Houston, We Have A Problem. Corporate Profit Growth Has No Limit

https://abc13.com/houston-we-have-a-problem-weve-had-remember-when-history/1869513/

Introduction

US Corporate profits grew from $1.9 Trillion(T) on an annual basis in the second quarter of 2019 before the pandemic to $3.0T in the second quarter of 2022; plus $1.1T (+57%)!!! US nominal gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 17%, from $21.3T to $24.9T, an increase of $3.6T. Real, inflation-adjusted, GDP grew by just 4%, accounting for a $0.8T increase in the real economy. Inflation grew by 13%, causing the other $2.8T of measured GDP. The $1.1T of increased corporate profits represents 39% of the inflation which has occurred in the last 3 years.

Analysis

Let’s look at the growth of US corporate profits from a half-dozen starting points to try to put this into perspective.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CP

YearProfitReal ProfitAnnl Incr StageCum Annl Incr
197055142
19802732717%6.7%
19954683071%3.1%
20061,3886288%4.5%
20121,8808193%4.3%
20181,947775-1%3.6%
20223,0121,0237%3.9%
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/about-us/monetary-policy/inflation-calculator/consumer-price-index-1913-

US corporate profits reached $3 Trillion in 2022, up from essentially zero in 1950. I’ve selected 7 peak profit years to outline this growth. Nominal profits increased from $55B in 1970 to $3.0T in 2022. In real, inflation-adjusted terms, profits have grown from $142B to $1,023B, a 7-fold increase in 52 years! Annual profit growth has been erratic, increasing by a high of 8% from 1995 to 2006 and a low of -1% from 2012 to 2018. The cumulative annual real profit growth has stayed near 4% throughout the period. 4% compounded for 52 years is a little more than 7x.

The US population grew from 200.3M to 338.3M during this period, 1.0% per year. So, corporate earnings grew by 3% per year above the rate of population growth for 52 years!!!! This kind of compound growth rate cannot continue for long periods of time without greatly impacting other sectors of the economy.

https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/USA/united-states/population

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-06/stock-market-u-s-corporations-hit-record-profits-in-2021-q3-despite-covid?sref=d6fKRvkp&leadSource=uverify%20wall

Corporate profits fluctuated in the 4-6% of GDP range from 1947 through 2000. Profits jumped up to 10% of GDP by 2010 and have largely remained at this two-fold elevated level for a decade. Profits reached a new record of 12% in 2022!

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1Pik
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A466RD3Q052SBEA

This measure shows profits growing eight-fold since 1970. (I’m going to ignore the detailed differences between the various measures of profit. They are important, but not necessary to see the major growth in profits, which is broadly consistent across the various measures.)

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W273RE1A156NBEA

A tighter measure of corporate profits shows an increase from 4.5% to 7% of GDP, even before the most recent profit growth.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A445RE1A156NBEA

An alternate measure of just “domesticly earned” corporate profits shows a flatter trend.

Another way to consider profits is to view its complement, the share of national income received by labor.

https://www.epi.org/blog/the-fed-shouldnt-give-up-on-restoring-labors-share-of-income-and-measure-it-correctly/

By this measure, labor has lost 10% of its income, while capital has gained 10% since 1980.

https://www.epi.org/blog/the-fed-shouldnt-give-up-on-restoring-labors-share-of-income-and-measure-it-correctly/

6% of GDP was moved from labor to capital.

https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/employment-and-growth/a-new-look-at-the-declining-labor-share-of-income-in-the-united-states

Consulting firm McKinsey shows an 8% of GDP transfer and provides 5 explanations.

https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/employment-and-social-policy/The-Labour-Share-in-G20-Economies.pdf

Most analyses of the growth in profits and decline in relative wages note that labor productivity has continued to rise by 2% or more annually, but labor has received almost no portion of those gains in the last 30 years.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Labor_share

Labor share of total income has dropped by 15% in the long-run by this measure.

https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2017/article/estimating-the-us-labor-share.htm

This author calculates a 6-8% decline for labor.

https://taxfoundation.org/labor-share-net-income-within-historical-range/#:~:text=The%20average%20labor%20share%20from,long%20decline%20in%20labor%20share.

A right-leaning think tank adjusts the data and claims that labor’s share remains constant in the long-run. The Tax Foundation does delve into the various measures of income and provides arguments for their preferred measure.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500

Stock prices tend to follow profits. The S&P 500 index has grown by 50% in the last 2 years (despite the recent decline), reflecting the amazing growth in corporate profits during a “once in a century” pandemic driven recession.

https://www.yardeni.com/pub/stmktbriefrevearndiv.pdf

S&P 500 company earnings (a subset of total profits earned) continued to grow strongly through and after the pandemic.

https://cdn.pficdn.com/cms/pgim-fixed-income/sites/default/files/2021-04/The%20Evolution%20of%20U.S.%20Corporate%20Profits_2.pdf

This investment advisor says that profits increased by 5% of GDP.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LES1252881600Q

Median REAL, inflation-adjusted, earnings remained flat at $330/week from 1979 through 2014, a period of 35 years! This is during periods where profits were growing at 4% per year in REAL terms. In the last 8 years, REAL wages have increased by 9%, a bit better than 1% per year on average.

