Much of the anxiety being expressed in the political arena today stems from the discovery that the turn of the millennium consensus views of steady assured progress were exaggerated, or just plain wrong.  The events of the last decade have shown that simple, deterministic conclusions are usually wrong.  This is not the first time that western society has had its “progressive” bubble burst.  Even the recent triple play natural disasters (hurricane, tsunami and earthquake) have a parallel in the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, which lead Voltaire to attack the belief that man was living in “the best of all possible worlds”.

In 2000, we thought that representative government would prevail as an increasing number of countries became functional democracies and established democratic traditions.  Cuba was the special exception.  Even China was seen as a potential convert.  Progress was being made in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America.   We now see that China’s leaders intend to maintain power, that progress in Russia and Eastern Europe is fragile and that a new Bolivarian revolution justifies dictatorships.

In 2000, the division of state and religious spheres was clear and settled in Europe, allowing a variety of religions to work within a set of rules.  The Pope spoke out for radical changes to society, but had limited impact.  Some progress in conflict areas lead to hope for progress, as nations from Turkey to Indonesia to Ireland found solutions.  The “consensus” was an illusion.  Islam, Christianity and other religions are not content to work within the context a secular humanist state.  We now see that “true believers” do not fit within the tidy scheme.

In 2000, a decade after the fall of the “iron curtain”, the U.S. stood tall as the only superpower, even after cashing in the peace dividend.  The US, Europe and the UN began to make significant progress in handling the remaining “trouble spots”, in areas that seemed unfamiliar and insignificant.  We now see that Brazil, Russia, India and China would like to join the US, Europe and Japan in a multi-polar world.  The shifting alliances of earlier centuries are the model of our future.

In 2000, after dodging the ironic Y2K threat, the world saw an unlimited future of technological progress.  The older physics, chemistry and energy based economy continued to grow at a healthy pace.  Agricultural and biological innovations promised to feed the world and heal the sick.  Information technology continued to evolve through the internet, telecommunications and knowledge management.  Even the environment was improving, as 30 years of focus on clean air, clean water and eliminating toxic waste had a cumulative positive impact.  We’re still making progress, but concerns about energy and water shortages, Frankenfoods, genetic manipulation and climate change become greater with time, as no simple “solutions” have appeared.

In 2000, international economic progress was in full-stride.  Individual, regional and global trade agreements increased trade and cross-country investment.  International financial crises were managed and outlier countries were guided through an agreed upon recovery plan.  European economic integration continued to deliver benefits with each new step.  Today, we struggle to find common ground for major trade deals.  A variety of crisis recovery models seem valid.  Further European economic integration is possible, but the benefits are not so certain.  International sensitivity to trade, labor, environmental, property rights and investment differences is growing.

In 2000, a mixed capitalist economic model dominated.  There were two flavors, traditional European and Atlantic, but these were differences in style and degree, not in fundamental substance.  Success stories in all areas of the world indicated that this model could and would be replicated.  Today, there are several varieties of state capitalism (Russia, China, France, Japan, and Venezuela) that offer alternatives.

Finally, in 2000, there was a widespread belief that we had moved into a new economic model where the rough edges of capitalism had been tamed.  The business cycle could be managed through independent monetary policy (and a touch of fiscal policy).  Productivity, inflation and unemployment goals could all be attained.  Financial guidelines like price-earnings ratios had been superseded by a “new economy”.  And, risk and volatility had been tamed through portfolio theory, hedging and new financial instruments.

The world is not in worse condition today than it was a decade ago.  Only by moving past the unrealistically utopian views of the turn of the century can we make progress in addressing the challenges we face.