0. What Didn’t Happen

Was Trump’s 2016 victory extraordinary? Hillary Clinton, Democrats, never-Trumpers and most journalists and analysts said “of course”. Many competing explanations were offered. Political data analyst Larry Bartels disagrees. Comparing the results of the 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016 campaigns, Trump’s percentage vote results are normal for a Republican presidential candidate when disaggregated by gender, race, religion, popular vote and historical Republican voter percentage support. Even though 61% of exit poll respondents said Trump was unqualified to be president and “principled” conservatives and his primary opponents painted him in the most unfavorable light initially, Trump was able to attract the normal Republican share of voters, mostly from the usual demographic groups.

Non college graduate white voters moved to Trump in significant numbers in 2016, especially in swing states, delivering his narrow electoral college win but other voter slices remained “normal”. Given Trump’s many headwinds, the more important question is “how was he even competitive”? Klein’s answer is that American politics, especially at the national level, is highly polarized based upon a binary split of political identities. Voters on both sides voted for their traditional “home team”, their political party, in spite of the wrinkles provided by Trump’s extraordinary campaign, voting against “the other guy” even more than “for” their heroes.

Klein claims that our political system, not the individual participants, no matter how interesting to follow, has evolved to become a self-reinforcing system that builds ever more polarization. He notes that most political issues have been studied by well-meaning academics, advocates and politicians resulting in compromise proposals that could address the basic challenge while meeting some of the desires of the political parties and not triggering rejection from the majority of either party. But when such proposals are made from either team or from blue ribbon panels, the political logic then focuses on the differences and makes real-world political adoption impossible. When “push comes to shove”, politicians decide that they are personally better positioned to fight “the other guys” than to be part of a compromise solution, aka a “defeat”.

The term “identity politics” has been used by Republicans to criticize and undermine parts of the Democratic coalition: blacks, Hispanics, Asians, women, LGBTQ, etc. However, the term is essential because almost all politics is “identity politics”. Individuals support parties, proposals and candidates that match one of their various identities, whether demographic, geographic or based on values. Politics is about defining brands that can be assembled in a coalition to drive political wins by parties, candidates and interest groups. Everyone has personal and political identities and winning political actors cater to them. Klein asserts that today we are more focused on political identities than on specific policies or issues. Further, he notes that our many identities increasingly overlap with the political identity of Red versus Blue, right versus left, conservative versus liberal, Republican versus Democrat. Partisan identities have merged with racial, religious, geographic, ideological and cultural identities. This simplification and streamlining have led political actors to be laser focused on this single dimension helping to further grow its dominant “share of mind”.

1. How Democrats Became Liberals and Republicans Became Conservatives

In 1950 a committee of the American Political Science Association concluded that the two parties were too similar and were doing voters a disservice by not providing them with clearly different choices. Political parties exist in representative democracies to give voters shortcuts. Voters can’t or don’t wish to become familiar with hundreds of policy choices, so they delegate this mission to representatives and political parties. Voters choose to support parties and candidates that roughly align with their values and preferences, especially on the few largest issues or general positions. The problem in 1950 was that the Democratic Party combined moderate to liberal to populist northerners with southerners of various views united by the preservation of their state racial policies. This was a “marriage of convenience” that provided the Democrats with national power and southern Democrats with state control at home. The liberal versus conservative scale had great overlaps in the two parties with many liberal Republicans far to the left of conservative Democrats. Many practicing politicians saw no problem with this system, noting that it helped to unify the country.

In 1959 a Republican Party committee decided that building its platform based mainly on ideological values was unwise. Barry Goldwater’s promise to offer “a choice, not an echo” in 1964 was diametrically opposed to this viewpoint. Goldwater and the Republican Party across the country lost badly in 1964 trying out this new approach. Most politicians doubled down on “moderation” after this result which was later reinforced by George McGovern’s similar loss in 1972. In the 1976 election 30% of Americans saw “no” ideological difference between the parties and only 54% agreed that the Republican Party was more conservative.

Ticket splitting between state and presidential candidates was commonplace into the 1970’s but had nearly disappeared by 2018. Using a “feeling thermometer” with a 1-100 degree scale, voters’ views of their own party cooled between 1980 and 2016 from 72 to 65 degrees, in line with more negative polling results about all kinds of institutions. Yet feelings for the “other” party plummeted from 45 degrees to a very chilly 29 degrees. Negative partisanship changed dramatically during this period. Other research showed that independents in 2000-4 were more consistent in supporting their favored party than were “strong partisans” in 1972-76. Self-described “independents” had grown from 20% to 37% of the electorate, but they were more politically consistent than self-proclaimed party stalwarts of the earlier era. Researchers say that independents vote against one of the parties consistently even though they do not align with the other party. We like “our” party less, but we dislike the “other” party much more.

The US has a long history of claiming that we prefer moderates, centrists and independents, going all the way back to George Washington. We dislike parties, factions and partisans because they highlight “conflict”. Historically, we prefer to be seen as “independent”, individualistic, thoughtful, reasoned, flexible, etc. We don’t want to be seen as inflexible or extremist, unwilling to compromise. But as the parties have become more clearly and reliably conservative versus liberal, they have crafted their messages and attracted candidates to match and we, the citizens, have moved along becoming more partisan and less apologetic about it. Survey questions on race, immigration, poverty programs and other issues show growing gaps between the opinions of Republicans and Democrats with the average gap growing from 15 points in 1994 (Clinton era) to 36 points recently. Voters better align with party positions today. Positions between the two parties are further apart. Party supporters increasingly see the “other” party as not just disagreeing, but disagreeable, a growing threat to many policies and values the hold dearly.

Klein provides examples on taxes, international trade, health care and abortion to show that presidents and parties in the 1970’s to 1990’s were still able to embrace compromise solutions on high visibility issues. We all know that has been impossible for the last 25 years. The parties have clarified and aligned their positions on a left to right scale and moved further apart. In this simpler world, voters find it easier to match their views with one party. As voters focus on this single, clear identity and reinforce it for years they find it nearly impossible to break with their self-identity and vote for the “other” party. In 2016, 45% of Republicans and 41% of Democrats saw their opponents as “a threat to the nation’s well-being”.

Challenge: Klein’s overall framework and evidence are compelling for me. However, in many places he seems to overstate his case. This makes the prospects of reform or change difficult to even imagine. In this case, keep in mind that the country is roughly split into thirds between the red, blue and purple. 45% of one-third is 15%. 41% of one-third is 13%. In the hotly contested 2016 election 28% of the population was really concerned about the “other side”. That is a big number, a true weakness in our democracy, but it is a minority position. These positions may be weakly held and subject to “cooling off” with different candidates, issues and party platforms in the future.