The media has published many articles, especially noting the increase of profits, overall, since before the pandemic. This is a popular topic because the result is certainly counterintuitive and because President Biden and the more left-leaning national Democrats have been criticizing corporations for “price gauging” and causing the recent inflation spike.

https://fortune.com/2022/03/31/us-companies-record-profits-2021-price-hikes-inflation/

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/corporate-profit-is-at-a-level-well-beyond-what-we-have-ever-seen-and-its-expected-to-keep-growing-11649802739

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/corporate-profits-boom-may-lead-to-higher-wages/

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/us-corporate-profits-stayed-high-through-2021-even-as-inflation-took-hold-160908829.html

A variety of sources provide compelling data and logic to indicate that corporations are “taking advantage of” the post-pandemic inflation caused by supply chain issues and expansive fiscal and monetary policies to boost prices at rates faster than their costs of inputs (suppliers, labor, capital).

https://www.epi.org/blog/corporate-profits-have-contributed-disproportionately-to-inflation-how-should-policymakers-respond/

https://www.wral.com/fact-check-are-corporate-profits-at-record-highs-because-companies-are-overcharging/20068026/

https://abcnews.go.com/US/record-corporate-profits-driving-inflation/story?id=87121327

https://fredblog.stlouisfed.org/2022/07/corporate-profits-are-increasing-rapidly-despite-increases-in-production-costs/

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/apr/27/inflation-corporate-america-increased-prices-profits

Most economists and analysts point to the increased concentration of firms (fewer) by industry increasing their pricing power and allowing them to raise prices during periods of change.

https://academic.oup.com/rof/article/23/4/697/5477414

https://www.uschamber.com/finance/antitrust/industrial-concentration-in-the-united-states-2002-2017

This is pretty dense and dry stuff. There is a general consensus among economists who focus on this topic that concentration and pricing power have risen very significantly. This is partly due to the simple aging of industries with fewer players left standing. The winners in a world of global competition are simply “much better” than the losers so they continue to take market share. US anti-trust enforcement in the last 40 years has been very limited, following the theory that “open competition” in the long run (Schumpeter’s creative destruction) eventually undermines leading companies with innovative products, processes and market strategies.

The US Chamber of Commerce argues that industry concentration has not increased, noting that consumer choices in broadly defined industries have increased greatly through time.

https://www.uschamber.com/finance/antitrust/industrial-concentration-in-the-united-states-2002-2017

Summary

By a dozen measures, profit has consistently grown as a share of the American economy in the last 40-50 years. This necessarily means that the share of output and income received by labor is much smaller as a percentage of the total pie. The recent surprising ability of American corporations to effectively work through the pandemic supply chain disruptions, lose more than 10% of their labor force, increase nominal wages significantly, encounter severe input price inflation and still engineer price increases to come out much further ahead on profits is a major story for our time.

It is attracting attention to what I believe is an even more important story: the ability of corporations to incrementally capture nearly all of the increased value added by the productive American economy across 40-50 years and share very little with labor. This structural advantage of a very effective corporate sector “doing its job” within the relatively low-tax and low-regulation US political context is now completely proven.

In an ideal world, we would be developing and considering serious policy options that would limit this excess power without “killing the goose that lays the golden eggs”. Unfortunately, the Republican party remains focused on tax and regulation cuts as the main economic tools and the Democratic party alternates between 1960-70’s era Biden “centrist” policies and much further-left Bernie Sanders style policies.

Good News: State Pension Funding is at a 13 Year High!

Background

Most states and local governments have chosen to pay their employees less than market salaries and higher than market fringe benefits since the WW II era. The Republican focus on reducing the size, pay and power of government has increased significantly in the post-Reagan era. Grover Norquist summarized this in 2001: “I don’t want to abolish government. I simply want to reduce it to the size where I can drag it into the bathroom and drown it in the bathtub.” Hence, Republicans have focused the spotlight on the “underfunded” status of state and local government fringe benefit plans, especially defined benefit pension plans.

Although the rhetoric is sometimes grating to the “left” ear, this spotlight does serve as a disinfectant, requiring political leaders to be more accountable for their decisions, especially in “one party” states where accountability was lacking historically.

On the other hand, pension accounting, funding, goals and policies are inherently complex and difficult to simply summarize or explain. This is true for both government and corporate defined benefit pension plans. It is easy to “cherry pick” pension statistics and overexaggerate the “crisis” in state pensions.

I will focus on the data and commentary from just 2 sources: Reason.org, a right-leaning policy group that cleverly adopted a left-side name and Pew Research, a centrist research group that has chosen to emphasize right-leaning data and commentary on this topic.

