Indianapolis Crime Rate

I’m using data from the FBI Unified Crime Reports. Total country violent crime increased by 25% from 600 events per 100,000 people in 1980 to 758 events in 1991 (thick black line). Violent crimes dropped dramatically to 500 events (33%) by 2001. There was a minor decline to 479 in the next 5 years and then another major decline to a minimum of 362 events, a 52% decline from the peak. Violent crime has increased to 399 in 2020, a 10% increase from the 4-decade minimum, but still 47% below the 1991 peak rate. In summary, the total country violent crime rate increased by 25% in the 1980’s, dropped by more than half in the next 25 years and has bumped back up to a level about one-half of the peak and one-third lower than the 1980 start. This is a quite positive result.

Indiana’s (orange line) general pattern mirrors the national figures. However, Indiana started at 378 violent events per 100K people in 1980, more than one-third lower than the national average. This is a quite significantly lower crime rate. Indiana’s violent crime rate increased by a larger 42% to a peak of 537 events in 1996. This was half again faster than the 27% increase for the country as a whole. Indiana was becoming more like the rest of the nation. Indiana’s violent crime rate dropped very quickly to just 349 events by 2000 (-35%), returning to 69% of the national level from 84% of the national level in 1996, a modest amount above the 63% ratio in 1980. Indiana violent crime inched down by 10% to 314 by 2010. The national crime rate was falling twice as fast, so Indiana was now at 78% of the average. In the “teens” decade, Indiana violent crime increased by 10%, returning to where it had been in 2000. National violent crime was flat during the “teens”, ending at 400 events. Indiana violent crime rate was essentially the same as the national rate during the “teens”, no longer one-third lower. It had returned to its starting point of roughly 400 events per year.

The city of Indianapolis (yellow line) is measured by the right hand scale, twice as high as the other 3 measures. Like most central cities, its violent crime rate is much higher than the national average. The Indianapolis crime chart follows the nation from 1980 through 2006. It starts at 1,134 events per 100K people, increases by 42% (like IN) to 1,611 in 1996, then drops by 45% to 884 events in 2003. The city’s violent crime rate is 1.9 times the national average at the beginning and the end of this 23-year period, but peaked at 2.5 times the average in 1996. The crime rate leapt up by 28% in 2007, reaching 2.6 times the national average. Violent crime in Indianapolis grew by 11% by the peak in 2016, 3.6 times the national average. The reported Indy crime rate has fallen by more than one-third in the last four years, ending at 2.2 times the national average. Looking at ten-year averages to smooth out the difficult to interpret variability, Indy has increased from 1.8 to 3.0 times the national average. The last 2 years look suspiciously low, just like 2007 looked suspiciously high. The 1,300 level for most of the last decade is more than 10% below the 1,500 peak level of the 1990’s. So … Indiananapolis violent crime is now down a little compared with the peak, up very significantly compared with the national average and roughly within the range of the first 30 years.

The Indy metro data follows the city of Indianapolis pattern very closely.

The national homicide rate per 100,000 people averaged 9 from 1980 to 1995. It dropped by one-third to just 6 by 2000 and stayed at that level through 2007. It declined to an average of just 5 for the next decade, before spiking up in 2020 (and 2021, FBI official data unavailable). The national homicide rate is up significantly, but one-third lower than in the eighties and early nineties.

Indiana started at an unusually high 9 homicides per 100,000 people in 1980, but averaged just 6 for most of the eighties, just two-thirds of the national level. Indiana homicides jumped quickly to a peak of 8.2 in 1992 and remained near 8 for six years. The national homicide rate fell rapidly from 10 to 6 during the nineties, leading to a six-year period (1997-2002) where Indiana homicide rates were slightly above the national average. Indiana homicide rates closely matched the national average for the next decade, falling to 5 in 2008. Indiana homicides increased by 50% between 2014 and 2020, from 5.0 to 7.5 while the national average increased about 50% from 4.4 to 6.5 events per 100K people. Indiana has averaged about 6 homicides per 100K people during this 4-decade period except for the 8 homicides rate in the mid-nineties. The most recent murder rate has returned to that peak level.