2. The Dixiecrat Dilemma

Southern Democrats were termed Dixiecrats in the post WW II era. The 11 states of the Confederacy had founded stable one-party authoritarian states in the 1890’s and maintained them for the next 70 years in alliance with the national Democratic party. Robert Mickey is quoted as saying “these rulers curtailed electorates, harassed and repressed opposition parties, and created and regulated racially separate – and significantly unfree – civic spheres. State-sponsored violence enforced these elements in a system that ensured cheap agricultural labor and white supremacy”. As with other one-party authoritarian regimes, staying in power was always the primary objective. Democrats held 90% of elected offices and less than 10% of Blacks were registered to vote.

The Dixiecrats’ regional domination translated into national power within the Democratic party. In the first third of the twentieth century, they comprised two-thirds of the house caucus. They maintained at least 40% of the caucus seats for the next two decades. Based on the seniority system and lack of candidate turnover, southern Democrats ran almost all committees of congress, holding veto power over all legislation at both the committee and party levels. Modern readers are often surprised to see the anti-civil rights positions, or lack of action taken by FDR, Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy, but practical politics played a critical role at that time.

The 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed with the support of 80% of House Republicans and 60% of House Democrats. President Johnson led the arm-twisting, breaking the Dixiecrat-Democrat link forever. Republican presidential nominee Goldwater voted against the bill. Suddenly the Republican party’s small government and state’s rights position became more appealing to southern politicians that were in no hurry to overhaul their local societies.

A little detour. Polarization is not extremism, but it is sorting. Polarization occurs when almost everyone choses one of two options with nearly no one left undecided or in the middle. 50/0/50 for example. 45/10/45 for example. Many political scientists would say 40/20/40 isn’t polarized, just sorted. Klein views “extremism” as how far towards the extreme end of the political spectrum a party’s choice is on an issue. The two parties can completely disagree, but one or both can hold relatively moderate positions when gauged against history or experience in other nations. He also criticizes the idea of a “moderate majority” because most individuals with “moderate” politics scores actually have a combination of left and right views on particular issues, with some being very extreme. He calls this group of people “internally unsorted”. The author is trying to distinguish between polarization and extremism. We clearly have polarization today: less ideological overlap, fewer people in the middle and more tension at the poles. Party positions are not automatically more “extreme” than they were historically.

Challenge: It appears that Republicans after Newt Gingrich have chosen to take extreme, yes/no positions on taxes, budgets, fiscal policy, guns, education, abortion, etc. in order to align voters with the “conservative” axis, to change the terms of debate with Democrats and to improve the effectiveness of their messaging. This appears to have been a very successful strategy.

Between 1955 and 2015, the Republican Party increased its share of non-White voters from 2% to 10%. The Democrats increased their share from 6% to 43%. The electorate became more racially diverse overall, with Democrats capturing nearly all of the change.

In 2014 evangelical Protestants were the largest religious group in the Republican Party while “nones” were the largest in the Democratic Party.

Geographical patterns are becoming more fixed and divided by party. County level results between McGovern in 1972 and Carter in 1976 were largely uncorrelated. Landslide counties with 60% or higher presidential support increased from 39% in 1992 to 61% in 2016. The urban/rural divide is greater and more consistent today. Bill Clinton carried 1,500 of 3,100 US counties in 1992, Al Gore won 700 in 2000 and Hillary Clinton won fewer than 500 counties in 2016, nearly all urban.

A 2017 poll revealed that 65% of Republicans prefer to live in large homes, farther apart, away from schools and shopping versus 61% of Democrats who prefer the complement of smaller houses within walking distance of schools and shopping.

Each of these changes means that political identities are becoming more important as they overlap with other identities and reinforce the political identities. Living with more people with a shared political identity does the same thing.

Klein proposes that a single personality trait sometimes underlies the main differences between liberals and conservatives. One scholar focuses on “openness – a general dimension of personality tapping tolerance for threat and uncertainty in one’s environment”. Another pair say to focus on “your perception of how dangerous the world is. Fear is perhaps our most primal instinct”. A third pair highlight “fluid” versus “fixed” approaches to managing threats and dangers. Liberals hold a basic optimism because they are open to experience while conservatives are closed to such risks, favoring conscientiousness, order and tradition that buffer change. People high in “openness” experiment with food, travel, options and politics. More “conscientious” people are more organized, faithful and loyal. Hence corporate store planners drop Whole Foods stores into Democratic locations and Cracker Barrels into Republican locations.

Challenge: the “entrepreneurial” wing of the Republican Party might disagree. A single conservative versus liberal axis combines a variety of views on economics, religion, race, class, opportunity, justice, fairness, immigration, freedom, international politics and economics which may not be perfectly compatible.

The author is not saying that personality strictly determines political views, but that this general difference in world views is correlated with political positions, so it is likely that personality drives politics at least as much as rational arguments. Liberal political views supporting changes, difference and diversity “fit” with a predisposition to “openness”. Political conservatives naturally overlap with preferences for predictable life in a smaller town, near family, based in faith, frequenting familiar stores.

Other research shows that the alignment between these measures of “openness” and “fluidity” are effective predictors of political views of those who are highly engaged in politics. Individuals work hard to achieve internal consistency. They manage their self-identity. Less politically engaged individuals don’t feel the need to align their votes with themselves. They tend to vote on a more transactional basis, looking for policies that might deliver personal benefits. “When we participate in politics to solve a problem, we’re participating transactionally. But when we participate in politics to express who we are, that’s a signal that politics has become an identity. And that’s when our relationship to politics, and to each other, changes”.

3. Your Brain on Groups

Research demonstrates that “discrimination” is a universal phenomenon. The targets and intensity vary by time and culture. The mental steps and rationalizations are the same everywhere. We have a deep mental capability to classify groups as “we” and “they”. We discriminate against “the other” even if there is no real basis or advantage. This conflicts with the “rational” view that posits that we perceive slights or threats from others and therefore work against them. Experiments showed that it took almost no time or effort to get individuals to adopt a group identity and then to discriminate between their group and another group even when there was no advantage to the home group or even if there were opportunities to increase the total take from the experiment by making more equal choices. Winning, rather than maximizing income, seemed to be the biggest driver of group behavior.