Current (2021) Good News

https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2021/09/the-state-pension-funding-gap-plans-have-stabilized-in-wake-of-pandemic
  1. The average state pension plan funding level, the ratio of assets to forecast liabilities, is expected to reach 84% when final 2021 data is summarized. This is a huge improvement from the 70% average of the prior 5 years. It is the highest level since 2008.

2. The system is working. Plan assets were $2.3T versus $2.8T in 2008. Assets grew by $1.5T to $3.8T, while liabilities grew by $1.8T to $4.6T. Since the added $1.5T/$1.8T is 5/6ths or 86%, the overall ratio increased. The “system” of policies, accounting, audits, contributions, investment strategies and actual investment returns, etc. appears to be functional across a quite challenging economic period. The funding ratio was relatively consistent throughout this period, even if it was not at the 100% level highlighted by some as “the goal”.

3. The gap between estimated liabilities and funded assets is less than $1T for the first time since 2014.

4. For the first time in this time period, the minimum expected funding level has been met. This is defined as a year in which contributions exceed benefits plus the “amortized” funding requirements based on past funding shortfalls. In 2014 only 17 states met this standard. In 2019, 35 states complied. Again, this is not perfection, but it is significant progress.

5. Overall contributions have increased by 8% annually. The states with the lowest funding ratios have increased their contributions even faster. The lowest 10 rated states growing by 15% annually and the 4 worst states by 16%.

6. A measure of benefits paid minus funding contributions, as a percentage of plan assets, has improved from 3% more benefits to 2.5% more benefits paid versus new funding contributions.

Historical Commentary

The Trillion Dollar Gap (2010)

https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2010/02/10/the-trillion-dollar-gap

The Funding Gap (2016). Funding ratio 66%. Few states reach 90%.

Bond interest rates have fallen faster than pension plan expected returns. Of course, because equity returns are much higher, more volatile, difficult to forecast and a higher share of plan assets.

State pension plan returns trail the S&P 500 returns. Of course, because plans hold significant (30-40-50%) in lower yielding bonds.

A lower “discount rate”, the assumed future interest rate used to calculate the present value of future pension benefits/liabilities, will increase current liabilities and the current net liability. Yes, this is how discounting works. As market interest rates and stock returns have been reduced with lower inflation rates, the discount rate used by financial professionals in all applications has slowly declined for the last 20 years. This “sensitivity analysis” is misleading. The sensitivity of present liabilities is inherent, it cannot be avoided.

Some states have amortization rates, the amount of new contributions required to eventually offset prior funding or investment return shortages, that are quite high compared to their annual payrolls. This is true. 7 are above 5% deficits, but 7 are above 5% surpluses.

Pew highlights what they call the “operating cash flow” ratio as another sign of trouble. Contributions minus benefits paid as a ratio to assets is the definition. The result is negative!!!! And increasing to negative 3%! Contributions should almost always be less than benefits paid in a long-term (20-30-40 year) pension plan because the plan trustees assume that there will be some positive return on plan assets. Given a 2/1 equity to debt mix, with 7% to 3% expected returns, the expected plan return is more than 5%, so a 3% “negative” return is not a concern. The insurance industry operates in the same way with “negative” operating ratios being offset by investment returns.

Reason.org Graphics

This group highlights the extraordinary 100% ratio in 2001 versus the more normal ratios of 82% in 2005, the quite low level of 66% in 2012 and the still below average 74% level in 2019. They provide state by state graphics to highlight the decline since the very high 2001 baseline and to emphasize the count of states that are below 90%, 80% and 60% “funded”.

Their websites do not allow their graphs to be linked/captured.

Reason.org breaks 2 rules. First, they implicitly assume that a 100% funding level is the “obvious” goal. That is untrue. Historically, US corporations and actuaries considered 80% to be a “fully funded” target. More was better. A little less was worth watching (70-75%). Much lower required increased focus and contributions. Due to the inherent uncertainties in investment returns and participant assumptions (lifespan, retirement dates, turnover, average salaries, etc.) short-term movements of 2-3-5% were never considered to be an issue. Long-term or persistent ratios significantly below 80% were considered to be a concern.

Second, they assume that all states will perform at the same level. The “laws” of probability prohibit this “ideal” result. In a normally shaped (bell curve) probability distribution, there will always be underperforming and overperforming states. This is inherent in a multiple probability-based system. Of course, if a state remains at the bottom of the funded percentage list for more than 5 years, it probably does have a challenge to face.

