Sr and Bush, Jr or Bill and Hillary Clinton tell the story. Compromise is out. One side is right and the other is wrong.
Political parties expected to benefit from this polarization but have become weaker. They are placeholding labels, fundraisers, messaging coordinators, sources of analysts and advisors but they are not as politically powerful. They don’t choose candidates, define and enforce platforms or influence behavior of elected officials as they once did when they had real power.
Trump conducted a hostile takeover of the Republican Party. He had limited history with the party and had transactionally invested in candidates from both parties. His ideology was undefined, he waffled on many issues, so did not match the views of any existing Republican group. He adopted a mishmash of policies, casually discarding core Republican policies on economics, trade and international relations. He ignored the eleventh commandment to not speak ill of a fellow Republican. He criticized everyone: candidates, war heroes, Senators, military leaders, business leaders and political leaders in terms that were simply “off limits” historically. His character and religious past made no friends. Yet, when he won the primary, almost everyone except for a relatively small group of “never Trumpers” lined up to support his campaign and his actions from 2016 until today. None of this could have occurred when political parties were effective forces.
Republicans who opposed Trump in the primaries in apocalyptical terms decided that a choice between Trump and Hillary or Bernie or Elizabeth Warren or mayor Pete or AOC or even “sleepy” Joe Biden was very easy to make. The Democrats opposed every “core” Republican belief. Trump would deliver on taxes, regulations and judges. He would not allow any Democratic initiatives. Bill Clinton had removed “character” as a requirement for holding higher office. There was no political downside to supporting Trump. The “Republicans in Name Only” (RINOs) were not going to run opposing primary candidates. In the post-Reagan/Thatcher era, politicians were expected to look out for their personal interests, not those of their communities, states, party or nation and they delivered on that promise.
Political parties lost power beginning with the move to direct election political primaries and caucuses in the 1970’s. Insiders – governors, long-term Senators, fundraisers, mayors, political bosses, large state delegate leaders, favorite sons, Wall Street and Silicon Valley community leaders, lobbyist and law firms, the largest corporations, major unions – lost power to whoever could win the most votes. Democrats held on to a small share of “superdelegates” but dropped even this after Bernie’s supporters objected. The McCain-Feingold Act restricted pure party fundraising. The transaction costs of campaigns dropped, allowing individual candidates to compete with their own staff and on-line fundraising from small donors. Parties still play an important role, but they are unable to shape primary and general election campaigns to match the interests of the party, per se.
This matters, because “the party”, the small group of individuals who are able to wield power on behalf of the party (or themselves), has different objectives than the candidates or the party’s voters, donors, volunteers or partisans. Political scientists argue that parties want to maximize their own power. They want to manage the other actors as required in order to use the party’s power. They want to get candidates elected. They want to define deliverable platforms. They want to deliver on the platform promises. They want to raise even more money for the party. They want to constrain the actions of “rogue” congressmen and women. They want activities to fit within the brand and messaging strategies of the party. They want to allocate funds and resources to the races with the best chance of winning for the party. They are OK with “horse-trading” and earmarks and “log rolling” as required to achieve political goals, even at the expense of ideological impurity. The party caucuses in the House and Senate have retained much of this central power, but the “national” parties have not.
This matters because political parties can act as a moderating agent. They identify, select and promote moderate candidates with the highest chance of winning in the general elections. They act as a governor on the pure ideologues, the motivated volunteers and activists and the most extreme candidates. Their downfall has contributed to the polarization of political races. Political scientists observe these forces at the national and state levels. Klein does not cover this topic, but it appears that the ability of more states to earn a trifecta of house, senate and governor rule (and judicial appointments) has radicalized this historical approach, with gerrymandered districts ensuring 60% safe, 10% competitive and 30% safe opponent districts which reduces the need/incentive to select moderate/electable candidates.
The reduction in the role of state and national parties in funding local candidate has changed the priorities for congressional candidates. In order to raise their own money, they need to gather attention from small donors, big donors and the party. To do so, they need to manage public attention by standing out. This encourages more extreme positions, messaging, allies and campaigns. Loud, extreme, controversial. Negative campaigning is up. Attention grabbing events are up. Purist ideological positions and platforms are up. Time devoted to fundraising is up. Winning the primary is most important since most districts are already “safe seats” and most primary opponents’ supporters will “fall in line”.
Klein contrasts large and small donors as pragmatists and purists, corrupt and polarized, details and big issues. Both are required, but wise candidates focus public messaging to attract and serve the small donors while taking time to work with large donors to understand and quietly deliver on their transactional needs. At the presidential level, small dollar contributors increased TEN-fold from 55,000 in 2000 to 566,000 in 2016. The “special interest” groups demonstrated that this could be done, and the political consultants and modern technology have made this a reality.
Politics is increasingly about “national” positions and issues. Donations to state and local candidates have fallen from two-thirds to one-third of the total between 1990 and 2012. With identity more important, individuals invest in those who reflect their party identity, not individual candidates, policies or character. Even at the state and local level, candidates “free ride” on national party identity politics to raise funds and attract voters, rather than invest in differentiating themselves based on local issues or personal attributes like competence or character.
Klein worries that the current environment opens the door for demagogues, populists, showmen and talented extremists and communicators to be nominated and secure power, risking democracy to authoritarians who could become dictators.
8. When Bipartisanship Becomes Irrational
Or, the system is simply broken.
The Supreme Court traditionally acted as a conservative break on the “progress” of the nation based on politics. Justices were nominated by politicians but made decisions based upon their own views. Like the divide between the president and the legislature, or between the House and the Senate, the judiciary provided one last place to buffer rapid changes in a representative democracy. The Warren Court made decisions more liberal than the American public, a historical outlier. The Burger Cort also provided relatively liberal results. Conservatives worked hard to ensure that Republican appointees would no longer “vote their conscience” or their profession but be reliably conservative. Justices like Antonio Scalia developed an “originalist” view which opposed the expansionist view of the Warren Court in defining “rights”.
In 2014 Obama nominated moderate Merrick Garland to succeed Scalia. Senate leader Mitch McConnell refused to consider the nomination, despite 103 comparable cases, because he could. With Trump’s 2016 victory a Republican nominee was appointed to the court. Democrats howled, but Republicans simply disregarded the informal norms. This could undermine the independent, non-political role of the judiciary, but this potential consequence was disregarded.
Klein turns to Juan Linz’s 1990 critique of the American political system. The multiply divided system is designed to prevent hasty progress, yet it has endured for two centuries. No other country has adopted this system. The US did not recommend it to Germany or Japan after WW II. Most democracies have a parliamentary system where the winning party or coalition has the combined legislative and executive power to get things done. The electorate will then judge the results.
Klein raises the big issue of political legitimacy. He accepts that McConnell’s tactics were legitimate and expects that future Senates may oppose all nominees of the other party, because they can. He then points to a world in which the Democrats routinely win the popular vote but lose the presidency due to the electoral college. Or that Democrats win 60% of the popular vote, but less than 50% of the Senate seats. Or that Democrats win 55% of the popular vote, but less than 50% of the House seats. Or that Democrats win 70% of GDP, but less than 50% of the House seats. In a polarized world with geographical advantages favoring one party, what happens in the long run?
Historically, national politics was both national and local. Senators and congressman took care of their constituents in a transactional manner, winning special rules for local interests, military bases and highway projects. Earmarks were used to deliver goods to local representatives who could set aside their political preferences. Voters have increasingly chosen to focus on national issues. Local representatives have increasingly chosen to oppose national policies even if they benefit local constituents.
Klein notes that 2-party politics are quite different when one party is dominant, as was the case from 1865-1965. In this situation, the minority party strives to have some influence. Demonizing the opposition is illogical. Working with the dominant party to limit the impact of its policies is rational. Cooperating makes sense. Once the two parties are relatively competitive, the rules are quite different. Winning is everything. Obstruct when in opposition. Cooperation is for losers. This was the Newt Gingrich moment for the newly competitive Republican Party.
Klein recalls the history of the Senate filibuster. It was accidentally created and mostly used by Southern Democrats to protect their modern version of the “peculiar institution” of racial domination. In recent years Republicans have used the required 60 vote majority as an effective weapon. In similar fashion, Republicans have used the approval of an increase in the “debt ceiling” to fund previously approved spending as another negotiating tool, despite the potential consequences.
“The problem is that we have a political system where the rules create irresolvable conflict, gridlock, and even global financial crises”.
9. The Difference between Democrats and Republicans
The author begins this chapter quoting Thomas Mann and Norm Ornstein in their 2012 book “It’s Even Worse Than It Looks”. These respected authors from opposing think tanks had worked together for many years and established a reputation for objectivity and nonpartisanship. By 2012 they concluded that the Republican Party had become ideologically extreme, contemptuous of traditional policy platforms, scornful of compromise, immune to facts and science, dismissive of the opposition’s legitimacy and opposed to the government which they sought to lead. They weren’t saying the Democrats were saints, but Democrats did largely play by the historical rules of politics, were more centrist ideologically, endorsed core government roles, were open to incremental policy changes and bargaining and less eager to pursue large win/lose situations. Their view was welcomed by Democrats, but controversial amongst independents, journalists and analysts. Trump unapologetically moved the party even further towards the edges, confirming their views.
Mann and Ornstein saw Trump as a logical next step for a party that had taken more extreme and emotional positions and relied upon angry social conservatives and tea partiers who felt that the opposition, the elites and the system conspired to prevent them from living as they wished. As the Republican congress was pushed to adopt more extreme positions and support more extreme politicians, the rest of the political actors at the national, state and local levels adjusted. The establishment, business, suburban, RINO, New England wing of the party lost its remaining power and influence. The conservative media welcomed this alignment of the party and politicians with their own message of rage, confrontation, disruption and revolution.
Klein notes that congressional Republicans have moved further right than Democrats have moved to the left. He also points to the fights between the “true believers” and House speakers John Boehner and Paul Ryan where no position or positioning was radical enough. He believes that Republican willingness to risk financial catastrophe with debt ceiling votes reflects this extreme mindset.
Klein says that the Democrats have not responded to the same polarizing pressures in the same way because the diversity of their coalition prevents it. Party activists have called for stronger measures, but the political leaders have mostly chosen to “waffle” and present policies and actions that appeal to both the progressive-left and the center-left wings of the party. Democrats rely on a coalition of liberal whites, African Americans, Hispanics and Asians. The three minority groups contain conservatives, moderates and liberals. Democrats span many religions and beliefs. Primary election winners must appeal to many groups. In the general election, Democrats face an audience that is quite individualistic, socially conservative and economically conservative compared with European nations. The American political system and the clustering of Democrats in urban areas provide Republicans with a 3-5% built-in advantage in many races. Hence, Democratic political winners must present policies that appeal to both the center and the left in most districts and states.
In 2019 35% of Americans identified as conservatives while only 26% identified as liberals. Liberals cannot support a winning party by themselves. Since only 30% of Americans vote in primary elections and the most partisan people are likeliest to vote, extreme candidates can be elected in Democratic as well as Republican primaries but face a stiffer challenge in the general elections. Three-quarters of Republicans identify as conservative while only half of Democrats identify as liberals. A recent survey reported that 57% of Republicans want their party to become more conservative while 54% of Democrats prefer their party to become more moderate. Democratic activists, partisans and candidates might wish to adopt “Bernie Sanders” positions, but the Democratic winners appeal to moderates as well.
Political scientists describe the Democrats as a coalition of interest groups and the Republicans as a collection of similar ideologies, connected by freedom, liberty and individual rights. Democrats rely upon policies and transactional politics more than Republicans. Klein promotes his view that the Republican party is held together more by identity than by any one purely consistent ideology. One research project was able to demonstrate that Trump’s position (sometimes left or right) was more influential than a voter’s self-expressed ideology in making political choices.
Partisan Democrats also consume a diverse media diet of mainstream media, left-leaning sources and select center-right options. Partisan Republicans consume right-leaning sources alone. This difference also supports Democrats defining and promoting more moderate political positions. Klein notes that the Republican Party has actively opposed the mainstream media and universities for decades, narrowing its news sources, while the Democrats continue to consume from these sources. He argues that conservatives did not create a parallel “neutral” and “objective” media because the existing mainstream media already filled the role well enough.