Sports team exemplify this kind of irrational attachment. Sports riots are common in North America, Europe and around the world. “Groupness” appears to be an evolutionary advantage. To be part of a group and make it win increased the odds of survival. To be exiled or see your group beaten by rivals could mean death. Some research links these real experiences of loss to psychological conditions such as social isolation. Some authors note that we have evolved to excel in small scale groups but have also managed to adapt these skills to succeed in much larger social environments. These large-scale associations; nations, religions, corporations, military divisions, universities, research parks, co-operatives, political parties, etc. can deliver positive results OR hatred and violence.

A 2015 paper reports “The behavior of partisans resembles that of sports team members acting to preserve the status of their teams rather than thoughtful citizens participating in the political process for the common good”. Research showed that policy ideas and ideology have moderate effects on feelings, and the strength of partisan identity was a much stronger motivator. “Us versus them” comparisons focused attention on potential “losses”, driving rivalry and anger. Partisan identity was also the strongest factor predicting actual voting. The foot soldiers in political campaigns are driven more by identity and group rivalry than by policy and ideology. Winning becomes the “only thing”. The same results occurred for making donations, but here negative feelings toward the opposition were much stronger than positive feelings toward the home party in driving donations. The most engaged people in politics are strongly driven by their political group identity. Politicians need resources from the most engaged, so they highlight group identity and rivalry rather than issues, ideologies or solutions.

Klein tells the story of Beto O’Rourke nearly defeating Ted Cruz with massive support only to be a mere footnote in the presidential primary when he could not capitalize on negative partisanship. Inspiration remains a tool in politics, but it is increasingly bypassed to promote fear of the “other guys”.

The Obama story. Polarization is something that is done to voters and candidates by political hacks, consultants and donors. It is possible to not be divided. Red and Blue states have much in common. Red and Blue voters overlap in every state. Obama doubted polarization and saw his experience as a counterexample. Obama sought to lead, educate, posture and negotiate to engage different groups and perspectives. He was unable to do so. Political identities are not our only or primary identities. We can certainly connect in other ways. Some identities have more influence on our thoughts, feelings and actions. Different experiences trigger different reactions. Individuals can choose to work around the usual flow of messages and message channels to not be polarized. Klein decides Obama was simply too optimistic.

Lilliana Mason argues that our partisan identity has become our mega-identity, subsuming all other identities. Religion, race, class, geography and culture are aligning with politics. When these identities are combined, individuals become even more sensitive to any threats to their mega-identity. We now have feedback loops “all the way down”. Political actors take advantage of these combined identities to trigger positive and negative partisan responses using the most sensitive dimensions of the mega-identity. Repeated experience of this messaging further reinforces the strength of the inter-identity associations.

Challenge: The data does show that the overlaps on various dimensions with political views are more common than before. But this shows that on a population basis there is overlap, not that the mental individual identities are truly fused. Marketers do use tricks to influence people, but their tricks are only grossly effective. The claims of Vance Packard and the Hidden Persuaders from the 1960’s have been repeated ever since, but not shown to be nearly as powerful on society, groups or individuals as claimed. They are effective, or advertisers would stop spending money, but they are not omnipotent.

Klein shares the story of Colin Kaepernick’s protests, the NFL’s responses and Nike’s response to highlight the linking of politics to other identities. He says that politics as the mega-identity is encompassing all others, depriving them of their independence.

Klein highlights the surprising claim that having many strong identities can lead to more cooperative politics as individuals can find some strong links to political actors. Yet if only “Red versus Blue” matters and other identities are submerged, we run the risk of true “winner take all” politics. It becomes “dead serious”. Cross-country research shows that civil wars are LESS likely when nations have multiple significant dimensions of differences. Detailed analysis of voters’ policy views showed that individuals with policy preferences that matched the other party still rated their party much higher. The correlation between policy preferences and identity are weak. Most individuals don’t have detailed policy preferences, but they do know that their identity is the “right one”. So … “The crisis emerges when partisan identities fall into alignment with other social identities, stoking our intolerance of each other to levels that are unsupported by our degrees of political disagreement”.

In 1960 5 percent or fewer Democrats or Republicans reported they would be upset if their children entered into a cross-party marriage. Race and religion mattered much more at the time. In 2010, 49% of Republicans and 33% of Democrats expressed concern. A resume evaluation experiment showed that political affiliation was a greater source of bias than race in recommending candidates for a scholarship. Researchers noted that political identity is fair game for discrimination or even hatred, while race is not. Cable TV news and opinion options confirm this view.

This research suggests that party politics has taken on a life of its own. It can trump objective facts, science and reason. Policy differences and identity conflict can become self-reinforcing; yet another feedback loop. When my team has more immigrants, we’ll adapt policies to be more immigrant friendly, attracting more immigrants and demonizing those who do not support our members and our policies. “Identity doesn’t just shape how we treat each other. It shapes how we understand the world”.

Challenge: Merging all identities and political dimensions into a single scale or two buckets of red versus blue is not as easy or permanent as described. Most democracies have 4-12 parties in order to accommodate these differences. Our two-party system encourages but does not require this consolidation. Third party candidates have not won, but they have influenced American politics. In a two-party system, parties try to align/merge interest groups and prioritize issues that benefit the party. Possible political dimensions are numerous: region, prosperity, urban/rural, industry, domestic/international, race, ethnicity, religion, ideology, class, profession, social policies, economic policies, immigration, international trade, defense, international relations, history, tradition, character, nature, global issues, generations, safety, crime, opportunity, fairness, justice, the list has no end.

President Reagan was a “once in a century” political talent who was able to consolidate various strands into a simple conservative versus liberal/socialist/radical framework. Big business, main street, libertarian, fundamentalist, neoconservative hawks, traditionalists, patriots, ideological conservatives and others were consolidated in opposition to the perceived radical/anarchist/revolutionary/socialist threat of the countercultural and antiwar 1960’s attached to McGovern’s 1972 campaign and the breakdown and ineffectiveness of professional elites in war and economics reflected in Carter’s 1976 presidency. Americans were motivated to vote against what they perceived as both prongs of the Democratic Party. Reagan cleverly linked this to an “American city on the hill”, tradition and a time without political conflict.

Newt Gingrich was not satisfied with presidential power alone and together with groups like the “Club for Growth” encouraged Republican candidates to take “extreme” positions on social issues in order to win congress. No taxes. Taxation is theft. Government is bad. Abortion is murder. No regulations. Minimum criminal sentences. No active fiscal or monetary policy. Drill, baby drill. Bomb, baby, bomb. Terrorism is an existential threat. Oppose everything from Obama. Welfare queens. Willie Horton. Tear down that wall. Greed is good. Free market. This helped to clearly define the Republican Party in opposition to the Democratic Party.