Pew Emphasizes Risks in 2021

https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2021/09/the-state-pension-funding-gap-plans-have-stabilized-in-wake-of-pandemic

  1. Greater state pension contributions have “crowded out” other spending and reduced states’ ability to respond to emergencies. Well, you can’t have it “both ways”. States have responded to the shortfalls highlighted since 2000 with greater contributions. This has improved the funding level despite the Great Recession, the slow recovery and the pandemic challenge.
  2. The recent funding level improvement is due to a “one-time” stock market return in 2021. Yes, stock market returns, both gains and losses, are volatile. That is why pension plans use long-term expected returns for stocks and bonds. That is why pension funds use longer time periods (10 years) to amortize the annually calculated gains or losses into the “required” contributions. Yes, a significant part of the increase from 70% to 84% funded is a short-term increase of investment returns, and probably unsustainable.
  3. The stock market is volatile. Recently. Yes, a once in a century pandemic drives increased volatility. Stock market volatility through time and across markets is well understood as a probability function with mean expected real percentage returns and a predictable range of returns volatility. All investors face this volatility and manage portfolios accordingly. As state pension plans have grown in value, they have been able to hire competent investment advisors.

4. Economic growth is slowing. Some assert this. Others disagree.

5. Future stock and bond returns will be lower, per Pew. The long-term decline in inflation does drive investment returns lower. The increased efficiency of financial markets, including global investment flows, also drives returns lower. However, pension plans have reduced their expected annual returns. Recent stock market volatility indicates that equity returns may not decline.

6. Increased funding of underfunded pension plans can be portrayed as “increased spending”, rather than the required adjustments for those plans which had historically lower investment returns, contributions or higher ultimate benefits.

Summary

State and local governments are faced with managing inherently variable pension plan decisions. They have choices to make about plan policies, goals, funding, investment policies, audits, advisors, etc. An 80% funded level goal (not 100%) is supported by 100 years of experience around the globe, in public, private and not for profit sectors. The increased publicity/focus on underperforming states and municipalities has forced these public bodies to make tough choices regarding defined benefit versus defined contribution plans, benefit levels, retirement ages, investment policies and advisors. Following the Great Recession, states struggled to increase their funding, but they did not allow the average funding level to fall below 70% for more than a year at a time. On a cumulative basis, they have increased their contributions, reduced benefits and captured the long-run benefits of equity investments.

The increased scrutiny of funding levels in state and local government defined benefit pension plans has forced elected officials and their professional advisors to address shortfalls in pension funding. This is very good news.

Good News: US Housing Market

Real Interest Rates Remain at Record Lows

Real, inflation-adjusted, interest rates have declined greatly since 1980. At that time, with the risks of variable inflation and surging oil prices, the real mortgage interest rate was 8%. It declined to 5% in the 1990’s and 4% in the 2000’s before falling to 2% in the 2010’s. The financial cost of owning property has rarely been lower.

House Values are Up, Way Up

House prices grew relatively consistently from 1970 through 2000, with a spike in 2005-9 and a return to trend values in 2010-12. In the last 10 years, house prices have increased by 6% annually in nominal terms, or 4% annually in real terms.

Home Ownership Rate is Rebounding, Up 2%

The US homeownership rate averaged 47% from 1900-40. It increased smartly in post WWII times to 60% by 1955 and 64% by 1965. Homeownership averaged 64%+ for the decade of 1969-78. It increased by 1% during 1979-81. In the midst of a difficult depression, homeownership rates dropped back to 64% by 1985, about the same for the last 20 years, setting a “normal” level. Homeownership rates stayed at 64% for the next decade. Ownership rates increased from 64% to 69% in the next decade before declining right back to 63% by 2015. In the last 7 years, despite many headwinds, the home ownership rate has increased by 2%.

Number of Homeowners has Jumped by 7 Million

In 2000, there were 69M owner-occupied homes in the US. This increased by a solid 7M to 76M by 2005. The housing market hit a lull and the number of owner-occupied homes essentially stayed flat for a dozen years, through 2017. The supply of owner-occupied homes then rose by a strong 7M in the next 4 years to 83M!

International Comparisons

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home-ownership_in_the_United_States

https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/us-homeownership-rate-has-lost-ground-compared-other-developed-countries

US homeownership rates are similar to other developed economies.

Housing Supply

https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/what-are-homeownership-rates-telling-us


The housing market is inherently volatile, typically rising by 2 times the trend and then falling to one-half of the trend. Annual housing starts averaged 1.6M from 1960-2008. They declined by a severe 75% to just 0.5M in 2009. Housing starts have subsequently grown 3-fold to 1.6M annual housing starts, but the accumulated lack of new supply is impacting housing markets today.

Housing Market by Segments

By Age Group

https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/what-are-homeownership-rates-telling-us

The period from 1982-2000 showed homeownership rates by the 5 age segments remaining relatively constant; 65+ 78%, 55-64 80%, 45-54 76%, 35-44 67% and <35 40%. The 65+ group increased homeownership from 75% to 80%. During this time, the overall US homeownership rate increased from 65% to 69%, mostly due to the aging of the population, now more heavily weighted towards the groups with 76-80% homeownership versus the 40-67% younger groups.