Klein ends this chapter by focusing on the depth of feeling held by many Republican voters. They see an urgency in winning, in defeating the enemy. They fear that these are the last elections in which their view can be supported in a democracy. He quotes former Bush, Sr and Trump Attorney General William Barr extensively. Barr sees a cosmic competition between secularists and religious people. He believes that the “secularists” will use any means to reach their goal of achieving a secular society where religion is outlawed. He sees religion as “under attack” and society threatened by the “moral relativism” of the secular world view. He points to the combined power of the media, popular culture, entertainment industry and universities to outlaw religious views, sidestepping the political processes and allowing a small unelected minority to impose their view. Many social conservatives share this apocalyptic view and are highly motivated to win this ultimate war.
10. Managing Polarization – and Ourselves
Klein reiterates that polarization, per se, is not a problem. Polarization causes issues to be raised and addressed even if they are not resolved. The absence of polarization can be suppression when real political issues are hidden or ignored. Unfortunately, our current polarization does not lead to problems being resolved but to greater political theatrics and a threat to democracy. The underlying factors described in the book don’t seem to be changing, so structural changes are needed to avoid the disaster scenarios.
Klein reiterates his support for the “rough and tumble” of the legislative process and the validity of representatives wrestling to a conclusion. But he argues that some decisions and situations are so essential that the full political arsenal should be stored in the armory. The debt ceiling threats should be eliminated by including debt authorization with the budget. The budget process itself should be revised to make longer term commitments to programs. Automatic stabilizers should be defined to ensure that counter cyclical economic support is available in recessions and not subject to blackmail from the minority party.
The legitimacy of our democracy must be increased. The electoral college cannot be easily changed but the National Interstate Popular Vote Compact could be used to increase the influence of the popular vote and reduce the disproportionate influence of rural, low population states. Independent commissions or other changes could reduce gerrymandering. Innovations like multiple member districts and ranked choice voting could help voters to see that their vote matters. The filibuster should be eliminated. Washington, DC and Puerto Rico should have congressional representation. Klein believes that improved voter representation would force the Republican party to serve/rebuild its moderate wing and define positions that would appeal to 60% of Americans rather than 40%.
His third principle is “balancing”. The American political system aimed to balance between the competing forces of democratic and elite rule, large and small states, federal and state power, etc. Today we compete between red and blue, liberal and conservative identities. The system does not address this dimension. Perhaps a multiparty system would be better. Perhaps a 15-person Supreme Court with 5 nominees from each party and the last 5 decided by the 10 justices. Consider reform of congressional rules that give the speaker absolute power to determine what bills are considered.
Klein urges us to become more aware or mindful of the role of identities, especially the mega-identity of politics. We have multiple identities and they all matter. We can choose to not immediately react to stimuli that touch our political identity. Practice maintaining the gap between stimulus and response. Be aware that political actors and advertisers and bloggers do want to use identity to influence and persuade us. Proactively define our information sources. Diversify them. Evaluate their bias and quality. Fight against the nationalization of views. Invest time in state and local politics where the issues are more concrete, the players are closer, and the impact is greater.
11. Afterword
The January 6 insurrection and the support for Trump’s claims of electoral theft should not surprise anyone who accepts the identity model of politics. Once an identify is chosen and closely held, almost nothing can pry it away. The Democrats chose Joe Biden and adopted relatively moderate policies in order to win. The Republican geographical advantage was clear again, with a 7 million vote margin barely winning the electoral college. The legitimacy of the president, senators and the Supreme Court is challenged by both parties. The overlap of race and politics lessened a bit with Trump winning 8% more Hispanics and Biden winning 7% more college educated whites. Klein doubles down on his challenge to the Republican Party to throw away its narrowly targeted white, religious, rural, extreme approach and redefine the party to appeal to a broader set of Americans. He argues that the Democrats’ voting reforms bill, HR1, could start the nation towards rebuilding its democratic foundation.
Author Robert Putnam also wrote the award-winning Bowling Alone (1999) and The Upswing (2022) summarizing the mountains of social science research on American Community and related topics. The first book documented the large, steady and widespread decline in community participation in the second half of the 20th century. The second book extended the timeframe back to the 1850’s to document that community participation was very low in the post-Civil War era, but that institutional innovations plus social, economic and political changes aligned to promote greater community participation throughout the next 75 years, before declines began in the post-WW II era.
This book is also data-intensive and primarily focused on the role of “community” in driving divergent opportunities for lower socioeconomic status (SES) versus higher SES children. Five chapters focus on the American Dream, Families, Parenting, Schooling and Community before a final chapter on why we should care and what we might do. The author provides paired case studies of higher (top 1/3rd) and lower (bottom 1/3rd) SES families in his hometown of Port Clinton, Ohio (near Toledo), Bend, OR, Atlanta, Orange County, CA and Philadelphia to illustrate how the various factors interact and apply.
The author chooses to frame his story under the heading of upward mobility or equal opportunity because this is a very widely held American value with supporters in both political parties. His liberal/Democratic party bias shows in various places, but his mastery of the data, case studies and sequencing make this a powerful book describing how American communities, families, kids and neighborhoods were actually functioning in 2015 contrasted with those in 1955-75.
In summary, the reduction in community activities documented in Bowling Alone is mostly felt by the bottom half of the SES groups. Poor/poverty class, working class and middle-class families have been very negatively impacted by both lower absolute and relative economic opportunity and weaker community support, while professional, upper middle and wealthy class families have maintained economic and community resources to guide their children to positive outcomes. Upward mobility in the US has fallen as income and wealth inequality have increased, leading to greater divisions in society, lower trust, weaker institutions and polarized politics.
Putnam tries not to shout, but the clear implication is that American civilization, per se, is at risk! If one-third or one-half or two-thirds of Americans do not benefit widely from social institutions, choose to not participate in them, lose trust in their neighbors, fail to raise their children and turn to populist political candidates for solutions, The American Dream is at risk. The author does quietly note that the measurements of intergenerational mobility lag by 20 years, so what we are seeing today is somewhat based upon the social, economic, political and economic conditions of the late 1990s. The next two decades of community, institution and parent formation have already taken place and shaped childhood development.
“Sociologists”, like Dr Putnam, are often commingled with “socialists” and other leftwing political groups in the public mind; and the profession is clearly leftward leaning in universities today. However, the discipline also has an inherent rightwing slant. Sociologists devote their time to analyzing the roles of community, family, kin, religion, neighborhood, voluntary groups, institutions, unions, employers, political parties and other groups on human behavior. The focus is on the group as a counterweight to the purely individualist, commercial, scientific, rational, transactional, computing, materialist conceptions of human beings. Classical conservatives have often tried to “conserve” the delivered group history, traditions, culture, value, art and institutions (civilization) of the past against the various progressive, experimental, enlightened proposals of liberals. A successful civilization must have successful groups and institutions.
As my 1972 high school general business teacher, Mr. Dunlap, often said, “we have much, much to do today”.
The American Dream
The 1950’s can be improperly idealized, but the contrast between 1950’s and 2010 Port Clinton, Ohio shows massive changes in economic opportunities and living conditions between the “haves” and the “have nots”. The author compares the top and bottom one-third of society using case studies and data. For data slices, he typically uses educational achievement, comparing high school graduates or less education groups with college degree achieved groups. His home village of 7,000 is between Toledo and Cleveland on the shores of Lake Erie, not far from the site of fictional Winesburg, Ohio. The small town thrived with manufacturing, fishing, farming, mining and government sites in the post-WW II era, but declined quickly after the 1970’s except for the addition of a string of lakeside second homes. Relatively small income and status differences, school and activity mingling between classes and widespread economic and educational advances characterized the 1950s. By the 2010’s, the poor had become poorer and the wealthy were of a different economic stratum, with less formal institutional support, class intermixing or intermarriage, informal mentoring or upward mobility.
Don 1959 – working class upbringing, dad worked 2 jobs, mom a homemaker, neither parent HS grad, top 1/4th academically, sports star, local minister guided him to liberal arts college, became a minister, married a high school teacher and his daughter became a librarian. Emphasis on economic and social stability of home life, assistance of community in upward mobility.
Frank 1959 – son of local business owner (fishing) and college educated mom from Chicago, lived 4 blocks from Don, modest school results, worked summers in family restaurant, not considered socially different even though dad was commodore at yacht club and mom “did charity work”, attended Ohio liberal arts college, played sports, worked as a journalist in Columbus for 25 years. Comparable results to Don.
1959 class – “we were poor, but we didn’t know it”. Of the parents, 5% held college degrees and one-third had not completed high school. Three-quarters of the high school graduates obtained more education than their parents. Half of the children of high school dropouts went to college. Absolute and relative upward mobility was high. On average, the children of the class of 1959 (1980s HS grads) equaled their parents in educational attainment but did not exceed them.
Libby 1959 – one of 10 children born to farmer/craftsman and homemaker without HS degrees. Parents actively involved at school. English teacher helped Libby attend U Toledo, but she dropped out of freshman year to marry hometown boy and become a homemaker. Divorced 20 years later, Libby worked as a clerk, writer and manager before winning a countywide political seat which she held for 30 years. Male and female opportunities and participation were quite similar for this cohort through joining college, but only 22% of women completed degrees versus 88% of men.
Jesse and Cheryl 1959 – only two black graduates out of 150. Families had moved from the South, dads worked in manufacturing and mining, moms worked as maids. Jesse excelled in sports, served as student council president, attended college on a sports scholarship, earned master’s degree in education and served as a high school teacher. Cheryl was hardworking, academic achiever and class officer. She also earned a master’s degree and taught high school. Both families lived in the poorest parts of town. The students interacted with their classmates, but knew that there were limits for dating, travel and recreational activities. The students were guided/assisted by local adults to attend college. While race and gender restrictions have fallen since 1959 in the US, class-based differences in opportunity have increased.
1950’s and 1960’s forward to 2010- one-half of high school grads to college and one-half to work. 1,000 employee factory trimmed jobs, then closed in 1993. Army base and gypsum mines closed. Manufacturing fell from 55% to 25% of jobs. Real wage in 2012 was 16% below that of 1970. Population had grown by 50% from 1940-70, flattened through 1990, then dropped by 17% by 2010. 2010 juvenile delinquency rates 3 times national average, up from just average in 1980’s. Net departures of 30-39 year olds doubled from 13% in 1970’s to 27% in 2000’s. Single parent households doubled, divorce rate up 5X, unwed births doubled, child poverty up 4X. At the same time, second homes now covered 20 miles of the lake shore. Small town “rust belt” story has same social impact as large city “rust belt” stories.
Chelsea 2014 – lives on the lake, dad is a national sales manager, mom has graduate degree and does part-time special education work. They own a second home. Mom is very active in shaping kids’ school life, intervening, investing and coaching. Chelsea is “most active person” at school, leading many extracurricular activities. She attends a big 10 university and plans to become a lawyer.
David 2014 – dad a HS drop out, worked periodically in odd jobs, imprisoned, angry, many women, drugs, moved from place to place. Mom moved out when David was preschooler. David has 9 step siblings. Finished HS through career classes. Juvenile detention record begins with age 13 store break-ins and continues for drug and alcohol violations. Lived with dad and grandparents at different times. Passed each grade, but never engaged in school. Worked in retail, factory and landscaping. Became a father at 18, did not marry, shares custody of child. Invests time helping his stepsiblings. Wants further education but has no plans. Bitter that community did not help him through his childhood when it was clear that his imprisoned dad and absent mom were incapable of raising him.
Equality of income and wealth is different from equality of opportunity and social mobility. The first is widely discussed in the media and rising inequality bemoaned by many. However, proposed government initiatives to address it, especially income or wealth transfers, are hotly debated by the two main political parties. While this form of inequality and changes in it clearly impacts equality of opportunity, the author focuses on the second measure.
“Do youth coming from different social and economic backgrounds in fact have roughly equal life chances, and has that changed in recent decades?” “A bedrock American principle is the idea that all individuals should have the opportunity to succeed on the basis of their own effort, skill and ingenuity” according to Fed chair Ben Bernanke. Faith in equal rights is embedded in the American founding documents and stories, American history, especially due to the growing economy of the US across more than two centuries. The Horatio Alger story of “rags to riches” has been told since formal public education began in the US in the 1840’s. Public opinion surveys from the 1940s through the 1980’s recorded an American public that believed that they and their children could pursue The American Dream with confidence.
95% of Americans repeatedly endorse equality of opportunity – “everyone in America should have an equal opportunity to get ahead”.