This extreme positioning helped the Republican Party to attract and retain those who agreed with the various “conservative” positions. It also helped the party to paint the opposition party as being clearly against each home position. But it does not reconcile the inherent differences between the different wings of the party. Libertarians and fundamentalist Christians. Big business and populist workers. Dynamic entrepreneurs and Main Street traditionalists. Globalist elites and corporations versus protectionists. Business support for immigration versus worker opposition. Social security and Medicare entitlements versus lower taxes. America first versus economic growth. Truck drivers versus investment bankers. Unconstrained capitalism versus “traditional values”. Free market versus unsustainable health care costs. Democrats face similar challenges in aligning policies with varied group interests. As Klein notes, Blacks, Asians and Hispanics are not inherently or universally liberal; socially, economically or internationally. It may be that the two parties are living in a “one time” period where a single dimension aligns most voters.

4. The Press Secretary in Your Mind

Mr. Klein begins the chapter by sharing a detailed history of the origins of Obamacare based on “individual provision” as a conservative, Republican solution to America’s health care system challenges, including initial Republican support and Romney’s use of the model in Massachusetts. However, by December 2009 every Senate Republican, including those who had sponsored a similar bill in 2007, now rejected it wholesale. When it was time to vote, all Republicans opposed Obamacare and the “individual mandate” component. “Cap and trade” was proposed by some Republicans in 2007 as a carbon emissions solution but then rejected wholesale as support for Climate Change beliefs. Klein rejects simple charges of hypocrisy and lying to explain these, and other changes of opinion made by political leaders.

He proposes a much larger explanation summarized by philosopher Joseph Heath, “The central flaw in the concept of reason that animated the eighteenth-century Enlightenment is that it is entirely ‘individualistic. … reason is both decentralized and dispersed across multiple individuals. It is not possible to be rational all by yourself; rationality is inherently a collective project”. Klein argues that group reasoning is also an evolutionary adaption that is more effective than individual reasoning. Hence, even informed individuals change their “minds” to adapt to the group’s decisions.

Various psychology experiments have shown that many individuals will report different conclusions to mildly ambiguous problems based upon peer pressure. They will comply with other individuals or the group as a whole even if they personally believe in a different solution. Experiments about political policy choices by political partisans reported that party policies quite easily overcame other evidence in selecting preferred policy choices. Reference group information overrode that of policy content. Political parties are a rational response to making many choices. We rationally outsource the detailed research and choice. But parties are not scientists or philosophers searching for truth, they are organizations with their own goals, associated with multiple ideologies and personal and group histories and goals.

Klein rejects the theory that “smart” or “knowledgeable” people are different. More information, better decision-making, awareness of context, etc. are all rejected as relatively minor players in explaining why individuals conform to group norms, especially political positions taken by a party that are “obviously” or “objectively” illogical. One study concluded that individuals are motivated more by improving their group standing by embracing group norms than by “pursuing the truth”. This experiment showed that better math/science skills were helpful in applying data that supported a preconceived position but worse in applying facts that opposed their preferences. Better math skills reduced the ability to solve a problem when it conflicted with previously held policy choices. Partisans exhibited this “blind spot”, while those with mild political views showed smaller self-deceit.

“True believers” on both sides are very adept at constructing such frameworks of logic, data, argument and counterargument to support their policy choices. These arguments are quite unconvincing to scientists or “neutral” parties, but persuasive to political supporters. Even the definition of “expert” is subject to political bias for partisans. Experiments also show that individuals who are most “politically informed” are most subject to such biases. Tests of “historical facts” showed that Democrats would deny positive results to Republican presidents and vice versa, even if they were supposedly “well informed”. So … the logic flows from party and group loyalties to political preferences, judgments and actions. Parties shape beliefs of members. Even these researchers say that for many decisions people are convinced by evidence, but individuals are willing to “rationalize” or “choose” to match the group’s views when a contrary view would threaten the group or our standing in the group. “Groupness” is the trump card, especially for individuals with strong attachment to the group.

Proponents of this view, including Dan Kahan, term this “identity-protective cognition”. Mildly guiding and shaping our views to align with a preferred group is more rational than relentlessly “seeking the truth”. Everyone lives in a social world and values their social standing. That value can outweigh “truth” in many situations. Klein says that this is especially true in the politically charged and socially driven climate of Washington, DC. This drive for belonging can blind the “rational mind” from fighting with the preferred logic.

Klein provides the Supreme Court testimony against the constitutionality of the “individual mandate” as evidence of how motivated partisans are able to create “evidence” to support any pre-existing conclusion, even if the bulk of scientific, professional, mainstream opinion has contrasting evidence and rejects the new claims. This counterevidence appears to have little impact on “true believers”. Klein refers to Johnathan Haidt’s conclusion in “The Righteous Mind” that the “press secretary” is required to defend any policy, history or situation and will do so. Such “motivated reasoning” is common and often pragmatically effective.

Historically, Americans have believed that the Supreme Court, in some sense, was an objective body, subject to political influence, but nonetheless capable of largely finding the “truth” with respect to the “constitutionality” of executive, legislative or judicial decisions. The increased politicization of the Court is leading many to doubt this fundamental pillar of the American political system or to consider changes in its structure to “shore up” this component.

5. Demographic Threat

Change and threats motivate political feelings and actions. In 2013, the majority of US newborns were nonwhite. By 2045, non-Hispanic whites will no longer be an absolute, 51% majority. Hispanic and Asian populations are forecast to double and mixed-race populations to triple by 2060, while the non-Hispanic white population falls from 200 to 180 million. The foreign-born population is expected to increase from 14% to 17% of the nation, a record high, triple the 1970 level of 5%. Women hold more power in society based on their greater educational results. Traditional religious belief and activity are falling. The dominant culture, white and Christian, is losing power. 70% of seniors are white Christians, but only 30% of young adults are white Christians. “Intersectionality” applies to the former majority just as it applies to minorities of minorities.

Data matters, but perceptions are most important. Race is a social construct and whiteness may someday include Hispanics, Asians or mixed-race individuals. Americans tend to overestimate the nonwhite share of the population. Political and media activity matter. It is the “feeling” or “perception” that a political group or identity is threatened which counts.

Research studies show that awareness of such change makes individuals more “conservative” when making political choices. They are primed or triggered to be more aware of potential threats and to respond to the threats. Given the demographic and policy choices of American Republicans and Democrats, this demographic change pushes more Americans to sympathetically consider the “whiter” party.