Homeownership rates grew from 2000 to peak rates in 2004, before declining significantly for all groups except for the 65+ cohort which essentially held it’s own. The adjacent 55-64 class fell 4%. The middle 45-54 group dropped 7%. The typically homeownership growing 35-44 group cratered by 9%. The young <35 group fell by 5%. Hence, the overall rate fell dramatically during this time.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-04-15/home-ownership-for-millennials-may-finally-be-within-reach

This difference in home ownership experience is reflected in generational wealth summaries.

By Marital Status

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home-ownership_in_the_United_States

There is a 30 point gap between married couples and other groups, with 84% of married couples owning homes versus about 55% for other family structures.

By Location Type

https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2017/09/rural-home-ownership.html#:~:text=Rural%20areas%20have%20higher%20homeownership,holds%20in%20all%20four%20regions.

https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-samplings/2016/12/homes_on_the_range.html

https://www.freddiemac.com/research/insight/20210602-rural-home-purchases

81% of rural households own their homes versus just 60% for urban households.

By Income Group

Historically, 80% of the top half of household incomes have been homeowners, while in the bottom half, just 50-60% have owned their homes.

By Racial Group

The US shows dramatically different homeownership rates by racial category. The differences between the 1995 non-Hispanic White rate (70%) and Others/Asians (50%), Hispanics (42%) and Blacks (42%) remain large in 2021 where we see White (74%), Other (57%), Hispanic (48%) and Black (44%). The groups homeownership share gain from 1995 to 2005 were similar, ranging from 6-10%, but the decline from 2005-2015 was only 3-4% for Whites and Hispanics, but 7% for Blacks and Others. The improvement from 2015 to 2021 has been 2% for 3 groups and 4% for the Other/Asian group.

Summary

The Great Recession flattened the housing market. The number of owner-occupied homes in the US remained level at 76 million from 2006 – 2017. The number of housing starts plummeted from 2.0M to 0.5M per year, compared with an historic average of 1.6M. New home construction first exceeded 1.2M units (75% of historic average) again only in 2020, a dozen years later. New home-owning households have increased by 7M units in the last 4 years! The homeownership rate is up 2 points, from 63.5% to 65.5%. Supply is responding to increased demand and higher home prices. Homeownership rates will increase with the economic recovery, but be constrained by higher home prices.

Good News: Consumer Debt Payments at Record Low

Household Debt Service Payments as a Percent of Disposable Personal Income (TDSP) | FRED | St. Louis Fed (stlouisfed.org)

The ratio of household debt service (loan payments) to disposable personal income includes both mortgage payments and consumer debt payments. From 1980-2000 it fluctuated between 10.5% and 12%. Following the 2001 recession it increased to more than 13% before falling steeply to 10% in 2012. During the long recovery from the Great Recession it remained just below 10%. During the pandemic time it fell as low as 9% as personal incomes were boosted through stimulus payments. In total, this is a healthy situation. American families worked through an unsustainable runup of debt and payment during the “ought” decade, the Great Recession and the pandemic. They are well positioned at les than 10% to either save or spend, depending on their preferences. This is good news for the economy, the housing market and risks to financial markets. This is often called the Debt Service Ratio (DSR).

Mortgage Debt Service Payments as a Percent of Disposable Personal Income (MDSP) | FRED | St. Louis Fed (stlouisfed.org)

The mortgage component averaged 5.5% of personal income from 1980-2000. It remained below 6% through 2004, before increasing quickly to 7% in 2007. This was unsustainable. Mortgage foreclosures and revised lending standards reduced mortgage lending balances quickly. The Fed reduced interest rates and kept them low. Mortgage payments as a percent of disposable personal income fell to just above 4%. This is a 40% drop (3/7). Even compared with the 5.5% average, this is a 27% reduction in debt service expenditures. This ratio is threatened by future interest rate increases, but current mortgage holders will benefit from years of low mortgage rates and refinancing for decades to come.

Consumer Debt Service Payments as a Percent of Disposable Personal Income (CDSP) | FRED | St. Louis Fed (stlouisfed.org)

Consumer debt has also fluctuated across these 40 years, reaching an early peak of 6.4% in 1986 during the confusing era of stagflation. In the next 6 years, families reduced their debt percentage by 1.7% to a safe minimum of 4.7%. Consumers were more confident through the 1990’s and took on more debt, allowing the payment ratio to rise to a new record of 6.6% before the 2000-2001 recession triggered less borrowing. Although mortgage payments increase during the 2000’s, consumer debt payments eased back to just 6.0%. Families were scared by the Great Recession and reduced their debt levels (and helped by lower interest rates) and payments to just 5% in 2010. The ratio remained low for 2 years, before resuming a familiar optimistic climb to 5.8% of disposable income before the pandemic.