3 stages. 1875-1945, less inequality of wealth and income, growth of wealth and income, modest equality of opportunity for non-minority men. 1945-75, much less inequality of wealth and income, rapid economic growth, strong absolute growth of opportunities for all and very open opportunities for economic growth and social mobility. 1975-2015, intermittent periods of economic growth, increased inequality of wealth and income, limited absolute economic opportunity and sharply reduced relative economic opportunity and social mobility. The contrast between 1959 and the post-Great Recession 2010 highlights the very different economic and social environments.
Income inequality within each racial/ethnic group increased from 1967-2011.
From 1979-2005, real after-tax income for bottom 1/5th up $1,000; for middle 1/5th up $9,000; for top 1% up $750,000.
From 1980-2012, real earnings of college educated males rose 35%, while high school graduates lost 11% and high school dropouts fell 22%.
From 1992-2013, real wealth of high school graduates or less education remained in $150-175,000 range while wealth of college graduates increased from $600-700,000 range to $1.1 million range. A 3.5 to 1 ratio increased to 6 to 1 in 20 years.
Neighborhoods are more clearly sorted into high, middle and low income. Between 1970 and 2009, high-income neighborhoods doubled from 15% to 30% of the total while low-income neighborhoods increased by one-half, from 20% to 30% of the total, leaving middle-income neighborhoods to shrink from 65% to 40%.
Neighborhood segregation drives educational segregation. In large cities, “neighborhood schools” policies ensure that lower and higher income groups mix less. Within schools, top third SES students disproportionately enroll in advanced tracks and complete AP courses. These differences have even greater disproportionate effects on college attendance, college graduations and especially selective college admissions.
Clustering in neighborhoods, schools and colleges leads to “assortive mating”, with higher SES students marrying each other much more often than in the post WW II era when interactions between the classes were more common. Combining all of these factors leads to extended families and kinship networks that are largely or solely comprised of similar SES people, further reducing the interaction of Americans from different walks of life.
Putnam notes that absolute mobility, completing more education, earning more and holding higher level positions than your parents, is the primary component of “upward mobility” in history. The growth of economies, movement to new locations, development of new industries, technologies and professions does tend to benefit many across society. Relative upward mobility, with the lower classes moving ahead (education, income, jobs) faster than the upper classes, is not as a big a driver because it is less common in history, and even when it occurs it does not mean than bus drivers and surgeons change places, only that bus drivers’ daughters become transportation analysts while surgeons’ daughters become pharmacists.
The social scientist standard measure of mobility compares the income or education of a 30-40 year old with their parents at 30-40 years old, assuming that lifetime career success is largely settled at this age. Putnam asks the reader to not wait for the high school graduates of 2005 to be measured in 2020 but instead to look at their situations in 2005 and project the results, adding urgency to the time period in which absolute and relative mobility have been so much below that experienced after WW II.
2. Families
Putnam next focuses on the rapidly growing mid-sized town of Bend, Oregon, a largely white representative of prosperous western towns driven by their outdoors assets. The logging industry has been replaced by tourism, retirees and second homes. Area population is up from 30,000 to 165,000 between 1970 and 2013. Per capita income is up 50% in one decade. Usual side effects of rapid growth are seen. Wealth is made in real estate and construction. But, even in this growing environment, income inequality has widened by 75%. Poor neighborhoods are clustered on the east side of town.
Andrew – 2015. Parents from modest middle-class backgrounds near Bend. Dad Earl a fair student, graduated from state college. Married classmate Patty, who left college. Earl worked as a stockbroker, Patty as a florist’s assistant. Earl moved into construction and built a solid business worth millions. Patty left work, had 2 kids and thrived as a homemaker. Children attended a new HS with 15% drop-out rate, contrasted with east-side HS with 50% drop-out rate. Parents focused on kids, school, building their marriage. Andrew lacked for little. Parents involved in school, activities and career steps. Andrew a modest student and not driven like dad, working towards a firefighting career. Feels secure in pursuing his future.
Kayla – 2015. Parents Darleen and Joe have both lead troubled lives. Darleen raised on a small ranch a few hours from Bend. Finished HS with modest record, worked in fast food and at a fuel station. Married by 20 with 2 kids to abusive man but left him. Met Joe in new job at Pizza Hut where he was the manager. Soon pregnant with Kayla. Joe’s father was mostly in prison while growing up, mom was an alcoholic who Joe helped from an early age. Experienced some structure and care in 6 years in a foster home. Dropped out of eighth grade. Cared for mom. Married at 18, 2 kids with drug abuser. Left woman, kept kids, moved back in with his mom and mom’s latest boyfriend. Met Darleen in Bend at Pizza Hut. Joe moved from job to job, unskilled, low wage. Kayla grew up with the 4 step-siblings. Always poor, little parental support for school or extras. Mom Darleen left with a new boyfriend when Kayla was 7, living across the west and becoming homeless. Kayla mostly lived with Joe but some of the time traveled with Darleen and her friend. Kayla has essentially lived “alone” due to limited prospects and parenting skills of Darleen and Joe. Kayla drifted in school, found some support in troubled youth and job corps programs and legally finished HS. Some school administrators helped Kayla with medical, counseling and educational support. She has taken some community college classes, has a new boyfriend who lives with her at Joe’s. Kayla is depressed and worried about her future but doesn’t know what to do.
The post WW II norm was a breadwinner dad and a homemaker mom. Relative stability. Modest income or extras, but owned home and settled in a neighborhood. Working- and middle-class wages were adequate to support this model. Only 4% of births were outside of marriage due to social norms and pressured marriages of new parents to be.
Family structure changed during the 1970’s. More divorce, more women working for pay, greater cohabitation, more unwed births resulting in more kids in single parent homes. These changes accelerated for decades. Birth control, feminist views, female job opportunities, working class male job insecurity and individualist, self-fulfillment norms all contributed to these major changes in expectations and actual family structures.
In time, the bottom half of the social classes continued to shun the traditional model, but the top half maintained a high rate of marriage, modest rate of divorce, delayed first births and raised kids in stable two-parent households. These women increased their college attendance rates and worked in higher skilled jobs before and after their children’s pre-school years.
Lower educated moms’ first birth age was relatively stable at 19-20 years from 1960-2010, but higher educated moms delayed child responsibilities from age 24 to age 30, providing time for dating, prospecting and cohabitating before marriage and maturing socially, completing education and career milestones before the responsibilities of motherhood.
Births to unmarried women with college degree completion status doubled from 5% to 10% between 1977 and 2007, making it still a relatively infrequent occurrence (1 in 10). For young mothers with high school credentials or less, the 1970’s rate was already much higher at 20% (1 in 5), but has grown consistently since then to more than 60% (approaching 2 in 3). This is a revolutionary change within the high school grad population — and between them and the college educated group.
By 2010, the high school graduates’ divorced percentage reached 28% versus 14% for the college graduates. Among the one-third of high school graduates who were married when their kids were born, 28% of the families experienced divorce.
Fathers with HS credentials are four times as likely to have children that do not live with them as fathers with college degrees.
The percentage of college educated families with children under age 7 lead by a single parent doubled from 5% to 10% between the 1950’s to 1970’s period and the 1990’s to 2010’s. It was a slightly higher 12% in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. The high school graduate lead families started at 20% in the early decades and has grown to more than 60%, the same pattern as births to unmarried women.
Lower education moms’ employment percentage grew from 18% to 32% between 1960 and 2010, a 70% increase. Higher education moms started at 20% in 1960 and rocketed up to almost 70% in the 1990’s — another gigantic change within this group and between the groups. In 1960, one in five moms worked throughout the classes. More lower education moms joined the paid work force, but more than two-thirds did not work in the 2010’s. More than two-thirds of college educated mothers rejoined the labor force, making that the usual situation for their peer group. On average, high paid college educated families have one and two-thirds earners while lower paid high school grad families have one and one-third earners, a further income difference of 20%, on average. Working moms today spend as much time with their kids as “stay at home” moms did in the 1970’s by cutting out other competing uses of time. Black Americans show this same split towards two-earner married couples at the top and single moms at the bottom. Recent immigrants and Hispanic families look more like the traditional model.
The two-tier model is driven by culture and economics. It is socially possible to have children without being, getting or remaining married. The social prohibitions against birth control, premarital relations, cohabitation and childbirth outside of marriage fell quickly and have little impact for most American today. Motherhood is open to young women irrespective of their economic, educational or social status and is considered a “good”. Young women can choose motherhood and romance over marriage and do so frequently in the lower half of society. Poor and working-class men today have relatively lower wealth, earnings, stability and prospects than their post WW II peers. Young women have greater economic resources and generally believe that marriage requires a solid economic foundation, so often choose to not make that commitment. For less well-off partners economic instability and risks prevent and threaten family stability. For fortunate partners their economic security reinforces family stability despite life’s challenges. This is an essential take-away. Economic differences are translated into social factors which magnify the different opportunities and security experienced by higher and lower income, wealth and education families.
Putnam does not believe that overly attractive welfare benefits play a major role in preventing or disrupting family formation. Technical studies show small effects. The overall change in structure is orders of magnitude larger than those effected by benefits. Welfare benefit policy changes do not correlate with the changes in family formation. Benefits do matter economically and have an impact, but this is not a primary driver of changes in family structure.
The social changes of the 1960’s and 1970’s and the overall trend towards a more secular public society and norms is correlated with the breakdown in family structure overall and for the lower SES groups. Putnam argues that correlation is not causation. The massive split between the top and bottom halves argues against this simple explanation. State and county level correlations indicate an opposite effect, with more rural and religious areas having even greater rates of family decay.
Policy choices in the 1980’s to criminalize drug infractions, increase sentences, reduce sentencing options and increase enforcement led to a five-fold incarceration rate increase between 1970 and 2000. Since young men account for 90% of offenses, this has directly removed many men from actual or prospective marriage. This is not the main driver of fragile families, but an aggravating factor.
The two-tier system has improved outcomes for the top half or two-thirds of society, with married two-income families devoting more time and money to a smaller number of children. The bottom one-quarter or one-third is increasingly comprised of single mother families with part-time, family or government support during the crucial preschool years followed by lower earnings thereafter, so their children receive less financial and social support throughout childhood and lower lifetime opportunities.
From a sociologist’s point of view, these are qualitative differences or “order of magnitude differences” not merely the “differences of degree” experienced in the post WW II period.
3. Parenting
Putnam uses metro Atlanta as the backdrop for this chapter. Fast growing, deep poverty, variety of suburbs, racially segregated, racially mixed in some suburbs, second largest number of African Americans in the US, second weakest upward mobility scores, northern transplants, income inequality within Black community, Black political power, highly educated Black population. But income/class differences have a large impact, perhaps more than race.
Simone, Carl and Desmond – 2015 – Mom Simone from New York City, upwardly mobile family, father a Merrill Lynch manager, mother a medical secretary, married 50 years, moved to New Jersey suburb. Simone earned BA industrial psychology at CUNY. Dad Carl born in Suriname to black and Dutch parents, moved to New York as a child. Dad worked for Alcoa, mom at UN. Dad built a warehousing business. Parents married 33 years. Close family, dinner table discussions, religion important, friends welcome. Simone and Carl met at CUNY, married, waited 5 years to start family per religious counselor’s advice. Simone worked as receptionist and paralegal before becoming at home mom. Carl is an IT manager, brings kids to work, shows role models, he advises them to be productive. Education a priority, in school, out of school, reading, flashcards, outings, activities, sports, music, diet choices. Parents shopped for schools, moved further out in NJ, then to Atlanta, chose HS first, then home. Chose diverse school district to prepare Desmond for world. Mom deeply involved in school activities. Sensitive and firm parenting style; claims never punished son. Dad emphasized autonomy. Religious faith, activities, interactions shaped Desmond’s friendships, activities and thinking. Family adapted to diabetes challenge. Racism acknowledged, but you “have to work a little bit harder”. Simone reflects that “you never stop parenting”. Desmond was top ranked HS student, in college, interning at CDC, moving forward on professional career path.
Stephanie, Lauren and Michelle – 2015 – Mom Stephanie a hardworking office manager in the hospitality industry, grew up in Detroit. Her alcoholic mom left her alcoholic father in Georgia, worked as an RN, lived with an alcoholic Chrysler factory worker. Stephanie grew up in middle class Detroit neighborhood but mixed with project kids, joined a gang, fought, went to juvenile detention center, suspended from school, barely completed grades, stole. Her mom died when Stephanie was 15, she moved in with an aunt who offered more structure and gained Stephanie’s respect. Left aunt and dropped out of 12th grade, moved to Atlanta, earned GED, got pregnant and married. Shared 4 children with her first husband. Caring for first child changed perspective to being responsible for her kids. Worked at fast food, supermarket, discount department store, earned promotions and living salary. Husband left, Stephanie married a forklift driver and has a good marriage with him but they keep financial responsibility for his kids and her 4 kids separate.