Klein highlights the “post-racial myth”. Race was a lesser political factor in the 2000’s prior to Obama’s winning candidacy. But this high visibility event resulted in greater sorting of political views by race, despite Obama’s relatively quiet advocacy for specific positions advocated by the Black Caucus. American media provided significantly more minority characters, ads and shows in the 2000’s. Strong minority support was essential for any national Democratic presidential candidate in the twenty-first century. Professors like Amy Chua noted that a very dominant racial/religious group (WASP) could “afford” to be enlightened or “liberal” and provide increased opportunity to minority groups in the 1960’s and 1970’s when their power was assured, but that it was not so easy more recently. While political power lags demography due to voting participation rates, cultural power “leads” because advertisers rationally attempt to develop brand allegiance in unsettled young adults, highlighting the demographic and cultural milieu in which they live. Hence, multicultural news, advertising, music, entertainment and university views get disproportionate attention.

“The left feels a cultural and demographic power that it can only occasionally translate into political power, and the Right wields political power but feels increasingly dismissed and offended culturally”.

Trump was the one Republican who rejected the national party’s 2012 presidential loss post-mortem advice to be “more inclusive” because of the inevitable impact of demographic trends. Trump clearly differentiated himself from the other candidates, doubling down on the majority’s historical cultural, political and demographic identity. Right-wing talk shows in the 21st century routinely adopted “extremist” cultural views that demonized the opponents. And these opponents were linked by political, racial, national, immigrant, gender, cultural, consumption, regional, educational, professional and other identities into a bipolar, Manichean “us versus them” world. These extremist voices were often dismissed by the mainstream media, academicians, scholars, analysts, critics and many “moderate”, “Main Street”, “corporate” or “establishment” Republican leaders. However, they highlighted the increased role that cultural views would have above economic, ideological or international political views in shaping parties and elections.

A 2016 poll reported that 57% of whites thought that discrimination against whites was as big a problem as discrimination against minorities. 48% of millennials agreed, showing that this was not just a Boomer issue. Klein agrees with Seth Trende in validating Trump’s 2016 strategy to focus on motivating the base of 7 million missing white voters in 2012 rather than catering to the vanishing “swing voter” or undecided voter. “White Identity Politics”, once unspeakable, became a clear part of Trump’s winning message and strategy. “Jardina repeatedly finds that much of the strengthening of white political identity is a defense of white political privilege without an attendant rise in racist attitudes”. One-third of the white population feels a sense of racial solidarity. Most of this subset does so without an increase in racial hostility. Hence, a wise marketer like Trump is careful to appeal to both groups of potential supporters.

“The simplest way to activate someone’s identity is to threaten it, to tell them that they don’t deserve what they have, to make them consider that it might be taken away. The experience of losing status – and being told that your loss of status is part of society’s march to justice – is itself radicalizing.

Klein does not go here, but I think some of the tremendous emotional and political reaction to Obama’s 2012 claim that “you didn’t build that” is related to this construct of human perception and thought.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/You_didn%27t_build_that

Klein argues that the post-2016 analysis of Trump’s victory shows that racial resentment activated economic anxiety.

Before Obama racial perceptions were uncorrelated with perceptions of the economy. After Obama, racial resentment was a strong predictor of views on the economy. Trump’s election led to an 80% jump in Republicans confidence about the economy and a 37% fall among Democrats. Klein cites the centrality of anti-immigrant positions in all “far-right” parties around the world as further evidence for the primacy of racial/ethnic views above economic views. He also notes that only right-wing populist parties have grown in recent years following the economic challenges of the Great Recession and the pandemic, not left-wing populist parties who might be expected to capitalize on economic anxiety.

Challenge: This is not very convincing to me. Working- and middle-class whites with economic anxiety have been moving from the union supporting Democrats to the union opposing Republicans since the times of George Wallace in 1968. This accelerated with the Great Recession 40 years later. The coincidence with demographic changes and Trump’s choice to highlight conservative social values above traditional mainstream corporate economic Republican economic choices on trade, immigration and social security do not “prove” that race is the dominant factor. Nativist populist parties have always used social issues: race, ethnicity, religion and nation to drive participation and emotion.

Detour regarding “political correctness” by Klein. The emphasis on the demon “political correctness” by Fox and Republicans is a long-standing political strategy to undercut the opposition, but its increasing use and greater emotional impact is new. This is a “culture war” about what is and who defines “acceptable discourse”.

Demographic change impacts political party positions. Democrats in 1992 presented “balanced” immigration platforms. In 2016 they were decidedly pro-immigrant groups. Klein quotes Michael Tesler, “In the post-civil rights era, Democrats needed to maintain their nonwhite base without alienating white voters. Republicans needed to win over white voters without appearing racist. So their incentive was to speak about race in code. The shifts have made it so Democrats’ incentive is to make explicitly pro-racial equality appeals and Republicans now have an incentive to make more explicit anti-minority appeals”. Democrats and Republicans have increasingly different views on the role of discrimination in explaining why “black people can’t get ahead”. In 1994, a few more Democrats agreed, 39% versus 26%. In 2017, a chasm of 64% versus 14% divided the parties. Klein argues that the merging of racial identity with party identity will continue to drive party choices in the future. As political demography changes, so do political identities.

Klein argues that the loss of white Christian primacy in politics has led to the emphasis on “identity politics” as the Democratic Party has increasingly embraced the preferences of racial and ethnic minorities. He warns that this inevitably leads into greater conflict between the parties. He notes that some talented politicians focus on actions rather than rhetoric to advance their policies to undercut this situation. He also notes that it would be wiser for Democratic politicians to downplay demographic changes by highlighting different terms, definitions and that many states and communities have become demographically diverse successfully. He notes that strong politicians like Obama can combine diverse groups using inspirational speech to bridge demographic gaps, but the demographic changes also call for populists and demagogues to take advantage of the inherent tensions.

6. The Media Divide beyond Left-Right

The political media is biased toward … loud, outrageous, colorful, inspirational and confrontational.

Klein considers other political journalists and media as collaborators fighting to build political attention of people who can choose to pay attention to anything else. No one must follow politics. Most consider it a hobby. Competition for political media attention is greater today because the political and non-political options have exploded. As much political news and commentary is available as anyone could hope for. Access to history is also ubiquitous, while in the past it mostly disappeared within a week.

Many political science models focused on access to information as a key constraint limiting effective democracies. The modern information age has eliminated this constraint, but democracies did not flourish. Political scientists have moved on to make interest in political information the new limit to effectiveness. Prior to the cable and internet revolutions, 3 TV networks and a handful of local and national newspapers served up political news as part of the general news. Some skipped the headlines and opinion pages, but many consumed at least some political news each day. Today, those less interested in politics consume less and those more interested consume more.