Household Financial Obligations as a percent of Disposable Personal Income (FODSP) | FRED | St. Louis Fed (stlouisfed.org)

The Household Financial Obligations Ratio (FOR) follows the same pattern as the Debt Service Ratio (DSR). It is a higher percentage as it includes other “fixed” obligations such as rent. We see relative stability between 16-17% through 2004. The mortgage driven increase to 18% by 2008 is evident, followed by a very rapid fall to 15% in 2012. This broader ratio has remained flat since then. The pandemic drop is due to extra stimulus income.

File:Total US household debt and its composition over time.png – Wikimedia Commons

The composition of total consumer debt for the last 20 years highlights the rise and fall and rise of mortgage debt and the increase in student loan debt.

Household Debt to GDP for United States (HDTGPDUSQ163N) | FRED | St. Louis Fed (stlouisfed.org)

Household debt to GDP peaked at 100% before the Great Recession and has fallen by one-fourth in the next 10 years. Unpaid mortgages and other consumer debt have begun to accumulate in the last year.

Personal Saving Rate (PSAVERT) | FRED | St. Louis Fed (stlouisfed.org)

The personal savings rate averaged 10-13% from 1960-1985. The country’s economic challenges lead families to save less to maintain their standard of living, falling in half (5%) by 1999. It remained in the 4-5% range through the next expansion. The Great Recession triggered families to replenish their savings, with a 7-8% rate. The pandemic period shows a 15% savings rate. In all likelihood, this rate will fall back below 10% soon.

Education | How has the percentage of consumer debt compared to household income changed over the last few decades? What is driving these changes? (frbsf.org)

How Stretched are Today’s Borrowers? Debt Service Levels in Fourth District States (clevelandfed.org)

Not Every Household Feels Relief amid Our Record-Low National Household Debt Service Ratio | Urban Institute

Household debt jumps the most in 12 years, Federal Reserve report says (cnbc.com)

Household Debt Service Drops to a Record Low – AIER

Household Debt Rising, but Payments Remain Under Control | LPL Financial Research (lplresearch.com)

We Are All Specialists Now

Apologies to Richard Nixon for paraphrasing his famous Keynesian quote.

Two years after starting a mid-career search, I remain impressed by the greatly increased emphasis on perfectly matching an individual’s professional and industrial experience to an open position.  Hiring managers, recruiters and HR managers have all adopted this approach.  This is partly because of the abundance of candidates and partly due to the risk averse environment caused by the slow economic recovery.  It is also due to the improved results of the “fill the bucket” approach to hiring where specific requirements are listed and then proven from actual experience and multiple interview responses.

However, I think there is something deeper involved.  Professional and industry specialization has continued to increase through time.  The discussion of outsourcing, virtual project teams and individual agents has died down, but these innovations have become a growing reality.  Successful firms increasingly focus on smaller niches of product, geography and comparative advantage.  Increased industrial and professional fragmentation is required for success.  The trend will continue.

How did I miss this?  As usual, paradigms act as blinders.  In high school in the 1970’s I was taught it was important to be “well rounded”.   At a liberal arts college, I learned that great minds and thoughts were academic, abstract and universal.  In business school, I learned that an MBA provided the necessary skills for a lifetime of career success.   I later discovered the competitive advantages of being a “general manager” from John Kotter’s influential work.

My teachers were correct in promoting the personal and professional value in developing broad knowledge, thinking skills and a professional base.   They did not foresee the modern world of global competition, where firms are forced to specialize and make economically rational decisions far beyond those envisioned by Adam Smith and David Ricardo who outlined these principles long ago. 

“General Managers” are now merely a declining specialization.   Some top-end MBAs with broad consulting experience can move from industry to industry and be successful.  A few individuals can specialize as “strategic advisors” to presidents.  But even in these fields, the trend is toward specialization.  Firms will pay for experts in a narrow tax, legal, technical or IT field only when in-house experts do not exist or others cannot complete a project well enough. 

Professional services firms have always paid lip-service to industry focus.  In the last two decades, led by IT firms, they now specialized by industry and technology equally.  Clients expect staff to understand their business.

Industrial and professional specialization will be required for future employment.   Individuals, firms and universities will adapt to survive.

Functional Specialization

Functional specialization may be the single most effective survival and progress strategy in the world.

At the biological level, organisms specialize within niche environments. Only the best of the best survive.

In economics, functional specialization is the winning strategy at the country, state, firm and individual levels.

David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage continues to apply at the country and state level.  Limited by by the size of the potential market, countries and states specialize in what they are economically comparatively best positioned to produce and use trade to improve their overall level of well-being.  The extent of international and state trade continues to grow, with no end in sight.

From Adam Smith to Alfred Marshall to Milton Friedman, many economists have focused their attention on the purely competitive market model.  Alternative monopoly, oligopoly and monopolistic competition models were developed to describe the real world where every profit maximizing firm attempts to differentiate their market position and leverage their market power.  They avoid perfectly competitive markets like the plague.