Stephanie has been a customer service manager for 15 years where she excels due to her social interaction skills and hard work. Her 4 kids were financially provided for. Mom tried to keep kids safe and used tough love parenting approach. You have to be hard, parents are in charge, not my children’s friend, kids need to be tough and know the world is tough, few conversations and hugs. Family moved twice to better neighborhoods to get further away from trouble. Some education support for kids in elementary and high school, financial support for community college. Eldest son is succeeding, challenging youngest son works at recycling center with his dad. Lauren is completing associates degree in counseling. Michelle dropped out of community college, had struggled with speech and reading in high school. Hopes to attend trade school and be a day care teacher. Currently at a pause in life, hanging out with HS drop out boyfriend. Stephanie claims that racism has never been an issue in her family’s life. Is proud that her kids are “respectable”.
Elijah -2015 – born in Germany to Army parents, mom left family when Elijah was 3, moved in with his grandparents in New Orleans projects. Saw and experienced violence frequently including shootings and murders. Taught by close cousin James how to be a burglar at age 7. James taught him to fight, be a thug and a bully. First re-encountered his dad at age 10, who had been in prison and fathering more children. Moved to Charleston, SC at age 10 to live with mom, then back to New Orleans for 2 years, then back to his mom, new boyfriend and year-old twins in Atlanta at 13. Elijah arrested for arson at age 14, beaten by his dad (moved to Atlanta) after he was bailed out. His father had become a “preacher” and tried to influence Elijah positively, but mom remained verbally abusive throughout his childhood. Elijah tried to reset his life several times after age 14, with limited success. He finished HS with much effort at age 19. He has lived with mom, dad or friends since high school. Worked. Stayed high. Focused on music. Stayed clean. Dreams of being a preacher or hip-hop hero. Influenced by religious teachings but still attracted to violence. Bagging groceries at Kroger, saving money for an apartment and school. Elijah is a survivor against the odds, just barely.
Prenatal through early childhood environment => brain circuitry and capacity for empathy.
Contingent reciprocity = “serve and return” experiences matter most. Consistent and caring adult interaction. Development is a social experience.
Much early learning is preverbal but it drives later verbal and math skills.
Early learning also drives “executive functions”: concentration, impulse control, mental flexibility and working memory.
Intellectual and socioemotional development are intertwined. Soft skills may be as important as academic skills: grit, social sensitivity, optimism, self-control, conscientiousness and emotional stability.
Unstable or inconsistently responsive parenting, physical or emotional abuse, substance abuse and lack of affection produce negative neurological changes.
Individuals differ on their inherent resilience, but negative factors have negative effects on children.
Early childhood care drives cognitive and soft skills which drive school performance.
Parental income, education and class are closely correlated with healthy brain development. Differences emerge at very early ages and remain stable through life (on average), operating most strongly in the preschool years.
Dr. Spock’s “permissive parenting” has been replaced by “intensive parenting” in response to this new understanding, especially by higher income, education and social class parents. Concerted cultivation of children’s skills by both parents is the new norm replacing an earlier theory that natural growth by a child would be good enough.
High school graduates prioritize obedience above self-reliance in their children by 55% to 35%, while college graduates seek self-reliance above obedience by 55% to 25%. Upper class parents have adopted the new parenting approach faster than lower class parents.
Working class parents provide their children with a 3/2 ratio of encouragement to discouragement, while professional class parents offer 6/1 positive to negative feedback, consistent with the goal of creating autonomous young adults accustomed to making good decisions and choices. Putnam notes that these differences reflect historical parental experience and the need to help students in threatening environments survive.
Trends in the percentage of parents who say their family usually eats together also shows that college graduate parents are retaining their interactive style better than high school graduate parents, with the first group declining from 80% to 75% since the 1980’s while the second dropped from 77% to 65%. Both groups saw a decline in a busier time, but college educated parents preserved this family time better.
Personal spending on children for educational activities reflects this split as well. Families in the bottom one-third of incomes invested about $1,000 of real dollars per child annually in the 1970s through 2010. The eight decile (higher) income families increased their investment from $1,700 to $2,600 while the top decile families more than doubled their investments from $3,000 to $6,500.
High school graduate parents increased their time in developmental childcare from 35 minutes to 75 minutes per day between 1990 and 2010 while college graduate parents surged from 50 minutes to 130 minutes per day. In rough terms, both groups doubled their investment, but the lower educated parents went from a half-hour to an hour while the greater educated parents moved from an hour to two hours, further increasing the care giving gap.
For their 4-6 year old children, college educated moms chose professional day care 70% of the time versus high school educated moms who “chose” it 40% of the time. Similar differences exist for younger children and for the availability of formal pre-K education.
Parenting differs significantly between American social classes and these differences drive large differences in child development, educational results and preparation for careers and life.
4. Schooling
Putnam next focuses on Orange County, CA, once the epicenter of suburban (and Republican) America. The county kept growing from its early 1960’s rise to prominence reaching 3 million people as the sixth most populous county in the nation. Its demographics have changed. 46% speak a language other than English at home. Latino immigrants account for almost one-half of K-12 students. Within the county, incomes and demographics vary widely. The author contrasts Santa Ana at $17,000 per capita income (95% Latino) with Fullerton at $100,000 per capita income (25% Latino). He compares the school districts and shows that school resources (inputs) are similar but outputs diverge. 65% vs 20% take the SAT test and score 1917 versus 1285. Top 10% versus bottom 20% on California standardized tests. 2% versus 33% truancy rate.
Clara, Ricardo and Isabella – 2015 – mom Clara and dad Ricardo grew up in an LA ghetto in the 1970’s. Both managed to attend college and then graduate, Clara advancing through a social work and counseling career and Ricardo succeeding as an architect and project manager. Clara’s first marriage failed and she managed as a single mom of one son in her late twenties. She married Ricardo before turning 30. Clara’s Mexican parents moved to LA during WWII and settled their family in Watts. Clara and her brother recall racial strains, good family and school support. Their family moved away from the poorer parts of town twice. Clara noted “We’re pretty Mexican at home, but at work we’re totally Americanized”.
When Isabella reached school age, her family also moved further from the poor neighborhoods and cities to Fullerton, noted for its university and high school excellence. Clara researched schools in depth before their move and continued as a highly involved parent, ensuring that her daughter was always engaged in learning. Troy HS in Fullerton is a public magnet school and ranked among the 100 “best” in the US. The environment is “pressure cooker”, but the kids complement their long hours of homework with extracurricular activities. Both parents helped with homework reviews. SAT prep classes are common. Parents easily raise money to support activities. School counselors and parents guided the college application and choice process. Isabella chose to attend a California university to “save money”, while her brother attended an Ivy League school.
Lola and Sofia – 2015 – The young ladies’ birth mom was drug addicted, a gang member and prisoner, dying when they were 10 and 2 years old. Their different fathers were also drug addicts and gang members. One disappeared altogether and one lives in Orange County but played no role in their lives. They were raised by their grandmother (mom’s mom) and step-grandfather in a solid working-class neighborhood in Santa Ana. The girls claim “we had the normal suburban life”. Grandma died when they were 14 and 6. Step-grandad continued to live with them until they were 19 and 11 before moving out, but allowed them to stay in the house and supported them financially. Lola became the “mom” for her sister before starting high school. She dropped out as a junior and eventually completed her GED. She works as a clerk in a discount clothing store.
Both girls had positive stories about elementary school but horror stories about high school. Gangs, disengaged teachers, no academics, no extracurricular options except for a few “honors” students, fights and shootings. Lola persevered and moved Sofia into a remedial “continuation school” for her last two years and she flourished in this “guided” independent study program mostly done at home. Sofia passed the California graduation test and attends the local community college in a teacher-training program, but many obstacles remain to obtaining a professional position.
Putnam uses his statistical approach to answer interrelated questions about public schools. He concludes that different schools provide very different environments and results, but that the different resources, teachers and academic programs have less impact on results than the differing financial and class backgrounds of the students who attend and the support of their parents. He believes that some school changes could improve results to help less advantaged students to compete and thrive.
The achievement gap between low- and high-income students is one-third wider in 2000 than it was in 1975. This is equal to several years of extra schooling. The class gap has been growing within racial groups while it has been narrowing between racial groups. Putnam takes great steps throughout the text explaining how measuring results within racial groups to support his claims that “class” is very important in no way should be seen as saying that differences across race are unimportant or that racism does not play a role in equal opportunity or social mobility. Research finds that gaps in school achievement at age 6 are essentially the same as at age 18 when compared by the mother’s level of educational achievement. Schools don’t seem to narrow or expand these differences. Again, Dr. Putnam walks a fine line. As much as he might like to criticize lower SES schools for their “less” effective programs and results, he must recognize that schools start with students of a given level of preparation, support, habits and expectations and might not be expected to deliver greater results for lower SES kids than for their higher SES counterparts. On the other hand, given their lower academic skills at the start of any school year, it ought to be possible to help some students to learn more than the usual “one year” of progress.
Residential sorting accounts for the differential results by school. Higher and lower SES pupils increasingly live in different neighborhoods and attend different school districts and schools. Higher SES parents have the information and resources to move into the more highly rated school zones, leaving lower SES parents and their children behind. Dr. Putnam acknowledges that “school choice” can have a positive impact for lower SES students who attend higher SES schools, but notes that the evidence is weak and that lower SES parents are not as skilled at identifying the best choices. Putnam cites research that shows that poor kids achieve significantly more in high-income schools, supporting his argument that class is at least as important as income or race in determining student results.
School funding per pupil is equal or subsidizes poorer districts in most states today. Student-teacher ratios and salaries are similar. Putnam suggests that a form of “teacher sorting” explains some of the different program quality across schools and school districts, citing higher turnover rates in lower rated districts as a result of more motivated teachers leaving them and moving to higher rated districts. He recommends investing more money in better teachers to improve results in lower SES programs.
However, the main takeaway is that what students bring to school with them matters most: skills, habits, expectations, curriculum demands, English language skills, medical diagnosis and care, parenting structures, encouragement, drugs, stress, disorder, parents, support, involvement, volunteers, fundraising, networks, etc. “Whom you go to school with matters a lot”. Peer pressure from students and parents complement the efforts of teachers. The “distractions”, discipline and make-up work required in low SES schools reduces the hours teachers invest in teaching.
Assignment of students to main/advanced academic tracks is less common today. Historically, it provided some advantages to higher SES kids who disproportionately qualified for the highest track. Most remaining schools with tracks do identify “higher potential” students from lower SES backgrounds. Schools with and without tracking show insignificant differences in social mobility.
Private school attendance has declined from 10% to 8% of students in the last two generations. The gap in private school attendance between college educated (10%) and high school educated (5%) families has remained the same. Private schools disproportionately benefit higher SES children, but no more today than earlier.
Differences in extracurricular activities offered, participation and leadership roles stand out when lower- and higher-SES schools and students are compared. Research links this participation to the development of soft-skills, education and career success. Five-sixths (86%) of top-quartile SES students participate in activities while only two-thirds (66%) of lowest-quartile students do so, down from a 77% participation rate in the 1970’s and 1980’s. High-poverty schools offer half as many team sports as low-poverty schools. Average and low-income school districts increasingly require “pay to play” funding for more expensive programs while higher income districts pay the fees or convince booster clubs to raise the money for all students.
American high school graduation rates rose throughout the twentieth century from 6% to 80% in 1970. Graduation rates in 1930 and 1950 favored the financially well-to-do, but closed through time to near 100% graduation rates at the top and 75% graduation rates for the poorest quartile by the year 2000. Solid progress. However, GED’s make-up one out of eight (12%) high school credentials and are clearly not the equivalent of a traditional high school diploma. Students with GED’s have some career doors opened, but GED holders have lower career results. Some of the progress in HS completion is real while some is unclear.
Economic, education and career standards have advanced in the last century. A high school diploma is not what it once was. The college degree wage bonus was 50% in 1980, but nearly 100% in 2008.
Rates of high school completion, college application and enrollment have converged in the last half century, with 45% of lower-SES students enrolling in college versus 90% of higher-SES students. Lower-SES students disproportionately enroll in community colleges and “for-profit” schools which have very low completion rates. Lower-SES students have lower graduation rates within 4-year colleges. Their low acceptance into selective colleges is even more disproportionate.