Political media is for the politically invested. Producers of political media have adapted to the new consumers. They provide more content. They include opinions. They select news of interest to politicos. They emphasize political identity, conflict and celebrity. Yet another feedback loop. This deepens political identity, hardens polarization and increases the political stakes.

Despite the large overlaps of demography and miscellaneous identities between the red and the blue, modern media has not helped partisans to understand the identity of members of the opposing party. Partisans tend to overexaggerate the distinctive demographics, characteristics and views of the opposition. The media emphasizes party differences – and colorful and opinionated newsmakers. Consumers normalize this input and exaggerate actual differences.

The new political media knows its audience, demographics, preferences, identities, hot buttons, etc. It has real-time feedback on audience followers, clicks and forwards. Klein recounts that Buzzfeed first defined, measured and used the power of identity to build followers, clicks and shares. This source demonstrated that interests could be translated into communities and identities that were powerful in building and deepening audiences. The media did not have to take communities and demographics “as is” but could construct and grow identity-based communities. This didn’t require outstanding insight or journalistic skill, just the willingness to define and feed a group that worked and abandon groups that failed to work. Other social media platforms have followed using the same techniques. Of course, focusing on enemies is a shortcut that is used here. As identities have been defined and fed compatible information, they are stronger today, less able to be changed.

Klein destroys another historical wish. If individuals only read the opposition they would better understand, tone down their rhetoric and views and seek compromise. Research provides no evidence for this view. If anything, individuals required to consume opposing views become more certain about their pre-existing positions. Some political media is designed to persuade and can have some effectiveness in gaining attention or moderating views, but few political media outlets invest in this.

Journalists who perform in a polarized political and media arena produce more polarizing output and become more polarized themselves, by and large.

Historically, the mainstream media promoted objectivity and balance, claiming that it was “above the fray”. With limited competition the main outlets all trended towards the middle and reinforced this informal norm. Today we have returned to the pre-mass media era when most media outlets adopted a political view and made no apologies. Some remain in the middle today, but the growth has been on the polarized ends. Trump capitalized on this world attracting one-half to three-quarters of news coverage during the 2016 campaign. News outlets are free to determine what is “newsworthy” and Trump understood that new, outrageous, conflict-oriented, secret, interesting, shocking, offensive, threatening and celebrity were far stronger than relevant, important, supported, normal, wise, presidential, balanced, consistent, inspirational and objective. In a competitive business, the “race to the bottom” was quick and largely universal.

Challenge: the main-stream media has revised its coverage to reduce the share of “sensational” coverage. It has improved its ability to call out extreme claims and not rely on formulaic “balanced” coverage. Some organizations continue to provide “neutral” news coverage and separate this from their commentary. Individuals who wish to follow this more traditional approach can find it.

7. Post-Persuasion Elections

The rising share of self-defined “independents” among American voters obscures the fact that “true independents”, those without a tendency to consistently support one party or the other had fallen from 22% to just 7% of the electorate by 2000. Bush and Gore ran against each other as “Tweedledum and Tweedle-dee”, a fiscally conservative New Democrat versus a “compassionate conservative”, both competing for the persuadable swing voter. By 2004, politicos had digested the loss of the “middle” voter, the suburban soccer mom, and re-engineered their campaigns to register, message, and energize their base to vote. Messages were sharpened to differentiate between the two parties and to demonize the opposition. Republicans won in 2004 and both parties adopted this strategy going forward. With the parties adopting polarizing strategies, voters learned to pick one or the other and the share of persuadable voters declined even further. The contrasts between Bush, Sr and Bush, Jr or Bill and Hillary Clinton tell the story. Compromise is out. One side is right and the other is wrong.

Political parties expected to benefit from this polarization but have become weaker. They are placeholding labels, fundraisers, messaging coordinators, sources of analysts and advisors but they are not as politically powerful. They don’t choose candidates, define and enforce platforms or influence behavior of elected officials as they once did when they had real power.

Trump conducted a hostile takeover of the Republican Party. He had limited history with the party and had transactionally invested in candidates from both parties. His ideology was undefined, he waffled on many issues, so did not match the views of any existing Republican group. He adopted a mishmash of policies, casually discarding core Republican policies on economics, trade and international relations. He ignored the eleventh commandment to not speak ill of a fellow Republican. He criticized everyone: candidates, war heroes, Senators, military leaders, business leaders and political leaders in terms that were simply “off limits” historically. His character and religious past made no friends. Yet, when he won the primary, almost everyone except for a relatively small group of “never Trumpers” lined up to support his campaign and his actions from 2016 until today. None of this could have occurred when political parties were effective forces.

Republicans who opposed Trump in the primaries in apocalyptical terms decided that a choice between Trump and Hillary or Bernie or Elizabeth Warren or mayor Pete or AOC or even “sleepy” Joe Biden was very easy to make. The Democrats opposed every “core” Republican belief. Trump would deliver on taxes, regulations and judges. He would not allow any Democratic initiatives. Bill Clinton had removed “character” as a requirement for holding higher office. There was no political downside to supporting Trump. The “Republicans in Name Only” (RINOs) were not going to run opposing primary candidates. In the post-Reagan/Thatcher era, politicians were expected to look out for their personal interests, not those of their communities, states, party or nation and they delivered on that promise.

Political parties lost power beginning with the move to direct election political primaries and caucuses in the 1970’s. Insiders – governors, long-term Senators, fundraisers, mayors, political bosses, large state delegate leaders, favorite sons, Wall Street and Silicon Valley community leaders, lobbyist and law firms, the largest corporations, major unions – lost power to whoever could win the most votes. Democrats held on to a small share of “superdelegates” but dropped even this after Bernie’s supporters objected. The McCain-Feingold Act restricted pure party fundraising. The transaction costs of campaigns dropped, allowing individual candidates to compete with their own staff and on-line fundraising from small donors. Parties still play an important role, but they are unable to shape primary and general election campaigns to match the interests of the party, per se.

This matters, because “the party”, the small group of individuals who are able to wield power on behalf of the party (or themselves), has different objectives than the candidates or the party’s voters, donors, volunteers or partisans. Political scientists argue that parties want to maximize their own power. They want to manage the other actors as required in order to use the party’s power. They want to get candidates elected. They want to define deliverable platforms. They want to deliver on the platform promises. They want to raise even more money for the party. They want to constrain the actions of “rogue” congressmen and women. They want activities to fit within the brand and messaging strategies of the party. They want to allocate funds and resources to the races with the best chance of winning for the party. They are OK with “horse-trading” and earmarks and “log rolling” as required to achieve political goals, even at the expense of ideological impurity. The party caucuses in the House and Senate have retained much of this central power, but the “national” parties have not.