Michael Porter synthesized this in his theory of core competency, noting that firms could not be the very best at everything, but that they could become world class in a limited area.  The specialization could be in products, channels, customers, functional competencies or strategies.  Treacy and Wiersma made this more specific, observing that successful firms tended to pursue only one of three generic strategies: customer intimacy, product innovation or operational excellence.  Firms have subsequently learned to outsource nearly every functional area.

At the individual level, functional specialization has grown through time.  Classic male and female roles were differentiated in man’s history.  Hunters and gatherers.  Hunters and farmers.  Priestly and political roles.  Traders.  Warriors.  Guilds.  Professions.  Tax collectors.  Court attendants.  Scientists.  Degrees.  Doctorates.  Certificates.  Professional specialists. Industry specialists.  Business specialists.  Subspecialists.  ERP Rainmakers.  Etc.

At every level, functional specialization continues to grow because it is effective and efficient.  Functional specialization provides cost effective results in the short-run and the long-run.  It manages risk and capacity effectively. 

The use of functional specialization as an effective country, state, firm and individual strategy has become increasingly sophisticated and detailed in every half-life of history: millennia, century, decade and year!  It continues because the human population and market have grown and because transportation, politics, communications and science have advanced.

Is there no end to the application of functional specialization?

Functional Specialization Limits

There are many costs and risks which offset the benefits of functional specialization.

As Adam Smith noted, the benefits are limited by the extent of the market.  At any point in time, there are only so many customers for a given product or service.

Functional specialization and trade are limited by transaction costs.  In an earlier age, vertical and horizontal integration strategies were effectively pursued because transaction costs were high.  Specialized internal or external providers require investments in communications, marketing, contracting, evaluation, incentives, training, negotiations, influence, hand-offs, shipping and receiving. 

Alignment of interests requires meetings, contracts, communications, incentives, negotiations, penalties and time.

Functional specialization is limited by transportation, finance and communications costs across country, state, firm and departmental borders.

Outsourced functional specialization also incurs the added costs of marketing and supplier management.

In general, firms have developed effective strategies to overcome these limitations.

Functional Specialization Conflicts

There are many examples of inherently competing interests which limit the application of functional specialization.

The increased specialization of countries, firms and functions has provided new net benefits, but it has also begun to generate inherent conflicts.

Greater functional specialization has increased the need for generalists who define and manage processes.

It has increased the need for other individuals to span levels, translating strategy into projects and then into operations.

It has increased the level of personal specialization to deliver more advanced technical skills, thereby increasing the costs of communication and coordination, even within similar disciplines..

It has divided those responsible for short-term and long-term success.

It has resulted in the development of competing financial and quality paradigms to coordinate operations activities.

It has generated work groups with vastly different cognitive and emotional intelligence capabilities.

Greater focus on specialized entry-level capabilities has resulted in ever greater task or people management skills, but less initial screening for situational leadership skills to balance these needs.

Greater functional specialization has made functional areas ever more stereotypical.  A given company, functional area or individual is less likely to have complementary skills in long-term/short-term analysis, divergent versus convergent thinking skills, or varied personality profiles. 

Ironically, the advance of functional specialization greatly increases the demand for specialized individuals who are generalists, able to knit together the increasing number of functional specialists.

Functional Specialization Solutions

There are many solutions strategies that can be used to maximize the potential net benefits of functional specialization and overcome the inherent limitations.

First, processes can be defined and optimized to effectively leverage functional talents.  The mechanical and modular paradigms can be refined to incorporate specialists.

Firms can adopt a portfolio strategy whereby the average success ratio largely offsets random failures.

Specialists and generalists can trade positions to increase their effective coordination skills and understanding.

Communications meetings, technologies, experiences and priorities can improve alignment.

Process management can be elevated to a meta-analysis level, with individuals responsible for the success of prospect to customer, concept to product and order to cash processes.

Countries, states and firms can develop long-term partnerships with their suppliers and customers and improve their prospecting, bidding and negotiation skills.

Individuals can improve their situational leadership skills, learning to balance task and people needs.

Firms can greatly improve their means-ends skills, improving staff delegation, board governance and supplier management skills.

In highly diverse and risky product development areas, firms can invest in specialized firms or in competing development teams.

Firms can invest in staff members who are highly skilled in translating strategy into projects and then into operations.

Finally, firms and individuals can increase their understanding of situations where there are two inherently conflicting objectives.  They can learn from the experience of statisticians, researchers and actuaries who routinely manage the alpha risk that a predicted relationship exists when it really doesn’t against the beta risk that a relationship is found to not exist when it really does.

Functional specialization is an incredible driver of incremental value.  Countries, states, firms and individuals will be rewarded for their attention to this factor.  Common tactics can be used to maximize the value of this strategy.

Dow 15,700

Dow 35,000 was a dream in the go-go 1990’s when the new economy had supposedly broken all of the old rules.  Dow 3,500 was a distinct fear in March, 2009 when stocks had fallen by more than half from their peak.  Dow 10,000 is the most visible reference point in the current stock market.