In 2012, 45% of the lower-SES students enrolled in college but only 12% completed degrees, while 90% of higher-SES students enrolled and 58% finished. Twice as many higher-SES students started degree programs, but more than four times as many finished. About one-third of higher SES students had not yet completed degrees within 8 years, while almost three-fourths of lower SES students had not reached their goal.
The gaps in college degree completion by family income have widened throughout the period. Lower-SES students increased from a 5% to a 10% graduation rate. Lower-middle SES students increased from 10% to 16%. The above-middle group improved from 16% to 33%. Higher SES students doubled their completion rate like the others, from 40% to 80%. In ratio terms, things are the same! But 80% versus 10% is clearly a wider gap than 40% versus 5%.
A final comparison shows that test scores play a role in achievement, but less of a role than family income. For the lower-SES quartile, degree completion improves from 3% to 8% to 29% for low, middle and high-test score students. For top-SES quartile students the comparable figures are 30%, 51% and 74%. A middle test score student of low means has an 8% chance of earning a degree (1/12) while a comparable student of high financial means has 50% odds (1/2). A high-test score student of the lowest financial quartile has essentially the same odds of college graduation as a low-test score student from an advantaged family (29-30%).
5. Community
The author turns to Philadelphia, a large and historically important city for America’s upper and working classes. He selects a pair of single moms with two daughters each for his biographical sketches. Like Port Clinton, Philadelphia had a long history of stable manufacturing jobs and mixed class white neighborhoods in the post WWII era, providing opportunities for upward mobility to children in all classes. The loss of manufacturing jobs and aging of housing, infrastructure and institutions lead to a break down of the formerly stable culture after the 1970’s.
Marnie, Eleanor and Madeline – 2015 – mom Marnie was raised in Beverly Hills and lived in suburban Philadephia for most of her adult life, daughter of an alcoholic film producer and wife who divorced and remarried three times. Marnie was academically gifted and despite her home turmoil earned an economics degree and MBA from Ivy League schools. The girls’ father earned similar professional credentials, succeeded as an entrepreneur, but when his business failed a dozen years later, he became depressed, was divorced by Marnie and moved “out West” when the daughters were in middle school.
Marnie worked for a consulting firm after graduate school. She struck out as an independent consultant, after her husband melted down, in order to maintain the lifestyle to which she and her daughters had become accustomed. She succeeded financially and despite a demanding work and travel schedule was able to raise her girls with the help of several caretakers. The daughters were distraught by the divorce and loss of their dad and absence of their mom. Private schools, boarding school, tutors and counselors were used to supplement mom and the caretakers. The daughters had challenges with drugs, sex, motivation and status but were supported by mom and her network of adult friends. Eleanor is majoring in business at a Midwest university while Madeline is pursuing French and International Development concentrations at a Canadian university.
Molly, Lisa and Amy – 2015 – mom Molly has lived in the inner-city Kensington neighborhood her whole life following earlier generations of her family. After her father’s death when she was young, the nine children in her family were placed in foster homes. She was placed in an orphanage for six years. She returned to her mother’s home as a teen but basically raised herself. She became pregnant in twelfth grade and dropped out of high school. Molly married and had a second child, Lisa, but her marriage ended in a few years as dad was an alcoholic and drug addict. Molly supported her family as a waitress and a construction worker for a decade. She had Amy and another child with a man who worked as a roofer, but he too became hooked on drugs and left to become a homeless neighbor.
Molly suffered additional injuries: multiple sclerosis and a stroke, restricting her to a wheelchair. Her youngest son was autistic and required extensive medical help. She did her best to use public welfare programs to get by but suffered from depression. A local church helped her with counseling, housing and programs.
Lisa was damaged by her poverty and parents’ woes. She struggled in school and to make and keep friends. She skipped school often, drank and used drugs. She became pregnant in twelfth grade with a local drug dealer but refused to marry him. She married another boy (John) from her church and lived with his alcoholic family. The church helped John find a job and the couple find an apartment. John finished high school but dropped out of community college. Lisa did graduate from high school and attended a for profit school to earn a pharmacy technician degree but has never worked in this field despite incurring $50,000 of debt.
Amy showed early promise in music and made some solid steps forward during middle and high school. She too fell for alcohol, drugs and boys. Due to cheating and truancy, she was expelled, was home schooled and then returned to public school. She became pregnant in tenth grade. She moved to a “pregnant moms” high school and excelled academically with the extra support provided to her. She has not married. She plans to attend a college with special programs for young moms.
Both families faced challenges. Marnie had enough personal, financial and community assets to guide her daughters to success. Amy lacked these support systems but was able to leverage public school, agency and church resources to help her daughters barely survive their difficult circumstances.
“Social capital” is used to refer to an asset in parallel with financial and human capital assets. It is the social connectedness held by an individual – who they know and what help they can be as mentors, advisors, guarantors, examples, insurers, job leads, system navigators, friends, trusted people, offering a sense of belonging and community, etc. Social capital provides economic and personal benefits. Research ties it to health, happiness, educational and career success, public safety and child welfare. Sociologists have made it a primary focus of their studies for more than a century documenting how migration, urbanization, globalization, family structures, work environments, neighborhoods, social institutions, social norms, religious practices, diversity and homogeneity effect people. In general, sociologists bemoan the loss of small-scale cohesion that existed in an earlier time replaced by large scale cities, secular ethics and a materialist, transactional culture. As noted above, sociologists tend to lean leftward politically, but much of the content of their work focuses on the human dimension that many political conservatives try to preserve or revive.
More educated individuals have more close friends and more contacts. Their friends and contact networks cover a wider range of classes, industries, professions and institutions. More educated individuals are able to leverage these networks as needed and provide reciprocal help to others when approached. The advantage in close friends is only 15-20%, but the informal network advantage ranges from 25-100%. The smaller and weaker networks of less educated parents, even when there is a married couple, provide less support to children in the key high school years when they are making the transition to career training and education. The children have met fewer people, in fewer places, mostly of lower professional levels. Their parents know fewer people and their teachers and counselors are less likely to plug the gap. Formal mentoring programs can help, but their availability and duration make them partial replacements even for the students with such support. Informal mentors and contacts can also help to guide students regarding social choices – drugs, alcohol, sex, church and activities. “It takes a village to raise a child”. Higher SES kids have 50% more mentoring contacts, including almost twice as many teachers, friends of family, religious leaders and coaches.
Neighborhoods are increasingly segregated by class and the character of the neighborhood shapes daily life. Crime, poverty, health, safety, institutions, schools, norms, civic engagement, disorder, decay, trust, responsibility, collective ownership and care vary by neighborhood and shape perceptions, habits, norms and opportunities. Neighborhood differences harm lower class kids at all ages and accumulate with years in a more challenging setting. These effects can accumulate across generations. Some of the effects come from the skills, beliefs, habits, behavior and attitudes of individuals while others are transmitted through the quality of local institutions like schools, programs, libraries, parks, childcare and churches.
60% of affluent citizens say that they trust their neighbors. Only 25% of poor citizens agree. Strong social trust has fallen for top-third educated parents from 37% to 25%, a one-third decline from 1970 to 2010. It fell more sharply, from 30% to 17%, for the bottom-third educated group. Hopefulness versus hopelessness varies by class.
Church attendance and participation has been shown to have strong benefits to the participants, their neighbors and their community. Church attendance has been falling for all social classes but has dropped faster for lower education families. Top-third educated families have reduced church attendance by one-seventh (14%) between 1975 and 2010 from an average of 35 weeks per year to 30. Bottom-third educated families started at 30 weeks per year but dropped by 30% to 21 weeks per year. Given the trend to economic self-sufficiency where higher income families can support themselves (partially) while lower income families struggle, this disengagement from religious organizations is a significant loss for those with the greatest needs.
6. What is to be Done?
Growing income and wealth inequality is a problem. It is a root cause, but the book sidesteps this broad topic. Related to this issue, but slightly different, is the growth in scale and international competitiveness of the US economy that makes the gap between various economic roles much greater. Leaders, VP’s, directors and managers lead much larger firms. The complexity of modern production and commerce requires advanced STEM and other professional roles. Supervisors and technicians increasingly fill the middle jobs. Service and remaining clerical, distribution and manufacturing jobs fill the bottom. The complexity, required education, skills and experience required for higher jobs has increased much faster than that required in the lower half. Hence, the gap in “value added” between different levels is much higher. Upward economic and social mobility requires an even greater “leap forward” than it did in 1959.
The other drivers of lesser “equal opportunity” are the huge differences in family structures, parenting, schools and community support across American social classes.
As Americans, we hesitate to even use the term or concept “social class”, because our country was founded in opposition to the “social classes” of Europe and has embraced the heroic individualism of Jefferson, Jackson, Horatio Alger and the Republican Party for almost 150 years. We don’t have a king or a landed aristocracy. The typical American of either party and any income level is happy to take “pot shots” at the Rockefellers, robber barons, bankers and the corporate elite. Even with the rise of entrepreneurship, “rock star” CEO’s, and “the lifestyles of the rich and famous”, few Americans see a permanent upper class. Sociologists inevitably create social classes as tools for their work: sometimes 3 or 5 or 7, based on income, wealth, education, property, advantages, power, social standing and influence. Putnam’s statistics usually slice the country into 3 or 4 categories. As he noted at the beginning, education serves as a good proxy for class. Today we have 3 roughly equal size classes, defined by high school graduates or less (lower), college grads or more (higher) and the middle.
Putnam’s main conclusion is that social institutions and policies in the post WWII era promoted social mobility and economic opportunity by investing in the lower and middle classes, but that today we don’t make that investment. Our growing economic disparities are further leveraged into weak equality of opportunity and social mobility by our changed norms, institutions and public investments.
He notes that these differences have been felt sooner in marginal communities, especially nonwhite communities. As his Port Clinton chapter documents, I believe that they have also been seen earlier and deeper in small town America as well.
Putnam asserts that there are no “upper-class villains”. Social critics, leftists and populists might “beg to differ”. The increase in income inequality and the disproportionate value of public institutions for the “upper middle class” or the “professional class” or “suburban America” or “the boomers” makes this an increasingly controversial issue.
Putnam says we should address this challenge because of its impact on economic growth, democracy and morality. Failing to invest in lower- and middle-class students and institutions results in less development of their economic potential, lower productivity, lower output, lower earnings, lower growth and greater social costs (crime, welfare, police). Lower education and income citizens are much less engaged in the democratic processes. They have less buy-in to the system. They tend to not participate and undercut the legitimacy of government institutions and become more attracted to populist, authoritarian figures. Most religions and the US founding documents emphasize the inherent equality of individuals as human beings and the need for societies to invest in all citizens. There is an American consensus that “equal opportunity” is essential. This book documents that we clearly do not have “equal opportunity”.
The collapse of the working-class family is the central contributor to the growing opportunity gap. This should be in “ALL CAPS“. “Bowling Alone” documented the decline in community across many measures of participation in America between 1950 and 2000. “Our Kids” refines this analysis to show that the “upper middle class” is quite doing fine, thank you, on most measures of community engagement, participation and support, but that the working class has lost its historical moorings in the neighborhood, parish, ethnic group, union hall, union steward, precinct captain, extended family, social norms, religious enforcement, cooperatives, schools, social hall, VFW, township trustee, political boss, fraternal organization, social and athletic allegiances. The author accepts that these historical sources of working-class cohesion and support are mostly leaving the modern world but “hopes” that new social replacements will be found.
Putnam eliminates policy responses in several areas because they have not worked. Marriage enticements, abstinence, contraception, delayed childbirth, etc, seem to be beyond state influence. Policies that provide more cash to poor families are preferred: cash transfers, earned income tax credits, child tax credits and dollars for existing programs are suggested. Reducing incarceration could help dads to be better providers.
Putnam advocates for public support for children in the critical first 6 years of life. First year parental leave. Childcare subsidies for ages 2-4. Public funded and provided pre-K education. Parenting skills training and promotion.
Class based residential segregation drives different school results. Mixed income residential development policies could help. Invest in more guidance counselors and better teachers in low-income schools. Extend school hours and invest in extracurricular programs in poorer schools. Encourage neighborhood-based charter schools. Encourage Catholic schools to remain and grow in poor areas where they have historically been very successful. Invest in vocational education and locally controlled community colleges with vocational focuses. Eliminate “pay to play” from sports and activities. Invest in mentoring programs.