The city of Indianapolis very closely matches the Indiana pattern for the first two decades, with 12 homicides per 100K people in 2000, about double the national average of 6. The Indy rate pops back up to 14.2 in 2001 versus the 5.6 rate for the country (2.5 times higher). Indy follows the slow national decline through 2012 to 11.6 events versus the 4.7 country level (2.5X). Indy’s murder rate jumped 31% to 15.2 in 2013, and has climbed steeply since then. It reached 19.5 in 2019, a two-thirds increase in 7 years. It jumped again in 2020 to 24.2 and is estimated to be more than 28 in 2021. Indy averaged about 14 murders per 100,000 people in the first 32 years of this period. 2019 was a 40% increase. 2020 was a 73% increase. 2021 is a doubling.

The Indy metro area pattern follows the city of Indianapolis. Metro Indy’s homicide rate averaged 1.35 times the national rate from 2003-2011. It has averaged 1.76 times the national average from 2012 to 2020.

Summary

Indianapolis has a huge violence and murder problem. Period. Violence at the national level is way down. Murders at the national level are much lower than the peak period. Indianapolis’ violence rate shot up in 2007 and only declined in the past 2 years. Indianapolis’ murder rate shot up in 2013 and has continued to climb. I try to highlight the “good news”. I emphasize long-term data to provide context. I try to minimize/offset the sirens of local and national journalists. But, for this topic, there is no apparent “silver lining” or “on the other hand” conclusion.

https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/publications

https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/1999

https://www.macrotrends.net/cities/us/in/indianapolis/crime-rate-statistics

https://www.disastercenter.com/crime/incrime.htm

https://crime-data-explorer.app.cloud.gov/pages/explorer/crime/crime-trend

https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019

https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/08/18/crime-in-context

https://www.savi.org/feature_report/equity-and-criminal-justice-the-cradle-to-prison-pipeline-in-indianapolis/

https://abcnews.go.com/US/12-major-us-cities-top-annual-homicide-records/story?id=81466453

https://www.wrtv.com/news/local-news/crime/2022-indianapolis-homicide-map

https://www.wrtv.com/news/local-news/crime/indianapolis-had-271-homicides-in-record-breaking-2021

https://fox59.com/news/indycrime/crime-mapping-neighborhoods-impacted-the-most-by-homicides-in-2021/

https://www.wthr.com/article/news/crime/762-people-shot-in-indianapolis-in-2021-shooting-cold-case-violence-indiana-impd/531-7e477cf2-31cc-4147-9005-4e4dab7b3366

https://www.wfyi.org/news/articles/law-enforcement-community-work-to-solve-more-homicides

US Labor Market: Just Like Living in Paradise

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CE16OV

US labor force employment grows and grows. 60M employed in the very glorious 1950’s. 80M by the end of the dynamic 1960’s. 100M by the end of the transforming 1970’s. 120M by the end of the conforming 1980’s. Not quite 140M by the turn of the millennium (2M shy). Just 140M at the end of the “oughts” decade. 158M before the pandemic, resuming the 20M new jobs per decade record of the sixties, seventies, eighties and nineties in the teens decade.

That is 100 million net new jobs added in my lifetime. 160M, up from 60M.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS

We have two sources, a payroll survey and a household survey. They both tell the same story.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS

A once in a century pandemic? No problem. 27 months later, total employment has been recovered, despite a 20M worker decline! Set aside politics. This is an amazing result for the US labor market, businesses and citizens.