Every investor and business degree holder knows that stock values are fundamentally based on the expected risk-adjusted net present value of future after-tax cash flows.  They are also tempted by the “efficient markets hypothesis” that says that stock valuations incorporate all information about future returns and therefore set the present value in a rational manner.  On the other hand, they understand fluctuations, random walks, animal spirits and the history of under and over valued stock markets.

http://stockcharts.com/charts/historical/djia1900.html

http://www.investorsfriend.com/return_versus_gdp.htm

Individuals who believe that stocks return 7-8% on average in the long-run through 2-4% dividend yields and 4-6% price increases, must conclude that the stock market is inherently irrational.  It has been 30% undervalued or overvalued a majority of the last 100 years.  Overvalued 1922-31.  Undervalued 1932-54, except for 1936-37.  Undervalued 1974-86.  Overvalued 1996-2008. 

Stocks were overvalued by 137% in 1929 before tumbling to -67% undervalued in 1933.  Stocks reached an undervaluated low of -58% in 1942.  Stocks reached a new -50% undervaluation during the depths of the 1982 recession.  In 15 short years, by 1997, they reached a 57% overvaluation.  They rose to 115% overvalued in 2000, before retreating to a mere 38% overvaluation in 2003.  In 2008, stocks were 67% overvalued compared with the long-run trends.

Based on 100 years of history, the Dow Jones Industrial Average at the end of 2010 should be 9,000.  The expected value in 2020 is 15,700, providing a 5% annual valuation return and 2% dividend return.  Investors who bet against long-term average valuations do so at their own risk.

Year  Trend  Actual +/-
1910             50 62 24%
1911             53 60 14%
1912             55 60 9%
1913             58 60 4%
1914             61 58 -5%
1915             64 56 -12%
1916             67 80 19%
1917             70 80 14%
1918             74 70 -5%
1919             78 75 -3%
1920             82 100 23%
1921             86 70 -18%
1922             90 80 -11%
1923             94 90 -5%
1924             99 85 -14%
1925            104 100 -4%
1926            109 130 19%
1927            115 140 22%
1928            121 190 58%
1929            127 300 137%
1930            133 250 88%
1931            139 190 36%
1932            146 80 -45%
1933            154 50 -67%
1934            161 90 -44%
1935            170 90 -47%
1936            178 130 -27%
1937            187 175 -6%
1938            196 100 -49%
1939            206 130 -37%
1940            216 125 -42%
1941            227 125 -45%
1942            239 100 -58%
1943            250 125 -50%
1944            263 130 -51%
1945            276 160 -42%
1946            290 200 -31%
1947            304 170 -44%
1948            320 170 -47%
1949            336 175 -48%
1950            352 200 -43%
1951            370 250 -32%
1952            388 260 -33%
1953            408 260 -36%
1954            428 260 -39%
1955            450 380 -15%
1956            472 500 6%
1957            496 500 1%
1958            521 475 -9%
1959            547 525 -4%
1960            574 600 5%
1961            603 580 -4%
1962            633 700 11%
1963            664 550 -17%
1964            697 750 8%
1965            732 900 23%
1966            769 950 24%
1967            807 850 5%
1968            848 900 6%
1969            890 950 7%
1970            935 800 -14%
1971            981 850 -13%
1972         1,030 900 -13%
1973         1,082 1000 -8%
1974         1,136 850 -25%
1975         1,193 700 -41%
1976         1,252 850 -32%
1977         1,315 1000 -24%
1978         1,381 850 -38%
1979         1,450 850 -41%
1980         1,522 850 -44%
1981         1,614 950 -41%
1982         1,710 850 -50%
1983         1,813 1000 -45%
1984         1,922 1200 -38%
1985         2,037 1200 -41%
1986         2,159 1300 -40%
1987         2,289 1900 -17%
1988         2,426 1900 -22%
1989         2,572 2100 -18%
1990         2,726 2600 -5%
1991         2,890 2500 -13%
1992         3,063 3000 -2%
1993         3,247 3300 2%
1994         3,442 3700 8%
1995         3,648 3800 4%
1996         3,867 5000 29%
1997         4,099 6500 59%
1998         4,345 7800 80%
1999         4,606 9000 95%
2000         4,882 10500 115%
2001         5,175 10000 93%
2002         5,485 10000 82%
2003         5,815 8000 38%
2004         6,163 9500 54%
2005         6,533 10500 61%
2006         6,925 11000 59%
2007         7,341 12000 63%
2008         7,781 13000 67%
2009         8,248 7000 -15%
2010         8,743 10000 14%
2011         9,268    
2012         9,824    
2013       10,413    
2014       11,038    
2015       11,700    
2016       12,402    
2017       13,146    
2018       13,935    
2019       14,771    
2020       15,657