This matters because political parties can act as a moderating agent. They identify, select and promote moderate candidates with the highest chance of winning in the general elections. They act as a governor on the pure ideologues, the motivated volunteers and activists and the most extreme candidates. Their downfall has contributed to the polarization of political races. Political scientists observe these forces at the national and state levels. Klein does not cover this topic, but it appears that the ability of more states to earn a trifecta of house, senate and governor rule (and judicial appointments) has radicalized this historical approach, with gerrymandered districts ensuring 60% safe, 10% competitive and 30% safe opponent districts which reduces the need/incentive to select moderate/electable candidates.

The reduction in the role of state and national parties in funding local candidate has changed the priorities for congressional candidates. In order to raise their own money, they need to gather attention from small donors, big donors and the party. To do so, they need to manage public attention by standing out. This encourages more extreme positions, messaging, allies and campaigns. Loud, extreme, controversial. Negative campaigning is up. Attention grabbing events are up. Purist ideological positions and platforms are up. Time devoted to fundraising is up. Winning the primary is most important since most districts are already “safe seats” and most primary opponents’ supporters will “fall in line”.

Klein contrasts large and small donors as pragmatists and purists, corrupt and polarized, details and big issues. Both are required, but wise candidates focus public messaging to attract and serve the small donors while taking time to work with large donors to understand and quietly deliver on their transactional needs. At the presidential level, small dollar contributors increased TEN-fold from 55,000 in 2000 to 566,000 in 2016. The “special interest” groups demonstrated that this could be done, and the political consultants and modern technology have made this a reality.

Politics is increasingly about “national” positions and issues. Donations to state and local candidates have fallen from two-thirds to one-third of the total between 1990 and 2012. With identity more important, individuals invest in those who reflect their party identity, not individual candidates, policies or character. Even at the state and local level, candidates “free ride” on national party identity politics to raise funds and attract voters, rather than invest in differentiating themselves based on local issues or personal attributes like competence or character.

Klein worries that the current environment opens the door for demagogues, populists, showmen and talented extremists and communicators to be nominated and secure power, risking democracy to authoritarians who could become dictators.

8. When Bipartisanship Becomes Irrational

Or, the system is simply broken.

The Supreme Court traditionally acted as a conservative break on the “progress” of the nation based on politics. Justices were nominated by politicians but made decisions based upon their own views. Like the divide between the president and the legislature, or between the House and the Senate, the judiciary provided one last place to buffer rapid changes in a representative democracy. The Warren Court made decisions more liberal than the American public, a historical outlier. The Burger Cort also provided relatively liberal results. Conservatives worked hard to ensure that Republican appointees would no longer “vote their conscience” or their profession but be reliably conservative. Justices like Antonio Scalia developed an “originalist” view which opposed the expansionist view of the Warren Court in defining “rights”.

In 2014 Obama nominated moderate Merrick Garland to succeed Scalia. Senate leader Mitch McConnell refused to consider the nomination, despite 103 comparable cases, because he could. With Trump’s 2016 victory a Republican nominee was appointed to the court. Democrats howled, but Republicans simply disregarded the informal norms. This could undermine the independent, non-political role of the judiciary, but this potential consequence was disregarded.

Klein turns to Juan Linz’s 1990 critique of the American political system. The multiply divided system is designed to prevent hasty progress, yet it has endured for two centuries. No other country has adopted this system. The US did not recommend it to Germany or Japan after WW II. Most democracies have a parliamentary system where the winning party or coalition has the combined legislative and executive power to get things done. The electorate will then judge the results.

Klein raises the big issue of political legitimacy. He accepts that McConnell’s tactics were legitimate and expects that future Senates may oppose all nominees of the other party, because they can. He then points to a world in which the Democrats routinely win the popular vote but lose the presidency due to the electoral college. Or that Democrats win 60% of the popular vote, but less than 50% of the Senate seats. Or that Democrats win 55% of the popular vote, but less than 50% of the House seats. Or that Democrats win 70% of GDP, but less than 50% of the House seats. In a polarized world with geographical advantages favoring one party, what happens in the long run?

Historically, national politics was both national and local. Senators and congressman took care of their constituents in a transactional manner, winning special rules for local interests, military bases and highway projects. Earmarks were used to deliver goods to local representatives who could set aside their political preferences. Voters have increasingly chosen to focus on national issues. Local representatives have increasingly chosen to oppose national policies even if they benefit local constituents.

Klein notes that 2-party politics are quite different when one party is dominant, as was the case from 1865-1965. In this situation, the minority party strives to have some influence. Demonizing the opposition is illogical. Working with the dominant party to limit the impact of its policies is rational. Cooperating makes sense. Once the two parties are relatively competitive, the rules are quite different. Winning is everything. Obstruct when in opposition. Cooperation is for losers. This was the Newt Gingrich moment for the newly competitive Republican Party.

Klein recalls the history of the Senate filibuster. It was accidentally created and mostly used by Southern Democrats to protect their modern version of the “peculiar institution” of racial domination. In recent years Republicans have used the required 60 vote majority as an effective weapon. In similar fashion, Republicans have used the approval of an increase in the “debt ceiling” to fund previously approved spending as another negotiating tool, despite the potential consequences.

“The problem is that we have a political system where the rules create irresolvable conflict, gridlock, and even global financial crises”.

9. The Difference between Democrats and Republicans

The author begins this chapter quoting Thomas Mann and Norm Ornstein in their 2012 book “It’s Even Worse Than It Looks”. These respected authors from opposing think tanks had worked together for many years and established a reputation for objectivity and nonpartisanship. By 2012 they concluded that the Republican Party had become ideologically extreme, contemptuous of traditional policy platforms, scornful of compromise, immune to facts and science, dismissive of the opposition’s legitimacy and opposed to the government which they sought to lead. They weren’t saying the Democrats were saints, but Democrats did largely play by the historical rules of politics, were more centrist ideologically, endorsed core government roles, were open to incremental policy changes and bargaining and less eager to pursue large win/lose situations. Their view was welcomed by Democrats, but controversial amongst independents, journalists and analysts. Trump unapologetically moved the party even further towards the edges, confirming their views.

Mann and Ornstein saw Trump as a logical next step for a party that had taken more extreme and emotional positions and relied upon angry social conservatives and tea partiers who felt that the opposition, the elites and the system conspired to prevent them from living as they wished. As the Republican congress was pushed to adopt more extreme positions and support more extreme politicians, the rest of the political actors at the national, state and local levels adjusted. The establishment, business, suburban, RINO, New England wing of the party lost its remaining power and influence. The conservative media welcomed this alignment of the party and politicians with their own message of rage, confrontation, disruption and revolution.