Postscript
In the last 40 years we were distracted by surface level debates about left versus right, liberal versus conservative. Republicans have clearly won the “framing” battle, contrasting the “free market” with “socialism”, “communism”, “bureaucrats”, “government”, “intellectuals”, “elites”, “planned economy”, “theft” and “taxation”. Schumpeter, Hayek, Rand and Friedman have eclipsed Keynes, Samuelson and Galbraith. The virtues of “capitalist creative destruction”, avoiding “the road to serfdom”, elevating economic results and values above all others and eliminating any national economic policy choices have captured the public imagination. The technocratic details of minimizing business cycles, managing a “mixed economy”, counterbalancing economic powers, balancing inflation and employment, managing the banking system, optimizing international trade and making real economic choices have become political “losers”.
Yet, the nation surely knows that “free market” economics is not the only solution. Real people are affected by our economic and social systems. We have a political system that is intended to manage these competing claims on society’s resources. Putnam describes this as the fundamental contrast between individual and group/community claims. American society has leaned to the individualist side historically but has often considered the community perspective as well. In the last 50 years it has leaned hard towards the individualist perspective alone.
This book shows what has happened. In 1964 with per capita GDP at $20,000, as a nation, we were able to invest in local, state and national institutions that ensured that all individuals in the bottom two-thirds could pursue upward mobility. Today at $60,000 real per capita income, we don’t have effective institutions or programs that support “our kids”. This is an economic, democratic and moral tragedy. I don’t think that politicians or citizens intended this result. I think that this is an unintended byproduct of the pendulum swing towards individual values alone.
US politics are very polarized. Left and Democrat are nearly synonymous. Right and Republican are nearly synonymous. Professor Fukuyama sees an even greater threat from the challenges of the “New Left” and the “Hard Right” to the core principles of the “classical liberal” political system of the United States.
The book is a defense of “classical liberalism”. Limited government power. Legal institutions protect individual rights.
Not US center-left political liberals or EU center-right political liberals.
Classical liberalism is under attack from right – nationalist, cultural, authoritarian and from the left – postmodern theory, inequality, identity politics, group rights.
Classical liberalism born of history, 1700-1800, rationalism, science of enlightenment, anti-conservative aristocracy, church, tradition, favored groups. Partial solution to the post-Reformation religious wars. Dominant world view 1945-1990 as communism and fascism lost war of ideas. But, also opposed by romantic movement 1800’s, nationalism late 1800’s, communism 1900, fundamentalist religion, etc.
Inherently a practical solution to a world with unavoidable diversity of opinion and interests: religious, ethnic, state, culture, race, gender, class, etc. Privileges individual over community. Privileges institutions (law, military) over individual political actors. Privileges pragmatism over theoretical cleanliness. Privileges conflict avoidance above utopian justice. Privileges incremental change to revolution. Privileges all individuals’ rights versus just the most valuable individuals’ rights.
In a more diverse, global world, “classical liberalism” remains a solid choice for organizing society. The burden for promoting change lies with the critics.
1. What Is Classical Liberalism?
A. Individualist. Claims and rights of individual get priority over claims of any group.
B. Egalitarian. All individuals have an equal legal and moral standing in society. This contrasts with systems and philosophies where groups are more important. Nations, monarchies, aristocracies, oligarchies, autocracies, religion, class, race, etc.
C.Universalist. Humanity as a species is first. Specific historical forms, institutions, groups, leaders, cultures, etc. are secondary.
D. Meliorist. Social and political institutions and arrangements are imperfect, subject to improvement or decay. Liberalism is inherently pragmatic, accepting that no system or policy will meet the needs or reflect the values of all citizens. Compromise and tolerance are required to govern a state with unreconcilable differences. Liberalism sought to end the “wars of religion” where opposing sides were certain they were right and willing to fight. Liberalism accepts the need for a “strong state” to militarily offset the powers of “strong men” or “strong groups”, echoing Thomas Hobbes.
Individuals have rights because they are human. These rights are more important than social, political, economic and cultural institutions. Freedom of speech, association, belief and politics. Right to own private property and transact by choice. The right to vote and influence political decisions were added through time. Starting with these principles, governments are freely formed by individuals (contract theory) in order to protect individuals and preserve these rights.
Critically, “liberalism” is based on ideas, rational philosophical ideas, rather than history, tradition or power, per se. It is not only based on ideas, but also on history and experience. The “rational” dimension of “liberalism” can cause proponents and defenders to take positions that are considered “extreme” by others.
Contrast “liberalism” with “democracy” which is “rule by the people”. Democracies provide voting rights to most citizens and limit the power of strong groups to restrict the vote of the people. Not all liberal states are democracies. Democracy has expanded greatly during the 20th century. “Liberalism” provides an infrastructure that supports democracies and buffers attacks on them.
The emphasis on individual rights in “liberalism” causes an emphasis on laws and the rule of law, independent of the exercise of direct political power. The history of powerful rulers disregarding any inconvenient “rights” made the early proponents and adopters of “liberalism” champions of this “checks and balances” approach to governance. Again, critics of “liberalism” point out that highlighting just legal rights can lead to unbalanced political systems and societies that downplay other values and interests.
“Liberalism” claims to be a moral system. It honors human dignity, autonomy and choice. Individual choice is supported in most areas of life, constrained only by legal and regulatory limits agreed upon by political representatives. This right to choose applies to all people.
Economic benefits stem from property rights, freedom to transaction, legal institutions and the “rule of law”. Individuals invest in potentially profitable opportunities because they are confident that they will be able to capture and maintain most of the benefits from successful ventures. Historically, this has delivered strong economic growth with positive spillover benefits. Some critics question the use of economic measures such as GDP and growth as proxies for society, but the “order of magnitude” growth levels under “liberal” economic systems clearly provide enough benefits to allow society to prosper and redistribute as desired. Liberals also tend to support “free trade” policies for the movement of goods, services, finances and people because these voluntary trades result in net added benefits to both sides.
“Liberalism” is strongly associated with the “enlightenment” and the “scientific revolution”, relying upon logic and evidence to make objective decisions. It is also linked with the “scientific method”, noting that the free marketplace of ideas is effective in evaluating competing claims and drawing conclusions, even if those conclusions are only formally probablistic, rather than certain.
Liberalism emphasizes tolerance and compromise as virtues in order to defuse strongly held differences of opinion. Hence, it is inherently in conflict with any religious or political view or system that believes that it holds the only “truth” and that this “truth” must be consistently reflected in political, regulatory, judicial and social decisions. This tolerance for differences aligns liberalism with ecumenical religious groups and “relativist” ethical philosophies. It also aligns liberalism with a more dovish foreign policy approach recognizing the “rights” of all states and the global community as valid. Because of its tolerance for diverse religious views, liberal secular states are sometimes seen as opposing religion or supporting atheist or agnostic religious positions.
Historically, liberal states have resorted to war to protect what they saw as essential national interests.
Liberal states focus on the philosophical principles that shape nation-states (freedoms, rights, liberties) rather than religious, ethnic or cultural dimensions (blood and soil).
Equal rights for all people was slow to develop in liberal states, even when the principles were enshrined in declarations, constitutions and bills of rights. On the other hand, the ideals of equality played a role in expanding equality through time.
Historically, the new “liberal” systems were supported by groups opposed to the existing, “conservative” powers: monarchy, state churches, aristicracy, landed gentry. Capitalists, property holders, traders, urbanites and professionals supported “liberal” systems which provided them with greater economic, political and social rights than the received systems. Through time, the more ancient powers lost influence and the new “middle class” accumulated power and influence in the “liberal” system.
“Liberals” celebrated the defeat of fascism and Nazism after WWII and the defeat of Soviet communism in 1990. Fukuyama’s 1992 book “The End of History and the Last Man” documented this achievement. The widespread adoption of basic liberal principles and “mixed capitalist” states was a clear economic success and no clear competitor remained in 1992.
Left- and right-wing political groups emphasize different parts of autonomy or free choice in the “liberal” state. Conservatives and neoliberals (Reagan, Thatcher, free marketers) emphasize free economic choices and a corresponding limit to government economic roles. Democrats, leftists and progressives emphasize personal social autonomy. Libertarians emphasize all freedoms and oppose large government roles of any kind.
2. From Liberalism to Neoliberalism
The post-WWII “good times” rolled for 3 decades, but the growth of government activities, slower economic growth, stagflation, international crises and growing political opposition to the “status quo” lead to a reaction against the general economic and political consensus that a “mixed economy” was “good enough”. Reagan and Thatcher won solid election victories with clear messages of “less government”.
This pro-business, anti-government philosophy became known as neoliberalism and was broadly adopted in many western countries, with left-leaning parties adapting with more pro-business policies and less government activism (Clinton).
Fukuyama points to inefficient, ineffective and overreaching government as drivers of this major change in political views. He notes that reduced regulations, outsourcing, divestiture and lower taxes did lead to more competitive industries and economies leading to increased growth and employment.
He also paints neoliberalism as an extreme view, discounting any role for government and unduly emphasizing just the economic dimension of public policy. He doesn’t see a close tie between “classical liberal” political states and neoliberal political philosophy and tactics. Like most “liberals” and economists, he sees various roles for the government in a modern state due to inherent “market failures”. Basic consumer and environmental regulations, military and public safety, anti-trust, financial market regulation, public goods (education, infrastructure), regulated natural monopolies, limits to inequality. He suggests that public policy should focus on the effectiveness of government services first and the share of government services second, without and demonization of government or lionizing of “free enterprise”. He notes that the share of government services provided is a political choice made within a “liberal” system that could be very low (20%) or very high (80%).
Fukuyama outlines the basic economic argument for “free trade” (opportunity to make both parties and societies better off) and notes that this is of little succor to those who lose from free trade (workers, businesses, localities), especially when policies and programs to help them recover are non-existent, underfunded or ineffective.
He observes that the political failures to ensure efficient governments, effective politics (vetocracy), limits to inequality, proper financial regulation and balanced trade have driven opposition to government, politicians and political parties on the left and the right from critics on the left and the right!
3. The Selfish Individual
The author sees neoliberalism and its libertarian cousin as distortions of “liberalism”, focusing solely on an extreme view of individual economic results alone.
Property rights matter, but no more than other rights of choice. Property rights are supported by government institutions, so the quality of government matters. The original distribution of property is an important factor which cannot be “assumed away”. There is no reason to prioritize financial rights or physical property rights over intangible property rights or other things which humans value. Economic efficiency and growth are valuable, but tradeoffs exist with other socially valuable goals: peace, security, opportunity, expression, speech, association, equality, fairness, solidarity, growth, etc.
Consumption is not the highest priority. Production matters, not supply-side economics, but human connection to producing. Pride of authorship.
Anti-trust regulation is required to offset monopoly power. Political action is needed to offset regulatory capture.
Libertarian approved theory of “spontaneous order” has little historical or theoretical support. Markets, common law and social Darwinism are not simply “facts”.
The state also has a role in international trade policy, industrial policy, R&D, defense, public goods airports, etc. Not either/or.
The economics discipline’s reliance on selfish utility maximizing agents is not supported by casual observation or behavioral economics. People use crutches to make decisions. They work from habit. They are OK with “good enough”. Individuals value social goods like friends, status, respect, pride, safety and power. They consider “fairness” and other principles. Choices are influenced by social norms.
People play various roles in groups. The simple rational model of principal-agent is inadequate to explain behavior. People follow leaders, norms and procedures. They discriminate based upon prejudices even when it is economically irrational. People belong to many groups which influence their behavior: nation, class, religion, family, neighborhood, profession, gender, gender preference, age, marital status, civic, artistic, political, social, athletics, etc. The materialist, determinist, rationalist, objective, calculating model of human behavior is clearly inadequate.
4. The Sovereign Self
The individual, good inner self evolves to become a self-worshipping god.
When the “liberal” model first evolved, a Christian (or at least deist) religious framework existed in most societies which provided a moral basis for politics and society. Freedom of choice was made within a largely fixed moral framework for most citizens. Through time, the individual grew relative to the community and individuals were then positioned to choose their own moral framework. This positioned individual autonomy to be the supreme virtue, above all others.
Autonomy evolved from individual choice to group choice and rights. This resulted in questions about the underlying basis of “liberalism”: individual versus group, universal human rights or differences, and the requirement of tolerance.