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/08/05/business/jobs-report-july-economy

US economy continues to add about 400,000 jobs each month. This is almost 5M jobs per year, more than twice as fast as the usual 2M jobs per year in recent history.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LNU01300060

The labor force participation rate for prime aged individuals (25-54) increased from 65% to 84% between 1950 and 1990 as women were accepted into the labor force. 84% was maintained for a decade and 83% for the next decade. The teens decade saw a decline to 81%. The market has remained in the 81-82% participation rate range.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTSHIL

New hires averaged 5M per month in the slower growth “oughts”. New hires dropped further to just 4M per month after the Great Recession. New hires slowly built up to a new record level of 6M per month before the pandemic arrived. The pandemic had just a minor impact on new hires, with a record 6.5M new employees being hired each month in late 2021 and 2022.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTSQUR

Voluntary quits averaged 2%, 1 in 50 employees, during the first decade of the 21st century. Quits dropped sharply to just 1.4%, just 1 in 70 employees, in the 3 years afterwards. The quit rate slowly returned to “normal” by 2016 and climbed further to 2.3% as the economic recovery continued for a full decade.

By October, 2021 quits had returned to the solid pre-pandemic rate of 2.3%. The quit rate jumped up to 2.8% by April, 2021 and has remained at this historically high rate.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTSJOL

Job openings averaged 4M before the Great Recession. They dropped below 3M during 2009-13. They increased to 5M in 2014 and to 6M by 2016. They remained at the 6M level during 2017, before climbing to 7M for 2018-19. By Jan, 2021 job openings had recovered to 7.2M. By October, job openings had increased to a historic 11M and have remained at this unprecedented level.

This is a greater than 50% increase in open positions since before the pandemic, just 29 months ago. This is 120% more than the peak level before the Great Recession.

Most Important Measure

Profit maximizing businesses, managers and HR departments work through internal processes to list/post a job opening only when:

  1. It’s within the annual financial and headcount budget.
  2. Hiring managers conclude that current staff are unable to serve current demands from internal and external customers.
  3. Hiring managers and financial analysts believe that the incremental hired employees will generate incremental measurable profits.
  4. Hiring managers believe that they can hire new staff using existing processes to fill well defined positions.
  5. Hiring managers believe that it is worth their time to go through the firm’s hiring process.
  6. Hiring managers cannot find an “adequate” labor source through stretching existing staff or using temporary, contract, supplier or agent work forces.

11M job openings means that firms believe that they can generate material incremental profits by hiring up to 11M new employees.

https://www.bls.gov/charts/job-openings-and-labor-turnover/unemp-per-job-opening.htm

11M open jobs is a startling number, but the ratio of unemployed persons to open positions is much more important. The Great Recession created a 6 applicants per job market. This declined to 2:1 in 2014. During the historic extended expansion it declined to just below 1:1, an unprecedented low number. The ratio fell below 1:1 in 2021 to the current 0.5 level. Two open positions for every unemployed job seeker.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE

Unemployment was quickly driven to the pre-pandemic record low of 3.5% this summer. Unemployment was below its usual minimum of 5% for 5 years just before the pandemic, leading most economists to recalibrate the “non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment” (NAIRU) down to 4% or slightly below. This is a very efficient labor market.

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LES1252881600Q#

Real (inflation-adjusted) wages have reflected this labor market situation. They remained at the $335/week level from 2000 through 2014, reflecting the slow growth of employment and GDP. Wages began to raise in real terms in 2015, reaching $360 by 2019, a 7.5% real increase. Wages were growing rapidly just before the pandemic and climbed to $390/week in the second quarter of 2020, an additional 8% increase in a few months. Real wages have since declined back to the $360 per week level as high inflation has offset higher than usual nominal wage increases. Firms have chosen to live with 11 million open positions rather than increase real wages.

Summary

Firms have 11M open positions that they believe will help them to make greater profits. Real wages are the same as they were just before the pandemic started. Firms have chosen to not increase hiring and regular wages any faster because they judge that this will cost them more profits than allowing 11M positions to remain unfilled. This is the first time in at least 50 years that firms have had to manage a labor market where employees and applicants have some market power. Despite this “standoff” in the labor market, total employment is back to the pre-pandemic level, firms are hiring record numbers of employees and labor force participation is recovering towards the pre-pandemic level, which was at a 10-year high. The overall economy has clearly slowed its growth rate to near zero, but the labor market remains in a very positive state for workers.