Klein notes that congressional Republicans have moved further right than Democrats have moved to the left. He also points to the fights between the “true believers” and House speakers John Boehner and Paul Ryan where no position or positioning was radical enough. He believes that Republican willingness to risk financial catastrophe with debt ceiling votes reflects this extreme mindset.

Klein says that the Democrats have not responded to the same polarizing pressures in the same way because the diversity of their coalition prevents it. Party activists have called for stronger measures, but the political leaders have mostly chosen to “waffle” and present policies and actions that appeal to both the progressive-left and the center-left wings of the party. Democrats rely on a coalition of liberal whites, African Americans, Hispanics and Asians. The three minority groups contain conservatives, moderates and liberals. Democrats span many religions and beliefs. Primary election winners must appeal to many groups. In the general election, Democrats face an audience that is quite individualistic, socially conservative and economically conservative compared with European nations. The American political system and the clustering of Democrats in urban areas provide Republicans with a 3-5% built-in advantage in many races. Hence, Democratic political winners must present policies that appeal to both the center and the left in most districts and states.

In 2019 35% of Americans identified as conservatives while only 26% identified as liberals. Liberals cannot support a winning party by themselves. Since only 30% of Americans vote in primary elections and the most partisan people are likeliest to vote, extreme candidates can be elected in Democratic as well as Republican primaries but face a stiffer challenge in the general elections. Three-quarters of Republicans identify as conservative while only half of Democrats identify as liberals. A recent survey reported that 57% of Republicans want their party to become more conservative while 54% of Democrats prefer their party to become more moderate. Democratic activists, partisans and candidates might wish to adopt “Bernie Sanders” positions, but the Democratic winners appeal to moderates as well.

Political scientists describe the Democrats as a coalition of interest groups and the Republicans as a collection of similar ideologies, connected by freedom, liberty and individual rights. Democrats rely upon policies and transactional politics more than Republicans. Klein promotes his view that the Republican party is held together more by identity than by any one purely consistent ideology. One research project was able to demonstrate that Trump’s position (sometimes left or right) was more influential than a voter’s self-expressed ideology in making political choices.

Partisan Democrats also consume a diverse media diet of mainstream media, left-leaning sources and select center-right options. Partisan Republicans consume right-leaning sources alone. This difference also supports Democrats defining and promoting more moderate political positions. Klein notes that the Republican Party has actively opposed the mainstream media and universities for decades, narrowing its news sources, while the Democrats continue to consume from these sources. He argues that conservatives did not create a parallel “neutral” and “objective” media because the existing mainstream media already filled the role well enough.

Klein ends this chapter by focusing on the depth of feeling held by many Republican voters. They see an urgency in winning, in defeating the enemy. They fear that these are the last elections in which their view can be supported in a democracy. He quotes former Bush, Sr and Trump Attorney General William Barr extensively. Barr sees a cosmic competition between secularists and religious people. He believes that the “secularists” will use any means to reach their goal of achieving a secular society where religion is outlawed. He sees religion as “under attack” and society threatened by the “moral relativism” of the secular world view. He points to the combined power of the media, popular culture, entertainment industry and universities to outlaw religious views, sidestepping the political processes and allowing a small unelected minority to impose their view. Many social conservatives share this apocalyptic view and are highly motivated to win this ultimate war.

10. Managing Polarization – and Ourselves

Klein reiterates that polarization, per se, is not a problem. Polarization causes issues to be raised and addressed even if they are not resolved. The absence of polarization can be suppression when real political issues are hidden or ignored. Unfortunately, our current polarization does not lead to problems being resolved but to greater political theatrics and a threat to democracy. The underlying factors described in the book don’t seem to be changing, so structural changes are needed to avoid the disaster scenarios.

Klein reiterates his support for the “rough and tumble” of the legislative process and the validity of representatives wrestling to a conclusion. But he argues that some decisions and situations are so essential that the full political arsenal should be stored in the armory. The debt ceiling threats should be eliminated by including debt authorization with the budget. The budget process itself should be revised to make longer term commitments to programs. Automatic stabilizers should be defined to ensure that counter cyclical economic support is available in recessions and not subject to blackmail from the minority party.

The legitimacy of our democracy must be increased. The electoral college cannot be easily changed but the National Interstate Popular Vote Compact could be used to increase the influence of the popular vote and reduce the disproportionate influence of rural, low population states. Independent commissions or other changes could reduce gerrymandering. Innovations like multiple member districts and ranked choice voting could help voters to see that their vote matters. The filibuster should be eliminated. Washington, DC and Puerto Rico should have congressional representation. Klein believes that improved voter representation would force the Republican party to serve/rebuild its moderate wing and define positions that would appeal to 60% of Americans rather than 40%.

His third principle is “balancing”. The American political system aimed to balance between the competing forces of democratic and elite rule, large and small states, federal and state power, etc. Today we compete between red and blue, liberal and conservative identities. The system does not address this dimension. Perhaps a multiparty system would be better. Perhaps a 15-person Supreme Court with 5 nominees from each party and the last 5 decided by the 10 justices. Consider reform of congressional rules that give the speaker absolute power to determine what bills are considered.

Klein urges us to become more aware or mindful of the role of identities, especially the mega-identity of politics. We have multiple identities and they all matter. We can choose to not immediately react to stimuli that touch our political identity. Practice maintaining the gap between stimulus and response. Be aware that political actors and advertisers and bloggers do want to use identity to influence and persuade us. Proactively define our information sources. Diversify them. Evaluate their bias and quality. Fight against the nationalization of views. Invest time in state and local politics where the issues are more concrete, the players are closer, and the impact is greater.

11. Afterword

The January 6 insurrection and the support for Trump’s claims of electoral theft should not surprise anyone who accepts the identity model of politics. Once an identify is chosen and closely held, almost nothing can pry it away. The Democrats chose Joe Biden and adopted relatively moderate policies in order to win. The Republican geographical advantage was clear again, with a 7 million vote margin barely winning the electoral college. The legitimacy of the president, senators and the Supreme Court is challenged by both parties. The overlap of race and politics lessened a bit with Trump winning 8% more Hispanics and Biden winning 7% more college educated whites. Klein doubles down on his challenge to the Republican Party to throw away its narrowly targeted white, religious, rural, extreme approach and redefine the party to appeal to a broader set of Americans. He argues that the Democrats’ voting reforms bill, HR1, could start the nation towards rebuilding its democratic foundation.