Martin Luther’s focus on “salvation by grace alone” focused on the individual, especially the internal individual’s thoughts in contrast with the mediation of salvation through the authority of the church and priests and the works of man. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s vision of uncivilized man as inherently good further focused attention on the individual, since it was possible to shape this blank slate which could be perfected, in contrast with the doctrine of “original sin”. Immanuel Kant used reason to define the limits of reason and to develop a rational basis for morality, essentially the golden rule, optionally expressed in the maxim that man should always be an “end”, but never just a “means”. Again, the individual was highlighted and separated from religion. In this context, the ability of each man to reason and make choices was elevated as a supreme virtue, potentially above morality itself.
Fukuyama indicates that the basis for extreme individualism was available from the start, but only in the 20th century, after two world wars, Darwin, Freud, Marx and Hitler, was this variety able to blossom. He stresses the growth of the self-help movement as a key accompaniment to the philosophical, political and academic evolution. Therapists replaced priests and ministers as the guides for personal growth.
The author focuses on the philosophy of John Rawls in his 1971 “Theory of Justice”. Rawls provides a theoretical framework of choosing society’s rules in a “veil of ignorance”, where each individual does not know what his or her abilities, talents, wealth and opportunities will be. Rawls argues that a “rational man” in this situation would set rules that would protect him from the worst-case circumstances, even if that required transfers of resources and limits to opportunity and overall output. This matches the rational “mini-max” principle developed in post-WWII game theory. This provided American political liberals with a justification for their preference to reduce inequalities of income and wealth through government redistribution.
Fukuyama argues that Rawls goes “too far” in removing any moral basis from society. This “moral” choice is made almost mechanically on the basis of thought alone. The political influence of real individuals is ignored. “Justice” is defined without reference to “the good”. Rawls says that the human subject is separate from his attributes (wealth, status, character, genes) which are assigned arbitrarily. Hence, all property belongs to the state and can be redistributed as required.
Robert Nozick’s 1975 book “Anarchy, State and Utopia” challenges this view, arguing that individual rights cannot so easily be acquired by the state based upon a philosopher’s story. Resurgent libertarians argue that the individual owns all property before the state has any rights. Philosophers since that time have been busy contrasting the “individualist” and “communitarian” views of ethics ever since. Even left-leaning philosophers like Michael Sandel criticize this “thin moral world” of choices without communities, traditions or other moral values. Fukuyama says that this most modern view of ethics compared with historical ethics is parallel to the evolution of liberalism to neoliberalism. A valid principle has been elevated to an absolute standing and lost its rationale and practical effectiveness.
Fukuyama claims that Rawls’ provides a philosophical basis for moral choice that is solely individual, independent of society. He notes that many commentators on “liberal” political systems see a requirement for some level of shared moral belief, including tolerance and public-spiritedness. The growth of the self-help movement, personal growth and self-actualization in the postwar era provided practical experience of the self, detached from religious and social norms. Rawls’ philosophy said that is “fine”. Existentialist philosophy evolved into postmodernism and complemented Rawls’ political and ethical philosophy. Fukuyama argues that these views undercut the social basis required for a liberal political system and that individuals lured into believing that total personal autonomy is possible will be dismayed when they learn this is not so and thereby reject historical individual based political views and pursue group-based views (next chapter).
5. Liberalism Turns on Itself
In the next two chapters the author outlines how modern “new left” thinkers have created a political theory that is quite opposed to “classical liberalism”, especially as outlined by John Rawls. “Critical theories” and postmodern philosophy reject any strong individualistic philosophy that does not give strong weight to groups, communities and society. Ironically, in this debate, classic conservatives and “new left” progressives are aligned, raising up the group as a critical basis for ethics, morality and a just political state.
Fukuyama focuses on the nature of the individual self in Rawls’ philosophy compared with that of others who propose “critical theories”. While most citizens don’t really want to dig this deep, Fukuyama and other philosophically minded academics, critics and political leaders consider this essential. In the Rawls model, and in other “classic liberal” models, the focus is on the rational individual facing a world of choices. From this existential situation, the need and desire for certain rights and freedoms to support these choices by the “choosing being” are developed and a consistent political and ethical model is developed. As with the ultra-skeptical Rene Descartes, the mathematical Newton and the medieval philosopher of science Occam, “less is presumed to be more” in “classical liberal” philosophies. If a few assumptions and observations about individuals are sufficient to create a robust and effective model, why make reference to groups or specific moral goods, especially after many philosophers wrestled with the distinction between facts and values, is and ought, descriptive and evaluative claims and concluded that these two groups of ideas simply don’t exist in ways that they can be combined and evaluated. In practical politics, liberals of all stripes are ready to insert and advocate for their “progressive” values, including the importance of groups and specific moral values. But this is missing from the philosophical model.
Philosophers have long seen individual identity as a crucial aspect of being a person, especially as a choice making agent. Without self-awareness and a personal identity, how can one make choices? For “liberals” the choosing agent makes choices which build that identity, preferences and moral framework to guide choices. Per Rousseau, the individual starts with a “blank slate” and constructs this identity. The individual is first; the environment, including family, groups and society is secondary.
For “critical theorists”, some group characteristics that are imposed upon the individual (race, ethnicity, gender, gender preference, culture) are much more fundamental. The individual may begin with a “blank slate”, but society forces its perceptions and values regarding these group characteristics upon the individual no matter how hard he or she may try to choose for him- or herself. The critical role of society, the group, the system, the power structure is unavoidable.
To the common man, even a very interested “John Q Public”, this seems to be “much ado about nothing”, senseless quarreling over “nature versus nurture” or “which came first, the chicken or the egg?”. But for philosophers, academics, theorists and advocates, getting to the “root cause” is precisely the most important topic.
“Identity politics” is aligned with the view that an individual’s identity based on these key groups is essential. Those with power in any society use that power to create ideologies, structures and norms that define these group identities in ways that benefit the elites of that society. Hence, individuals in the non-preferred categories are unwittingly deprived of their rightful power and marginalized. Individuals shaped and governed by society’s messages, institutions, laws, thoughts and actions must be re-educated to understand the “real” situation and combat their exploitation. This sounds very much like the Marxist view of western society before communism was discredited by the real-world actions and results of the Soviet Union. The marginalized groups replace the marginalized workers, both needing to be enlightened by the few who have “true insight”.
From the 1960’s “New Left” forward, proponents of “critical theories” and “identity politics” have rejected “classic liberalism” as being an ideology of the powerful classes designed to maintain power and exploit the “masses”. The progressive left rejects individualism alone as a valid basis for any meaningful political philosophy. It observes little progress on reducing inequality or helping individuals to develop their true identities free from socially imposed masks. Unconstrained capitalism is linked to “classical liberalism” and found guilty of supporting the elites and oppressing the marginalized groups. The divide between the center-left and far-left is very deep.
In 1964 Herbert Marcuse outlined the basics of this transition from Marxist to “new left” political thought in “One Dimensional Man”. So-called liberal democracies did not promote equality or autonomy. The elites captured the corporations and legislatures and controlled society to maintain political, economic and social control by the elites. Charles Reich’s 1971 The Greening of America provided a more digestible best-seller with a similar message. “Free speech” was deemed a tool of the powerful and questioned. The “working class” was determined to be coopted in a consumer society where Vance Packard’s “hidden persuaders” forced them to consume ever more, work ever more and envy others. Individuals didn’t really choose; they only had the illusion of choice.
The New Left questioned the individualistic “contract theory” underlying “classic liberalism’s” political model, highlighting examples of slavery, worker and marriage contracts that were clearly imposed rather than negotiated. They argued that the exploitation of society by capitalists, dominance of neoliberal ideology and capture of regulatory agencies were inevitable. They outlined the long history of colonialism, imperialism, destruction of natives and presumption of a superior “western civilization” as evidence that the powerful groups would always do whatever is required to maintain control. They documented the ways in which political “checks and balances” provided the ruling elites with additional levers of power. They concluded that “classical liberalism” was intellectually and historically bankrupt.
Fukuyama presents some counterevidence to oppose these claims. Liberalism does not exclude groups, morals, society or other values. Real-world liberal political systems incorporate these values. An extreme form of liberal philosophy (Rawls) is just a straw-man, not representative of how actual liberal political systems work. Liberal states have made social progress through time, voluntarily investing more individuals and groups with greater rights. Economic progress is obvious. Liberal states invest heavily in social welfare programs. Liberal political states make it possible for progressives, liberals, conservatives and hard right groups to all have voice and political influence. International trade and economic growth make possible individual choices, health, art, safety, security and self-actualization. The individual focus of the liberal state frees individuals from the constraints of traditional family, kin and religious bonds. Meritocracy is consistent with a wide range of human development and actualization ideals. Migration continues to flow from states with limited individual rights to those with liberal rights, the rule of law and economic advantages. Liberal states support multicultural societies. The worst “sins” of “western civilization” and liberal states, including colonialism, are receding into history. Eastern European, East Asian and other states have successfully adopted the liberal state model. “Checks and balances” result in sustainable political changes and prevent authoritarian rule.
6. The Critique of Rationality
“Classical liberalism” is also closely associated with a rational approach to determining truth. Historically, logically and currently it uses and supports the “scientific method”. An objective reality exists and can be discovered by observation. Theories begin with self-evident assumptions and are fleshed out using logic. Theories are evaluated by the testing of predictions. Theories build credence as they develop more testable hypotheses which are validated or not invalidated. Humans can understand this objective reality and use science and technology to control nature. Scientists keep facts and values separated. Scientific conclusions (theories) are inherently probabilistic, but relative confidence can be determined and agreed upon. Techniques to verify propositions are agreed upon by professional scientists. Evidence is more highly regarded than individual assertions. Testing is defined so that it can be repeated and verified. Progress accumulates, although changes in scientific theories do occur. Science, like the courts, journalism and the military, is led by professionals who are largely independent of political power.
“Critical theory” proponents treat science and rational discourse as another social institution subject to control by the powerful elite.
In 1882 Friedrich Nietzche proclaimed “God is dead”. The decline in religious belief and influence in western Europe, especially in elite circles, allowed this to be stated and analyzed. Nietzche was saying that society had substitutes for the concept of God as a way to explain the world and manage suffering, so God was no longer necessary. He saw that Christian morality underpinned western society and politics and that the loss of this framework was a radical and threatening change. In such a world without shared morality, the only virtue or value was power. Nietzche outlined the contrasting lives of those living by the Christian “slave morality” and those of a noble superman who sees himself as the measure of all things. He concluded that “there are no facts, only interpretations”. Nietzsche did not convince many of his views then or now, but he opened the door to considering such different viewpoints. No morality. Only power. No objectivity.
Nietzche was a precursor to the philosophical approaches that lead to postmodernism. Nietzsche’s professional training was in philology, the study of a language’s grammar, history and literary tradition. His contemporary, Ferdinand Saussure, was a pioneer in the development of linguistics as the science of language. He separated words from a direct link to reality. For him, the human process of speaking is dynamic and the meaning of words are shaped by the speaker, disrupting the naive view that words simply signify things. The act of speaking also shapes the worldview of the speaker, making language a subjective entity.
Saussare’s subjective approach to language and meaning lead a series of French intellectuals including Jacques Derrida in the 1960’s and 1970’s to develop an extension of this view. The claimed that the external world is actually created by the words that we use to describe it. Other philosophers had considered what was “really real” previously and some had proposed that reality is really a subjective creation of the mind rather than an objective, material fact but this approach had limited impact outside of philosophy. As philosophers focused on language as a primary topic during the twentieth century, this idea became more attractive and, in some sense, “plausible”. The next step was to link language back to the power structures which determine language. Now, we have the power structure determining language which determines thought which creates reality. With this “structure”, a critic could “deconstruct” the underlying meaning of any important writings and show how the power structure guided the writer to reinforce the beliefs and interests of the power structure. Many doctoral dissertations could be written to show that all of “the western canon” was comprised of individuals unwittingly working for the power structure.
Michel Foucault expanded from this criticism of the true meaning of written language to a broader attack on all modes of thinking done within the framework of language guided by the “powers that be”. A subject like cross-cultural studies was inherently defective due to assumptions shared by the ruling western culture. The liberal idea that all individuals share an underlying moral core was rejected by Foucalt and the postmodernists. Instead, the shared lived experience of group identity is considered most important and differs from person to person. A privileged white American male simply cannot understand the experience of a marginalized non-white non-American female. The group experience is most important. The combination of various dimensions results in the concept of intersectionality which defines the most relevant group in even finer terms. By denying the ruling group member’s ability to understand the experience of the minority group member, this approach undercuts any authority of the ruling group member.
Fukuyama says that some of these insights about the role of language, subjectivity, tools of power, self-deception, alignment of interests, hidden biases, unconscious prejudices, etc. are valid in some historical situations. However, he does not agree with the philosophical or political conclusions that have been drawn. He notes that the deconstructionists and postmodernists have written in ways to make their theories difficult to describe or evaluate. He asserts that the extremely broad use of power as the driver of all activity is inherently flawed, asking if Foucalt’s analysis is also driven by the power structure. He notes that this framework can be used effectively for political purposes, to fence off criticism from others with differing views and to force others to consider societal or systematic components of social challenges instead of focusing on individual moral choices.
The author concludes the chapter by noting that modern identity politics can be a tactic used to help left-leaning partisans increase the sharing of equal rights, opportunities and outcomes for all members of less-privileged groups within the framework of the liberal state model. Or identity politics can be a threat to the liberal model, denying universal modes of comprehension and experiencing reality and promoting groups as the primary political actors. He notes that the hard right often takes this same point of view, denying the authority of science or elites, creating its own language, denying free speech, challenging facts and elevating racial and national groups above the rule of law and universal rights of individuals.
8. Are There Alternatives?
The author summarizes some of the major criticisms of liberal states from the right and the left. He acknowledges that liberal states are imperfect at delivering these desired outcomes, even when they might be broadly accepted by the citizenry. He does not really address the true strength of this criticism. He has three responses. Better results could be delivered within the existing system through more effective political strategies and improved rules. The far left and far right usually don’t offer structural solutions that are better conceptually or practically. The solutions that are offered are typically offensive to the liberal state’s individual protecting principles and a majority of the citizens’ political opinions.
Social conservatives say that the liberal state offers no moral core beyond a soft nationalism, universal human rights, rationality, tolerance, respect for the rule of law, deliberation and compromise. The state “allows” morality and allegiance to groups but does not promote them. Hence, society has weak communities, low trust, diluted morality, limited responsibility and the absence of any overarching purpose. The bureaucratic state tends to overreach, prioritizing secular over religious views and empowering judicial and administrative actors to intrude on individuals. Unchecked market capitalism undermines family, community and tradition. The emphasis on individual rights undermines the efforts of groups to maintain ethnic, religious or other group cohesiveness.
Progressives focus on the lack of progress on addressing equal rights, opportunities and results for the broad population, but especially marginalized groups.
10. Principles for a Liberal Society
A. The quality of government matters, as does trust and support.
B. Inequality of opportunity, rights and outcomes matters.
C. Federalism is an important tool for controversial, non-critical issues.
D. Freedom of speech is a core value that supports other freedoms.
E. Privacy is a core right requiring protection.
F. The scientific method and rational problem solving matter.
G. Individual rights are fundamental. Group rights are problematic.
H. Human autonomy/independent choice is not a trump card. Groups, ethics, morality, nation matter too.
I. The liberal state rests upon the commitment and participation of its citizens.
Florida governor and presidential aspirant Ron DeSantis decided that my alma mater, 700 student New College in Sarasota, Florida needs a makeover. He appointed 6 new trustees and expressed his desire for the publicly funded liberal arts college to be overhauled to better provide for the public good and to eliminate “woke” policies, practices and culture.
New College was founded in 1964 as an alternative private college with an innovative program of study emphasizing personal responsibility for learning using all available resources without the usual bureaucratic constraints. Private New College was folded into the University of South Florida in 1975 and eventually set up as New College of Florida, branded as “the honors college” of the Florida state university system. New College’s very low student faculty ratio (7-1 to 10-1) has made it an inherently costly investment. In 2021 Florida politicians introduced bills to fold it into some other state university. A new president was hired in 2021 to help the small college re-evaluate its academic, financial and political strategies in order to re-establish its long-term viability.
The college has continued to attract very high potential students, its graduates have a truly enviable record of graduate and professional study and fellowships, but its 5-year graduation rate is low versus comparable schools and its graduates disproportionately pursue academic, not-for-profit, small business and other non-traditional career paths so that the average measured financial success of graduates is not competitive with schools which produce students who pursue more conventional professional careers.
I hope that the 6 new trustees will invest some time to analyze the “current state” before seeking to overhaul, makeover or revolutionize the curriculum, culture, faculty and leadership. I believe that there is a large overlap between what really matters at New College historically and today and what conservative leaning Florida politicians, citizens and voters value.
The Individual Matters
New College curriculum and culture emphasize the central role of the individual in making life choices.
Personal responsibility for the student’s program of study is at the heart of the curriculum.
Freedom of thought is honored. Left, Right or Center. Various shades of left.
Humility. Great thinkers among classmates, professors and writers. Chances are good that your views are not “simply the best”. In a post-Freudian world we only “know” so much. Many have a “piece of the truth”. Pride is risky.
Authenticity. Consistency. Self-awareness. Embracing feedback and interaction.
Ideals Matter
Ideals matter. The unexamined life is not worth living. Politics, community, philosophy, religion and spirituality matter. Dead serious. It’s important to proactively explore options and make choices. Evaluate choices versus experience, data and new frameworks, paradigms and world views. Individuals are responsible for developing personal philosophies.
Growth and Learning Matter
College provides an opportunity for tremendous learning in many dimensions. So much to learn. Consider all possibilities. Personal quest. No limits to growth. The journey matters. There is no end to growth and learning, so develop those skills. “Still there’s more”. Embrace feedback and interaction, even when it hurts.
Community Matters
Community of learners and seekers of knowledge, wisdom, truth, beauty and meaning. Small scale community where “everybody knows your name”. Forced to interact and be authentic. Academic discipline and profession matter. Generation matters. Groups matter. Politics matters. Service matters.
Character Matters
Classical philosophy focused on “living a good life”. Authenticity. Humility. Respect for others. Openness. Personal responsibility. Tolerance/acceptance of differences. Dead serious. Excellence. Merit.
Competency Matters
Demonstrated learning. The Western Canon. Mastery. Results. Achievement. Research. Critical thinking. Written expression. Debate. Progress. Examination.
Creativity Matters
“Both/and” perspective. Multiple intelligences. Multiple perspectives. Interdisciplinary views. Paradigms. Two cultures. Theory and practice. Local and global.
Founded in 1964
The post-war economic expansion was followed by a culturally conservative 1950’s and then concerns about the role of the individual in a world where big business and big government dominated. World War I and World War II shattered simplistic modern expectations of “progress”. Romanticism and utopian socialism were in decline. Cultural critics worried about the sameness of suburbia, the organization man, the man in the grey flannel suit and “the lonely crowd”. Existentialist philosophy was very influential at the time. I think that New College’s curriculum and culture were shaped by this founding period. Existentialism focused on the individual in a different way than Ayn Rand, but clearly on the individual. The key insight was that “in spite of” the challenges provided by modern knowledge and society, an individual could move forward (maybe).
The relation between the individual and various communities was a clear focus. The contrast between existential “existence” and the historical emphasis on “essence” by philosophers and religions alike was unavoidable. The “solution” was to study, learn and grow, while accepting that final, deterministic answers were very unlikely. The best a person could do was to work through life considering the conflicting viewpoints and holding on to whatever he or she thought was best. This is a fundamentally “liberal” view, even if many/most of the implications greatly support historical conservative views that aim to preserve individual character and institutions.
Unavoidable Conflicts Between New College and Modern Conservatism (The Rub)
Rejection of civil and religious authorities. Belief that the individual must choose (and live with the consequences).
Inherently a “relativistic” perspective. There are many ways to frame situations, decisions, politics, religion, etc. No one view, perspective or paradigm is clearly correct. Individuals may embrace fixed perspectives but should accept that others might make different choices.
The classic western canon of received literature and science continues to evolve. There is value in having “everyone” share in the study of “the classics” but diverse perspectives also have an important role to play.
Individuals belong to many “communities of limited liability”. The nation or church does not automatically take dominant priority.
The global community and priorities may be as important as the national and commercial perspectives.
No one deterministic religious perspective is fully adequate.
Individual “rights” compete with the community’s rights and interests.
There is an intolerance of “intolerance” by left-leaning institutions like New College and its students, faculty and leadership.
Summary
New College was founded in the early 1960’s within a culture that raised up the individual in contrast to the conformist social norms of the state, community and businesses. Yet, it was a child of the US which embraced individualism even as it promoted patriotism. The New College curriculum and culture which I experienced in the 1970’s and which largely continues today supports this individual centered model of learning and personal growth. Most of the curriculum and culture is compatible with classic conservative views. Some of the beliefs are incompatible with more fundamentalist conservative views. New College has recently become a pawn in the national “culture wars”. I hope that the trustees will see the very positive role which New College can play in helping a small share of students to wrestle with the difficult questions posed today and contribute mightily to society.
2018 and 2022 elections showed widespread increased voter participation. Increases were seen by all races, genders, income, ages, states and education levels. Increased voting by the youngest age group and Hispanic Americans were most notable.
The 2020 and 2022 elections both relied heavily upon mail-in and early voting options. Early voting participation, especially in competitive states, was equal to or ahead of 2018. Hence, election day participation in 2022 was somewhat lower than in the record year.
Voter Registration is as Important as Participation
Voter registration in the states with party-preference records increased from 108 million in 2017 to 117 million in 2021 and then a little to 120 million in 2022. Registrations have increased a little faster than voting age population, but have not made a material difference.
The Democratic party share has declined significantly in the last 2 decades, replaced by “independent” voters. The Republican party share has declined by just 3%.
Good data on the impact of various voting law changes is not yet available. Anecdotal media reporting of the 2022 election did not indicate extremely large changes in voter behavior.
US Registration and Net Participation is Low versus other Advanced Economies
Voting participation in the US varies significantly by gender, race, age, state, income and education level. It recovered to some degree in 2018-22 following a 40-year low period. Voter registration has increased by a small amount in the last 10 years, but increased participation among registered voters has been the driver of overall results. The availability of mail-in and expanded early voting clearly boosted turn-out in 2020 and 2022. The impact of additional voting restrictions is unclear, but obviously intended to reduce turnout. Polarized politics in the US has increasing voter turnout, but only by 10-15% versus recent history. Presidential years boost turnout by 15%. State by state participation in election years ranges from 58% to 76% (excluding a few extremes), based on habits, demography and state laws. Presidential elections could have 10% higher participation if all states followed the examples of the high participation states.
Government has an increased impact on all citizens. Democracy requires participation to make the decisions and programs of governments (at all levels) legitimate. The US can do better.
Claims of election fraud have a long history in the US. They exist for 3 reasons. Losers hate to lose. Fraud claims support efforts to restrict voting by opponents. Fraud claims undermine the legitimacy of US democratic processes (Russia).
TRUTH
Historically, without “checks and balances” or other controls, political parties and machines had taken advantage to ensure that they won. We’re mostly talking about 1820-1900. Even in the 20th century, there were states and cities where one party had control and could “deliver” votes at the city, state or national level. This kind of fraud largely ended by the 1960’s based on journalists, lawyers, political opponents and activists overturning this corruption of democracy. Then and now, the numbers of fraudulent votes were very small as a percentage of the votes cast, less than 1%. Fraudulent votes are effective in a democracy only when their small share can tip the election. Most claims of voter fraud are based on a misunderstanding of voting, statistics or logic.
History
In 2007, before the partisan push for photo-ID’s and Trump’s 2016 and 2020 pre-emptive and post-emptive claims of fraud, the Brennan Institute consolidated the research and concluded that voter fraud was statistically irrelevant, 1 in 10,000 or 1 in 1,000 at the most.
We are blessed with an incredibly low level of election fraud in the US for the last 50 years. With a simple two-party system, partisans from both sides have ensured that fraudulent voting is difficult to do, highly punished if discovered and easy to discover (and therefor highly disincentivized). US voting is largely managed at the lowest levels: counties, cities, precincts, where citizens know their neighbors. It is effective because enough Americans of various political beliefs today believe in this process and volunteer their time to make it effective.
Analysis
Republicans generally take a negative view of human nature, expecting individuals to actively pursue their self-interest. Hence, they expect that Democrats, with influence over the election process in some venues, will take steps to optimize their results. In an earlier age this was partially true. But, in the modern world (post 1920’s), several factors work against this direct pursuit of self-interest. The country’s laws make voting fraud a felony with significant penalties. Local election officials are elected. In a two-party system it is relatively easy to engage both parties to monitor the election process. The US has very many lawyers ready to assist their preferred party. Election results are public. Statistically improbable results are very easy to identify today. Each precinct has a historical preference which is unlikely to change materially in any single election, so any fraudulent voting is easily identified.
Good News 